What has the month of October brought us so far from the increased US military forces in Afghanistan? President Karzai government is holding talks with some top Taliban leaders, though US military and government leaders don’t like the idea. The US airwar in Afghanistan creeps up. The US offensive against the rural district of Marjah remains a failure, as marines face full-blown insurgency. General Patraeus continues to suggest we need to stay in Afghanistan for some undefined number of years beyond next summer, when Obama promises the beginning of the withdrawal of US troops from the country. Here are some other reports from the month.
A shaky national election - Jason Ditz highlights some of major problems with the September parliamentary elections in the country. For example, he reports on fraud in the elections which increasingly leaves the official elections results in doubt. “Officials say, 4,169 complaints were issued, centered around 175 candidates,” 25 of whom are “current members of parliament.” Ditz also notes that “more than 1,500 of the nation’s 6,800 [election] centers never even opened.”
Little interest in the ninth anniversary of the US invasion of Afghanistan. Josh Rushing writes an article for Al Jazeera (Oct, 9, 2010) on the lack of interest among Americans on the anniversary. His first sentence encapsulates the main point of the article: “The invasion of Afghanistan’s ninth anniversary passed in DC this week with hardly a notice.” He found a few dozen vets representing Afghanistan Veterans Against the War demonstrating in front of the Walter Reed Medical Center, urging “the US to stop redeploying soldiers who have been identified as suffering trauma – either post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, military sex trauma, or others.”
By the way, Aaron Glantz covers the myriad obstacles veterans fact in trying to get treatment in the VA medical system in his fine book, The War Comes Home: Washington’s Battle Against America’s Veterans.”
An BBC News online headline reads “NATO contractors attacking own vehicles in Pakistan” (Oct. 8, 2010). Riaz Sohail reports: “NATO supply convoys travelling through Pakistan to Afghanistan have regularly come under attack in the past, but following, Pakistan’s decision to block their route through the Khyber Pass, they now face an even bigger security threat.” Sohail continues: “Hundreds of tankers and trucks have been stranded on highways and depots across Pakistan, with little or no security.” The individuals or companies who own the vehicles and who have contracts with NATO, have sell the fuel, blow up their truck, and then receive compensation from NATO for the fuel and a new vehicle.
Juan Cole broadens the context and discusses another aspect of the convoy problem in a post on his blog Informed Comment (Oct. 4, 2010). His headline reads: “28 More US Fuel Trucks Set Ablaze in Pakistan, 6 Killed, as Convoy Boycott Continues.” The focus here is on the Taliban rather than the contractors. Here is most of Cole’s article.
The Taliban Movement of Pakistan (Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan or TTP) claimed on Monday that it was responsible for yet another attack on NATO fuel trucks, this time near Islamabad. Some twenty trucks were set ablaze and 6 people were killed. The trucks were parked in a poorly guarded area near the capital, awaiting permission to cross into Afghanistan at Torkham, the Pakistani checkpoint at the Khyber Pass. Since Friday, Pakistan has closed the crossing to US and NATO military supply vehicles, as a way of protesting the attack last Thursday by US helicopter gunships flying from Afghanistan on a Pakistani checkpoint inside Pakistan, which killed and wounded Pakistani Frontier Corpsmen. A similar attack took place near Shikarpur in Sindh on Thursday night.
The closing of the Khyber crossing and the exposure of stalled NATO convoys to attacks by Muslim extremists has roiled Islamabad’s relations with Washington. The Pakistani government appears to have felt that it had no choice but to take some visible action against the US, given the public rage throughout the country over the US attack on the Pakistani checkpoint and US violations of Pakistani sovereignty.
Some 75 percent of supplies (food, ammunition, even military vehicles) and 50 percent of the fuel needed by US and NATO troops in Afghanistan flow from the Arabian Sea port of Karachi in Pakistan’s Sindh Province up highways to Peshawar and then across the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan. The convoys are being impeded not only by the closure to them of the crossing at Torkham but also by all the bridges and highways washed out by Pakistan’s recent massive flooding.
High US officers in Afghanistan are said to be furious about the Pakistani closure of the Khyber pass to their convoys. Some one hundred trucks are waiting at Torkham. After Monday’s attack on more fuel trucks, the officers must be even more angry.
[….]
So the US may be done out with Pakistan, and vice versa, but as long as the US and NATO are fighting in Afghanistan, likely Pakistan is the indispensable country for them.
Even inside Afghanistan, convoys are often attacked or are guarded by a ragtag band of private companies, which President Hamid Karzai plans to get rid of, even though there is nothing to put in their place. They have been accused of demanding big bribes
US Army digs in for long haul in Afghanistan, according to Nick Turse’s article published on TomDispatch. I found it on Salon (Oct. 21, 2010). The concluding paragraphs of the article captures its principal points:
“At the moment, the American people are being offered one story about how the American war in Afghanistan is to proceed, while in Afghanistan their tax dollars are being invested in another trajectory entirely. The question is: How permanent are U.S. bases in Afghanistan? And if they are not meant to be used for a decade or more to come, why is the Pentagon still building as if they were?
“Recently, the Army sought bids from contractors willing to supply power plants and supporting fuel systems at forward operating bases in Afghanistan for up to five years. Power plants, fuel systems, and the bases on which they are being built are facts on the ground. Such facts carry a weight of their own, and offer a window into U.S. designs in Afghanistan that may be at least as relevant as anything Barack Obama or his aides have been saying about draw-downs, deadlines, or future withdrawal plans. If you want to ask hard questions about America's Afghan War, start with those bases.”
Showing posts with label Marja. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Marja. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Friday, August 13, 2010
Wikileaks revelations won't end the war
Noam Chomsky's article comes from the magazine In These Times. I take excerpts from the article. Chomsky's agrees that the wikileaks documents may help to raise questions about the U.S. role in Afghanistan and challenge Obama's and the media echo chamber's justifications for it. However, in his view, while documents like those released by WikiLeaks may help to increase opposition to the war/occupation in Afghanistan, it will take a riled and mobilized American citizenry to bring it to an end.
This article is permanently archived at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280/
Why WikiLeaks Won’t Stop the War
By Noam Chomsky
http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280
August 3, 2010
The War Log...released on the Internet by the organization WikiLeaks--documents a grim struggle becoming grimmer, from the U.S. perspective. And for the Afghans, a mounting horror.
While the documents are generally viewed as providing support against the continued war and occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops, Chomsky has another view. The War Logs, however valuable, may contribute to the unfortunate and prevailing doctrine that wars are wrong only if they aren't successful--rather like the Nazis felt after Stalingrad.
Last month came the fiasco of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, forced to retire as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and replaced by his superior, Gen. David H. Petraeus.
A plausible consequence is a relaxation of the rules of engagement so that it becomes easier to kill civilians, and an extension of the war well into the future as Petraeus uses his clout in Congress to achieve this result.
President Obama's principal justification of the continued Afghanistan intervention makes little sense. [....] The official goal is to protect ourselves from al-Qaida, a virtual organization, with no specific base -- a "network of networks" and "leaderless resistance," as it's been called in the professional literature. Now, even more so than before, al-Qaida consists of relatively independent factions, loosely associated throughout the world.
The CIA estimates that 50 to 100 al-Qaeda activists may now be in Afghanistan, and there is no indication that the Taliban want to repeat the mistake of offering sanctuary to al-Qaeda.
[....]
In February, in the first exercise of Obama's new strategy, U.S. Marines conquered Marja, a minor district in Helmand province, the main center of the insurgency, but failed to oust the Taliban permanently.
[....]
According to Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. `Most people here identify themselves as Taliban. [....]
Chomsky compares the situation being faced by the U.S. military forces to what U.S. forces confronted in Vietman in 1969.
[....] In 1969, Douglas Pike, the leading U.S. government scholar on Vietnam, lamented that the enemy--the National Liberation Front--was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam." Pike then recommended that the only way to overcome the NLF's political force was
by using our comparative advantage, violence--with horrifying results.
Chomsky also refers to other comparable unwinnable situation, for example to the Russians in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where they won every battle but lost the war.
[....]
After the Marja triumph, the U.S.-led forces were expected to assault the major city of Kandahar, where, according to a U.S. Army poll in April, the military operation is opposed by 95 percent of the population, and 5 out of 6 regard the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers"--again, echoes of earlier conquests. The Kandahar plans were delayed, part of the background for McChrystal's leavetaking.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that U.S. authorities are concerned that public support for the war in Afghanistan may erode even further.
In May, WikiLeaks released a March CIA memorandum about how to sustain Western Europe's support for the war. The memorandum's subtitle: "Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough."
[....]
Democratic societies rely not on force but on propaganda, engineering consent by "necessary illusion" and "emotionally potent oversimplication," to quote Obama's favorite philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr.
The battle to control the internal enemy, then, remains highly pertinent--indeed, the future of the war in Afghanistan may hinge on it.
© The New York Times Syndicate
Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor & Professor of Linguistics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the author of dozens of books on U.S. foreign policy. He writes a monthly column for The New York Times News Service/Syndicate.
This article is permanently archived at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280/
Why WikiLeaks Won’t Stop the War
By Noam Chomsky
http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280
August 3, 2010
The War Log...released on the Internet by the organization WikiLeaks--documents a grim struggle becoming grimmer, from the U.S. perspective. And for the Afghans, a mounting horror.
While the documents are generally viewed as providing support against the continued war and occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops, Chomsky has another view. The War Logs, however valuable, may contribute to the unfortunate and prevailing doctrine that wars are wrong only if they aren't successful--rather like the Nazis felt after Stalingrad.
Last month came the fiasco of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, forced to retire as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and replaced by his superior, Gen. David H. Petraeus.
A plausible consequence is a relaxation of the rules of engagement so that it becomes easier to kill civilians, and an extension of the war well into the future as Petraeus uses his clout in Congress to achieve this result.
President Obama's principal justification of the continued Afghanistan intervention makes little sense. [....] The official goal is to protect ourselves from al-Qaida, a virtual organization, with no specific base -- a "network of networks" and "leaderless resistance," as it's been called in the professional literature. Now, even more so than before, al-Qaida consists of relatively independent factions, loosely associated throughout the world.
The CIA estimates that 50 to 100 al-Qaeda activists may now be in Afghanistan, and there is no indication that the Taliban want to repeat the mistake of offering sanctuary to al-Qaeda.
[....]
In February, in the first exercise of Obama's new strategy, U.S. Marines conquered Marja, a minor district in Helmand province, the main center of the insurgency, but failed to oust the Taliban permanently.
[....]
According to Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. `Most people here identify themselves as Taliban. [....]
Chomsky compares the situation being faced by the U.S. military forces to what U.S. forces confronted in Vietman in 1969.
[....] In 1969, Douglas Pike, the leading U.S. government scholar on Vietnam, lamented that the enemy--the National Liberation Front--was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam." Pike then recommended that the only way to overcome the NLF's political force was
by using our comparative advantage, violence--with horrifying results.
Chomsky also refers to other comparable unwinnable situation, for example to the Russians in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where they won every battle but lost the war.
[....]
After the Marja triumph, the U.S.-led forces were expected to assault the major city of Kandahar, where, according to a U.S. Army poll in April, the military operation is opposed by 95 percent of the population, and 5 out of 6 regard the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers"--again, echoes of earlier conquests. The Kandahar plans were delayed, part of the background for McChrystal's leavetaking.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that U.S. authorities are concerned that public support for the war in Afghanistan may erode even further.
In May, WikiLeaks released a March CIA memorandum about how to sustain Western Europe's support for the war. The memorandum's subtitle: "Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough."
[....]
Democratic societies rely not on force but on propaganda, engineering consent by "necessary illusion" and "emotionally potent oversimplication," to quote Obama's favorite philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr.
The battle to control the internal enemy, then, remains highly pertinent--indeed, the future of the war in Afghanistan may hinge on it.
© The New York Times Syndicate
Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor & Professor of Linguistics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the author of dozens of books on U.S. foreign policy. He writes a monthly column for The New York Times News Service/Syndicate.
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Some libertarians also support a withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan
Not all voices supporting the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan come from the left-of-center crowd. In the following article, Doug Bandow, associated with the libertarian Cato Institute, supports in general terms a withdrawal. He offers a host of arguments in defense of his position.
Is war in Afghanistan necessary?
By Doug Bandow
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2010/08/137_70943.html
August 6, 2010
The massive document leak on U.S. policy in Afghanistan is causing more Americans to ask: Why are we in Afghanistan? There is no good answer.
The original justification for war long ago disappeared. Today, says CIA Director Leon Panetta, “At most, we’re looking at 50 to 100, maybe less” al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, John Bolton argues that the Taliban and al-Qaida must be defeated lest they “reconquer Afghanistan and make it a base for international terrorism.” However, the Taliban leadership appeared unhappy that its guests brought down the wrath of Washington back in 2001. The Taliban likely would avoid a repeat performance.
In any case, al-Qaida doesn’t need Afghanistan. Pakistan’s northwest has proved to be a hospitable home. Other failed or semi-failed states could similarly host terrorists. It’s hard to fathom another reason for staying. Would withdrawal harm U.S. credibility? Unfortunately, the longer Washington and its allies stay, the greater will be its ultimate loss of face.
Of course, leaving Afghanistan a better place is a worthy objective, but is not easily achieved through outside military intervention. Civilian deaths in Afghanistan may run 10,000, and as fighting grows more intense more civilians will be harmed. Sadly, Americans are directly responsible for many deaths. Then-U.S. commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal complained in March: “We’ve shot an amazing number of people [at checkpoints] and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat.” There are still Afghans who hope to create a liberal society. But the Western allies already have been at war in Afghanistan for nearly nine years. Yet after the sacrifice of nearly 2,000 lives and expenditures approaching $400 billion, the country remains a wreck. In June Gen. McChrystal briefed NATO members. He indicated that just five of 116 areas were rated “secure.” In only five of 122 districts did the government exercise full authority.
Taliban attacks are up. The Afghanistan Rights Monitor recently complained that “the insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly.” When I visited in May, allied personnel warned that many areas had become much more dangerous.
Nevertheless, some war advocates praise the new allied strategy. However, manpower remains inadequate. Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine suggests that more than 600,000 troops are needed, which would mean quintupling current force levels. Islamabad continues to play a double game, aiding the Pashtun Taliban forces. One Westerner working with the Afghan government told me: “Pakistan is in a state of undeclared war with NATO and Afghanistan.”Nor is salvation likely to come from an increasing number of Afghan security personnel. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently noted that only 23 percent of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 12 percent of the Afghan National Police (ANP) were rated in the top of four categories, meaning they were capable of independent action. On my recent trip one Afghan complained that sending in the ANP is the best way to turn people into Taliban.
Then there is the Afghan government, which is noted for its corruption. Kabul is a vampire city in which the well-connected elite live off of drug or Western money. A long-time associate of President Karzai told me that no Afghan politician could long survive without “taking care of” his family and friends.The daunting challenge facing the U.S. and its allies is evident from operations in both Marja and Kandahar. The town of Marja was a Taliban sanctuary targeted by the U.S. military in February. In May Gen. McChrystal complained of the perception that Marja had become “a bleeding ulcer.”The far larger operation planned for Kandahar has been put off from June and support for the Taliban remains worrisomely strong. Again, success will depend on effective local governance which does not exist.
Washington is pursuing the wrong objective in the wrong place. The West's critical objectives are to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming an al-Qaida training ground and to avoid destabilizing next-door nuclear-armed Pakistan. The first has been achieved, and could be maintained through a negotiated withdrawal with the Taliban ― which likely would prefer not to be deposed again ― backed by air/drone strikes and Special Forces intervention if necessary. The second would be best served by deescalating the conflict. The war is a major source of instability in Pakistan.
Failing to “win” in Afghanistan would be bad. But carrying on in a war not worth fighting would be worse. Washington and its allies should leave nation-building in Afghanistan to the Afghan people.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including ``Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire” (Xulon). He can be reached at ChessSet@aol.com.
Is war in Afghanistan necessary?
By Doug Bandow
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2010/08/137_70943.html
August 6, 2010
The massive document leak on U.S. policy in Afghanistan is causing more Americans to ask: Why are we in Afghanistan? There is no good answer.
The original justification for war long ago disappeared. Today, says CIA Director Leon Panetta, “At most, we’re looking at 50 to 100, maybe less” al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, John Bolton argues that the Taliban and al-Qaida must be defeated lest they “reconquer Afghanistan and make it a base for international terrorism.” However, the Taliban leadership appeared unhappy that its guests brought down the wrath of Washington back in 2001. The Taliban likely would avoid a repeat performance.
In any case, al-Qaida doesn’t need Afghanistan. Pakistan’s northwest has proved to be a hospitable home. Other failed or semi-failed states could similarly host terrorists. It’s hard to fathom another reason for staying. Would withdrawal harm U.S. credibility? Unfortunately, the longer Washington and its allies stay, the greater will be its ultimate loss of face.
Of course, leaving Afghanistan a better place is a worthy objective, but is not easily achieved through outside military intervention. Civilian deaths in Afghanistan may run 10,000, and as fighting grows more intense more civilians will be harmed. Sadly, Americans are directly responsible for many deaths. Then-U.S. commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal complained in March: “We’ve shot an amazing number of people [at checkpoints] and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat.” There are still Afghans who hope to create a liberal society. But the Western allies already have been at war in Afghanistan for nearly nine years. Yet after the sacrifice of nearly 2,000 lives and expenditures approaching $400 billion, the country remains a wreck. In June Gen. McChrystal briefed NATO members. He indicated that just five of 116 areas were rated “secure.” In only five of 122 districts did the government exercise full authority.
Taliban attacks are up. The Afghanistan Rights Monitor recently complained that “the insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly.” When I visited in May, allied personnel warned that many areas had become much more dangerous.
Nevertheless, some war advocates praise the new allied strategy. However, manpower remains inadequate. Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine suggests that more than 600,000 troops are needed, which would mean quintupling current force levels. Islamabad continues to play a double game, aiding the Pashtun Taliban forces. One Westerner working with the Afghan government told me: “Pakistan is in a state of undeclared war with NATO and Afghanistan.”Nor is salvation likely to come from an increasing number of Afghan security personnel. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recently noted that only 23 percent of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 12 percent of the Afghan National Police (ANP) were rated in the top of four categories, meaning they were capable of independent action. On my recent trip one Afghan complained that sending in the ANP is the best way to turn people into Taliban.
Then there is the Afghan government, which is noted for its corruption. Kabul is a vampire city in which the well-connected elite live off of drug or Western money. A long-time associate of President Karzai told me that no Afghan politician could long survive without “taking care of” his family and friends.The daunting challenge facing the U.S. and its allies is evident from operations in both Marja and Kandahar. The town of Marja was a Taliban sanctuary targeted by the U.S. military in February. In May Gen. McChrystal complained of the perception that Marja had become “a bleeding ulcer.”The far larger operation planned for Kandahar has been put off from June and support for the Taliban remains worrisomely strong. Again, success will depend on effective local governance which does not exist.
Washington is pursuing the wrong objective in the wrong place. The West's critical objectives are to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming an al-Qaida training ground and to avoid destabilizing next-door nuclear-armed Pakistan. The first has been achieved, and could be maintained through a negotiated withdrawal with the Taliban ― which likely would prefer not to be deposed again ― backed by air/drone strikes and Special Forces intervention if necessary. The second would be best served by deescalating the conflict. The war is a major source of instability in Pakistan.
Failing to “win” in Afghanistan would be bad. But carrying on in a war not worth fighting would be worse. Washington and its allies should leave nation-building in Afghanistan to the Afghan people.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including ``Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire” (Xulon). He can be reached at ChessSet@aol.com.
Thursday, June 3, 2010
Afghan police not doing the job in Marja
Just Foreign Policy News on the Web carries headlines and excerpts during the week from various news source. You can see their daily news items at: http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/598. The following item focuses on why and how Afghan police officers stationed in Marja, Afghanistan, are ineffective, even counterproductive, and continuing to be dependent on American supervision and support.
Afghanistan....Afghan Police Earn Poor Grade For Marja Mission
C. J. Chivers, New York Times, June 1, 2010http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/asia/02marja.html
Marja, Afghanistan - Three months after arriving in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan's Helmand Province, a contingent of specialized Afghan police officers has logged a mediocre performance while being almost wholly dependent on American supervision and support, Westerners who work with the officers said.
The conduct of Marja's interim police, from a unit American officials describe as the Interior Ministry's most promising force, has been undercut by drug use, petty corruption and, at times, a lack of commitment in the face of the ordinary hardships and duties of uniformed life.
When the force first arrived in late winter, entire units refused to stand guard or clean their living areas, several Marines said, and in northern Marja, police shifts often still abandon checkpoints during the sweltering midday heat, disappearing for lunch breaks lasting hours. Some officers have deserted the force.
The police also seem unschooled in rules of engagement, which risks putting their behavior at cross-purposes with Western units trying to earn civilian support. Police officials themselves say they have inadequate equipment and face a complex, dangerous mission.This early assessment, of a high-profile unit on a much publicized mission, underlined anew the difficulties in creating Afghan forces that can operate independently and be entrusted with the nation's security - an essential step toward drawing down Western forces after nine years of war.
It also raises questions about any timetable for Afghan self-sufficiency. American officials and contractors say it will take much longer for the units to be nurtured to self-reliance and a higher level of skill. For now, the police in Marja perform limited duties. American units create the space in which they operate, and provide their logistical, medical and military support.
[...]
The police also said that establishing connections with residents had been difficult. Part of their problem, they said, was that many sergeants are Tajik, and do not speak Pashto, southern Afghanistan's dominant language.
[...]
Afghanistan....Afghan Police Earn Poor Grade For Marja Mission
C. J. Chivers, New York Times, June 1, 2010http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/world/asia/02marja.html
Marja, Afghanistan - Three months after arriving in the most dangerous area of Afghanistan's Helmand Province, a contingent of specialized Afghan police officers has logged a mediocre performance while being almost wholly dependent on American supervision and support, Westerners who work with the officers said.
The conduct of Marja's interim police, from a unit American officials describe as the Interior Ministry's most promising force, has been undercut by drug use, petty corruption and, at times, a lack of commitment in the face of the ordinary hardships and duties of uniformed life.
When the force first arrived in late winter, entire units refused to stand guard or clean their living areas, several Marines said, and in northern Marja, police shifts often still abandon checkpoints during the sweltering midday heat, disappearing for lunch breaks lasting hours. Some officers have deserted the force.
The police also seem unschooled in rules of engagement, which risks putting their behavior at cross-purposes with Western units trying to earn civilian support. Police officials themselves say they have inadequate equipment and face a complex, dangerous mission.This early assessment, of a high-profile unit on a much publicized mission, underlined anew the difficulties in creating Afghan forces that can operate independently and be entrusted with the nation's security - an essential step toward drawing down Western forces after nine years of war.
It also raises questions about any timetable for Afghan self-sufficiency. American officials and contractors say it will take much longer for the units to be nurtured to self-reliance and a higher level of skill. For now, the police in Marja perform limited duties. American units create the space in which they operate, and provide their logistical, medical and military support.
[...]
The police also said that establishing connections with residents had been difficult. Part of their problem, they said, was that many sergeants are Tajik, and do not speak Pashto, southern Afghanistan's dominant language.
[...]
Sunday, May 16, 2010
US military/gov optimism dashed on the ground in Afghanistan
I have quoted some of the points from an article by Patrick Cockburn that were published in The Independent online site on May 16, 2010. The gist of the article is captured by the title, "'Nobody is winning' admits McChrystal." You can find the full article at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/nobody-is-winning-admits-mcchrystal-1974697.html.
From what I've been reading, the Obama administration/Pentagon generals may well fulfill the promise of "beginning" a withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. However, this may turn out to be a very small and slow troop withdrawal, given the lack of military success so far in subduing the "enemy." Indeed, the Occupation/war may be drawn out for many years to come. Cockburn offers evidence that as of now there is no better than a military stalemate between US-led forces and insurgents. Part of the problem, Cockburn emphasizes, is that US leaders have yet to understand that they are embroiled in a civil war in which they have implicitly taken sides.
In what promises to be an extended war and occupation, there are many losers, including, for example, the Afghan civilian population, the continued destruction of Afghan villages and infrastructure, the increasing number of US troop casulaties, the American taxpayers and the society as a whole as debt-financed wars deepen the national debt, and the lack of progress by the Obama administration in diminishing the US economy's growing dependence on foreign oil.
---------------------------
Quotes from Cockburng's article.
'Nobody is winning,' admits McChrystal
The weakness of the Kabul government is hindering attempts by US and Nato forces to gain much ground from the insurgents
By Patrick Cockburn
Sunday, 16 May 2010
"Afghan President Hamid Karzai arrived in London yesterday as US generals express doubts that the fight against the Taliban is having any success.
"The US and Nato commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, who was boasting of military progress only three months ago, confessed last week that "nobody is winning". His only claim now is that the Taliban have lost momentum compared with last year."
[....]
"... the failure so far of General McChrystal's strategy of using his troops to seize Taliban strongholds and, once cleared, hand them over to Afghan forces. He sold this plan, under which he was promised an extra 30,000 US troops, last November but all the signs are that it is not working. Starting in February, 15,000 US, British and Afghan troops started taking over the Taliban-held area of Marjah and Nad Ali in Helmand province."
[....}
"Three months after the operation in Marjah, however, local people say that the Taliban still control the area at night. Shops are still closed and no schools have reopened. Education officials who returned at the height of the US-led offensive have fled again. The local governor says he has just one temporary teacher teaching 60 children in the ruins of a school. Aid is not arriving. The Taliban are replacing mines, the notorious IEDs, removed by US troops and often use the same holes to hide them in.
"Pentagon officials increasingly agree with the Afghan villagers that the Marjah operation failed to end Taliban control and put the Afghan government in charge. This puts in doubt General McChrystal's whole strategy which also governs the way in which 10,000 British troops are deployed. He is being held to account for earlier optimism such as his claim at the height of Marjah offensive that "we've got a government in a box ready to roll in". Three months later, people in Marjah say they have yet to see much sign of the Afghan government.
"Lack of success in Marjah is feeding doubts about the promised US-led offensive in Kandahar, parts of which are under Taliban control. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned against destroying the city in order to save it.... Local elders have lobbied against it on the grounds that it will bring nothing but ruin to their city.
"So far the much-heralded attempt to turn the tide in Kandahar has simply terrified local people about what is to come. US and Nato supply columns thunder through the narrow streets, the soldiers guarding them gesturing menacingly to Afghan vehicles not to get too close. "An atmosphere of terror is hanging over Kandahar," Ahmad Wali Karzai, the president's much-criticised brother who is also head of the local council, is quoted as saying. 'People are breathing terror here.'"
[....]
From what I've been reading, the Obama administration/Pentagon generals may well fulfill the promise of "beginning" a withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. However, this may turn out to be a very small and slow troop withdrawal, given the lack of military success so far in subduing the "enemy." Indeed, the Occupation/war may be drawn out for many years to come. Cockburn offers evidence that as of now there is no better than a military stalemate between US-led forces and insurgents. Part of the problem, Cockburn emphasizes, is that US leaders have yet to understand that they are embroiled in a civil war in which they have implicitly taken sides.
In what promises to be an extended war and occupation, there are many losers, including, for example, the Afghan civilian population, the continued destruction of Afghan villages and infrastructure, the increasing number of US troop casulaties, the American taxpayers and the society as a whole as debt-financed wars deepen the national debt, and the lack of progress by the Obama administration in diminishing the US economy's growing dependence on foreign oil.
---------------------------
Quotes from Cockburng's article.
'Nobody is winning,' admits McChrystal
The weakness of the Kabul government is hindering attempts by US and Nato forces to gain much ground from the insurgents
By Patrick Cockburn
Sunday, 16 May 2010
"Afghan President Hamid Karzai arrived in London yesterday as US generals express doubts that the fight against the Taliban is having any success.
"The US and Nato commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, who was boasting of military progress only three months ago, confessed last week that "nobody is winning". His only claim now is that the Taliban have lost momentum compared with last year."
[....]
"... the failure so far of General McChrystal's strategy of using his troops to seize Taliban strongholds and, once cleared, hand them over to Afghan forces. He sold this plan, under which he was promised an extra 30,000 US troops, last November but all the signs are that it is not working. Starting in February, 15,000 US, British and Afghan troops started taking over the Taliban-held area of Marjah and Nad Ali in Helmand province."
[....}
"Three months after the operation in Marjah, however, local people say that the Taliban still control the area at night. Shops are still closed and no schools have reopened. Education officials who returned at the height of the US-led offensive have fled again. The local governor says he has just one temporary teacher teaching 60 children in the ruins of a school. Aid is not arriving. The Taliban are replacing mines, the notorious IEDs, removed by US troops and often use the same holes to hide them in.
"Pentagon officials increasingly agree with the Afghan villagers that the Marjah operation failed to end Taliban control and put the Afghan government in charge. This puts in doubt General McChrystal's whole strategy which also governs the way in which 10,000 British troops are deployed. He is being held to account for earlier optimism such as his claim at the height of Marjah offensive that "we've got a government in a box ready to roll in". Three months later, people in Marjah say they have yet to see much sign of the Afghan government.
"Lack of success in Marjah is feeding doubts about the promised US-led offensive in Kandahar, parts of which are under Taliban control. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has warned against destroying the city in order to save it.... Local elders have lobbied against it on the grounds that it will bring nothing but ruin to their city.
"So far the much-heralded attempt to turn the tide in Kandahar has simply terrified local people about what is to come. US and Nato supply columns thunder through the narrow streets, the soldiers guarding them gesturing menacingly to Afghan vehicles not to get too close. "An atmosphere of terror is hanging over Kandahar," Ahmad Wali Karzai, the president's much-criticised brother who is also head of the local council, is quoted as saying. 'People are breathing terror here.'"
[....]
Monday, April 12, 2010
Marja residents say security has not improved
Juan Cole points out on his Informed Comment blog today that the US-led assault on Marja has not brought local residents the security they were promised.
Cole:
The violence is placing in doubt supposed US achievements on the security front. Pajwhok News Agency reports that, ironically, the residents of Marjah are complaining about poor security in the aftermath of the US move into that area. They say that there is poor security, that civilians are caught in the cross-fire between US/ Afghanistan National Army troops and the Taliban, and that it is dangerous to work their fields (Marjah is a set of agricultural villages and scattered farm houses). They say that the Afghanistan police have not provided even the level of security that the Taliban once had.
Here are excerpts from the report by the Pajwhok News Agency, to which Cole alludes. You can find the full report at http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/news_Pages/Main%20news3.html#70
Report: Marjah Residents Complain of Poor Security
LASHKARGAH - Residents of the Marjah district in southern Helmand province say a recent military operation has failed to bring any improvement to their lives. Instead the offensive has added to their problems.
Cole:
The violence is placing in doubt supposed US achievements on the security front. Pajwhok News Agency reports that, ironically, the residents of Marjah are complaining about poor security in the aftermath of the US move into that area. They say that there is poor security, that civilians are caught in the cross-fire between US/ Afghanistan National Army troops and the Taliban, and that it is dangerous to work their fields (Marjah is a set of agricultural villages and scattered farm houses). They say that the Afghanistan police have not provided even the level of security that the Taliban once had.
Here are excerpts from the report by the Pajwhok News Agency, to which Cole alludes. You can find the full report at http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/news_Pages/Main%20news3.html#70
Report: Marjah Residents Complain of Poor Security
LASHKARGAH - Residents of the Marjah district in southern Helmand province say a recent military operation has failed to bring any improvement to their lives. Instead the offensive has added to their problems.
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Marja - Paying money to the "enemy"?
Here are some excerpts from an online article by the Afghanistan News. The central point of the article is US Marines have paid local residents thousands of dollars as compensation for property damage resulting from the US-led assault. Where did the money go? Some of it ended up in the pockets of local "Taliban" and used "to acquire ammunition and weapons to be used against foreign troops" [US, etc., troops]. This is yet another indication that the US/NATO occupation of Afghanistan is not very good in identifying the enemy or how to fight it. The highly publicized attacks on Marja do not give one much confidence in those who are making US policy in Afghanistan.
--------------------------------
Excerpts from http://www.afghanistannews.net/story/619692
Taliban using 'compensation' money against Marines in Marja
Afghanistan News.NetSunday 4th April, 2010 (ANI)
"In an attempt to garner public support, US Marines engaged in an intense battle with the Taliban in Marja, have been offering thousands of dollars a week to the local residents as compensation for property damage, but the move has backfired as the insurgents are using the same money against the international forces stationed in Afghanistan."
"Both Afghan and US officials are aware of the fact that the Taliban is using the compensation for acquiring arms and ammunitions to be used against foreign troops, but they say it is hard to recognise the extremists among the masses"....
"We've got to re-evaluate our definition of the word 'enemy'. Most people here identify themselves as Taliban."
--------------------------------
Excerpts from http://www.afghanistannews.net/story/619692
Taliban using 'compensation' money against Marines in Marja
Afghanistan News.NetSunday 4th April, 2010 (ANI)
"In an attempt to garner public support, US Marines engaged in an intense battle with the Taliban in Marja, have been offering thousands of dollars a week to the local residents as compensation for property damage, but the move has backfired as the insurgents are using the same money against the international forces stationed in Afghanistan."
"Both Afghan and US officials are aware of the fact that the Taliban is using the compensation for acquiring arms and ammunitions to be used against foreign troops, but they say it is hard to recognise the extremists among the masses"....
"We've got to re-evaluate our definition of the word 'enemy'. Most people here identify themselves as Taliban."
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
US-led assault on Marja produces civilan casualties and refugees
The following post is from the Peace Action West blog - http://blog/peaceactionwest.org/2010/03/04/the-marja-offensives-impact-on-civilians
The Marja offensive’s impact on civilians
March 4, 2010
tags: Afghanistan, civilian casualties, marja, war
by Chen Lin
A prominent narrative relating to the offensive in Marja has been the military’s emphasis on reducing civilian casualties. For example, the Brookings Institution notes that unlike past operations, the recent US offensive into Marja was announced in advance to Afghanis in order to reduce civilian casualties:
This battle is fascinating for the fact that it was announced repeatedly in advance by NATO commanders. The unusual tactic deprived us of tactical surprise, but General Stanley McChrystal and others clearly felt it even more important to minimize civilian casualties by trying to convince resistance fighters to vacate the area in advance. Even if those insurgents who flee remain free to fight another day, our key premise is that they will not be successful in galvanizing widespread support in Helmand province or elsewhere if we can establish positive momentum first—on the battlefield, and then in improving the lives of Afghan citizens.
The strategy adopted by General McChrysal also serves a broader PR purpose, bolstering US efforts to “win hearts and minds” in Afghanistan, and, indeed, the US. But this approach can only work if it is actually effective in reducing the humanitarian cost of the battle. In reality, civilians always pay dearly for war. That is, as we’ve argued, one of the most fundamental strategic failings of war. As an interview with Radio Free Europe reveals, many civilians remain in the city because they did not escape in time.
“The civilians are trapped because although they had planned to leave after the fighting started in cars or anything they could find, all the roads are mined now and they cannot leave their homes,” said Rahman. “Their food supplies are running out and they face thirst and hunger. People are slaughtering and eating up their cattle. All the shops are closed even as most people stayed behind. Less than 10 percent of the residents left. We have information that civilians have also suffered deaths and injuries and they cannot bury their dead or help their wounded.”
Moreover, as we covered earlier, some 20 civilians have already been killed in the battle. Worse, more are dying because the battle has greatly restricted their access to hospitals:
Most of the wounded civilians recuperating at the whitewashed Italian-run hospital said their injuries were caused by “the foreign soldiers” — a claim that does not bode well for international and Afghan forces who are trying to get residents to renounce the Taliban and embrace the Afghan government.
Bernard Metraux, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Helmand province, told The Associated Press on Wednesday that as many as 40,000 people trapped by fighting in and around Marjah have little to no access to medical care.
The emphasis on the direct casualties of the battle masks a humanitarian crisis of equal magnitude occurring outside of city limits – the plight of the internally displaced. The LATimes reported last Tuesday that since the beginning of the offensive, some 4,000 families have escaped the town. While most currently have access to proper food and shelter, their inability to return home has begun to jeopardize their livelihoods, and there is no guarantee their resources will last:
For agricultural families, the great majority of the town’s residents, each passing day is a countdown to ruin. Worry beads click late into the night as farmers envision their crops dying, livestock scattered or starving, irrigation ditches choked with debris.
Still, many believe their decision to flee may have saved their lives. NATO says 16 civilians have been killed in the offensive, but the Afghanistan Human Rights Commission on Wednesday put the civilian death toll at 28, of whom 13 were children. At least 70 others have been hurt, the group said.
Although most of the displaced have access to food and at least rudimentary shelter, the privations are beginning to grate. Kinship dictates that a family must take in fleeing relatives without question. But many people in rural Helmand already live at the subsistence level, so host families and their guests alike face growing hardship.
The problems began in the planning stages of the Marja operation. For all the attention paid to making civilians aware of the impending battle, the advance efforts fell short of ensuring that fleeing civilians had places to stay with secure access to necessary resources.
NATO and Afghan leaders said they hatched the assault in close co-operation so the military phase can be immediately followed by the establishment of civil administration and services.
But Norine MacDonald, the president of the International Council for Security and Development, which has an office in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, said planners had paid little regard to civilian well-being.
”The forward planning we heard so much about did not include ensuring that the local population would be able to leave and live elsewhere in decent conditions, with access to food and medical care,” she said.
More than 2800 families – averaging about five members each – had been displaced before and during the fighting, said Abdul Rahman Hutaki, the head of the Human Rights and Environment Organisation, an independent Afghan group.
NATO commanders say it could be another three weeks before the area is under control as fighting between militants and the 15,000-strong force of US marines, NATO and Afghan troops is proving ”difficult”.
The US and NATO decision to reach out to the civilian population prior to the offensive in Marja is commendable, but efforts like this will likely continue to fall short in the face of a messy war. In Marja as in so many other places in Afghanistan, a military solution has only made existing problems worse.
The Marja offensive’s impact on civilians
March 4, 2010
tags: Afghanistan, civilian casualties, marja, war
by Chen Lin
A prominent narrative relating to the offensive in Marja has been the military’s emphasis on reducing civilian casualties. For example, the Brookings Institution notes that unlike past operations, the recent US offensive into Marja was announced in advance to Afghanis in order to reduce civilian casualties:
This battle is fascinating for the fact that it was announced repeatedly in advance by NATO commanders. The unusual tactic deprived us of tactical surprise, but General Stanley McChrystal and others clearly felt it even more important to minimize civilian casualties by trying to convince resistance fighters to vacate the area in advance. Even if those insurgents who flee remain free to fight another day, our key premise is that they will not be successful in galvanizing widespread support in Helmand province or elsewhere if we can establish positive momentum first—on the battlefield, and then in improving the lives of Afghan citizens.
The strategy adopted by General McChrysal also serves a broader PR purpose, bolstering US efforts to “win hearts and minds” in Afghanistan, and, indeed, the US. But this approach can only work if it is actually effective in reducing the humanitarian cost of the battle. In reality, civilians always pay dearly for war. That is, as we’ve argued, one of the most fundamental strategic failings of war. As an interview with Radio Free Europe reveals, many civilians remain in the city because they did not escape in time.
“The civilians are trapped because although they had planned to leave after the fighting started in cars or anything they could find, all the roads are mined now and they cannot leave their homes,” said Rahman. “Their food supplies are running out and they face thirst and hunger. People are slaughtering and eating up their cattle. All the shops are closed even as most people stayed behind. Less than 10 percent of the residents left. We have information that civilians have also suffered deaths and injuries and they cannot bury their dead or help their wounded.”
Moreover, as we covered earlier, some 20 civilians have already been killed in the battle. Worse, more are dying because the battle has greatly restricted their access to hospitals:
Most of the wounded civilians recuperating at the whitewashed Italian-run hospital said their injuries were caused by “the foreign soldiers” — a claim that does not bode well for international and Afghan forces who are trying to get residents to renounce the Taliban and embrace the Afghan government.
Bernard Metraux, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Helmand province, told The Associated Press on Wednesday that as many as 40,000 people trapped by fighting in and around Marjah have little to no access to medical care.
The emphasis on the direct casualties of the battle masks a humanitarian crisis of equal magnitude occurring outside of city limits – the plight of the internally displaced. The LATimes reported last Tuesday that since the beginning of the offensive, some 4,000 families have escaped the town. While most currently have access to proper food and shelter, their inability to return home has begun to jeopardize their livelihoods, and there is no guarantee their resources will last:
For agricultural families, the great majority of the town’s residents, each passing day is a countdown to ruin. Worry beads click late into the night as farmers envision their crops dying, livestock scattered or starving, irrigation ditches choked with debris.
Still, many believe their decision to flee may have saved their lives. NATO says 16 civilians have been killed in the offensive, but the Afghanistan Human Rights Commission on Wednesday put the civilian death toll at 28, of whom 13 were children. At least 70 others have been hurt, the group said.
Although most of the displaced have access to food and at least rudimentary shelter, the privations are beginning to grate. Kinship dictates that a family must take in fleeing relatives without question. But many people in rural Helmand already live at the subsistence level, so host families and their guests alike face growing hardship.
The problems began in the planning stages of the Marja operation. For all the attention paid to making civilians aware of the impending battle, the advance efforts fell short of ensuring that fleeing civilians had places to stay with secure access to necessary resources.
NATO and Afghan leaders said they hatched the assault in close co-operation so the military phase can be immediately followed by the establishment of civil administration and services.
But Norine MacDonald, the president of the International Council for Security and Development, which has an office in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, said planners had paid little regard to civilian well-being.
”The forward planning we heard so much about did not include ensuring that the local population would be able to leave and live elsewhere in decent conditions, with access to food and medical care,” she said.
More than 2800 families – averaging about five members each – had been displaced before and during the fighting, said Abdul Rahman Hutaki, the head of the Human Rights and Environment Organisation, an independent Afghan group.
NATO commanders say it could be another three weeks before the area is under control as fighting between militants and the 15,000-strong force of US marines, NATO and Afghan troops is proving ”difficult”.
The US and NATO decision to reach out to the civilian population prior to the offensive in Marja is commendable, but efforts like this will likely continue to fall short in the face of a messy war. In Marja as in so many other places in Afghanistan, a military solution has only made existing problems worse.
Misinformation on Marja battle to mislead US public
Gareth Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specializing in US national security policy, uncovers information on the US-led offensive on Marja, in Afghanistan's Helmand Province. The offensive included 7,500 US, NATO, and Afghan troops. In an article titled "Fiction of Marja as a City Was US Information War," Porter makes three major points.
First, "the picture of Marja presented by military officials and obediently reported by the news media is one of the clearest and most dramatic pieces of misinformation of the entire war." In the highly publicized run-up to the battle, US officials described Marja as "a city of 80,000 people." Porter reports that "Marja is not a city or even a real town, but either a few clusters of farmers' homes or a large agicultural area covering much of the Helmand River Valley, which covers "125 square miles." The focus of the attack was a location in Marja "where farmers gathered for markets" and included "a mosque and a few shops."
Second, Porter asks, "how did the fiction that Marja is a city of 80,000 get started?" "The idea," he reports, "was passed on to the news media by the US Marines in southern Helmand," and then picked up by the Associated Press and other news media. The story that was more or less repeated was that there were as many as a 1,000 insurgents in the town and that there would be deadly "house to house urban street fighting."
Third, why then was the fiction of an urban Marja perpetrated. Porter's answer can be gleaned from from the last two sentences in the article:
"The Washington Post reported Feb. 22 that the decision to launch the offensive against Marja was intended largely to impress US public opinion with the effectiveness of the US military in Afghanistan" - and how Afghan soldiers are becoming ready to engage the enemy and do their part in the fighting that lies ahead.
"The false impression that Marja was a significant city was an essential part of that message."'
One implication of Porter's reporting is that the US command in Afghanistan - and at the Pentagon - is groping for a military strategy that can convince American elected officials and the American public that pouring more resources into the Afghanistan occupation will eventually be successful or cost-effective. They seem to be making it up as they go. What a snow job.
http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/03/08/fiction-of-marjah-as-city.
First, "the picture of Marja presented by military officials and obediently reported by the news media is one of the clearest and most dramatic pieces of misinformation of the entire war." In the highly publicized run-up to the battle, US officials described Marja as "a city of 80,000 people." Porter reports that "Marja is not a city or even a real town, but either a few clusters of farmers' homes or a large agicultural area covering much of the Helmand River Valley, which covers "125 square miles." The focus of the attack was a location in Marja "where farmers gathered for markets" and included "a mosque and a few shops."
Second, Porter asks, "how did the fiction that Marja is a city of 80,000 get started?" "The idea," he reports, "was passed on to the news media by the US Marines in southern Helmand," and then picked up by the Associated Press and other news media. The story that was more or less repeated was that there were as many as a 1,000 insurgents in the town and that there would be deadly "house to house urban street fighting."
Third, why then was the fiction of an urban Marja perpetrated. Porter's answer can be gleaned from from the last two sentences in the article:
"The Washington Post reported Feb. 22 that the decision to launch the offensive against Marja was intended largely to impress US public opinion with the effectiveness of the US military in Afghanistan" - and how Afghan soldiers are becoming ready to engage the enemy and do their part in the fighting that lies ahead.
"The false impression that Marja was a significant city was an essential part of that message."'
One implication of Porter's reporting is that the US command in Afghanistan - and at the Pentagon - is groping for a military strategy that can convince American elected officials and the American public that pouring more resources into the Afghanistan occupation will eventually be successful or cost-effective. They seem to be making it up as they go. What a snow job.
http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/03/08/fiction-of-marjah-as-city.
Saturday, February 13, 2010
Juan Cole update on US-led assault on Marja
Juan Cole reviews current reports on the US-led attacks on Marja, in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The most significant fact here is that the Taliban may have vacated the area and thus avoided a major battle. If this turns out to be true, then the destruction, civilian casualties, and injuries and killing of combatants on both sides may have been minimized.
There are other questions. One of the most important is what happens now in Marja? Will the refugees be able to return to Marja without difficulty? There is a reference in the following report that Afghan police will "establish order." Will they have the motivation and resources to do this in a way that is beneficial to the local people? And, importantly, will there be some sort of meaningful reconstruction or development assistance? We'll see.
Bob
-----------------------------------
Juan Cole, Informed Comment
Saturday, February 13, 2010
NATO/ ANA Assault on Marjah; Has the City already Fallen without a Shot?
AFP reports that the joint NATO/ Afghanistan National Army assault force of 15,000 on Friday moved toward the Helmand city of Marjah, at the center of the poppy growing heartland of Helmand Province. The city of some 80,000 has been surrounded for weeks.
On Friday the road east to the capital, Lashkar Gah, was crowded with Afghans fleeing Marjah, where some had been kept against their will by the Taliban or were too poor to be able to afford to leave.
The military forces are spearheaded by the US Marines and Afghanistan National Army troops, in the first major test of the latter, and a British contingent of over 1,000 is being sent in. Radio Azadi reports in Dari Persian that the helicopter gunships were sent in first.Pajwhok news agency reports that there were 'shaping' attacks on Friday: "In one clash, Marines fought off an ambush against one of their convoys with 50-caliber machine guns and grenade launchers. Reporters with the U.S. 5th Stryker Brigade heard a large explosion, which troops said was from a missile attack against a Taliban compound." These actions appeared to have produced no casualties on Friday, though on Thursday the Taliban had killed a British soldier with a roadside bomb.(Hundreds of miles to the east of Marjah, a suicide bomber wearing an Afghan police uniform wounded 5 US troops when he detonated his payload on Friday.)
But it may be that no Taliban stood and fought as the invasion took place. The USG Open Source center translated an item from the Afghan Islamic Press in Pasho early on Saturday, February 13, 2010 that reported,
' Foreign forces have reportedly captured Marja. Mohammad Salem Wardag, a former member of the Helmand provincial council, told Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) this morning, 13 February, that last night the foreign and domestic forces captured the Marja area (district). Wardag added:
"The local residents told me over the satellite phone that when we woke up this morning, we saw Americans walking in Marja, and they have captured the area." Wardag said no clashes had taken place in Marja and that the foreigners had captured the whole area. '
The Afghan government says it has 1900 police ready to go into Marjah and establish long-term order. But if these police prove corrupt, oppressive, or lazy (and many Afghan police are on the take and are regular drug users), then the area could easily fall back under Taliban rule.CBS News has video on preparations for the assault:AP emphasized the way in which the assembled NATO and ANA forces had surrounded Marjah
There are other questions. One of the most important is what happens now in Marja? Will the refugees be able to return to Marja without difficulty? There is a reference in the following report that Afghan police will "establish order." Will they have the motivation and resources to do this in a way that is beneficial to the local people? And, importantly, will there be some sort of meaningful reconstruction or development assistance? We'll see.
Bob
-----------------------------------
Juan Cole, Informed Comment
Saturday, February 13, 2010
NATO/ ANA Assault on Marjah; Has the City already Fallen without a Shot?
AFP reports that the joint NATO/ Afghanistan National Army assault force of 15,000 on Friday moved toward the Helmand city of Marjah, at the center of the poppy growing heartland of Helmand Province. The city of some 80,000 has been surrounded for weeks.
On Friday the road east to the capital, Lashkar Gah, was crowded with Afghans fleeing Marjah, where some had been kept against their will by the Taliban or were too poor to be able to afford to leave.
The military forces are spearheaded by the US Marines and Afghanistan National Army troops, in the first major test of the latter, and a British contingent of over 1,000 is being sent in. Radio Azadi reports in Dari Persian that the helicopter gunships were sent in first.Pajwhok news agency reports that there were 'shaping' attacks on Friday: "In one clash, Marines fought off an ambush against one of their convoys with 50-caliber machine guns and grenade launchers. Reporters with the U.S. 5th Stryker Brigade heard a large explosion, which troops said was from a missile attack against a Taliban compound." These actions appeared to have produced no casualties on Friday, though on Thursday the Taliban had killed a British soldier with a roadside bomb.(Hundreds of miles to the east of Marjah, a suicide bomber wearing an Afghan police uniform wounded 5 US troops when he detonated his payload on Friday.)
But it may be that no Taliban stood and fought as the invasion took place. The USG Open Source center translated an item from the Afghan Islamic Press in Pasho early on Saturday, February 13, 2010 that reported,
' Foreign forces have reportedly captured Marja. Mohammad Salem Wardag, a former member of the Helmand provincial council, told Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) this morning, 13 February, that last night the foreign and domestic forces captured the Marja area (district). Wardag added:
"The local residents told me over the satellite phone that when we woke up this morning, we saw Americans walking in Marja, and they have captured the area." Wardag said no clashes had taken place in Marja and that the foreigners had captured the whole area. '
The Afghan government says it has 1900 police ready to go into Marjah and establish long-term order. But if these police prove corrupt, oppressive, or lazy (and many Afghan police are on the take and are regular drug users), then the area could easily fall back under Taliban rule.CBS News has video on preparations for the assault:AP emphasized the way in which the assembled NATO and ANA forces had surrounded Marjah
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