Disputing Patraeus

Disputing Patraeus on Progress in theAfghanistan War

General David Patraeus testified before the Senate Arms Services Committee on March 15, providing an annual assessment of the war/occupation in Afghanistan. He is the top gun in Afghanistan as Commander of International Security Assistance Force and Commander of US Forces in Afghanistan. His assessment was cautiously positive about “US-NATO-ISAF” achievements in the past year, and upbeat in his expectations that Afghan forces will be able to take the “the lead” on security efforts by the end of 2014.

Here is how he begins his statement to the committee.

“At a bottom line up front, it is ISAF’s assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas. However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. Moreover, it is clear that much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the expected Taliban spring offensive. Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and early 2011 have enabled the Joint Afghan-NATO Transition Board to recommend initiation this spring of transition to Afghan lead in several provinces. The achievements of the past year are also very important as I prepare to provide options and a recommendation to President Obama for commencement of the drawdown of the US surge forces in July. Of note, as well, the progress achieved has put us on the right azimuth [direction, path] to accomplish the objective agreed upon at last November's Lisbon Summit, that of Afghan forces in the lead throughout the country by the end of 2014.”

Gen. Patraeus reports that the additional troops he has received over the past year, from the beginning of 2010 to early 2011, has made a decided difference. As a result of increased “inputs” from the US and “47 other troop-contributing countries,” 68% coming from the US, the ISAF has been able “to conduct a comprehensive, civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, on staffing those organizations properly, on developing - in close coordination with our Afghan partners - the requisite concepts and plans, and, above all, on deploying the additional forces, civilians, and funding needed.” Continuing: he says: “Indeed, more than 87,000 additional ISAF troopers and 1,000 additional civilians have been added to the effort in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009. And Afghanistan's Security Forces have grown by over 122,000 in that time, as well.”

The overall troop totals add up roughly to 262,000 troops, including 100,000 US troops, 40,000 troops from 47 other countries, and 122,000 Afghan troops. In addition, there are 6,000-8,000 civilians providing “services in logistics, intelligence, stabilization, and reconstruction.” (http://cnas.org/node/5399.), over 112,000 DOD contractors (http://fas.org.sgp/natsec/R40764.pdf), and more Afghan troops in the pipeline.

With all of these inputs, the “core objective” of the war/occupation remains [pathetically]“to ensure that Al-Qaeda is not able to reestablish a sanctuary in Afghanistan.” Al Qaeda! Patraeus implies misleadingly, that there are two options. Win or lose. If US and other foreign troops withdraw from the country prematurely and before the Afghanistan army is able (if ever) to protect the country by itself, then the Taliban (assumed to be a unified force) will take over the country and provide Al-Qaeda with a safe haven for its international terrorist efforts. With Taliban in control of the country and the Al-Qaeda ensconced therein, the “war on terrorism” will suffer a grave setback and US national security will be compromised. From Patraeus’ perspective, these perceived consequences of withdrawal are clearly sufficient to carry on the war/occupation for however long it takes to “win.”

In his assessment to the Senate Arms Services Committee, General Patraeus goes on to make other points. For example, he reports that the ISAF, Afghan, and other “international partners” have more efficiently captured or killed “insurgent leaders,” in recent months, the Taliban have been cleared from critical areas, the number of “weapons and explosive caches turned in” have increased, more troops have been positioned “to interdict the flow of fighters and explosives from insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan.” He also points out that the Afghan Local Police Initiative has been improved and represents movement toward a time when local communities will be able to defend themselves against “insurgents.”

In the meantime, he says, “I have put a conventional US infantry battalion under the operational control of our Special Operations Command in Afghanistan to increase our ability to support the program's expansion.” The US and international forces have gone to improvements in “governance, economic development, and the provision of basic services.”

In a word, General Patraeus’s testimony comes across as expected, with encouraging statements of progress and the promise of continuing successes in the future. But for all of this, of course, there are reasons to reject his cheerleading assessment. Here I’ll allude to a few of the reasons:

(1) the majority of Americans polled do not buy the idea that we should remain in Afghanistan to “get the job done” according to Patraeus and the other generals and hawkish senators and representatives in the Congress.

(2) The opposition in congress is going up. Though still a minority, it is a growing minority.

(3) Gen Patraeus does not say anything in his testimony about the costs to Afghan society and its people from the 10-year old war. There are great costs, the result of the US/NATO/Etc war and occupation or facilitated by them.

(4) The financial costs of the war for the US are great and the money could be alternatively well spent to address domestic economic problems.

(5) The many arguments in opposition to the war are and remain valid.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/threatmatrix/archives/2011/03/full_text_of_general_petraeus.php
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#1 - Contrary to Gen. Patraeus rosy assessment, most Americans don’t buy it and want a speedy withdrawal of US troops from the war

Reporting for The Washington Post, Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen, write on a “new Washington Post-ABC News poll that finds “nearly two-thirds of Americans [who] say [the] Afghan war isn’t worth fighting.” Additionally, almost “three-quarters of Americans say Obama should withdraw a ‘substantial number’ of combat troops from Afghanistan this summer….” Further, “[t]he number of respondents to the Post-ABC News poll who say the war is not worth fighting has risen from 44 percent in late 2009 to 64 percent in the survey conducted last week.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/poll-nearly-two-thirds-of-Americans-say-afghan-war-isn
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#2 - The number of Representatives in the US Congress in favor of a quick withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan has gone up

Here is the full text of a blog entry on March 18, 2011, by Rebecca Griffin, who is a member of Peace Action West.

Yesterday, the House voted on Reps. Kucinich and Jones’ resolution that would have directed the president to remove all US troops from Afghanistan within 30 days, and if that was deemed unsafe, by the end of 2011.

“The bill gave war opponents in the House another opportunity to draw attention to the failing strategy and to highlight growing public opposition to the war. Rep. Farr (D-CA) summed it up effectively when he took to the floor in support of the resolution:

“’As many of my colleagues demand $100 billion spending cuts, they need look no further than our reckless war spending. For the good of our troops and the health of our economy, this war must end.

“’And this viewpoint is shared across the nation. According to a recent Washington Post poll, nearly two-thirds of the American people support an immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan. Mr. Speaker, our job in this chamber is to represent our constituents, and they have spoken loud and clear. The American people are fed up with a war that has done little to improve our national security or bolster our international standing. Furthermore, after nearly ten years of fighting, it is crystal clear that the problem in Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means alone.

"Stabilization and reconstruction, governance, and peace-building activities can help to stabilize states, promote rule of law, and bring enduring peace at a sliver of the cost we pay for troops on the ground.’

“In the end, 93 representatives voted in favor of the bill. While we would have preferred a majority, it’s important to keep in mind that at this time last year, only 65 representatives voted in favor of a nearly identical bill. That’s significant growth, especially when many members of

“Congress are hesitant to ‘tie the president’s hands’ with specific dates, especially ones that specifically contradict his stated plan. More and more members of Congress are willing to draw a line and say it’s time to get out. See how your representative voted here.

“Some Senate Republicans criticized what they called ‘mixed messages’ about whether the US is staying or going in Afghanistan when General Petraeus testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee this week. They’re right, though I’m sure we want the administration to affirm the opposite messages. When we continue to get members of Congress on the record with votes like this, we are saying that the one message is clear: it’s time for this war to end.”

http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2011/03/18/vote-count-grows-for-quick-withdrawal-from-afghanistan
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#3 – Patraeus unsurprisingly says nothing about the costs to Afghan society and its people.

There were many articles that appeared during the weeks before and after Patraeus testimony that reminded us of the great costs and harms of the war and occupation for the Afghan civilian population and society. On our blog stopafghanwar, we have paid a great deal of attention to the devastation and death wrought by this horrendous situation. Here are sections from two articles that complement and amplify our concerns.

First, Patrick Kelly provides the following summary in his article “Pursuing Peace in Afghan,” for Voices for Creative Nonviolence. Here are two paragraphs from Kelly’s piece.

“Environmental degradation, poverty, and inadequate health care delivery are some of the serious challenges facing this country. Electrical outages are common and clean water does not appear to be in Afghanistan’s immediate future. It is also apparent that the Kabul’s infrastructure has not benefitted in a meaningful way from the billions of dollars that have flowed into Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion. The sewage and sanitation system is exposed and as the busses, cars, truck, and donkey carts maneuver the paved and unpaved roads around the city they create clouds of deadly air. The streets and neighborhoods are a collection of brick and mud homes, bombed out buildings, and piles of rubble that have survived the thirty years of war but do not provide adequate shelter for their residents. Garbage piles, excrement, and animals abound creating a smelly and unsanitary environment. It is these conditions that explain why Afghanistan has the highest rate of fecal matter in the air of any place in the world. These poor living conditions result in nearly 3,000 people dying a year from diseases and medical conditions related to the pollution (wagingnonviolence.com) and a life expectancy of forty five years. Afghanistan is also the third poorest nation in the world. The country is overflowing with orphans, widows, unemployed, and underemployed. The United Nations reports that 36 % of Afghans live on less than a dollar a day. Compounding the problem is that since the US invasion Kabul’s population has grown by over 600 percent. Outside of Kabul, the situation is not much better. Nearly 850 children die from respiratory, gastrointestinal diseases, and malnourishment per day (Save the Children, 2010). These are just some of the challenges facing the nation as people continue to deal with thirty years of war that have gripped Afghanistan.

“Violence is the other major challenge facing the country. The Red Cross says the security situation in the country is deteriorating and life is untenable (International Red Cross, March 15, 2011) The threat of violence is never far from people’s minds and the reality that violence could break out at any time is a constant challenge for Afghans. Since December 2010, levels of violence have increased across the country and Kabul has been rocked by three suicide bombings. While the ISAF is hidden behind 12 foot blast walls rung with barbed wire and sentry post, the day to day security operations are left to Afghans. On nearly every block there are people with automatic weapons patrolling the streets, acting as security for private institutions, and staffing the official and unofficial checkpoints that dot the city. The situation is further complicated by the blast walls and the barb wire which make the city look like an armed camp.

The resulting siege mentality and threat of violence creates futility and shows that the current strategy in Afghanistan is not working.”

http://vcnv.org/pursuing-peace-in-afghanistan

Second, Kathy Kelly offers in her article “Incalculable – the human cost of NATO’s war on Afghanistan, printed by Pulse Media, March 9, 2011, heart-rending examples of a few of the many thousands of Afghan children killed, maimed, or driven into child labor out of desperation in this war. Here is some of what Kelly writes, from her personal witness in Afghanistan as well as from media reports.

“U.S. people, if they do read or hear of it, may be shocked at the apparent unconcern of the crews of two U.S. helicopter gunships, which attacked and killed nine children on a mountainside in Afghanistan’s Kunar province, shooting them ‘one after another’ this past Tuesday March 1st. (‘The helicopters hovered over us, scanned us and we saw a green flash from the helicopters. Then they flew back high up, and in a second round they hovered over us and started shooting.’ (NYT 3/2/11)).

“Four of the boys were seven years old; three were eight, one was nine and the oldest was twelve. ‘The children were gathering wood under a tree in the mountains near a village in the district,’ said Noorullah Noori, a member of the local development council in Manogai district. ‘I myself was involved in the burial,’ Noori said. ‘Yesterday we buried them.’ (AP, March 2, 2011) General Petraeus has acknowledged, and apologized for, the tragedy.

“He has had many tragedies to apologize for just counting Kunar province alone. Last August 26th, in the Manogai district, Afghan authorities accused international forces of killing six children during an air assault on Taliban positions. Provincial police chief Khalilullah Ziayee said a group of children were collecting scrap metal on the mountain when NATO aircraft dropped bombs to disperse Taliban fighters attacking a nearby base. ‘In the bombardment six children, aged six to 12, were killed,’ the police commander said. ‘Another child was injured.’

“In the Bamiyan province of Afghanistan, Zekirullah, a young Afghan friend of mine, age 15, rises at 2:00 a.m. several mornings each week and rides his donkey for six hours through the pre-dawn to reach a mountainside where he can collect scrub brush and twigs which he loads on the donkey in baskets. Then he heads home and stacks the wood – on top of his family’s home – to be taken down later and burned for heat. They don’t have electrical appliances to heat the home, and even if they did the villagers only get electricity for two hours a day, generally between 1:00 a.m. – 3:00 a.m. Families rely on their children to collect fuel for heat during the harsh winters and for cooking year round. Young laborers, wanting to help their families survive, mean no harm to the United States. They’re not surging at us, or anywhere: they’re not insurgents.

"They’re not doing anything to threaten us. They are children, and children anywhere are like children everywhere: they’re children like our own.

“Sadly, more and more of us in America are getting used to the idea of child poverty – and even child labor – as our own economy sinks further under the burden of our latest nine years of war, of two billion dollars per week we spend creating poverty abroad that we can then emulate at home. Things are getting bad here, but in Afghanistan, children are bombed. Their bodies are casually dismembered and strewn by machines already lost in the horizon as the limbs settle. They lie in pools of blood until family members realize, one by one, that their children are not late in returning home but in fact never will.”

http://nwoobserver.com/2011/03/09/incalculable-the-human-cost-of-nato%E2%80%99s-war-on-afghanistan
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#4 -The enormous financial costs of the war for the US are great and the money could be better spent to address domestic economic problems.

In an article written for Sojourner’s online magazine, Jim Wallis discusses some of the costs of the Afghanistan war here in the US. Here is most of his article.

[….]

“What weighs on my mind is the growing cost of war and that so few are actually seeing the bill, both human and financial. In the two wars, there have been nearly 6,000 U.S. deaths and 40,000 wounded. Tens of thousands of others suffer from post-traumatic stress and other psychological disorders, and a growing number of veterans are committing suicide. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Afghans have died, which is hardly ever a focus of American consciousness.

“There has also been a huge financial cost. The war in Afghanistan now costs more than $100 billion per year, and the cost of caring for veterans is steadily rising. From 2001 to the present, the two wars have cost approximately $1.3 trillion. Economists Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes estimate that the total cost could go as high as $4 trillion to $6 trillion, including continuing care for veterans and the opportunity cost of inadequate funding for domestic investments.

“With unemployment and poverty rates at near-record highs, this misuse of our precious resources is staggering. President Dwight Eisenhower once reminded us, ‘Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.’

“The military budget in FY 2010 was nearly $700 billion, with an additional $37 billion for Afghanistan. If we include the defense and homeland security expenses outside the Defense Department, the total exceeds $1 trillion. By contrast, all other discretionary domestic programs totaled approximately $400 billion. It is exactly the situation Martin Luther King warned of when he said, ‘A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.’

“How do we break this military addiction? People respond to incentives. If they know they are going to be footing the bill for something, they are more likely to count the cost. If we were paying extra taxes to fund the war and every family knew they might have to pay the human cost, we would be more careful about what we committed ourselves to.

“We are paying billions of dollars for weapon systems the military hasn't even asked for and doesn't need. Weapons manufacturing brings jobs to congressional districts, which keeps politicians in office. Those workers, and the politicians they elect, will do everything they can to preserve defense contracts -- whether or not they're beneficial to our security or our fiscal health.

“Many of those in the weapons industry are good people, working hard to support their families. I doubt they often think about what they are making or what it will be used for. We rarely hear Eisenhower's term "military-industrial complex" any more. But we have a system in which too many people rely on war and the tools of war for their livelihood. Good people in a bad system can have a lot of bad results.

“Part of our moral recovery must be to challenge the influence of this powerful engine. With the growing national concern over the deficit, and the desperate need for investment in our future, the amount of money spent on war is no longer tenable.

“There are many reasons to end the war in Afghanistan, as the articles in this issue explain. But the unaffordable cost is another compelling reason that we cannot ignore. Even some of the newly elected "tea party" members of Congress are raising this concern. The desire to restore fiscal sanity and to stop mortgaging our children’s future stretches across the political spectrum.

“It is time for the war in Afghanistan to end. Our financial and spiritual health depends on it.”

Jim Wallis is editor-in-chief of Sojourners.

http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=magazine.article&issue=soj1103&article=the-cost-of-war
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#5 – Many arguments against the war.

You can find a list and discussions of a host of the arguments that have been made against the war in Afghanistan, all of which are relevant for the ongoing debate over when, if ever, to withdraw US troops from the country. Here is the list. You can find the discussions at Wikipedia,
“Opposition to the War in Afghanistan (2001-present). (See URL at the end of the list.)

1 Disputed legality of the U.S. invasion

2 Involvement in an Afghan civil war

3 Afghan civilian opposition to the invasion

4 Afghan civilian casualties

5 Coalition military casualties

6 International public opinion

7 International protests against the war

8 Foreign military occupation

9 Foreign military raids of Afghan homes

10 Destruction of Afghan homes and crops

11 Rejection of the terrorism argument

11.1 Creating and training insurgents

11.1.1 Insurgent detention and recruitment facilities

11.1.2 Incubating and disseminating bomb-making expertise

12 Geo-political and corporate interests

12.1 U.S. energy interests

12.1.1 Pipeline path 'clearing and holding' forces

12.2 War in Afghanistan as a demonstration of U.S. military power

13 Thriving opium production since the invasion

14 Financial cost of the war to taxpayers and Western economies

15 Length of the war

15.1 Comparison to the length of the Soviet war in Afghanistan

15.2 Decades of war imposed on Afghans

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposition_to_the_War_in_Afghanistan_(2001%E280%93present)#Financial_cost_of_war_to_taxpayer_and_Western_economies
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In short, most Americans who think about the war are opposed to it. And General David Patraeus testimony before the Senate committee is hardly going to change minds, but it does provide a cover for the majority of Senators and Representatives who will go along with his recommendations and appeals for full funding of the war.

The evidence contradicting Patraeus’ sanitized commentary is belied by a growing mountain of evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, what the majority of citizens think, and even minimal democracy, does not seem to matter. Democratic President Obama and Republican President Bush seem to present variations on the same tune coming from the military brass and weapons’ makers – stay the course. It’s the same old duopoly and same old military-industrial complex.

What is encouraging is that the opposition to the Afghanistan war still has many supporters and voices.

Afghanistan - much that's going wrong

Surely, we cannot go on supporting the war in Afghanistan when there is so much that is going wrong for the US/NATO occupation of the country, so many civilian and military casualties, so much poverty and so little progress for most of the Afghan people, so much corruption in the Afghan government and among US contractors, so much waste of US resources in a war that seems to chase its own tail.
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Even Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates seems discouraged about US prospects in Afghanistan, as reported as follows by Thom Shanker for the New York Times (Feb. 25, 2011).

“Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates bluntly told an audience of West Point cadets on Friday that it would be unwise for the United States to ever fight another war like Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the chances of carrying out a change of government in that fashion again were slim.

‘In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it,’ Mr. Gates told an assembly of Army cadets here.”
Secretary Gates did not mean to suggest that such wars are out of the question, but only that they should be based less on ground forces and more on “air and sea” power – and perhaps, implicitly, on pilotless drones and other mechanized warfare. Still, the Secretary and other leaders must be weighed down by the US devastation sheer price of it all caused by their policies in Iraq and now Afghanistan, with at the moment no end in sight. Where is the “democracy” and progress they promised, as all US leaders have done to justify invasions and wars.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/26gates.html
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Ordinary Americans have caught this dark and dismal mood, as reflected in public opinion polls anyway. There is an overall trend in the news coverage of the Afghanistan War among people in the US who are questioned by pollsters. Those responding to unfavorable choices about the war are growing in number while the number of those responding favorably to US involvement in Afghanistan is falling. You can see the results of polls going back in some cases to 2007 or earlier at Polling Report.com. - Afghanistan. Support for the war in Afghanistan is declining among US citizens. Not good news for US Afghan policymakers. Here are examples of responses from two recent polls.

A CBS News Poll conducted from February 11-14, 2011 and based on 1,031 interviews found that 54 percent of the respondents indicate that the US “should…not be involved in Afghanistan now.” Only 37 percent agreed with the other option that “the US is doing the right thing. Nine percent were “unsure.” In the same CBS News Poll, the pattern held up in the responses to another question. The question, “What is your impression of how the war in Afghanistan is going for the US right now,” 55% chose “somewhat badly” (36%) or “very badly” (19%) compared to 36% who chose “somewhat well” (33%) or “very well” (3%).

A poll of 1,012 people by CNN/Opinion Research found 58 percent of the respondents who “oppose the US War in Afghanistan,” and a lesser percentage of 40% who “favor the US war in Afghanistan.”
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A similar climate of opinion seems to hold among Afghans. The Huffington Post (Dec. 6, 2010) titles an article “Afghanistan Poll: Afghans Lose Confidence in US and NATO Forces. The poll, “based on face-to-face interviews with a random sample of nearly 1,700 Afghan adults in all 34 of the country’s provinces,” was “conducted from Oct. 29-Nov. 13 [2010] by ABC News, the BBC, ARD German TV and the Washington Post.” Here are two relevant quotes from the article.
“Monday's survey also showed Afghans are losing confidence in the United States and NATO to provide security in their country, and they are more willing to see a negotiated settlement with the Taliban than they were last year.

“Just 36 percent of those polled expressed confidence in the U.S. and NATO to bring stability, down by 12 percentage points from last year and down by 31 percentage points since 2006. The survey also said 73 percent favor a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, up by 13 percentage points since 2007.”
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While Secretary of Defense Gates seems demoralized, you can say that at least he seems guided by a certain rationality about the present and future of warfare. The same cannot be said of an outburst by General Patraeus. On Antiwar.com (Feb 21, 2001), Jason Ditz captures what happened, and it appears to be a sudden loss of concentration or an expression of pent-up rage on the part of the general. Who knows? The title of Ditz’ article is “Petraeus Accuses Afghan Parents of Burning Kids to Make US Look Bad. Here is some of what Ditz penned:

“One would think that the effort to downplay the killings of as many as 64 civilians, including a large number of children, would be enough to spark considerable anti-US outrage, but apparently Gen. David Petraeus saw an opportunity to make things even worse, and took it.
“In a closed door meeting aimed at explaining why they had killed so many civilians, Gen. Petraeus actually accused parents in the region of burning their own children in an attempt to raise the death count and make the US look bad.
[….]

“The US has a long history of making up ridiculous hypotheticals that might explain away massive civilian death tolls, including the May 2009 Farah Province massacre, in which the US initially claimed the Taliban had “pre-killed” a large number of civilians and stored them in buildings before tricking the US into bombing them, scattering the bodies. They later admitted the claim was entirely made up.

“….This appears, however, to be the first time they actually accused parents of killing their children just to make the US occupation look bad.”
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The bad news onslaught is tragically reflected in other recent new items. Consider just five recent sources worth looking up.

#1 - The Independent. Uk posted on their website the following AP news item that “Afghan security worst for 10 years, says UN.” The post, from Feb 24, 2011, reports, ‘Security in the country is at its lowest level for a decade and two-fifths of the country is off-limits,’ according to “Robert Watkins, a Canadian diplomat and the UN's deputy special representative in Afghanistan.” Watkins is also quoted as saying, the occupation is‘at its lowest point since the departure of the Taliban" following the 2001 invasion.’”

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/afghan-security-worst-for-10-years-says-un-2223699.html
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#2 – C.J. Civers, Alissa J. Rubin, and Wesley Morgan write about “US Pulling Back in Afghan Valley It Called Vital to War,” Feb 24, 2011
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/asia/25afghanistan.html
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#3 – Slobodan Lekic, “NATO: Afghan [troop] attrition remains stubbornly high,” Yahoo News, Feb 23, 2011.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110223/ap_on_re_en/eu_nato_afghan_training
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#4 – Emma Graham-Harrison, “NATO’s Afghan night raids come with high civilian cost.”
http://ca.reuters.com/articles/topNews/idCATRE71N15U20110224
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#5 – John Donnelly, “Pentagon Contracts: No bid required,” Congress.org, Feb 15, 2011
http://www.congress.org/new/2011/02/15/pentagon_contracts_no_bids_required

US troop casualties in Afghanistan are rising, contrary to Petraeus' claim

The basic point of Gareth Porter's well written and fact-based article is that the officially documented trend in US troop casualties in Afganistan contradict what Gen. Petraeus has publicly claimed. The evidence indicates the US troop casualties are rising. This trend challenges the general's position that counterinsurgency accompanied by more troops is quelling the Afghan insurgency. Rather than conceding the point that the counterinsurgency strategy is not working, other sources (some posted elsewhere on this blog) report that Patraeus wants more troops and more time to get the job done. If recent trends continue, Patraeus' strategy, backed by the Obama and his administration, means more US casualties as well.

Petraeus Spin on Afghan War Belied by Soaring Casualties
by Gareth Porter, September 10, 2010
http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/09/09/petraeus-spin-on-afghan-war-belied-by-soaring-casualties

Gen. David Petraeus claimed limited success this week in the war within a war over the Taliban’s planting of roadside bombs, but official Pentagon data shows the Taliban clearly winning that war by planting more bombs and killing many more U.S. and NATO troops since the troop surge began in early 2010.

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal published Tuesday, Petraeus asserted that the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Taliban had "flattened" over the past year and attributed that alleged success to pressures by the U.S. military, and especially the increased tempo of Special Operations Forces raids against Taliban units.

Data provided by the Pentagon’s Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), however, shows that IEDs planted by Afghan insurgents killed nearly 40 percent more U.S. and NATO troops in the first eight months of 2010 than in the comparable period of 2009.

The data also show that Taliban IEDs wounded 2,025 U.S. and NATO troops in the first eight months of this year – almost twice the 1,035 wounded in the same months last year.
In the Journal interview, Petraeus said that the data on violent incidents in Afghanistan indicate a slowly improving security situation.

[....]

The total number of IED incidents in Afghanistan began to rise steeply in March 2010 to a new high of 1,087 and then continued to climb to 1,128 in May and again to 1,258 in August.

[....]

In late 2005, the civilian population was informing U.S. and NATO troops of about 15 percent of of all IEDs planted. That proportion fell to just over nine percent in 2006, to less than seven percent in 2007 to about three percent in 2008, and again to 2.8 percent in 2009.
In the first six months of 2010, that ratio dropped to 2.6 percent, and in May and June it fell to 1.4 and one percent, respectively.

[....]

The steep decline in the proportion of IEDs turned in by the population as more U.S. and NATO troops intruded on the Pashtun countryside is another reliable indicator – supporting opinion surveys in Helmand and Kandahar provinces – of the deterioration of relations between foreign troops and the population.

US military plans and requests suggest a long occupation in Afghanistan

The website Antiwar.com is an excellent source of news and reports on countries around the world. The focus is usually critical and on situations that have some relevance to US foreign and military policies.

Today, one of the many articles posted is about Gen. Patraeus request for 2,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. You can find the full article at: http://news.antiwar.com/2010/09/06/patraeus-seeks-more-troops-for-afghanistan.

Another article (see below) deals with plans for the US to spend $6 billion a year on the Afghan police and military forces, probably a low-ball estimate.

These articles unfortunately suggest that US military leaders in Afghanistan are expecting to be in the country for many years. This follows the pattern of US military wars and interventions around the world since at least the Korean War. Once in a country, stay there.

US Plans to Spend $6 Billion a Year on Afghan Troops
Posted By Jason Ditz On September 6, 2010
http://news.antiwar.com/2010/09/06/us-plans-to-spend-6-billion-a-year-on-afghan-troops

According to previously undisclosed estimates, the United States is planning to spend $6 billion annually on supporting Afghanistan’s military and police starting in 2011, an expense which given the weak Afghan economy will probably continue more or less forever.

But the estimate could also be unrealistically low, as the administration spent about $9 billion this year and is planning to spend $11.6 billion next year on this expense. As US plans to increase the size of Afghanistan’s military seem to grow virtually annually, it seems the expected “drop” past 2011 is not based on anything.

Training pledges and goals seem to constantly go unfulfilled, and most officials openly say that it will take another decade, at best, to build the Afghan security forces, so the $6 billion “maintenance” level, which will be quite a bit lower than the training costs, will likely not come for quite some time.

This cost is only a comparatively small percentage of the overall amount the US spends annually on its occupation of Afghanistan. But it serves as perhaps the clearest reminder of how long the Obama Administration intends to keep the US chained to Afghanistan.

Article printed from News From Antiwar.com: http://news.antiwar.com

Gen Pataeus advances idea of extending US occupation in Afghanistan

The Following two news items present some disouraging information, namely, that Gen. Patraeus is using his dubiously iconic influence to postpone the withdrawal process of US troops from Afghanistan. Since President Obama appointed the general to his present leadership role in Afghanistan, this may indeed become the accepted policy. If it should become the policy, the war without a reasonable public objective and with great costs to ordinary Afghans, the Afghan environment and infrastructure, and to American troops and taxpayers; the war that is opposed by an increasing percentage of American citizens and by citizens in most other countries; the unwinnable war that threatens to strengthen the US militarized foreign policy and continue to disfavor diplomatic initiatives, especially regional ones - will continue. If there are motives for this war, they involve imperialistic, non-democratic, interests.


First Item:
Headline from Democracy Now, 8-16-10

Gen: Petraeus Hints Scheduled Afghan Withdrawal Could Be Postponed

The top US military official in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, has launched a public relations campaign to build support for the US war effort. During an appearance on Meet the Press, Petraeus asserted that the US strategy in Afghanistan is "fundamentally sound," but he hinted that he might oppose President Obama’s plan to begin withdrawing troops next summer. Although the troop withdrawal is scheduled to begin next July, Petraeus said the withdrawal date is not set in stone.

Gen. David Petraeus: "This is a date when a process begins that is conditions-based. And as the conditions permit, we transition tasks to our Afghan counterparts and the security forces and in various governmental institutions, and that enables a, quote, 'responsible' drawdown of our forces."

Second Item:

Gen. Petraeus Cautions Against ‘Rapid Pullout’ in Afghanistan
Posted By Jason Ditz On August 15, 2010

In a pair of interviews released today, General David Petraeus seemed to be setting Americans up for years of additional war in Afghanistan, cautioning against a “rapid pullout” while raising the possibility that he would oppose even a trivial July 2011 drawdown.

Rather Gen. Petraeus maintains that he is “not bound” by the July 2011 date and reserves the right to tell the president at that time, which will be just shy of the 10 year anniversary of the invasion, is “too soon.”

Though it is difficult to imagine how anything the US does at this point in what is arguable the longest war in American history would constitute a “rapid pullout,” Gen. Petraeus seems to be backing off all promises of “gains” by the end of the year, while the same time maintaining that the progress is being made.

But instead of being able to demonstrate this progress at a time when all of the metrics are showing a war getting worse and worse, the general seems to be trying to delay backing up these claims in the future, insisting only that he hopes to demonstrate the progress before July of next year. Even this seems to be at best prospective, and will likely get shrugged off in the future as the situation warrants.

Article printed from News From Antiwar.com: http://news.antiwar.com
URL to article: http://news.antiwar.com/2010/08/15/gen-petraeus-cautions-against-rapid-pullout-in-afghanistan/

Wikileaks revelations won't end the war

Noam Chomsky's article comes from the magazine In These Times. I take excerpts from the article. Chomsky's agrees that the wikileaks documents may help to raise questions about the U.S. role in Afghanistan and challenge Obama's and the media echo chamber's justifications for it. However, in his view, while documents like those released by WikiLeaks may help to increase opposition to the war/occupation in Afghanistan, it will take a riled and mobilized American citizenry to bring it to an end.

This article is permanently archived at: http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280/


Why WikiLeaks Won’t Stop the War
By Noam Chomsky


http://www.inthesetimes.com/main/article/6280



August 3, 2010


The War Log...released on the Internet by the organization WikiLeaks--documents a grim struggle becoming grimmer, from the U.S. perspective. And for the Afghans, a mounting horror.


While the documents are generally viewed as providing support against the continued war and occupation of Afghanistan by U.S. troops, Chomsky has another view. The War Logs, however valuable, may contribute to the unfortunate and prevailing doctrine that wars are wrong only if they aren't successful--rather like the Nazis felt after Stalingrad.


Last month came the fiasco of Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, forced to retire as commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and replaced by his superior, Gen. David H. Petraeus.


A plausible consequence is a relaxation of the rules of engagement so that it becomes easier to kill civilians, and an extension of the war well into the future as Petraeus uses his clout in Congress to achieve this result.


President Obama's principal justification of the continued Afghanistan intervention makes little sense. [....] The official goal is to protect ourselves from al-Qaida, a virtual organization, with no specific base -- a "network of networks" and "leaderless resistance," as it's been called in the professional literature. Now, even more so than before, al-Qaida consists of relatively independent factions, loosely associated throughout the world.


The CIA estimates that 50 to 100 al-Qaeda activists may now be in Afghanistan, and there is no indication that the Taliban want to repeat the mistake of offering sanctuary to al-Qaeda.
[....]


In February, in the first exercise of Obama's new strategy, U.S. Marines conquered Marja, a minor district in Helmand province, the main center of the insurgency, but failed to oust the Taliban permanently.
[....]


According to Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commander of the Marine expeditionary brigade in Helmand Province. `Most people here identify themselves as Taliban. [....]


Chomsky compares the situation being faced by the U.S. military forces to what U.S. forces confronted in Vietman in 1969.


[....] In 1969, Douglas Pike, the leading U.S. government scholar on Vietnam, lamented that the enemy--the National Liberation Front--was the only "truly mass-based political party in South Vietnam." Pike then recommended that the only way to overcome the NLF's political force was
by using our comparative advantage, violence--with horrifying results.


Chomsky also refers to other comparable unwinnable situation, for example to the Russians in Afghanistan during the 1980s, where they won every battle but lost the war.

[....]


After the Marja triumph, the U.S.-led forces were expected to assault the major city of Kandahar, where, according to a U.S. Army poll in April, the military operation is opposed by 95 percent of the population, and 5 out of 6 regard the Taliban as "our Afghan brothers"--again, echoes of earlier conquests. The Kandahar plans were delayed, part of the background for McChrystal's leavetaking.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that U.S. authorities are concerned that public support for the war in Afghanistan may erode even further.

In May, WikiLeaks released a March CIA memorandum about how to sustain Western Europe's support for the war. The memorandum's subtitle: "Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough."
[....]

Democratic societies rely not on force but on propaganda, engineering consent by "necessary illusion" and "emotionally potent oversimplication," to quote Obama's favorite philosopher, Reinhold Niebuhr.

The battle to control the internal enemy, then, remains highly pertinent--indeed, the future of the war in Afghanistan may hinge on it.

© The New York Times Syndicate

Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor & Professor of Linguistics (Emeritus) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the author of dozens of books on U.S. foreign policy. He writes a monthly column for The New York Times News Service/Syndicate.

Counterinsurgency is Counterproductive

Ann Jones, award-winning journalist and women's rights activist, offers an insightful and informative, first-hand, and passionate analysis of how the US counterinsurgency policy in Afghanistan is, has been, and will continue to be a losing proposition at tremendous costs to Afghans, US troops, and further undermine the diminishing US international credibility that still exists. I found her article at http://www.zcommunications.org/counterinsurgency-down-for-the-count-in-afghanistan-by-ann-jones. The article was included there in Ann Jone's ZSpace Page. The original source of the article is Tom Dispatch.

Counterinsurgency Down for the Count in Afghanistan...
But the War Machine Grinds On and On and On
By Ann Jones
Source: TomDispatch
Friday, July 02, 2010
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Ann Jones's ZSpace PageJoin ZSpace


....Why, when President Obama fires an insubordinate and failing general, does he cling to his failing war policy? And if our strategy isn't working, what about the enemy's? And if nothing much is working, why does it still go on nonstop this way? Let's take these one at a time.

1. What do you mean by "it's not working"?"It" is counterinsurgency or COIN, which, in fact, is really less of a strategy than a set of tactics in pursuit of a strategy. Counterinsurgency doctrine, originally designed by empires intending to squat on their colonies forever, calls for elevating the principle of "protecting the population" above pursuing the bad guys at all cost. Implementing such a strategy quickly becomes a tricky, even schizophrenic, balancing act, as I recently was reminded.

I just spent some time embedded with the U.S. Army at a forward operating base near the Pakistan border where, despite daily "sig acts" -- significant activity of a hostile nature -- virtually every "lethal" American soldier is matched by a "nonlethal" counterpart whose job it is, in one way or another, to soften up those civilians for "protection."General McChrystal himself played both roles. As the U.S. commander, he was responsible for killing what he termed, at one point, "an amazing number of people" who were not threats, but he also regularly showed up at Afghan President Hamid Karzai's palace to say, "Sorry." Karzai praised him publicly for his frequent apologies (each, of course, reflecting an American act or acts that killed civilians), though angry Afghans were less impressed.

The part of the lethal activity that often goes awry is supposed to be counterbalanced by the "sorry" part, which may be as simple as dispatching U.S. officers to drink humble tea with local "key leaders." Often enough, though, it comes in the form of large, unsustainable gifts. The formula, which is basic COIN, goes something like this: kill some civilians in the hunt for the bad guys and you have to make up for it by building a road....

Many Afghans, of course, are angry because they haven't been compensated at all, not even with a road to nowhere. Worse yet, more often than not, they've been promised things that never materialize. (If you were to summarize the history of the country as a whole in these last years, it might go like this: big men -- both Afghan and American -- make out like the Beltway Bandits many of them are, while ordinary Afghans in the countryside still wish their kids had shoes.)

And don't forget the majority of Afghans in the countryside who have scarcely been consulted at all: women. To protect Afghan women from foreign fighters, Afghan men lock them up -- the women, that is. American military leaders slip easily into the all-male comfort zone, probably relieved perhaps to try to win the "hearts and minds" of something less than half "the population."It's only in the last year or two that the Marines and the Army started pulling a few American women off their full-time non-combat jobs and sending them out as Female Engagement Teams (FETs) to meet and greet village women. As with so many innovative new plans in our counterinsurgency war, this one was cobbled together in a thoughtless way that risked lives and almost guaranteed failure.

Commanders have casually sent noncombatant American women soldiers -- supply clerks and radio operators -- outside the wire, usually with little training, no clear mission, and no follow up. Predictably, like their male counterparts, they have left a trail of good intentions and broken promises behind. So when I went out to meet village women near the Pakistan border last week with a brand-new Army FET-in-training, we faced the fury of Pashto women still waiting for a promised delivery of vegetable seeds.

[....]

....It turns out that the women of Afghanistan, whom George W. Bush claimed to have liberated so many years ago, are still mostly oppressed, impoverished, malnourished, uneducated, short of seeds, and mad as hell.

Count them among a plentiful crew of angry Afghans who are living proof that "it's not working" at all. Afghans, it seems, know the difference between genuine apologies and bribes, true commitment and false promises, generosity and self-interest. And since the whole point of COIN is to gain the hearts and minds of "the population," those angry Afghans are a bad omen for the U.S. military and President Obama.

Moreover, it's not working for a significant subgroup of Americans in Afghanistan either: combat soldiers. I've heard infantrymen place the blame for a buddy's combat injury or death on the strict rules of engagement ("courageous restraint," as it's called) imposed by General McChrystal's version of COIN strategy....

It's also clear that even the lethal part of counterinsurgency isn't working. Consider all those civilian deaths and injuries, so often the result of false information fed to Americans to entice them to settle local scores. To give just one example: American troops recently pitched hand grenades into a house in Logar Province which they'd been told was used by terrorists. Another case of false information. It held a young Afghan, a relative of an Afghan agricultural expert who happens to be an acquaintance of mine. The young man had just completed his religious education and returned to the village to become its sole maulawi, or religious teacher. The villagers, very upset, turned out to vouch for him, and the Army hospitalized him with profuse apologies. Luckily, he survived, but such routine mistakes regularly leave dead or wounded civilians and a thickening residue of rage behind.

Reports coming in from observers and colleagues in areas of the Pashtun south, once scheduled to be demonstration sites for McChrystal's cleared, held, built, and better-governed Afghanistan, are generally grim. Before his resignation, the general himself was already referring to Marja -- the farming area (initially trumpeted as a "city of 80,000 people") where he launched his first offensive -- as "a bleeding ulcer." He also delayed the highly publicized advance into Kandahar, the country's second largest city, supposedly to gain more time to bring around the opposing populace, which includes President Karzai. Meanwhile, humanitarian NGOs based in Kandahar complain that they can't do their routine work assisting the city's inhabitants while the area lies under threat of combat. Without assistance, Kandaharis grow -- you guessed it -- angrier.

From Kandahar province, where American soldiers mass for the well-advertised securing of Kandahar, come reports that the Afghan National Army (ANA) is stealing equipment -- right down to bottled drinking water -- from the U.S. military and selling it to the Taliban. U.S. commanders can't do much about it because the official American script calls for the ANA to take over responsibility for national defense.

NATO soldiers have complained all along about the ill-trained, uninterested troops of the ANA, but the animosity between them seems to have grown deadly in some quarters. American soldiers in Kandahar report that, for their own security, they don't tell their ANA colleagues when and where they're going on patrol. Back in the 1980s, in the anti-Soviet jihad we supported, we trained Afghan jihadists who have today become our worst enemies, and now we may be doing it again.

Factor in accounts of what General McChrystal did best: taking out bad guys. Reportedly, he was vigorously directing Special Forces' assassinations of high and mid-level Taliban leaders in preparation for "peeling off" the "good" Taliban -- that is, those impoverished fighters only in it for the money. According to his thinking, they would later be won over to the government through internationally subsidized jobs. But assassinating the ideological leaders, the true believers and organizers -- or those we call the bad Taliban -- actually leaves behind leaderless, undisciplined gangs of armed rent-a-guns more interested in living off the population we're supposed to protect than being peeled off into abject Afghan poverty. From the point of view of ordinary Afghans in the countryside, our "good Taliban" are the worst of all.

I could go on. If you spend time in Afghanistan, evidence of failure is all around you, including those millions of American taxpayer dollars that are paid to Afghan security contractors (and Karzai relatives) and then handed over to insurgents to buy protection for U.S. supply convoys traveling on U.S. built, but Taliban-controlled, roads. Strategy doesn't get much worse than that: financing both sides, and every brigand in between, in hopes of a happier ending someday.

2. So why does Obama stick to this failed policy?

Go figure. Maybe he's been persuaded by Pentagon hype. Replacing General McChrystal with Centcom commander General David Petraeus brought a media golden-oldies replay of Petraeus's greatest hits: his authorship of the Army's counterinsurgency manual, updated (some say plagiarized) from a Vietnam-era edition, and of Bush's 2007 "surge" in Iraq, an exercise in sectarian cleansing now routinely called a "success." If you can apply the word "success" to any operation in Iraq, you're surely capable of clinging to the hope that Petreus can find it again in Afghanistan.

But like David McKiernan, the general he ousted, McChrystal has already misapplied the "lessons" of Iraq to the decidedly different circumstances of Afghanistan and so producing a striking set of failures. A deal to buy off the Shinwari Pashtuns, for instance, a tribe mistakenly thought to be the equivalent of the Anbar Sunnis in Iraq, ended in an uproar when they pocketed the money without firing a shot at a single Talib. Not so surprising, considering that the people they were paid to fight are not foreign invaders -- that would be us -- but their Pashtun cousins.

Moreover, the surge into the Afghan south seems only to have further alienated the folks who live there, while increasing violence against local residents. It has also come at the expense of American troops in the east, the ones I was recently embedded with, who face an onslaught of hostile fighters moving across the border from Pakistan.

3. What about the enemy strategy? How's that working?

It seems the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and various hostile fighters in Afghanistan drew their own lessons from Petraeus's surge in Iraq: they learned to deal with a surge not by fading away before it, but by meeting it with a surge of their own. An American commander defending the eastern front told me that hostile forces recently wiped out five border posts. "They opened the gate," he said, but with the American high command focused on a future surge into Kandahar, who's paying attention? In fact, as the battle heats up in the east, another official told me, they are running short of helicopters to medevac out American casualties. In this way, so-called strategy easily morphs into a shell game played largely for an American audience at the expense of American soldiers.

And all the while America's "partner" in this strategy, the dubious President Karzai, consolidates his power, which is thoroughly grounded in the Pashtun south, the domain of his even more suspect half-brother, Ahmed Wali. In the process, he studiously ignores the parliament, which lately has been staging a silent stop-work protest, occasionally banging on the desks for emphasis. He now evidently bets his money (which used to be ours) on the failure of American forces, and extends feelers of reconciliation to Pakistan and the Taliban, the folks he now fondly calls his "angry brothers." As for the Afghan people, even the most resilient citizens of Kabul who, like Obama, remain hopeful, say: "This is our big problem." They're talking, of course, about Karzai and his government that the Americans put in place, pay for, prop up, and pretend to be "partners" with.

In fact, America's silent acceptance of President Karzai's flagrantly fraudulent election last summer -- all those stuffed ballot boxes -- seems to have exploded whatever illusions many Afghans still had about an American commitment to democracy. They know now that matters will not be resolved at polling places or in jirga council tents. They probably won't be resolved in Afghanistan at all, but in secret locations in Washington, Riyadh, Islamabad, and elsewhere. The American people, by the way, will have little more to say about the resolution of the war -- though it consumes our wealth and our soldiers, too -- than the Afghans.Think of what's happening in Afghanistan more generally as a creeping Talibanization, which Afghans say is working all too well. In Marja, in Kandahar, in the east, everywhere, the Taliban do what we can't and roll out their own (shadow) governments-in-a-box, ready to solve disputes, administer rough justice, collect taxes, and enforce "virtue." In Herat, the Ulema of the West issue a fatwa restricting the freedom of women to work and move about without a mahram, or male relative as escort. In Kabul, the police raid restaurants that serve alcohol, and the government shuts down reputable, secular international NGOs, charging them with proselytizing. Taliban influence creeps into parliament, into legislation restricting constitutional freedoms, into ministries and governmental contracts where corruption flourishes, and into the provisional peace jirga tent where delegates called for freedom for all imprisoned Taliban. Out of the jails, into the government, to sit side by side with warlords and war criminals, mujahideen brothers under the skin. Embraced by President Karzai. Perhaps even welcomed one day by American strategists and President Obama himself as a way out.

4. If it's so bad, why can't it be stopped?

The threatening gloom of American policy is never the whole story. There are young progressive men and women running for Parliament in the coming September elections. There are women organizing to keep hold of the modest gains they've made, though how they will do that when the men seem so intent on negotiating them away remains a mystery. There are the valiant efforts of thoroughly devout Muslims who wish to live in the twenty-first century. When they look outward to more developed Islamic countries, however, they see that their homeland is a Muslim country like no other -- and if the Taliban return, it will only be worse.

American development was supposed to have made it all so much better. But tales abound of small, successful projects in education or health care, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and then dropped without a single visit from USAID monitors afraid to leave their Embassy fortress in Kabul. Regularly, USAID now hands over huge hunks of "aid" money to big, impossibly ambitious, quick-fix projects run by the usual no-bid Beltway Bandit contractors whose incompetence, wastefulness, unconscionable profits, and outright fraud should be a national scandal. This, too, is a process everyone knows but can't speak about because it's not part of the official script in which the U.S. must be seen as developing backward Afghanistan, instead of sending it reeling into the darkest of ages. Despairing humanitarians recall that Hillary Clinton promised as secretary of state to clean house at USAID, which, she said, had become nothing but "a contracting shop." Well, here's a flash from Afghanistan: it's still a contracting shop, and the contracts are going to the same set of contractors who have been exposed again and again as venal, fraudulent, and criminal.

Just as Obama sends more troops and a new commander to fight a fraudulent war for a purpose that makes no sense to anyone -- except perhaps the so-called defense intellectuals who live in an alternative Washington-based Afghanaland of their own creation -- Clinton presides over a fraudulent aid program that functions chiefly to transfer American tax dollars from the national treasury to the pockets of already rich contractors and their congressional cronies. If you still believe, as I would like to, that Obama and Clinton actually meant to make change, then you have to ask: How does this state of affairs continue, and why do the members of the international community -- the U.N., all those international NGOs, and our fast-fading coalition allies -- sign off on it? You have only to look around in Kabul and elsewhere, as I did this month, to see that the more American military there is, the more insurgents there are; the more insurgent attacks, the more private security contractors; the more barriers and razor wire, the more restrictions on freedom of movement in the capital for Afghans and internationals alike; and the more security, the higher the danger pay for members of the international community who choose to stay and spend their time complaining about the way security prevents them from doing their useful work.And so it goes round and round, this ill-oiled war machine, generating ever more incentives for almost everyone involved -- except ordinary Afghans, of course -- to keep on keeping on. There's a little something for quite a few: government officials in the U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan, for-profit contractors, defense intellectuals, generals, spies, soldiers behind the lines, international aid workers and their Afghan employees, diplomats, members of the Afghan National Army, and the police, and the Taliban, and their various pals, and the whole array of camp followers that service warfare everywhere.

It goes round and round, this inexorable machine, this elaborate construction of corporate capitalism at war, generating immense sums of money for relatively small numbers of people, immense debt for our nation, immense sacrifice from our combat soldiers, and for ordinary Afghans and those who have befriended them or been befriended by them, moments of promise and hope, moments of clarity and rage, and moments of dark laughter that sometimes cannot forestall the onset of despair.

Ann Jones, a TomDispatch regular, is the author of Kabul in Winter. Her new book, War Is Not Over When It's Over: Women Speak Out from the Ruins of War, about her work with women in post-conflict countries, is to be published by Metropolitan Books in September. She is at work on her next book about what happens when America's wars come home. To visit her website, click here.[This article first appeared on Tomdispatch.com, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news, and opinion from Tom Engelhardt, long time editor in publishing, co-founder of the American Empire Project, author of The End of Victory Culture, as of a novel, The Last Days of Publishing. His latest book is The American Way of War: How Bush's Wars Became Obama's (Haymarket Books).]

Additional reasons to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan

Here are parts of what you can find today (July 1, 2010) on Juan Coles' award-winning blog, Informed Comment. One focuses on rising US troop deaths in Afghanistan, which appear to be the result of growing aggressiveness by group identified as Taliban. The other part reports that the US Congress has cut $4 billion out of civilian aid to Afghanistan.

In short, Gen. Patraeus maintains that rising troop casualties are to be expected as the counter-insurgency strategy is implemented. The Congress justifies its reduction in civilian aid to Afghanistan by saying that too much of it ends up in the wrong hands and for unintended purposes.

From our perspective, these two examples provide additional evidence that the US occupation of Afghanistan is mired in chaotic conditions, that US troops are suffering from the make-it-up-as-you-go occupation and interventions. And, further, the White House and US Congress should withhold additional funding for Afghanistan and affirm their support for a substantial and continuing withdrawal of troops no later than in July 2011,


Posted on July 1, 2010 by Juan

As the Senate confirmed Gen. David Petraeus as commander of US troops in Afghanistan, CNN estimated that 101 NATO troops (including Americans) were killed in June, the highest total ever since the NATO presence began in 2001. The Pentagon maintains that such a spike in troop deaths is to be expected given the counter-insurgency push that began this winter, in which troops were given the task of ‘taking, clearing, holding and building’ in Pashtun territory.

Taliban guerrillas boldly attacked a NATO air base at the eastern Pashtun city of Jalabad on Tuesday. A Taliban spokesman said that the operation was intended to send a signal to Gen. Petraeus, that they considered him no different from any other general. At least one NATO soldier was killed in the assault becoming death number 101 for June). A Taliban spokesman said that six of them detonated their payloads or were killed, while 4 escaped. NATO said that there were 6-8 attackers and all were killed. The Pajhwok News Agency reports, “A top Afghan army official on the base, Col. Jahangir Azimi, said six attackers, equipped with two machine guns, automatic rifles and a rocket launcher, stormed the airbase from its northern gate. One bomber blew himself up at the gate and the rest of the attackers infiltrated the camp, he added. Two of the bombers were killed by Afghan soldiers and three others were hunted by NATO choppers which were immediately called after the explosion, Col. Azimi further said.”

Aljazeera English has video:

The battle of Marawara in the eastern Kunar province between NATO forces and Taliban continued on Wednesday. It began on Sunday, when two US troops and a third NATO soldier were killed.

Meanwhile, Congress cut $4 billion out of civilian aid to Afghanistan, owing to fears that it was just being eaten up by corruption. Afghanistan is listed as the second most corrupt country in the world after Somalia by Transparency International, and reports have circulated for months about mysterious large shipments of cash out of Kabul airport to Dubai. It has also been alleged that money paid to security contractors in Afghanistan who oversee the safety of US convoys is often in turn paid out to Taliban as a bribe not to attack the convoys. Still, the civilian aid money is crucial to the Obama administration’s counter-insurgency campaign, and it had been hoped that providing, e.g., more electricity to Pashtun areas such as the city of Qandahar might help NATO and the Karzai government blunt the appeal of the Taliban there. Apparently, though, the money was not so much denied as put in escrow until a better general accounting system can be put in to keep track of it.

Big question - Will US troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011 in large or small numbers

On the website Just Foreign Policy, Robert Naiman comments, in short statements and in outlines/excerpts, on articles that report on important issues regarding the Middle East and Central Asia (e.g., Afghanistan). You can find three of his items after my observations from today's list.

The first item reports on a public opinion polls that find (1) a growing percentage (48%) of those polled think ending the war is more important than winning it, and (2) 53% now disapprove of how Obama is managing the war

The second item reports on Rep. Nancy Pelosi's insistence that there will be "a serious drawdown" of [our] forces in Afghanistan by July 2011. She is skeptical about the occupation's effectiveness and says that we need to use the money now spent on the Afghanistan occupation for domestic programs.

The third item reports on General Patreus' testimony before a Senate Committee, in which the general makes three important points on the issue of withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan. (1) The Afghan army won't be ready to manage on their own for years. (2) The overal "security" situation in Afghanistan is "tenuous." (3) The start of the drawdown of troops in July 2011 is only the beginning.

The key implication of these items is that there is disagreement not so much about the beginning of a withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in July 2011, but about just how many troops will be brought home then. If Pelosi's views prevail, a large number of troops will be withdrawn in July and in the not-many-months that follow. If Patreus' views prevail, there will only be a few US troops pulled out in July 2011, and only a small number will be leave Afghanistan in subsequent months. The implication is that, according to Patreus' preferences (speaking for the US armed forces), there will be a large number of US troops stationed in Afghanistan, even after some additional years.

Perhaps the decisive factor in determining whether there is a substantial withdrawal of US troop or just a trickle of troops coming home is the state of public opinion. If opinion continues to go against the occupation and the president, Pelosi's views may win out. Though, of course, the US military-industrial complex is a ferocious and very influential opponent when it comes to defending its preferred goals.


U.S./Top News (selected from Robert Naiman, on Just Foreign Policy, on July 1, 2010 - http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/

1) Quagmire? Nine years on, Americans grow weary of war in AfghanistanBrad Knickerbocker, Christian Science Monitor, June 26, 2010 http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0626/Quagmire-Nine-years-on-Americans-grow-weary-of-war-in-Afghanistan%20

Americans approve of Gen. David Petraeus as the new US commander in Afghanistan. But after nine years and with mounting US casualties, support for the war itself is waning.

Until recently, the nine-year conflict in Afghanistan had become "the forgotten war" for many Americans - a complaint increasingly heard among US troops there.

But this week's sacking of Gen. Stanley McChrystal as US commander puts Afghanistan - and especially how the fight against the Taliban is going - squarely back into public thought and concern.

Most Americans agree with Obama that McChrystal had to go, polls show. But they're far less supportive of the conflict itself, weary of what's become the longest war in US history.

A recent Rasmussen Reports telephone survey of likely voters finds that just 41 percent "now believe it is possible for the United States to win the nearly nine-year-old war in Afghanistan." More to the point, a plurality of 48 percent now say ending the war in Afghanistan is a more important goal than winning it.

Meanwhile, 53 percent of those polled by Newsweek disapprove of how Obama is managing the war - a sharp reversal since February when 55 percent supported Obama on Afghanistan and just 27 percent did not. (Put another way, the percentage of Americans who disapprove of Obama's Afghan policy has nearly doubled in four months.)

The same Newsweek poll finds that "46 percent of respondents think America is losing the war in Afghanistan (26 percent say the military is winning).

[...]

Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan predicts that conservatives may "start to peel off" as well. "Not Washington policy intellectuals but people on the ground in America," she wrote this week. "There are many reasons for this. Their sons and nephews have come back from repeat tours full of doubts as to the possibility of victory, 'whatever that is,' as we all now say.


"Noonan continued: "The other day Sen. Lindsey Graham, in ostensibly supportive remarks, said that Gen. David Petraeus … 'is our only hope.' If he can't pull it out, 'nobody can.' That's not all that optimistic a statement."

2) Pelosi: There Will Be 'A Serious Drawdown' From Afghanistan In July 2011Sam Stein, Huffington Post, June 28, 2010http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/28/pelosi-there-will-be-a-se_n_628130.html

In some of the strongest terms she has used to date, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi declared last Friday that the United States will see "a serious drawdown" of forces in Afghanistan by July 2011 and that the House may use the power of the purse to ensure the drawdown takes place.

In an exclusive interview with the Huffington Post, Pelosi made clear that while recent talk has hinted that the administration's stated goal of a June 2011 start date for a troop drawdown may be open to change, her commitment to it remains firm. "I think we'll have a serious drawdown, I don't think it'll be, as [the president] said, turning out the lights," said Pelosi.

Asked point-blank whether she thinks troops will be pulled out of the country in July 2011, Pelosi replied: "I do. And everything I saw there before, for all the bad things there that I saw in terms of [corruption and money wasted] ... I did consistently hear that the timetable was on schedule to have serious drawdown."

[...]

Pelosi, likewise, said that the president should be afforded the time and support to see his plan through, though her insistence on seeing some troops withdrawn in July 2011 suggests that she views the drawdown as part of the plan. The issue at hand, she notes, is not simply whether it made smart military policy to keep a troop presence in Afghanistan, but also if it was economically feasible for the United States to do so."It just can't be that we have a domestic agenda that is half the size of the defense budget," she said. "If you take away entitlements, the domestic discretionary non-defense budget is about half the defense budget, and maybe that's what we need to protect the American people. But in terms of the war now in Afghanistan, which is a growing part of it, that we have to say how can we carry this and can we carry this on the backs of children's nutrition. I'm not even talking about unemployment, there's so much else that is at stake.

"3) Petraeus warns it could be years before Afghan troops manage on their own

Obama's July 2011 withdrawal date 'only start of the process'; general tells Senate tough fighting will continueIan Black, The Guardian, Wednesday 30 June 2010http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/29/david-petraeus-obama-afghanistan

Barack Obama's candidate to run the war in Afghanistan yesterday pledged America's "enduring" commitment to the country, described its security as "tenuous" and called the presidential deadline for starting withdrawals next summer only "the beginning of a process".

[...]

Petraeus, head of US central command, endorsed July 2011 as the start of troop drawdowns, but insisted it was not the date when America "heads for the exits"; he warned it would be "a number of years" before Afghan forces could manage on their own. The pace of withdrawals would have to be responsible, he told a packed session of the armed services committee, as protesters in the audience held up signs reading: "New General, Old War."Petraeus confirmed that the military had not recommended setting that date.

June has been the most deadly month of the nine-year conflict, with more than 100 Nato troops killed, adding to an intensifying debate in the US and Britain on the prosecution of the war. Eleven UK personnel have died in the last 10 days alone.

Petraeus's careful language appeared designed to manage strains between the military and the administration, where some key figures are pressing for speedier disengagement from a war which has now been going on for longer than Vietnam in terms of US combat troop deployment.

[...]

Perpetual war - US society pays little attention

Paul Woodward, "The Price of Perpetual War," June 29, 2010 - http://warincontext.org

If wars could be won through slick advertising, no one would be better qualified to become the US commander in Afghanistan than General David Petraeus.

This is how he recently encapsulated his wisdom on counterinsurgency:

We have learned above all that, in campaigns such as those in Iraq or Afghanistan, the human terrain is the decisive terrain. We have to understand the people, their culture, their social structures and how systems to support them are supposed to work — and how they do work. And our most important tasks have to be to secure and to serve the people, as well as to respect them and to facilitate the provision of basic services, the establishment of local governance and the revival of local economies.

That’s a fine wish list — and to be fair, Petraeus makes no claims about the success of the US military in accomplishing these aims. Indeed, he concedes that success in the war is likely to go to whichever side is swifter to learn and adapt.

It might not quite rise to the level of being a law of physics, but the capacity for massive organizations to swiftly learn and adapt is about as great as the ability of oil tankers to make sudden U-turns. It doesn’t matter who’s in charge or how gifted he might be in charming the US Congress.

But Petraeus’ problems run deeper than the structural limitations of the military. As Andrew Bacevich makes clear, the US military is now suffering the corrupting effect of endless war. Far from seeing Gen Stanley McChrystal’s recently revealed contempt for civilian command as exceptional, Bacevich sees strong indications that the problem is systemic.

In the seemingly endless wars of the post-Sept. 11 era, a military that has demonstrated remarkable durability now shows signs of coming undone at the top. The officer corps is losing its bearings.

Americans might do well to contemplate a famous warning issued by another frustrated commander from a much earlier age.

“We had been told, on leaving our native soil,” wrote the centurion Marcus Flavius to a cousin back in Rome, “that we were going to defend the sacred rights conferred on us by so many of our citizens [and to aid] populations in need of our assistance and our civilization.” For such a cause, he and his comrades had willingly offered to “shed our quota of blood, to sacrifice our youth and our hopes.” Yet the news from the homeland was disconcerting: The capital was seemingly rife with factions, treachery and petty politics. “Make haste,” Marcus Flavius continued, “and tell me that our fellow citizens understand us, support us and protect us as we ourselves are protecting the glory of the empire.”

“If it should be otherwise, if we should have to leave our bleached bones on these desert sands in vain, then beware of the anger of the legions!”

Stanley McChrystal is no Marcus Flavius, lacking the Roman’s eloquence, among other things. Yet in ending his military career on such an ignominious note, he has, however clumsily, issued a warning that deserves our attention.

The responsibility facing the American people is clear. They need to reclaim ownership of their army. They need to give their soldiers respite, by insisting that Washington abandon its de facto policy of perpetual war. Or, alternatively, the United States should become a nation truly “at” war, with all that implies in terms of civic obligation, fiscal policies and domestic priorities. Should the people choose neither course — and thereby subject their troops to continuing abuse — the damage to the army and to American democracy will be severe.

Whether for an individual or an nation, change often hinges on reaching a point where the status quo is intolerable.

Over the last decade, perpetual war, far from becoming less tolerable has on the contrary become easier to ignore. It is the backdrop to normalcy — just like climate change — in a culture that barely has any sense of gravity.

Gen. Patraeus says no timetable for ending US occupation of Afghanistan

The important point in the following article on an interview with Gen. Patraeus, the commander of CENTCOM (e.g., including Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, etc), is that Patraeus seems not to acknowledge that President Obama has set a target for the beginning of a withdrawal of US troops in the summer of 2011. Rather, the report suggests that any withdrawal of US troops will not likely begin until some unspecified years after that.

One implication: This is a stark example of the power of the military in US foreign policy. It is also a failure to accept the limits of American military power, a central theme of Andrew J. Backvich's widely read book, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism.

At the same time, Afghanistan is important to US leaders and advisers because it is located in an oil-rich part of the Casbian-Sea region and close to the biggest reserves of oil that lie in the Middle East. The US, as presently organized, needs this oil for herself and for her strategic allies in Europe and Japan. But there are now other countries who are bidding on or gaining access to the oil reserves in Central Asia and the Middle East, particularly China and Russia.

If the US loses her privileged access to these sources of oil, US international hegemony, already on the wain, would continue to decline. On this point, there is no better source than the work of Michael T. Klare. His most recent book is titled Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy.

The upshot: Without her military power, the US is sunk and the capitalist economy is then in deep trouble, that is, unless there is a transformation of its political and economic structure based on a green economy and new cooperative international agreements.

Bob

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Gen. Patraeus: Afghan War Will Take Longer Than Iraq
CENTCOM Commander Hasn't Heard Any Talk of a Timetable
by Jason Ditz, January 24, 2010

http://news.antiwar.com/2010/01/24/gen-petraeus-afghan-war-will-take-longer-than-Iraq

In an in-depth interview with the Times of London gearing up for the London Conference on Afghanistan later this week, CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus again cautioned that the war was going to “get harder before it gets easier.”

Likening the January 2007 surge in Iraq to President Obama’s December escalation, the general said he thought that the war in Afghanistan was going to take longer than the war in Iraq.
Perhaps even more troubling over eight years after the war began, Gen. Petraeus insisted he still hasn’t heard any talk of setting a timetable for the end of the war, and said any predictions would be “premature.” Several nations had hoped to use the London Conference to set out some sort of exit strategy for the seemingly endless conflict.

In fact, Petraeus suggested that the London Conference would not so much focus on setting a timetable for a transition, but on deciding “what transition actually means.” Though he provided little in the way of detail, it does suggest that officials have abandoned the pretense of starting the pullout in 2011.