Noam Chomsky's article comes from the magazine In These Times. I take excerpts from the article. Chomsky's agrees that the wikileaks documents may help to raise questions about the U.S. role in Afghanistan and challenge Obama's and the media echo chamber's justifications for it. However, in his view, while documents like those released by WikiLeaks may help to increase opposition to the war/occupation in Afghanistan, it will take a riled and mobilized American citizenry to bring it to an end.
This article is permanently archived at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280/
Why WikiLeaks Won’t Stop the War
By Noam Chomsky
http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280
August 3, 2010
The War Log...released on the Internet by the organization WikiLeaks--documents a grim struggle becoming grimmer, from the U.S. perspective. And for the Afghans, a mounting horror.
While the documents are generally viewed as providing support against the continued war and occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops, Chomsky has another view. The War Logs, however valuable, may contribute to the unfortunate and prevailing doctrine that wars are wrong only if they aren't successful--rather like the Nazis felt after Stalingrad.
Last month came the fiasco of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, forced to retire as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and replaced by his superior, Gen. David H. Petraeus.
A plausible consequence is a relaxation of the rules of engagement so that it becomes easier to kill civilians, and an extension of the war well into the future as Petraeus uses his clout in Congress to achieve this result.
President Obama's principal justification of the continued Afghanistan intervention makes little sense. [....] The official goal is to protect ourselves from al-Qaida, a virtual organization, with no specific base -- a "network of networks" and "leaderless resistance," as it's been called in the professional literature. Now, even more so than before, al-Qaida consists of relatively independent factions, loosely associated throughout the world.
The CIA estimates that 50 to 100 al-Qaeda activists may now be in Afghanistan, and there is no indication that the Taliban want to repeat the mistake of offering sanctuary to al-Qaeda.
[....]
In February, in the first exercise of Obama's new strategy, U.S. Marines conquered Marja, a minor district in Helmand province, the main center of the insurgency, but failed to oust the Taliban permanently.
[....]
According to Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. `Most people here identify themselves as Taliban. [....]
Chomsky compares the situation being faced by the U.S. military forces to what U.S. forces confronted in Vietman in 1969.
[....] In 1969, Douglas Pike, the leading U.S. government scholar on Vietnam, lamented that the enemy--the National Liberation Front--was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam." Pike then recommended that the only way to overcome the NLF's political force was
by using our comparative advantage, violence--with horrifying results.
Chomsky also refers to other comparable unwinnable situation, for example to the Russians in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where they won every battle but lost the war.
[....]
After the Marja triumph, the U.S.-led forces were expected to assault the major city of Kandahar, where, according to a U.S. Army poll in April, the military operation is opposed by 95 percent of the population, and 5 out of 6 regard the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers"--again, echoes of earlier conquests. The Kandahar plans were delayed, part of the background for McChrystal's leavetaking.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that U.S. authorities are concerned that public support for the war in Afghanistan may erode even further.
In May, WikiLeaks released a March CIA memorandum about how to sustain Western Europe's support for the war. The memorandum's subtitle: "Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough."
[....]
Democratic societies rely not on force but on propaganda, engineering consent by "necessary illusion" and "emotionally potent oversimplication," to quote Obama's favorite philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr.
The battle to control the internal enemy, then, remains highly pertinent--indeed, the future of the war in Afghanistan may hinge on it.
© The New York Times Syndicate
Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor & Professor of Linguistics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the author of dozens of books on U.S. foreign policy. He writes a monthly column for The New York Times News Service/Syndicate.
Showing posts with label chomsky. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chomsky. Show all posts
Friday, August 13, 2010
Friday, June 25, 2010
Obama backs off of a withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in July 2011
Jason Ditz offers confirmation that President Obama is not likely to adhere to a deadline for the beginning of withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The President has given himself the discretion of whether to commence the reduction in troop levels in July 2011. All along his statements have been ambiguous. The idea of a "beginning" of a troop withdrawal does not specify how many troops would be withdrawn.
Further, under certain conditions, there may not be a withdrawal at all, that is, if the conditions on the ground and the judgement of generals in the field indicate more time - and perhaps additional troops - are necessary. This may well be the case if the central Afghan government is still weak, has significant warlord influence, and is plagued by corruption. This is the case if there is too little progress in creating an effective Afghan police and army forces. This is the case if groups associated with the Taliban or other insurgents continue to be a threat to the Afghan government and various parts of Afghanistan. This is the case if the Pashtun continue to feel alienated and targeted by the Karzai government, police, and army. This is the case if the great majority of the Afghan people remain impoverished and without hope, except for anger at and getting revenge on the occupation and government.
Such conditions prove counterproductive in the sense that they create additional insurgents and Taliban adherents. In his recent book, hopes and prospects, Noam Chomsky refers to a study of Taliban foot soldiers that has relevance for how the occupation itself is generating insurgency and implies as well how the prospects for a negotiated peaceful settlement are immproved if the occupation is drawn down. He writes:
"A study of the Taliban foot soldiers carried out by the Toronto Globe and Mail, though not a scientific survey as they point out, nevertheless yields considerable insight. All were Pashtuns, from the Kandahar area. They described themselves as mujahideen, following the ancient tradition of driving out foreign invaders. Almost a third reported that at least one family member had died in aerial bombings in recent years. Many siad that they were fighting to defend Afghan villagers from air strikes by foreign troops. Few claimed to be fighting a global jihad, or had allegiance to Taliban leader Mullh Omar....Most saw themselves as fighting for principles - an Islamic government - not a particular leader. Again, the results suggest possibilities for a negotiated settlement, without foreign interference" (p. 244).
Despite findings like these, Obama appears to be committed to an indefinite occupation in Afghanistan. Other evidence is consistent with this view. For example, Chomsky points out:
"The Obama administration is also constructing mega-embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan that are completely without precedent. Throughout the Gulf region, billions of dollars are being spent to develop 'critical base and port facilities,' along with military training and arms shipments expanding the US global system of militarization" (p. 63). And there are minerals in Afghanistan and the possibility of oil/gas pipeplines as well as the strategic location of the country. In the meantime, the Obama administration pushes the U.S. Congress to grant it supplemental funds for the war/occupation in Afghanistan.
In a word, indications are that the Afghanistan war/occupation is going to be a "long war."
“We didn’t say we’d be switching off the lights,” Obama insisted, adding that “we said we’d begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility.”
Officials have been dismissing the July 2011 date as largely meaningless in the first place, but President Obama has avoided comment on it, since his announcement of the most recent escalation in December.
Actually what President Obama said was that the US would begin to “start the pullout” in July 2011 at the time, and Vice President Biden was sticking with that story as recently as last week, saying that a “whole lot of people” would be moving out in July.
Biden’s comments were quickly disavowed by a number of officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Since Gen. David Petraeus was tapped to head the war yesterday, it has been expected that the date would be quickly disavowed, as President Obama did.
The date was little but an excuse to convince opponents of the surge to withhold judgement on the war at any rate, but its new role as the “beginning of a transition phase” has downgraded it to complete irrelevance, as officials have been claiming for years that they have been encouraging the Afghan government to take “more and more responsibility” to no real effect.
European nations which have attempted to put realistic timetables on the war have predicted several more decades of conflict on a number of fronts. The reality however is that there is no end in sight on this war, and even ridiculously far-sighted dates are just guesses of when the war will, for some reason, stop getting worse and start getting better. The evidence suggests that every escalation will just make matters worse, and officials have no strategy other than more escalation, making the prospect of such a turn-around unlikely, at best.
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Further, under certain conditions, there may not be a withdrawal at all, that is, if the conditions on the ground and the judgement of generals in the field indicate more time - and perhaps additional troops - are necessary. This may well be the case if the central Afghan government is still weak, has significant warlord influence, and is plagued by corruption. This is the case if there is too little progress in creating an effective Afghan police and army forces. This is the case if groups associated with the Taliban or other insurgents continue to be a threat to the Afghan government and various parts of Afghanistan. This is the case if the Pashtun continue to feel alienated and targeted by the Karzai government, police, and army. This is the case if the great majority of the Afghan people remain impoverished and without hope, except for anger at and getting revenge on the occupation and government.
Such conditions prove counterproductive in the sense that they create additional insurgents and Taliban adherents. In his recent book, hopes and prospects, Noam Chomsky refers to a study of Taliban foot soldiers that has relevance for how the occupation itself is generating insurgency and implies as well how the prospects for a negotiated peaceful settlement are immproved if the occupation is drawn down. He writes:
"A study of the Taliban foot soldiers carried out by the Toronto Globe and Mail, though not a scientific survey as they point out, nevertheless yields considerable insight. All were Pashtuns, from the Kandahar area. They described themselves as mujahideen, following the ancient tradition of driving out foreign invaders. Almost a third reported that at least one family member had died in aerial bombings in recent years. Many siad that they were fighting to defend Afghan villagers from air strikes by foreign troops. Few claimed to be fighting a global jihad, or had allegiance to Taliban leader Mullh Omar....Most saw themselves as fighting for principles - an Islamic government - not a particular leader. Again, the results suggest possibilities for a negotiated settlement, without foreign interference" (p. 244).
Despite findings like these, Obama appears to be committed to an indefinite occupation in Afghanistan. Other evidence is consistent with this view. For example, Chomsky points out:
"The Obama administration is also constructing mega-embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan that are completely without precedent. Throughout the Gulf region, billions of dollars are being spent to develop 'critical base and port facilities,' along with military training and arms shipments expanding the US global system of militarization" (p. 63). And there are minerals in Afghanistan and the possibility of oil/gas pipeplines as well as the strategic location of the country. In the meantime, the Obama administration pushes the U.S. Congress to grant it supplemental funds for the war/occupation in Afghanistan.
In a word, indications are that the Afghanistan war/occupation is going to be a "long war."
The article:
Obama Disavows July 2011 Afghan Drawdown Date
Insists Date Just the 'Beginning of a Transition Phase'
by Jason Ditz, June 24, 2010
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“We didn’t say we’d be switching off the lights,” Obama insisted, adding that “we said we’d begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility.”
Officials have been dismissing the July 2011 date as largely meaningless in the first place, but President Obama has avoided comment on it, since his announcement of the most recent escalation in December.
Actually what President Obama said was that the US would begin to “start the pullout” in July 2011 at the time, and Vice President Biden was sticking with that story as recently as last week, saying that a “whole lot of people” would be moving out in July.
Biden’s comments were quickly disavowed by a number of officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Since Gen. David Petraeus was tapped to head the war yesterday, it has been expected that the date would be quickly disavowed, as President Obama did.
The date was little but an excuse to convince opponents of the surge to withhold judgement on the war at any rate, but its new role as the “beginning of a transition phase” has downgraded it to complete irrelevance, as officials have been claiming for years that they have been encouraging the Afghan government to take “more and more responsibility” to no real effect.
European nations which have attempted to put realistic timetables on the war have predicted several more decades of conflict on a number of fronts. The reality however is that there is no end in sight on this war, and even ridiculously far-sighted dates are just guesses of when the war will, for some reason, stop getting worse and start getting better. The evidence suggests that every escalation will just make matters worse, and officials have no strategy other than more escalation, making the prospect of such a turn-around unlikely, at best.
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Sunday, December 13, 2009
Chomsky sees some Afghans working for peaceful resolution of conflicts
Noam Chomsky says that diplomacy and support for peace in Afghanistan are better approaches than a large and escalated US occupation predicated on the idea that the use of military force is necessary for any progress in the country. In the following paragraphs from Chomsky's article, where the focus is on Afghanisant, Chomsky refers to some prospects for peaceful alternatives. Note especially his reference to the National Peace Jirga, a grand assembly of Afghans, formed in May 2008. This is one of the few articles I've seen that provide specific examples of efforts among some large number of Afghans to find a negotiated peaceful resolution of their internal conflicts without foreign interference.
Bob
----------------------------------
Noam Chomsky, "The Election, Economy, War & Peace," (section on Afghanistan), Nov. 11, 2009
http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewarticle/19749
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's first message to president-elect Obama was much like that delivered to General Petraeus by Pakistani leaders: "end US airstrikes that risk civilian casualties." His message was sent shortly after coalition troops bombed a wedding party in Kandahar province, reportedly killing 40 people. There is no indication that his opinion was "taken on board."
The British command has warned that there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and that there will have to be negotiations with the Taliban, risking a rift with the US, the Financial Times reports. Correspondent Jason Burke, who has long experience in the region, reports that "the Taliban have been engaged in secret talks about ending the conflict in Afghanistan in a wide-ranging 'peace process' sponsored by Saudi Arabia and supported by Britain."
Some Afghan peace activists have reservations about this approach, preferring a solution without foreign interference. A growing network of activists is calling for negotiations and reconciliation with the Taliban in a National Peace Jirga, a grand assembly of Afghans, formed in May 2008. At a meeting in support of the Jirga, 3,000 Afghan political and intellectuals, mainly Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group, criticized "the international military campaign against Islamic militants in Afghanistan and called for dialogue to end the fighting," AFP reported.
The interim chairman of the National Peace Jirga, Bakhtar Aminzai, "told the opening gathering that the current conflict could not be resolved by military means and that only talks could bring a solution. He called on the government to step up its negotiations with the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami groups." The latter is the party of the extremist radical Islamist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Reagan favorite responsible for many terrible atrocities, now reported to provide core parliamentary support for the Karzai government and to be pressing it towards a form of re-Talibanization.
Aminzai said further that "We need to pressure the Afghan government and the international community to find a solution without using guns." A spokeswoman added that "We are against Western policy in Afghanistan. They should bury their guns in a grave and focus on diplomacy and economic development." A leader of Awakened Youth of Afghanistan, a prominent antiwar group, says that we must end "Afghanicide -- the killing of Afghanistan." In a joint declaration with German peace organizations, the National Peace Jirga claimed to represent "a wide majority of Afghan people who are tired of war," calling for an end to escalation and initiation of a peace process.
The deputy director of the umbrella organization of NGOs in the country says that of roughly 1,400 registered NGOs, nearly 1,100 are purely Afghan operations: women's groups, youth groups and others, many of them advocates of the Peace Jirga.
Though polling in war-torn Afghanistan is a difficult process, there are some suggestive results. A Canadian-run poll found that Afghans favor the presence of Canadian and other foreign troops, the result that made the headlines in Canada. Other findings suggest some qualifications. Only 20% "think the Taliban will prevail once foreign troops leave." Three-fourths support negotiations between the Karzai government and the Taliban, and more than half favor a coalition government. The great majority therefore strongly disagree with the US-NATO focus on further militarization of the conflict, and appear to believe that peace is possible with a turn towards peaceful means. Though the question was not asked, it is reasonable to surmise that the foreign presence is favored for aid and reconstruction.
A study of Taliban foot soldiers carried out by the Toronto Globe & Mail, though not a scientific survey as they point out, nevertheless yields considerable insight. All were Afghan Pashtuns, from the Kandahar area. They described themselves as Mujahadeen, following the ancient tradition of driving out foreign invaders. Almost a third reported that at least one family member had died in aerial bombings in recent years. Many said that they were fighting to defend Afghan villagers from air strikes by foreign troops. Few claimed to be fighting a global Jihad, or had allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Most saw themselves as fighting for principles - an Islamic government -- not a leader. Again, the results suggest possibilities for a negotiated peaceful settlement, without foreign interference.
A valuable perspective on such prospects is provided by Sir Rodric Braithwaite, a specialist on Afghanistan who was UK ambassador to Moscow during the crucial 1988-92 period when the Russians withdrew (and the USSR collapsed), then becoming chair of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. On a recent visit, Braithwaite spoke to Afghan journalists, former Mujahideen, professionals, people working for the US-based "coalition" - in general, to "natural supporters for its claims to bring peace and reconstruction." In the Financial Times, he reports that they were "contemptuous of President Hamid Karzai," regarding him as another one of the puppets installed by foreign force. Their favorite was "Mohammad Najibullah, the last communist president, who attempted to reconcile the nation within an Islamic state, and was butchered by the Taliban in 1996: DVDs of his speeches are being sold on the streets. Things were, they said, better under the Soviets. Kabul was secure, women were employed, the Soviets built factories, roads, schools and hospitals, Russian children played safely in the streets. The Russian soldiers fought bravely on the ground like real warriors, instead of killing women and children from the air. Even the Taliban were not so bad: they were good Muslims, kept order, and respected women in their own way. These myths may not reflect historical reality, but they do measure a deep disillusionment with the `coalition' and its policies."
Specialists on the region urge that US strategy should shift from more troops and attacks in Pakistan to a "diplomatic grand bargain -- forging compromise with insurgents while addressing an array of regional rivalries and insecurities" (Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid in Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2008). They warn that the current military focus "and the attendant terrorism" might lead to the collapse of nuclear-armed Pakistan, with grim consequences. They urge the incoming US administration "to put an end to the increasingly destructive dynamics of the Great Game in the region" through negotiations that recognize the interests of the concerned parties within Afghanistan as well as Pakistan and Iran, but also India, China and Russia, who "have reservations about a NATO base within their spheres of influence" and concerns about the threats "posed by the United States and NATO" as well as by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The immediate goal should be "Lowering the level of violence in the region and moving the global community toward genuine agreement on the long-term goals," thus allowing Afghans to confront their internal problems peacefully. The incoming US president must put an end to "Washington's keenness for `victory' as the solution to all problems, and the United States' reluctance to involve competitors, opponents, or enemies in diplomacy."
It appears that there are feasible alternatives to escalation of the cycle of violence, but there is little hint of it in the electoral campaign or political commentary. Afghanistan and Pakistan do not appear among foreign policy issues on the Obama campaign's website.
Bob
----------------------------------
Noam Chomsky, "The Election, Economy, War & Peace," (section on Afghanistan), Nov. 11, 2009
http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewarticle/19749
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's first message to president-elect Obama was much like that delivered to General Petraeus by Pakistani leaders: "end US airstrikes that risk civilian casualties." His message was sent shortly after coalition troops bombed a wedding party in Kandahar province, reportedly killing 40 people. There is no indication that his opinion was "taken on board."
The British command has warned that there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and that there will have to be negotiations with the Taliban, risking a rift with the US, the Financial Times reports. Correspondent Jason Burke, who has long experience in the region, reports that "the Taliban have been engaged in secret talks about ending the conflict in Afghanistan in a wide-ranging 'peace process' sponsored by Saudi Arabia and supported by Britain."
Some Afghan peace activists have reservations about this approach, preferring a solution without foreign interference. A growing network of activists is calling for negotiations and reconciliation with the Taliban in a National Peace Jirga, a grand assembly of Afghans, formed in May 2008. At a meeting in support of the Jirga, 3,000 Afghan political and intellectuals, mainly Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group, criticized "the international military campaign against Islamic militants in Afghanistan and called for dialogue to end the fighting," AFP reported.
The interim chairman of the National Peace Jirga, Bakhtar Aminzai, "told the opening gathering that the current conflict could not be resolved by military means and that only talks could bring a solution. He called on the government to step up its negotiations with the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami groups." The latter is the party of the extremist radical Islamist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Reagan favorite responsible for many terrible atrocities, now reported to provide core parliamentary support for the Karzai government and to be pressing it towards a form of re-Talibanization.
Aminzai said further that "We need to pressure the Afghan government and the international community to find a solution without using guns." A spokeswoman added that "We are against Western policy in Afghanistan. They should bury their guns in a grave and focus on diplomacy and economic development." A leader of Awakened Youth of Afghanistan, a prominent antiwar group, says that we must end "Afghanicide -- the killing of Afghanistan." In a joint declaration with German peace organizations, the National Peace Jirga claimed to represent "a wide majority of Afghan people who are tired of war," calling for an end to escalation and initiation of a peace process.
The deputy director of the umbrella organization of NGOs in the country says that of roughly 1,400 registered NGOs, nearly 1,100 are purely Afghan operations: women's groups, youth groups and others, many of them advocates of the Peace Jirga.
Though polling in war-torn Afghanistan is a difficult process, there are some suggestive results. A Canadian-run poll found that Afghans favor the presence of Canadian and other foreign troops, the result that made the headlines in Canada. Other findings suggest some qualifications. Only 20% "think the Taliban will prevail once foreign troops leave." Three-fourths support negotiations between the Karzai government and the Taliban, and more than half favor a coalition government. The great majority therefore strongly disagree with the US-NATO focus on further militarization of the conflict, and appear to believe that peace is possible with a turn towards peaceful means. Though the question was not asked, it is reasonable to surmise that the foreign presence is favored for aid and reconstruction.
A study of Taliban foot soldiers carried out by the Toronto Globe & Mail, though not a scientific survey as they point out, nevertheless yields considerable insight. All were Afghan Pashtuns, from the Kandahar area. They described themselves as Mujahadeen, following the ancient tradition of driving out foreign invaders. Almost a third reported that at least one family member had died in aerial bombings in recent years. Many said that they were fighting to defend Afghan villagers from air strikes by foreign troops. Few claimed to be fighting a global Jihad, or had allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Most saw themselves as fighting for principles - an Islamic government -- not a leader. Again, the results suggest possibilities for a negotiated peaceful settlement, without foreign interference.
A valuable perspective on such prospects is provided by Sir Rodric Braithwaite, a specialist on Afghanistan who was UK ambassador to Moscow during the crucial 1988-92 period when the Russians withdrew (and the USSR collapsed), then becoming chair of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. On a recent visit, Braithwaite spoke to Afghan journalists, former Mujahideen, professionals, people working for the US-based "coalition" - in general, to "natural supporters for its claims to bring peace and reconstruction." In the Financial Times, he reports that they were "contemptuous of President Hamid Karzai," regarding him as another one of the puppets installed by foreign force. Their favorite was "Mohammad Najibullah, the last communist president, who attempted to reconcile the nation within an Islamic state, and was butchered by the Taliban in 1996: DVDs of his speeches are being sold on the streets. Things were, they said, better under the Soviets. Kabul was secure, women were employed, the Soviets built factories, roads, schools and hospitals, Russian children played safely in the streets. The Russian soldiers fought bravely on the ground like real warriors, instead of killing women and children from the air. Even the Taliban were not so bad: they were good Muslims, kept order, and respected women in their own way. These myths may not reflect historical reality, but they do measure a deep disillusionment with the `coalition' and its policies."
Specialists on the region urge that US strategy should shift from more troops and attacks in Pakistan to a "diplomatic grand bargain -- forging compromise with insurgents while addressing an array of regional rivalries and insecurities" (Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid in Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2008). They warn that the current military focus "and the attendant terrorism" might lead to the collapse of nuclear-armed Pakistan, with grim consequences. They urge the incoming US administration "to put an end to the increasingly destructive dynamics of the Great Game in the region" through negotiations that recognize the interests of the concerned parties within Afghanistan as well as Pakistan and Iran, but also India, China and Russia, who "have reservations about a NATO base within their spheres of influence" and concerns about the threats "posed by the United States and NATO" as well as by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The immediate goal should be "Lowering the level of violence in the region and moving the global community toward genuine agreement on the long-term goals," thus allowing Afghans to confront their internal problems peacefully. The incoming US president must put an end to "Washington's keenness for `victory' as the solution to all problems, and the United States' reluctance to involve competitors, opponents, or enemies in diplomacy."
It appears that there are feasible alternatives to escalation of the cycle of violence, but there is little hint of it in the electoral campaign or political commentary. Afghanistan and Pakistan do not appear among foreign policy issues on the Obama campaign's website.
Saturday, November 7, 2009
Chomsky says Joya deserves the Nobel Peace Prize
Dear Stop War in Afghan supporters,
Noam Chomsky, now in his eighties, is certainly one of the world's best known public intellectuals. For decades, he has been a critical analyst of American foreign, as well as domestic, policy. He has achieved much in another area of analysis as well. His dissertation in linquistics completed back about 1969 established the basis for a new paradigm in the field. He has written over 100 books and given countless speeches and interviews. You can keep up-to-date with Chomsky's achievements through his website. For all of this, Chomsky is rarely interviewed on network news programs in the US, though smaller programs like Democracy Now and out-of-the-mainstream magazines like Z Magazine and Monthly Review have long published his writing.
In the following article Chomsky considers the Nobel Peace Prize given to President Obama. Much of the article identifies how Obama's administration is hardly oriented to diplomatic efforts to solve important problems. At the same time, near the end of the article, he says that Malalai Joya deserves a Nobel Peace Prize. Only when people like Joya become recipients of the prize will it continue to have any credibility.
Bob Sheak
IN THESE TIMES
Please consider subscribing to the print edition and supporting independent media: http://www.inthesetimes.com/subscribe/This article is permanently archived at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/5134/
War, Peace and Obama’s Nobel
By Noam Chomsky
November 5, 2009
The hopes and prospects for peace aren't well aligned--not even close. The task is to bring them nearer. Presumably that was the intent of the Nobel Peace Prize committee in choosing President Barack Obama.
The prize "seemed a kind of prayer and encouragement by the Nobel committee for future endeavor and more consensual American leadership," Steven Erlanger and Sheryl Gay Stolberg wrote in The New York Times.
The nature of the Bush-Obama transition bears directly on the likelihood that the prayers and encouragement might lead to progress.
The Nobel committee's concerns were valid. They singled out Obama's rhetoric on reducing nuclear weapons.
Right now Iran's nuclear ambitions dominate the headlines. The warnings are that Iran may be concealing something from the International Atomic Energy Agency and violating U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, passed last month and hailed as a victory for Obama's efforts to contain Iran.
Meanwhile, a debate continues on whether Obama's recent decision to reconfigure missile-defense systems in Europe is a capitulation to the Russians or a pragmatic step to defend the West from Iranian nuclear attack.
Silence is often more eloquent than loud clamor, so let us attend to what is unspoken.
Amid the furor over Iranian duplicity, the IAEA passed a resolution calling on Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and open its nuclear facilities to inspection.
The United States and Europe tried to block the IAEA resolution, but it passed anyway. The media virtually ignored the event.
The United States assured Israel that it would support Israel's rejection of the resolution--reaffirming a secret understanding that has allowed Israel to maintain a nuclear arsenal closed to international inspections, according to officials familiar with the arrangements. Again, the media were silent.
Indian officials greeted U.N. Resolution 1887 by announcing that India "can now build nuclear weapons with the same destructive power as those in the arsenals of the world's major nuclear powers," the Financial Times reported.
Both India and Pakistan are expanding their nuclear weapons programs. They have twice come dangerously close to nuclear war, and the problems that almost ignited this catastrophe are very much alive.
Obama greeted Resolution 1887 differently. The day before he was awarded the Nobel Prize for his inspiring commitment to peace, the Pentagon announced it was accelerating delivery of the most lethal non-nuclear weapons in the arsenal: 13-ton bombs for B-2 and B-52 stealth bombers, designed to destroy deeply hidden bunkers shielded by 10,000 pounds of reinforced concrete.
It's no secret the bunker busters could be deployed against Iran.
Planning for these "massive ordnance penetrators" began in the Bush years but languished until Obama called for developing them rapidly when he came into office.
Passed unanimously, Resolution 1887 calls for the end of threats of force and for all countries to join the NPT, as Iran did long ago. NPT non-signers are India, Israel and Pakistan, all of which developed nuclear weapons with U.S. help, in violation of the NPT.
Iran hasn't invaded another country for hundreds of years--unlike the United States, Israel and India (which occupies Kashmir, brutally).
The threat from Iran is minuscule. If Iran had nuclear weapons and delivery systems and prepared to use them, the country would be vaporized.
To believe Iran would use nuclear weapons to attack Israel, or anyone, "amounts to assuming that Iran's leaders are insane" and that they look forward to being reduced to "radioactive dust," strategic analyst Leonard Weiss observes, adding that Israel's missile-carrying submarines are "virtually impervious to preemptive military attack," not to speak of the immense U.S. arsenal.
In naval maneuvers in July, Israel sent its Dolphin class subs, capable of carrying nuclear missiles, through the Suez Canal and into the Red Sea, sometimes accompanied by warships, to a position from which they could attack Iran--as they have a "sovereign right" to do, according to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden.
Not for the first time, what is veiled in silence would receive front-page headlines in societies that valued their freedom and were concerned with the fate of the world.
The Iranian regime is harsh and repressive, and no humane person wants Iran--or anyone else--to have nuclear weapons. But a little honesty would not hurt in addressing these problems.
The Nobel Peace Prize, of course, is not concerned solely with reducing the threat of terminal nuclear war, but rather with war generally, and the preparation for war. In this regard, the selection of Obama raised eyebrows, not least in Iran, surrounded by U.S. occupying armies.
On Iran's borders in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, Obama has escalated Bush's war and is likely to proceed on that course, perhaps sharply.
Obama has made clear that the United States intends to retain a long-term major presence in the region. That much is signaled by the huge city-within-a city called "the Baghdad Embassy," unlike any embassy in the world.
Obama has announced the construction of mega-embassies in Islamabad and Kabul, and huge consulates in Peshawar and elsewhere.
Nonpartisan budget and security monitors report in Government Executive that the "administration's request for $538 billion for the Defense Department in fiscal 2010 and its stated intention to maintain a high level of funding in the coming years put the president on track to spend more on defense, in real dollars, than any other president has in one term of office since World War II. And that's not counting the additional $130 billion the administration is requesting to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan next year, with even more war spending slated for future years."
The Nobel Peace Prize committee might well have made truly worthy choices, prominent among them the remarkable Afghan activist Malalai Joya.
This brave woman survived the Russians, and then the radical Islamists whose brutality was so extreme that the population welcomed the Taliban. Joya has withstood the Taliban and now the return of the warlords under the Karzai government.
Throughout, Joya worked effectively for human rights, particularly for women; she was elected to parliament and then expelled when she continued to denounce warlord atrocities. She now lives underground under heavy protection, but she continues the struggle, in word and deed. By such actions, repeated everywhere as best we can, the prospects for peace edge closer to hopes.
This column appears, in edited form, in In These Times' December 2009 issue.
© New York Times Syndicate
Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor & Professor of Linguistics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the author of dozens of books on U.S. foreign policy. He writes a monthly column for The New York Times News Service/Syndicate.
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