Sunday, July 26 5pm EST.
WikiLeaks today released over 75,000 secret US military reports covering the war in Afghanistan.
The Afghan War Diary an extraordinary secret compendium of over 91,000 reports covering the war in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010. The reports describe the majority of lethal military actions involving the United States military. They include the number of persons internally stated to be killed, wounded, or detained during each action, together with the precise geographical location of each event, and the military units involved and major weapon systems used.
The Afghan War Diary is the most significant archive about the reality of war to have ever been released during the course of a war. The deaths of tens of thousands is normally only a statistic but the archive reveals the locations and the key events behind each most of these deaths. We hope its release will lead to a comprehensive understanding of the war in Afghanistan and provide the raw ingredients necessary to change its course.
Most entries have been written by soldiers and intelligence officers listening to reports radioed in from front line deployments. However the reports also contain related information from Marines intelligence, US Embassies, and reports about corruption and development activity across Afghanistan.
Each report consists of the time and precise geographic location of an event that the US Army considers significant. It includes several additional standardized fields: The broad type of the event (combat, non-combat, propaganda, etc.); the category of the event as classified by US Forces, how many were detained, wounded, and killed from civilian, allied, host nation, and enemy forces; the name of the reporting unit and a number of other fields, the most significant of which is the summary - an English language description of the events that are covered in the report.
The Diary is available on the web and can be viewed in chronological order and by by over 100 categories assigned by the US Forces such as: "escalation of force", "friendly-fire", "development meeting", etc. The reports can also be viewed by our "severity" measure-the total number of people killed, injured or detained. All incidents have been placed onto a map of Afghanistan and can be viewed on Google Earth limited to a particular window of time or place. In this way the unfolding of the last six years of war may be seen.
The material shows that cover-ups start on the ground. When reporting their own activities US Units are inclined to classify civilian kills as insurgent kills, downplay the number of people killed or otherwise make excuses for themselves. The reports, when made about other US Military units are more likely to be truthful, but still down play criticism. Conversely, when reporting on the actions of non-US ISAF forces the reports tend to be frank or critical and when reporting on the Taliban or other rebel groups, bad behavior is described in comprehensive detail. The behavior of the Afghan Army and Afghan authorities are also frequently described.
The reports come from US Army with the exception most Special Forces activities. The reports do not generally cover top-secret operations or European and other ISAF Forces operations. However when a combined operation involving regular Army units occurs, details of Army partners are often revealed. For example a number of bloody operations carried out by Task Force 373, a secret US Special Forces assassination unit, are exposed in the Diary -- including a raid that lead to the death of seven children.
This archive shows the vast range of small tragedies that are almost never reported by the press but which account for the overwhelming majority of deaths and injuries.
We have delayed the release of some 15,000 reports from total archive as part of a harm minimization process demanded by our source. After further review, these reports will be released, with occasional redactions, and eventually, in full, as the security situation in Afghanistan permits.
Additional information from our media partners:
Der Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,708314,00.html
The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/series/afghanistan-the-war-logs
The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/war-logs.html
Friday, August 13, 2010
Wikileaks - the information and some implications
Amy Goodman is co-host of the award-winning radio/television/satellite program Democracy Now and recipient of numerous awards herself. She hosts the program on July 26, 2010 which involves a roundtable discussion with five guests concerning the 90,000 government classified documents released by WikiLeaks. The documents are from the years 2004 to 2010. I include Amy's introduction of the subject and then draw excerpts from the roundtable discussion.
The guests for the discussion are:
Stephen Grey, independent journalist based in London. He has been reporting from Afghanistan for the past few years. He is author of Operation Snakebite: The Explosive True Story of an Afghan Desert Siege. He recently interviewed Julian Assange for Channel 4.
Daniel Ellsberg, Pentagon Papers whistleblower.
Rick Rowley, independent journalist with Big Noise Films He just returned from a six-week trip to Afghanistan, where he was embedded with a Marine division in Marjah.
Matthew Hoh, former Marine Corps captain in Iraq and former State Department official in Afghanistan. He is the first-known US official to resign in protest over the Afghan war.
Gareth Porter, investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy.
AMY GOODMAN: It’s one the biggest leaks in US military history. More than 90,000 internal records from US military actions in Afghanistan over the past six years have been published by the whistleblower website WikiLeaks. The documents provide a devastating portrait of the war in Afghanistan, revealing how coalition forces have killed hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents, how a secret black ops special forces unit hunts down targets for assassination or detention without trial, how Taliban attacks have soared, and how Pakistan is fueling the insurgency. WikiLeaks made the files available this week to the New York Times, The Guardian of London and the German weekly Der Spiegel, who agreed simultaneously to publish their reports on Sunday.
The documents, most of them classified as secret, give a blow-by-blow account of the war in Afghanistan between January 2004 and December of 2009. The findings include detailed reports on 144 attacks on civilians by coalition forces, ranging from the shootings of individuals to massive air strikes, resulting in hundreds of casualties; how a secret black ops special forces unit named Task Force 373 hunts down targets for assassination or detention without trial. The so-called "kill or capture" list of senior Taliban and al-Qaeda figures includes more than 2,000 names and is known as JPEL, the Joint Prioritized Effects List. The files also reveal how coalition forces are increasingly using deadly Reaper drones to hunt and kill Taliban targets by remote control from a base in Nevada.
The records reveal there has a been a steep rise in Taliban attacks on coalition troops and that the US covered up evidence that the Taliban have acquired deadly surface-to-air missiles. In addition, the Taliban have caused growing carnage with a massive escalation on their roadside bombing campaign, which has killed more than 2,000 civilians to date.
And the files reveal NATO commanders fear neighbouring Pakistan and Iran are fueling the insurgency. According to the New York Times, the records suggest Pakistan allows representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.
[....]
DANIEL ELLSBERG: I’m very impressed by the release. It is the first release in thirty-nine years or forty years, since I first gave the Pentagon Papers to the Senate, of the scale of the Pentagon Papers, and not the first as it should have been. I would—how many times in those years should there have been the release of thousands of pages showing our being lied into war in Iraq, as in Vietnam, and the nature of the war in Afghanistan? I hope there will be—I hope this will inspire, despite the charges brought against Manning [the alleged source] under the UC, under the Universal Code of Military Justice, which is not civilian law, it’s not First Amendment law. It’s the military law, so he’s in deep water here, as I think he expected....that realize that there is great deception going on, that there is, in Manning’s reported words, horrific material, almost criminal, as he put it, which deserve to be in the public domain....
AMY GOODMAN: Stephen Grey, just to clarify, Dan Ellsberg is talking about Private First Class Bradley Manning....
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: ....Rick, your observations of what this six years of document release means based on what you’ve seen in Afghanistan?
RICK ROWLEY: Well, I mean, what these documents show—prove—is that the US military has been whitewashing the war in Afghanistan for years and that most of the media has been along for the ride. They’ve systematically covered up civilian casualties. They’ve covered up the successful attacks by the Taliban and their significance. And they’ve covered up the violent criminality of the security forces that we’ve created there, security forces that are preying on Afghan civilians. I mean, the picture that emerges from these documents is, on the one hand, of an insurgency that is resilient and adapting and that is winning the war on the ground, and, on the other hand, of an Afghan state that we’ve constructed there that looks less like a government and looks more like a patchwork of warlords and criminal gangs that’s extorting the local population and that has become more hated in many parts of the country than the Taliban who they replaced.
A third interesting thing that these documents do is they put flesh on a process that we’ve been tracking, along with reporters like Jeremy Scahill, for some time, of a transition to what some people call a special forces war, an entirely covert and classified war that’s conducted with drone strikes and midnight raids and targeted assassinations, where everything is classified, there are no media embeds, and there’s very little accountability. I mean, I think that is the trajectory that this war is taking right now.
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: Matthew Hoh, you’re the highest-level ranking government official to quit over the war in Afghanistan. You were speaking this weekend in Las Vegas at Netroots Nation. Your response to this massive document release?
MATTHEW HOH: That was just an excellent summary we just heard by Mr. Rowley. I think the thing to take away from this is the lack of attention paid to the war by the American public, the lack of involvement by the American media in this war for the last seven, eight years, and, most damningly, the lack of oversight by our Congress on this war. [....]
AMY GOODMAN: I want to turn to Gareth Porter. Can you talk about the documents that refer to Pakistan aiding the insurgency, the Pakistani ISI, the spy services, working with the forces in Afghanistan who are killing US soldiers?
GARETH PORTER: Yes. This is perhaps the closest thing to a major story that—in terms of news value that comes out of the collection of documents that have just been leaked. And this is a story that is extremely important politically, in terms of US politics and US policy, because of the Obama administration’s admission that it is vital that Pakistan assist the United States in preventing the Afghan Taliban from having the sort of safe havens in Pakistan that they’ve had in the past. Now, you know, what these documents are indicating is that there’s lots of evidence that Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, has indeed been meeting with the Taliban commanders. And although, you know, the American intelligence people were not there on the ground, nor Afghan intelligence people, not there on the ground at those meetings, the supposition was obviously that what’s going on here is that Pakistan’s intelligence is working closely with the Taliban in terms of planning their strategy, and indeed even specific operations....
AMY GOODMAN: .... Secretary of State Hillary Clinton just promised Pakistan another $500 million in aid. Gareth?
GARETH PORTER: .... They’ve [Pakistan government] changed their policy significantly in terms of dealing with the Pakistani Taliban, but they have not changed their policy with regard to the Afghan Taliban....
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: .... Let me ask the question to Rick Rowley about Task Force 373, about the whole issue of this special forces war.
RICK ROWLEY: .... When we abandon the nation-building project, which everyone recognizes is an abject failure, the new form, paradigm, the war is going to take is drone strikes and special forces raids and midnight assassinations and capturing and abducting people. I mean, this—if you look at the press releases every day, every week, that NATO and ISAF put out, you can see that the majority of the kinetic action, the military calls it, the majority of the people killed and captured, are done by special forces. So there is no real information about them at all. It’s all entirely secret.... So, I mean, it’s absolutely true that there are two parallel wars going on: there’s the war for hearts and minds, which is increasingly just a distraction, that the media have access to, where they have a very restricted rules of engagement, where they don’t use as many air strikes; and then there’s a special forces war, where it’s, you know, all systems go, where there aren’t the same restrictions, where they routinely kill people who don’t represent the same kind of—don’t reach the same kind of threat level that they would have to in the conventional war....
AMY GOODMAN: Stephen Grey, you were just getting into Task Force 373.
STEPHEN GREY: ... 373 is involved in what they call decapitation operations. They believe that there is a—the Taliban as an organization can be defeated by removing its head and that getting rid of all these leaders will destabilize and help them to win. But it’s actually a very conventional way of viewing things, and it goes completely counter to the idea of actually having a peace settlement, because if you remove the leadership of an organization, you have no one to negotiate with, and you end up with a sort of constantly rejuvenated rebellion, which I think is what it is, of more and more extreme people....
[....]
DANIEL ELLSBERG:
[....]
....But as your previous speakers have been saying, we’re more and more conducting a war, and not only in Afghanistan, but it was earlier true in Iraq under General McChrystal, a war of death squads, of selective assassination.... What I would like to see leaked—I don’t know if it’s in these documents or not—is the following bottom line. What was their estimate in December of the order of battle or the strength of all the various groups that we are fighting there in Afghanistan? After the $300 billion that we’ve spent, how does that compare with a year earlier? And how does it compare with the estimate now? I would like to see a leak to Congress, in the first place, and to the public, of what their estimate is now in June, July of 2010, after we put more troops in there? Is it really smaller? I will make a strong guess that their official estimate, which we should know, of the Taliban forces in their various forms, all different kinds of them, that we’re facing is larger now than it was six months ago and larger than it was a year ago. And I’ll predict that after the next $100 billion we’ve spent over there, it will be larger next year and the year after.
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: Let’s go back to Gareth Porter in Washington, DC. Talk more about the significance, what you think is most important to highlight here, as we go through these hundreds of thousands of pages of top-secret documents, classified documents.
GARETH PORTER:
[....]
... I think what we have here [in WikiLeaks] is a new institution that is undoubtedly the most important antiwar institution that has been created so far and that I have no doubt is frightening the US military and intelligence establishment, as well as the Obama administration, very strongly. And I think that’s for very good reason. I think they understand that this represents a potentially powerful weapon for the future against war crimes as well as other illegal actions by the United States.
[....]
The guests for the discussion are:
Stephen Grey, independent journalist based in London. He has been reporting from Afghanistan for the past few years. He is author of Operation Snakebite: The Explosive True Story of an Afghan Desert Siege. He recently interviewed Julian Assange for Channel 4.
Daniel Ellsberg, Pentagon Papers whistleblower.
Rick Rowley, independent journalist with Big Noise Films He just returned from a six-week trip to Afghanistan, where he was embedded with a Marine division in Marjah.
Matthew Hoh, former Marine Corps captain in Iraq and former State Department official in Afghanistan. He is the first-known US official to resign in protest over the Afghan war.
Gareth Porter, investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy.
AMY GOODMAN: It’s one the biggest leaks in US military history. More than 90,000 internal records from US military actions in Afghanistan over the past six years have been published by the whistleblower website WikiLeaks. The documents provide a devastating portrait of the war in Afghanistan, revealing how coalition forces have killed hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents, how a secret black ops special forces unit hunts down targets for assassination or detention without trial, how Taliban attacks have soared, and how Pakistan is fueling the insurgency. WikiLeaks made the files available this week to the New York Times, The Guardian of London and the German weekly Der Spiegel, who agreed simultaneously to publish their reports on Sunday.
The documents, most of them classified as secret, give a blow-by-blow account of the war in Afghanistan between January 2004 and December of 2009. The findings include detailed reports on 144 attacks on civilians by coalition forces, ranging from the shootings of individuals to massive air strikes, resulting in hundreds of casualties; how a secret black ops special forces unit named Task Force 373 hunts down targets for assassination or detention without trial. The so-called "kill or capture" list of senior Taliban and al-Qaeda figures includes more than 2,000 names and is known as JPEL, the Joint Prioritized Effects List. The files also reveal how coalition forces are increasingly using deadly Reaper drones to hunt and kill Taliban targets by remote control from a base in Nevada.
The records reveal there has a been a steep rise in Taliban attacks on coalition troops and that the US covered up evidence that the Taliban have acquired deadly surface-to-air missiles. In addition, the Taliban have caused growing carnage with a massive escalation on their roadside bombing campaign, which has killed more than 2,000 civilians to date.
And the files reveal NATO commanders fear neighbouring Pakistan and Iran are fueling the insurgency. According to the New York Times, the records suggest Pakistan allows representatives of its spy service to meet directly with the Taliban in secret strategy sessions to organize networks of militant groups that fight against American soldiers in Afghanistan and even hatch plots to assassinate Afghan leaders.
[....]
DANIEL ELLSBERG: I’m very impressed by the release. It is the first release in thirty-nine years or forty years, since I first gave the Pentagon Papers to the Senate, of the scale of the Pentagon Papers, and not the first as it should have been. I would—how many times in those years should there have been the release of thousands of pages showing our being lied into war in Iraq, as in Vietnam, and the nature of the war in Afghanistan? I hope there will be—I hope this will inspire, despite the charges brought against Manning [the alleged source] under the UC, under the Universal Code of Military Justice, which is not civilian law, it’s not First Amendment law. It’s the military law, so he’s in deep water here, as I think he expected....that realize that there is great deception going on, that there is, in Manning’s reported words, horrific material, almost criminal, as he put it, which deserve to be in the public domain....
AMY GOODMAN: Stephen Grey, just to clarify, Dan Ellsberg is talking about Private First Class Bradley Manning....
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: ....Rick, your observations of what this six years of document release means based on what you’ve seen in Afghanistan?
RICK ROWLEY: Well, I mean, what these documents show—prove—is that the US military has been whitewashing the war in Afghanistan for years and that most of the media has been along for the ride. They’ve systematically covered up civilian casualties. They’ve covered up the successful attacks by the Taliban and their significance. And they’ve covered up the violent criminality of the security forces that we’ve created there, security forces that are preying on Afghan civilians. I mean, the picture that emerges from these documents is, on the one hand, of an insurgency that is resilient and adapting and that is winning the war on the ground, and, on the other hand, of an Afghan state that we’ve constructed there that looks less like a government and looks more like a patchwork of warlords and criminal gangs that’s extorting the local population and that has become more hated in many parts of the country than the Taliban who they replaced.
A third interesting thing that these documents do is they put flesh on a process that we’ve been tracking, along with reporters like Jeremy Scahill, for some time, of a transition to what some people call a special forces war, an entirely covert and classified war that’s conducted with drone strikes and midnight raids and targeted assassinations, where everything is classified, there are no media embeds, and there’s very little accountability. I mean, I think that is the trajectory that this war is taking right now.
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: Matthew Hoh, you’re the highest-level ranking government official to quit over the war in Afghanistan. You were speaking this weekend in Las Vegas at Netroots Nation. Your response to this massive document release?
MATTHEW HOH: That was just an excellent summary we just heard by Mr. Rowley. I think the thing to take away from this is the lack of attention paid to the war by the American public, the lack of involvement by the American media in this war for the last seven, eight years, and, most damningly, the lack of oversight by our Congress on this war. [....]
AMY GOODMAN: I want to turn to Gareth Porter. Can you talk about the documents that refer to Pakistan aiding the insurgency, the Pakistani ISI, the spy services, working with the forces in Afghanistan who are killing US soldiers?
GARETH PORTER: Yes. This is perhaps the closest thing to a major story that—in terms of news value that comes out of the collection of documents that have just been leaked. And this is a story that is extremely important politically, in terms of US politics and US policy, because of the Obama administration’s admission that it is vital that Pakistan assist the United States in preventing the Afghan Taliban from having the sort of safe havens in Pakistan that they’ve had in the past. Now, you know, what these documents are indicating is that there’s lots of evidence that Pakistan’s intelligence service, ISI, has indeed been meeting with the Taliban commanders. And although, you know, the American intelligence people were not there on the ground, nor Afghan intelligence people, not there on the ground at those meetings, the supposition was obviously that what’s going on here is that Pakistan’s intelligence is working closely with the Taliban in terms of planning their strategy, and indeed even specific operations....
AMY GOODMAN: .... Secretary of State Hillary Clinton just promised Pakistan another $500 million in aid. Gareth?
GARETH PORTER: .... They’ve [Pakistan government] changed their policy significantly in terms of dealing with the Pakistani Taliban, but they have not changed their policy with regard to the Afghan Taliban....
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: .... Let me ask the question to Rick Rowley about Task Force 373, about the whole issue of this special forces war.
RICK ROWLEY: .... When we abandon the nation-building project, which everyone recognizes is an abject failure, the new form, paradigm, the war is going to take is drone strikes and special forces raids and midnight assassinations and capturing and abducting people. I mean, this—if you look at the press releases every day, every week, that NATO and ISAF put out, you can see that the majority of the kinetic action, the military calls it, the majority of the people killed and captured, are done by special forces. So there is no real information about them at all. It’s all entirely secret.... So, I mean, it’s absolutely true that there are two parallel wars going on: there’s the war for hearts and minds, which is increasingly just a distraction, that the media have access to, where they have a very restricted rules of engagement, where they don’t use as many air strikes; and then there’s a special forces war, where it’s, you know, all systems go, where there aren’t the same restrictions, where they routinely kill people who don’t represent the same kind of—don’t reach the same kind of threat level that they would have to in the conventional war....
AMY GOODMAN: Stephen Grey, you were just getting into Task Force 373.
STEPHEN GREY: ... 373 is involved in what they call decapitation operations. They believe that there is a—the Taliban as an organization can be defeated by removing its head and that getting rid of all these leaders will destabilize and help them to win. But it’s actually a very conventional way of viewing things, and it goes completely counter to the idea of actually having a peace settlement, because if you remove the leadership of an organization, you have no one to negotiate with, and you end up with a sort of constantly rejuvenated rebellion, which I think is what it is, of more and more extreme people....
[....]
DANIEL ELLSBERG:
[....]
....But as your previous speakers have been saying, we’re more and more conducting a war, and not only in Afghanistan, but it was earlier true in Iraq under General McChrystal, a war of death squads, of selective assassination.... What I would like to see leaked—I don’t know if it’s in these documents or not—is the following bottom line. What was their estimate in December of the order of battle or the strength of all the various groups that we are fighting there in Afghanistan? After the $300 billion that we’ve spent, how does that compare with a year earlier? And how does it compare with the estimate now? I would like to see a leak to Congress, in the first place, and to the public, of what their estimate is now in June, July of 2010, after we put more troops in there? Is it really smaller? I will make a strong guess that their official estimate, which we should know, of the Taliban forces in their various forms, all different kinds of them, that we’re facing is larger now than it was six months ago and larger than it was a year ago. And I’ll predict that after the next $100 billion we’ve spent over there, it will be larger next year and the year after.
[....]
AMY GOODMAN: Let’s go back to Gareth Porter in Washington, DC. Talk more about the significance, what you think is most important to highlight here, as we go through these hundreds of thousands of pages of top-secret documents, classified documents.
GARETH PORTER:
[....]
... I think what we have here [in WikiLeaks] is a new institution that is undoubtedly the most important antiwar institution that has been created so far and that I have no doubt is frightening the US military and intelligence establishment, as well as the Obama administration, very strongly. And I think that’s for very good reason. I think they understand that this represents a potentially powerful weapon for the future against war crimes as well as other illegal actions by the United States.
[....]
Wikileaks revelations won't end the war
Noam Chomsky's article comes from the magazine In These Times. I take excerpts from the article. Chomsky's agrees that the wikileaks documents may help to raise questions about the U.S. role in Afghanistan and challenge Obama's and the media echo chamber's justifications for it. However, in his view, while documents like those released by WikiLeaks may help to increase opposition to the war/occupation in Afghanistan, it will take a riled and mobilized American citizenry to bring it to an end.
This article is permanently archived at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280/
Why WikiLeaks Won’t Stop the War
By Noam Chomsky
http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280
August 3, 2010
The War Log...released on the Internet by the organization WikiLeaks--documents a grim struggle becoming grimmer, from the U.S. perspective. And for the Afghans, a mounting horror.
While the documents are generally viewed as providing support against the continued war and occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops, Chomsky has another view. The War Logs, however valuable, may contribute to the unfortunate and prevailing doctrine that wars are wrong only if they aren't successful--rather like the Nazis felt after Stalingrad.
Last month came the fiasco of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, forced to retire as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and replaced by his superior, Gen. David H. Petraeus.
A plausible consequence is a relaxation of the rules of engagement so that it becomes easier to kill civilians, and an extension of the war well into the future as Petraeus uses his clout in Congress to achieve this result.
President Obama's principal justification of the continued Afghanistan intervention makes little sense. [....] The official goal is to protect ourselves from al-Qaida, a virtual organization, with no specific base -- a "network of networks" and "leaderless resistance," as it's been called in the professional literature. Now, even more so than before, al-Qaida consists of relatively independent factions, loosely associated throughout the world.
The CIA estimates that 50 to 100 al-Qaeda activists may now be in Afghanistan, and there is no indication that the Taliban want to repeat the mistake of offering sanctuary to al-Qaeda.
[....]
In February, in the first exercise of Obama's new strategy, U.S. Marines conquered Marja, a minor district in Helmand province, the main center of the insurgency, but failed to oust the Taliban permanently.
[....]
According to Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. `Most people here identify themselves as Taliban. [....]
Chomsky compares the situation being faced by the U.S. military forces to what U.S. forces confronted in Vietman in 1969.
[....] In 1969, Douglas Pike, the leading U.S. government scholar on Vietnam, lamented that the enemy--the National Liberation Front--was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam." Pike then recommended that the only way to overcome the NLF's political force was
by using our comparative advantage, violence--with horrifying results.
Chomsky also refers to other comparable unwinnable situation, for example to the Russians in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where they won every battle but lost the war.
[....]
After the Marja triumph, the U.S.-led forces were expected to assault the major city of Kandahar, where, according to a U.S. Army poll in April, the military operation is opposed by 95 percent of the population, and 5 out of 6 regard the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers"--again, echoes of earlier conquests. The Kandahar plans were delayed, part of the background for McChrystal's leavetaking.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that U.S. authorities are concerned that public support for the war in Afghanistan may erode even further.
In May, WikiLeaks released a March CIA memorandum about how to sustain Western Europe's support for the war. The memorandum's subtitle: "Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough."
[....]
Democratic societies rely not on force but on propaganda, engineering consent by "necessary illusion" and "emotionally potent oversimplication," to quote Obama's favorite philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr.
The battle to control the internal enemy, then, remains highly pertinent--indeed, the future of the war in Afghanistan may hinge on it.
© The New York Times Syndicate
Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor & Professor of Linguistics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the author of dozens of books on U.S. foreign policy. He writes a monthly column for The New York Times News Service/Syndicate.
This article is permanently archived at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280/
Why WikiLeaks Won’t Stop the War
By Noam Chomsky
http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280
August 3, 2010
The War Log...released on the Internet by the organization WikiLeaks--documents a grim struggle becoming grimmer, from the U.S. perspective. And for the Afghans, a mounting horror.
While the documents are generally viewed as providing support against the continued war and occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops, Chomsky has another view. The War Logs, however valuable, may contribute to the unfortunate and prevailing doctrine that wars are wrong only if they aren't successful--rather like the Nazis felt after Stalingrad.
Last month came the fiasco of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, forced to retire as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and replaced by his superior, Gen. David H. Petraeus.
A plausible consequence is a relaxation of the rules of engagement so that it becomes easier to kill civilians, and an extension of the war well into the future as Petraeus uses his clout in Congress to achieve this result.
President Obama's principal justification of the continued Afghanistan intervention makes little sense. [....] The official goal is to protect ourselves from al-Qaida, a virtual organization, with no specific base -- a "network of networks" and "leaderless resistance," as it's been called in the professional literature. Now, even more so than before, al-Qaida consists of relatively independent factions, loosely associated throughout the world.
The CIA estimates that 50 to 100 al-Qaeda activists may now be in Afghanistan, and there is no indication that the Taliban want to repeat the mistake of offering sanctuary to al-Qaeda.
[....]
In February, in the first exercise of Obama's new strategy, U.S. Marines conquered Marja, a minor district in Helmand province, the main center of the insurgency, but failed to oust the Taliban permanently.
[....]
According to Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. `Most people here identify themselves as Taliban. [....]
Chomsky compares the situation being faced by the U.S. military forces to what U.S. forces confronted in Vietman in 1969.
[....] In 1969, Douglas Pike, the leading U.S. government scholar on Vietnam, lamented that the enemy--the National Liberation Front--was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam." Pike then recommended that the only way to overcome the NLF's political force was
by using our comparative advantage, violence--with horrifying results.
Chomsky also refers to other comparable unwinnable situation, for example to the Russians in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where they won every battle but lost the war.
[....]
After the Marja triumph, the U.S.-led forces were expected to assault the major city of Kandahar, where, according to a U.S. Army poll in April, the military operation is opposed by 95 percent of the population, and 5 out of 6 regard the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers"--again, echoes of earlier conquests. The Kandahar plans were delayed, part of the background for McChrystal's leavetaking.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that U.S. authorities are concerned that public support for the war in Afghanistan may erode even further.
In May, WikiLeaks released a March CIA memorandum about how to sustain Western Europe's support for the war. The memorandum's subtitle: "Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough."
[....]
Democratic societies rely not on force but on propaganda, engineering consent by "necessary illusion" and "emotionally potent oversimplication," to quote Obama's favorite philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr.
The battle to control the internal enemy, then, remains highly pertinent--indeed, the future of the war in Afghanistan may hinge on it.
© The New York Times Syndicate
Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor & Professor of Linguistics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the author of dozens of books on U.S. foreign policy. He writes a monthly column for The New York Times News Service/Syndicate.
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
Widespread corruption is a barrier to development in Afghanistan
Dr. James C. Dabhi's argues in the following article that Afghan society is plagued by widespread bribes and corruption, especially in all levels of the government. Dabhi presents evidence from Integrity Watch Afghanistan, interviews with UN officials, and information from a Toronto Star report, to document his analysis. He contends that democracy is weak in Afghanistan and is "concentrated within the elite class and family network." While necessary to the development of democracy, civil society remains weak while many parts of academia are "not free from corruption and nepotism." Two implications of Dabhi's analysis are that there are at present no Afghan forces powerful enough to challenge government corruption and the US-led occupation has been unable to reduce it.
Bribe and corruption violate people’s right to development in Afghanistan
Dr. James C. Dabhi
July 20, 2010 - http://www.aopnews.com/opinion/dabhi_corruption.shtml
Bribe and corruption are not new to south Asian countries; Afghanistan may be topping the list. Some may say it is a way of life here. Bribe and corruption are haraam (an Arabic term meaning forbidden) but people in power and position thrive on it.
Afghan and foreign officials have been under attack for being corrupt. There have been public charges blaming each other for the rampant corruption surrounding aid spending. Afghan officials say most of the corruption is due to the fact that foreign contractors and NGOs control the aid. Afghan Justice Minister Habibullah Ghalib recently told reporters in Kabul, "The foreigners come here and wipe their dirty hands on our clean clothes." But international officials generally defend the foreign NGOs' record and transparency. They argue that the international aid is generally well spent and there are good audit controls in place to ensure that it meets the needs of the people.
Eliminating corruption has become the top priority for the government in Afghanistan and it will be an issue discussed in Kabul conference. The agenda if translated into to action has a huge political and economic implication for those who reap the benefits of corruption (in Afghanistan and outside). Therefore scepticism among the masses about the political-will of the higher ups in implementing the agenda is understandable.
According to a recent survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, the average Afghan household pays out an estimated $100 US in petty bribes every year. With approximately 70 percent of the population surviving on less than $1 US per day, the burden on families is enormous. A staggering sum of $100-250 million USD is paid in bribes every year. To put it in relevant terms, this is equivalent to half the national development budget for 2006. Rupert Colville of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported, “The main conclusion is that the abuse of power is the key driver of poverty in Afghanistan”. The report says the majority of Afghans live in poverty despite the fact that some $35 billion US (£23 billion) in aid was poured into the country between 2002 and 2009. The BBC online news reported that "widespread corruption further limits access to services for a large proportion of the population". It blames Afghan officials for advancing their own interests at the expense of the general public.
Kai Eide, the new UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, said at an event, "Corruption in Afghanistan is endemic, it hurts the poorest people disproportionately, pushes people away from the state and undermines our joint efforts to build peace, stability and progress for Afghanistan's peoples.” He also went on to say that government corruption must be tackled from the bottom up with the people, Afghan civil society and the media having a crucial role in supporting government efforts.
Widespread corruption is systemic, structurally deep rooted and has gone unchallenged for years. It is systemic and structural because it not simply a few individuals taking bribes, but the entire governmental structure seems to be operating using bribes, whether it is the legislature, bureaucracy or judiciary. To illustrate the extent of the corruption, in 2008 Toronto Star columnist Rosie DiManno quoted Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabet as saying: “They are in the central government, the provincial governments, the district centres, police stations, army garrisons, the banks, the aid agencies – not a sector of Afghan society is without contamination of corruption”.
No doubt there are a few people in the system who refuse to take bribes. But the refusal of a few, though courageous and praiseworthy, will not have much of an overall impact or bring about the desired reform.
Corrupt leaders and people of position in the system are much more dangerous than a police officer asking for a couple of dollars at the airport check-in or low-ranking official asking for a few hundred Afghanis to move your file up. Many of us get annoyed and shout at these small fry and often ignoring the big guns who are the main culprits. Those in high places have money, arms and connections, so people naturally fear for their lives when it comes to challenging high-level corruption.
Government knows who is engaging in corrupt behaviour, but it will not be easy for it to take these people to task. After all, it is difficult to hurt one’s own, isn't it? Corrupt enemies can be easily targeted, but what about friends who are corrupt? These are the ones you call upon when you need a favour. To eliminate a person is no big deal in this part of the world and it can easily be covered up with a bribe. Exposing these people through print and electronic media requires tremendous courage. It is a risky business but are there other options?
Democracy is still young in Afghanistan and not adequately comprehended by a larger population; and politicians and bureaucrats are no exception. By and large the politics here is feudal, patriarchal, concentrated with the elite class and family network. A political system based on ideology and development discourse has yet to emerge. For a civil society to flourish it must be nurtured in a democratic climate which at the moment is largely hyped by the international community in Afghanistan. This civil society barely exists in this country, and where it does it is weak. Academia is not free from corruption and nepotism either, and those in academic circles often lack the courage, commitment and leadership required to address these issues.
The civil society and the news media can be a big help in fighting corruption that is if the state allows sufficient freedom to these entities to play their role. But when the state players have such a stake in the bribery and corruption, why would they want to allow civil society and the media to be the spoiler? The media and civil society will have to begin to realise that rights are often not freely given, but have to be taken. Unless these actors collectively exercise their right to expose corruption and pursue follow up, hardly anything will change and the masses will continue to suffer.
Academia can help in the process of transformation of the country but then academia and educational institutions need to act without engaging in what is called party politics. They cannot remain apolitical and mute spectators. They need to provide some leadership through their research-based data through seminars, workshops and campaign against corruption nationwide. Let their studies support the civil society in highlighting the nature of corruption that exists and how it has violated the right to development of the masses here in Afghanistan
Unless ordinary Afghan women and men make their voices heard, corruption and nepotism will persist. In the process, hundreds of millions of dollars will be siphoned off in corruption, money that was intended for the development of the people of Afghanistan.
Dr. James C. Dabhi is a visiting Professor at Herat and Bamiyan Universities. He can be reached at jimmydabhi@gmail.com
Bribe and corruption violate people’s right to development in Afghanistan
Dr. James C. Dabhi
July 20, 2010 - http://www.aopnews.com/opinion/dabhi_corruption.shtml
Bribe and corruption are not new to south Asian countries; Afghanistan may be topping the list. Some may say it is a way of life here. Bribe and corruption are haraam (an Arabic term meaning forbidden) but people in power and position thrive on it.
Afghan and foreign officials have been under attack for being corrupt. There have been public charges blaming each other for the rampant corruption surrounding aid spending. Afghan officials say most of the corruption is due to the fact that foreign contractors and NGOs control the aid. Afghan Justice Minister Habibullah Ghalib recently told reporters in Kabul, "The foreigners come here and wipe their dirty hands on our clean clothes." But international officials generally defend the foreign NGOs' record and transparency. They argue that the international aid is generally well spent and there are good audit controls in place to ensure that it meets the needs of the people.
Eliminating corruption has become the top priority for the government in Afghanistan and it will be an issue discussed in Kabul conference. The agenda if translated into to action has a huge political and economic implication for those who reap the benefits of corruption (in Afghanistan and outside). Therefore scepticism among the masses about the political-will of the higher ups in implementing the agenda is understandable.
According to a recent survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, the average Afghan household pays out an estimated $100 US in petty bribes every year. With approximately 70 percent of the population surviving on less than $1 US per day, the burden on families is enormous. A staggering sum of $100-250 million USD is paid in bribes every year. To put it in relevant terms, this is equivalent to half the national development budget for 2006. Rupert Colville of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported, “The main conclusion is that the abuse of power is the key driver of poverty in Afghanistan”. The report says the majority of Afghans live in poverty despite the fact that some $35 billion US (£23 billion) in aid was poured into the country between 2002 and 2009. The BBC online news reported that "widespread corruption further limits access to services for a large proportion of the population". It blames Afghan officials for advancing their own interests at the expense of the general public.
Kai Eide, the new UN Special Representative in Afghanistan, said at an event, "Corruption in Afghanistan is endemic, it hurts the poorest people disproportionately, pushes people away from the state and undermines our joint efforts to build peace, stability and progress for Afghanistan's peoples.” He also went on to say that government corruption must be tackled from the bottom up with the people, Afghan civil society and the media having a crucial role in supporting government efforts.
Widespread corruption is systemic, structurally deep rooted and has gone unchallenged for years. It is systemic and structural because it not simply a few individuals taking bribes, but the entire governmental structure seems to be operating using bribes, whether it is the legislature, bureaucracy or judiciary. To illustrate the extent of the corruption, in 2008 Toronto Star columnist Rosie DiManno quoted Attorney General Abdul Jabar Sabet as saying: “They are in the central government, the provincial governments, the district centres, police stations, army garrisons, the banks, the aid agencies – not a sector of Afghan society is without contamination of corruption”.
No doubt there are a few people in the system who refuse to take bribes. But the refusal of a few, though courageous and praiseworthy, will not have much of an overall impact or bring about the desired reform.
Corrupt leaders and people of position in the system are much more dangerous than a police officer asking for a couple of dollars at the airport check-in or low-ranking official asking for a few hundred Afghanis to move your file up. Many of us get annoyed and shout at these small fry and often ignoring the big guns who are the main culprits. Those in high places have money, arms and connections, so people naturally fear for their lives when it comes to challenging high-level corruption.
Government knows who is engaging in corrupt behaviour, but it will not be easy for it to take these people to task. After all, it is difficult to hurt one’s own, isn't it? Corrupt enemies can be easily targeted, but what about friends who are corrupt? These are the ones you call upon when you need a favour. To eliminate a person is no big deal in this part of the world and it can easily be covered up with a bribe. Exposing these people through print and electronic media requires tremendous courage. It is a risky business but are there other options?
Democracy is still young in Afghanistan and not adequately comprehended by a larger population; and politicians and bureaucrats are no exception. By and large the politics here is feudal, patriarchal, concentrated with the elite class and family network. A political system based on ideology and development discourse has yet to emerge. For a civil society to flourish it must be nurtured in a democratic climate which at the moment is largely hyped by the international community in Afghanistan. This civil society barely exists in this country, and where it does it is weak. Academia is not free from corruption and nepotism either, and those in academic circles often lack the courage, commitment and leadership required to address these issues.
The civil society and the news media can be a big help in fighting corruption that is if the state allows sufficient freedom to these entities to play their role. But when the state players have such a stake in the bribery and corruption, why would they want to allow civil society and the media to be the spoiler? The media and civil society will have to begin to realise that rights are often not freely given, but have to be taken. Unless these actors collectively exercise their right to expose corruption and pursue follow up, hardly anything will change and the masses will continue to suffer.
Academia can help in the process of transformation of the country but then academia and educational institutions need to act without engaging in what is called party politics. They cannot remain apolitical and mute spectators. They need to provide some leadership through their research-based data through seminars, workshops and campaign against corruption nationwide. Let their studies support the civil society in highlighting the nature of corruption that exists and how it has violated the right to development of the masses here in Afghanistan
Unless ordinary Afghan women and men make their voices heard, corruption and nepotism will persist. In the process, hundreds of millions of dollars will be siphoned off in corruption, money that was intended for the development of the people of Afghanistan.
Dr. James C. Dabhi is a visiting Professor at Herat and Bamiyan Universities. He can be reached at jimmydabhi@gmail.com
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Some libertarians also support a withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan
Not all voices supporting the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan come from the left-of-center crowd. In the following article, Doug Bandow, associated with the libertarian Cato Institute, supports in general terms a withdrawal. He offers a host of arguments in defense of his position.
Is war in Afghanistan necessary?
By Doug Bandow
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2010/08/137_70943.html
August 6, 2010
The massive document leak on U.S. policy in Afghanistan is causing more Americans to ask: Why are we in Afghanistan? There is no good answer.
The original justification for war long ago disappeared. Today, says CIA Director Leon Panetta, “At most, we’re looking at 50 to 100, maybe less” al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, John Bolton argues that the Taliban and al-Qaida must be defeated lest they “reconquer Afghanistan and make it a base for international terrorism.” However, the Taliban leadership appeared unhappy that its guests brought down the wrath of Washington back in 2001. The Taliban likely would avoid a repeat performance.
In any case, al-Qaida doesn’t need Afghanistan. Pakistan’s northwest has proved to be a hospitable home. Other failed or semi-failed states could similarly host terrorists. It’s hard to fathom another reason for staying. Would withdrawal harm U.S. credibility? Unfortunately, the longer Washington and its allies stay, the greater will be its ultimate loss of face.
Of course, leaving Afghanistan a better place is a worthy objective, but is not easily achieved through outside military intervention. Civilian deaths in Afghanistan may run 10,000, and as fighting grows more intense more civilians will be harmed. Sadly, Americans are directly responsible for many deaths. Then-U.S. commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal complained in March: “We’ve shot an amazing number of people [at checkpoints] and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat.” There are still Afghans who hope to create a liberal society. But the Western allies already have been at war in Afghanistan for nearly nine years. Yet after the sacrifice of nearly 2,000 lives and expenditures approaching $400 billion, the country remains a wreck. In June Gen. McChrystal briefed NATO members. He indicated that just five of 116 areas were rated “secure.” In only five of 122 districts did the government exercise full authority.
Taliban attacks are up. The Afghanistan Rights Monitor recently complained that “the insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly.” When I visited in May, allied personnel warned that many areas had become much more dangerous.
Nevertheless, some war advocates praise the new allied strategy. However, manpower remains inadequate. Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine suggests that more than 600,000 troops are needed, which would mean quintupling current force levels. Islamabad continues to play a double game, aiding the Pashtun Taliban forces. One Westerner working with the Afghan government told me: “Pakistan is in a state of undeclared war with NATO and Afghanistan.”Nor is salvation likely to come from an increasing number of Afghan security personnel. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently noted that only 23 percent of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 12 percent of the Afghan National Police (ANP) were rated in the top of four categories, meaning they were capable of independent action. On my recent trip one Afghan complained that sending in the ANP is the best way to turn people into Taliban.
Then there is the Afghan government, which is noted for its corruption. Kabul is a vampire city in which the well-connected elite live off of drug or Western money. A long-time associate of President Karzai told me that no Afghan politician could long survive without “taking care of” his family and friends.The daunting challenge facing the U.S. and its allies is evident from operations in both Marja and Kandahar. The town of Marja was a Taliban sanctuary targeted by the U.S. military in February. In May Gen. McChrystal complained of the perception that Marja had become “a bleeding ulcer.”The far larger operation planned for Kandahar has been put off from June and support for the Taliban remains worrisomely strong. Again, success will depend on effective local governance which does not exist.
Washington is pursuing the wrong objective in the wrong place. The West's critical objectives are to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming an al-Qaida training ground and to avoid destabilizing next-door nuclear-armed Pakistan. The first has been achieved, and could be maintained through a negotiated withdrawal with the Taliban ― which likely would prefer not to be deposed again ― backed by air/drone strikes and Special Forces intervention if necessary. The second would be best served by deescalating the conflict. The war is a major source of instability in Pakistan.
Failing to “win” in Afghanistan would be bad. But carrying on in a war not worth fighting would be worse. Washington and its allies should leave nation-building in Afghanistan to the Afghan people.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including ``Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire” (Xulon). He can be reached at ChessSet@aol.com.
Is war in Afghanistan necessary?
By Doug Bandow
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2010/08/137_70943.html
August 6, 2010
The massive document leak on U.S. policy in Afghanistan is causing more Americans to ask: Why are we in Afghanistan? There is no good answer.
The original justification for war long ago disappeared. Today, says CIA Director Leon Panetta, “At most, we’re looking at 50 to 100, maybe less” al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, John Bolton argues that the Taliban and al-Qaida must be defeated lest they “reconquer Afghanistan and make it a base for international terrorism.” However, the Taliban leadership appeared unhappy that its guests brought down the wrath of Washington back in 2001. The Taliban likely would avoid a repeat performance.
In any case, al-Qaida doesn’t need Afghanistan. Pakistan’s northwest has proved to be a hospitable home. Other failed or semi-failed states could similarly host terrorists. It’s hard to fathom another reason for staying. Would withdrawal harm U.S. credibility? Unfortunately, the longer Washington and its allies stay, the greater will be its ultimate loss of face.
Of course, leaving Afghanistan a better place is a worthy objective, but is not easily achieved through outside military intervention. Civilian deaths in Afghanistan may run 10,000, and as fighting grows more intense more civilians will be harmed. Sadly, Americans are directly responsible for many deaths. Then-U.S. commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal complained in March: “We’ve shot an amazing number of people [at checkpoints] and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat.” There are still Afghans who hope to create a liberal society. But the Western allies already have been at war in Afghanistan for nearly nine years. Yet after the sacrifice of nearly 2,000 lives and expenditures approaching $400 billion, the country remains a wreck. In June Gen. McChrystal briefed NATO members. He indicated that just five of 116 areas were rated “secure.” In only five of 122 districts did the government exercise full authority.
Taliban attacks are up. The Afghanistan Rights Monitor recently complained that “the insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly.” When I visited in May, allied personnel warned that many areas had become much more dangerous.
Nevertheless, some war advocates praise the new allied strategy. However, manpower remains inadequate. Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine suggests that more than 600,000 troops are needed, which would mean quintupling current force levels. Islamabad continues to play a double game, aiding the Pashtun Taliban forces. One Westerner working with the Afghan government told me: “Pakistan is in a state of undeclared war with NATO and Afghanistan.”Nor is salvation likely to come from an increasing number of Afghan security personnel. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently noted that only 23 percent of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 12 percent of the Afghan National Police (ANP) were rated in the top of four categories, meaning they were capable of independent action. On my recent trip one Afghan complained that sending in the ANP is the best way to turn people into Taliban.
Then there is the Afghan government, which is noted for its corruption. Kabul is a vampire city in which the well-connected elite live off of drug or Western money. A long-time associate of President Karzai told me that no Afghan politician could long survive without “taking care of” his family and friends.The daunting challenge facing the U.S. and its allies is evident from operations in both Marja and Kandahar. The town of Marja was a Taliban sanctuary targeted by the U.S. military in February. In May Gen. McChrystal complained of the perception that Marja had become “a bleeding ulcer.”The far larger operation planned for Kandahar has been put off from June and support for the Taliban remains worrisomely strong. Again, success will depend on effective local governance which does not exist.
Washington is pursuing the wrong objective in the wrong place. The West's critical objectives are to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming an al-Qaida training ground and to avoid destabilizing next-door nuclear-armed Pakistan. The first has been achieved, and could be maintained through a negotiated withdrawal with the Taliban ― which likely would prefer not to be deposed again ― backed by air/drone strikes and Special Forces intervention if necessary. The second would be best served by deescalating the conflict. The war is a major source of instability in Pakistan.
Failing to “win” in Afghanistan would be bad. But carrying on in a war not worth fighting would be worse. Washington and its allies should leave nation-building in Afghanistan to the Afghan people.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including ``Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire” (Xulon). He can be reached at ChessSet@aol.com.
The convenient but hollow justification for Afghanistan war
William Blum's central point is that, while US leaders continue to invoke 9/11 and Al Qaeda as the principal justifications for the long US intervention in Afghanistan, the more plausible reasons have to do with US imperialist aspirations in Central Asia and the Middle East.
William Blum
So please tell me again: What's the war about? -
http://killinghope.org/bblum6/aer84.html
August 4th, 2010
When facts are inconvenient, when international law, human rights and history get in the way, when war crimes can't easily be justified or explained away, when logic doesn't help much, the current crop of American political leaders turns to what is now the old reliable: 9/11. We have to fight in Afghanistan because ... somehow ... it's tied into what happened on September 11, 2001. Here's Vice-President Joe Biden: "We know that it was from the space that joins Afghanistan and Pakistan that the attacks of 9/11 occurred." 1
Here's Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC): "This is the place [Afghanistan] we were attacked from 9/11." 2
Rep. Mike Pence, the third-ranking House Republican, asserted that the revelations in the Wikileaks documents do not change his view of the Afghan conflict, nor does he expect a shift in public opinion. "Back home in Indiana, people still remember where the attacks on 9/11 came from." 3
Here's President Obama a year ago: "But we must never forget this is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." 4
And here is the president, two days after the release of the Wikileaks documents, referring to Afghanistan and Pakistan as "the region from which the 9/11 attacks were waged and other attacks against the United States and our friends and allies have been planned". 5
Never mind that out of the tens of thousands of people the United States and its NATO front have killed in Afghanistan not one has been identified as having had anything to do with the events of September 11, 2001.
Never mind that the "plot to kill Americans" in 2001 was devised in Germany and Spain and the United States more than in Afghanistan. Why hasn't Washington bombed those countries?
Indeed, what actually is needed to plot to buy airline tickets and take flying lessons in the United States? A room with some chairs? What does "an even larger safe haven" mean? A larger room with more chairs? Perhaps a blackboard? Terrorists intent upon attacking the United States can meet almost anywhere, with Afghanistan probably being one of the worst places for them, given the American occupation.
There are many people in Afghanistan and Pakistan — the ones still living — who deeply resent the US presence there and the drones that fly overhead and drop bombs on their houses, their wedding parties, their funerals, their life. As in Iraq, the American "war on terrorism" in Afghanistan regularly, routinely, and conspicuously creates numerous new anti-American terrorists.
The only "war of necessity" that draws the United States to Afghanistan is the need for protected oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea area, the establishment of military bases in this country that is surrounded by the oil-rich Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf regions, and making it easier to watch and pressure next-door Iran. What more could any respectable imperialist nation desire? Oh, did I mention that the military-industrial-security-intelligence complex and its shareholders will be further enriched?
But the war against the Taliban can't be won. Except perhaps by killing everyone in Afghanistan. The United States should negotiate the pipelines with the Taliban, as the Clinton administration tried to do, without success, then get out, and declare "victory". Barack Obama can surely deliver an eloquent victory speech.
William Blum
So please tell me again: What's the war about? -
http://killinghope.org/bblum6/aer84.html
August 4th, 2010
When facts are inconvenient, when international law, human rights and history get in the way, when war crimes can't easily be justified or explained away, when logic doesn't help much, the current crop of American political leaders turns to what is now the old reliable: 9/11. We have to fight in Afghanistan because ... somehow ... it's tied into what happened on September 11, 2001. Here's Vice-President Joe Biden: "We know that it was from the space that joins Afghanistan and Pakistan that the attacks of 9/11 occurred." 1
Here's Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC): "This is the place [Afghanistan] we were attacked from 9/11." 2
Rep. Mike Pence, the third-ranking House Republican, asserted that the revelations in the Wikileaks documents do not change his view of the Afghan conflict, nor does he expect a shift in public opinion. "Back home in Indiana, people still remember where the attacks on 9/11 came from." 3
Here's President Obama a year ago: "But we must never forget this is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity. Those who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." 4
And here is the president, two days after the release of the Wikileaks documents, referring to Afghanistan and Pakistan as "the region from which the 9/11 attacks were waged and other attacks against the United States and our friends and allies have been planned". 5
Never mind that out of the tens of thousands of people the United States and its NATO front have killed in Afghanistan not one has been identified as having had anything to do with the events of September 11, 2001.
Never mind that the "plot to kill Americans" in 2001 was devised in Germany and Spain and the United States more than in Afghanistan. Why hasn't Washington bombed those countries?
Indeed, what actually is needed to plot to buy airline tickets and take flying lessons in the United States? A room with some chairs? What does "an even larger safe haven" mean? A larger room with more chairs? Perhaps a blackboard? Terrorists intent upon attacking the United States can meet almost anywhere, with Afghanistan probably being one of the worst places for them, given the American occupation.
There are many people in Afghanistan and Pakistan — the ones still living — who deeply resent the US presence there and the drones that fly overhead and drop bombs on their houses, their wedding parties, their funerals, their life. As in Iraq, the American "war on terrorism" in Afghanistan regularly, routinely, and conspicuously creates numerous new anti-American terrorists.
The only "war of necessity" that draws the United States to Afghanistan is the need for protected oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea area, the establishment of military bases in this country that is surrounded by the oil-rich Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf regions, and making it easier to watch and pressure next-door Iran. What more could any respectable imperialist nation desire? Oh, did I mention that the military-industrial-security-intelligence complex and its shareholders will be further enriched?
But the war against the Taliban can't be won. Except perhaps by killing everyone in Afghanistan. The United States should negotiate the pipelines with the Taliban, as the Clinton administration tried to do, without success, then get out, and declare "victory". Barack Obama can surely deliver an eloquent victory speech.
Sunday, August 8, 2010
Changing course in Afghanistan
Getting Out of Afghanistan
Editorial by The Nation magazine editors, published in the August 16/23, 2010, issue of the magazine. [See URL at the end of the post.] In what follows, I offer a summary of what I see as their principal points.
The editors of The Nation magazine have given up on President Obama’s Afghanistan policy. Unless he changes the policy, they think, his chances of reelection are diminished.
More troops, more special forces, more bombing and drones, the continuing occupation overall have not changed the corrupt government structure that is “unable to deliver the most basic services.” The Afghan people want the occupation to end. Continuing civilian deaths and casualties only deepen the hostility toward the occupation.
Further, a growing number of Americans also question the war/occupation, with its rising costs, troop casualties, and no clear measure of success. The US-led attack on Marja in Helmand province last spring, with overwhelming forces, failed to keep the Taliban from returning to the district. Looking to the future, the editors note importantly “...Petraeus’s proposal for building village defense forces is fraught with problems, not the least of which is that it would empower local militias and warlords and add more fuel to the civil war.”
“Time is not on our side,” the editors maintain. With rising Afghan casualties, the Taliban have grown and this will continue. “Even if we are able to eliminate many Taliban leaders, younger and more radical ones may take their place.” Therefore: “Better to negotiate with the ones we know today than those who may be radicalized by the fighting to come.”
“The war is expensive,” and there are many unmet and growing need at home. “A drawdown of forces would allow Obama to stop the loss of American and Afghan lives, reduce the drain on the federal budget and redeploy resources to create jobs and rebuild the battered US economy.”
There is, additionally, “uncertainty over whether the administration will adhere to the July 2011 drawdown....[Thus] “In June a majority of House Democrats supported legislation demanding an exit strategy and a timetable for withdrawal, and in late July the number of Democrats voting against the supplemental funding for the war tripled, to more than 100....”
What then should Obama do? “It would be better...for the administration to clear the air with a firm timetable for withdrawal and redirect its efforts toward regional diplomacy....” Such a changed course of policy could also improve the political chances of Obama in 2012.
If the editors are right, what then is spurring Obama, so far, in the wrong direction, toward an escalation of the war/occupation? Like so many US Democratic presidents before him, Obama may be stalled in the failed Afghan policy out of fear of being criticized for “losing a war.” For a detailed and insider’s view of how this fear applied to Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, see Daniel Ellsberg’s book, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers.
Then there is also the pervasive influence of the military-industrial complex, the concern of losing influence in any part of an oil-rich region, and the growing influence of China.
Source URL: http://www.thenation.com/article/38031/getting-out-afghanistan
Editorial by The Nation magazine editors, published in the August 16/23, 2010, issue of the magazine. [See URL at the end of the post.] In what follows, I offer a summary of what I see as their principal points.
The editors of The Nation magazine have given up on President Obama’s Afghanistan policy. Unless he changes the policy, they think, his chances of reelection are diminished.
More troops, more special forces, more bombing and drones, the continuing occupation overall have not changed the corrupt government structure that is “unable to deliver the most basic services.” The Afghan people want the occupation to end. Continuing civilian deaths and casualties only deepen the hostility toward the occupation.
Further, a growing number of Americans also question the war/occupation, with its rising costs, troop casualties, and no clear measure of success. The US-led attack on Marja in Helmand province last spring, with overwhelming forces, failed to keep the Taliban from returning to the district. Looking to the future, the editors note importantly “...Petraeus’s proposal for building village defense forces is fraught with problems, not the least of which is that it would empower local militias and warlords and add more fuel to the civil war.”
“Time is not on our side,” the editors maintain. With rising Afghan casualties, the Taliban have grown and this will continue. “Even if we are able to eliminate many Taliban leaders, younger and more radical ones may take their place.” Therefore: “Better to negotiate with the ones we know today than those who may be radicalized by the fighting to come.”
“The war is expensive,” and there are many unmet and growing need at home. “A drawdown of forces would allow Obama to stop the loss of American and Afghan lives, reduce the drain on the federal budget and redeploy resources to create jobs and rebuild the battered US economy.”
There is, additionally, “uncertainty over whether the administration will adhere to the July 2011 drawdown....[Thus] “In June a majority of House Democrats supported legislation demanding an exit strategy and a timetable for withdrawal, and in late July the number of Democrats voting against the supplemental funding for the war tripled, to more than 100....”
What then should Obama do? “It would be better...for the administration to clear the air with a firm timetable for withdrawal and redirect its efforts toward regional diplomacy....” Such a changed course of policy could also improve the political chances of Obama in 2012.
If the editors are right, what then is spurring Obama, so far, in the wrong direction, toward an escalation of the war/occupation? Like so many US Democratic presidents before him, Obama may be stalled in the failed Afghan policy out of fear of being criticized for “losing a war.” For a detailed and insider’s view of how this fear applied to Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, see Daniel Ellsberg’s book, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers.
Then there is also the pervasive influence of the military-industrial complex, the concern of losing influence in any part of an oil-rich region, and the growing influence of China.
Source URL: http://www.thenation.com/article/38031/getting-out-afghanistan
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