Corruption and Waste in developmental funds going to Afghanistan

The widespread problem of official and unofficial corruption in Afghanistan is not a new topic. But it is an ongoing problem that has not been fixed or even reduced according to investigative reports over the past year or so. In my old New World Dictionary, “corruption” is defined in a number of ways. For example, it is defined as “evil or wicked behavior; depravity…bribery or similar dishonest dealings….”

Specifically, in the context of the US/NATO occupation of Afghanistan, corruption may be a way to divert money from its intended purpose for personal gain or influence. Or, in violation of a contract, it may involve cost cutting measures that produce shoddy or unfinished projects. It may entail the exploitation of workers, often brought in from other countries. Often it involves bribes or payoffs to government officials or police.

American corporations that receive big contracts from the US government are often at the center of corrupt dealings, subcontracting much of the work to Afghan or other national enterprises, suspected of putting profits over the expected work. The same is true when the Afghan government receives assistance from the US or the UK. Keep some and pass the rest on.
In many cases, the problem of corruption results in poor planning or inadequate vetting of contractors or sub-contractors by the funding source. Political favoritism is a factor. Too often little or none of the contracted work being done is up to even minimal standards. And through the process, local leaders or communities are not given the opportunity to participate.

The results of corruption are to enrich a few, undermine development projects, alienate Afghans from the government and its representatives, and keep too many Afghan citizens and their children, many of them dirt poor, from gaining opportunities that were intended for them – like jobs, a working infrastructure, effective schools, access to health care, housing, and a government that represents their interests and provides them with security in their lives and communities.

To illustrate some of these points, I draw on five articles and organize them chronologically, with the first article reported at an earlier date than the next ones, and so on. The thrust of the articles is that corruption and waste continue to be massive problems in Afghanistan.
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ARTICLE #1: “The report reveals that in 2006-07, more than half of the department’s large projects, in which millions of pounds were invested, were deemed likely to fail.”

Deborah Haynes, Defense Correspondent for RAWA (Revolutionary Afghan Women’s Association) provides an of corruption in an article titled “Public millions fail to provide wells, schools and clinics in Afghanistan. [You can see the URL at the end of the article.]

Haynes’ article, reported May 22, 2009, focuses on British funded projects carried out in Afghanistan in 2004-2007 and an assessment of these projects by the Department for International Development.

“Millions of pounds in taxpayers’ money have been wasted on failed reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, according to an internal assessment by the Department for International Development.

“An evaluation by independent consultants criticized the department’s approach to planning, risk management and staffing, and said poor co-ordination with the rest of Whitehall meant that the department was slow to shift strategy as the military effort moved to counter-insurgency.

“The report reveals that in 2006-07, more than half of the department’s large projects, in which millions of pounds were invested, were deemed likely to fail, excluding money put into a fund run by the World Bank. Only a quarter of state building projects were rated successful in 2006, with 4.5 per cent of them rated value for money.

“Among the failed projects singled out in the Country Programme Evaluation is the Afghanistan Stabilisation Fund, designed to ‘establish basic security and good governance in the district and provinces of Afghanistan’. This was begun in 2004 with a £20 million payment to the Afghan Government but ended three years later with “little evidence of tangible benefit’.

“The department’s own review in 2005 warned of ‘potentially catastrophic consequences’ if weaknesses in the programme were not corrected. Beset by poor planning, a lack of transparency and failed delivery, it was abandoned in March 2007. Only 639 people received training. Commentators criticised the “disastrous” project.

“In another programme in Helmand, the department paid for 300 wells to be dug in an area prone to drought, without carrying out a geological survey. Some of the wells have since run dry as the water table retreated. The report finds that the department’s risk assessment ignored the absence of the rule of law and corruption in the region.

“A survey of Afghan opinion in Helmand found local residents complaining about poor construction, a lack of monitoring and unhappiness with the role of interpreters, while the department rated its own projects there a success. It took until late 2007 for the department to recruit a conflict adviser even though British troops started operating in Helmand in 2006.
Staffing levels in Kabul were described as ‘wholly unrealistic’. Until 2006 the development department attempted to run its programmes with only six non-Afghan staff in Kabul.
[….]

“Only one person is overseeing a massive, $404 million Afghan reconstruction contract -- and is thousands of miles away in Maryland, auditors say. The contract's supervising officer in Maryland hired someone else to work in Afghanistan, but that person didn't have much experience and wasn't able to visit many of the actual work sites, the audit said.”
[….]

“Some projects were a success, including a £20 million initiative to give small loans to the poor and an £18 million programme to build and repair roads, schools and clinics. By 2007 the department’s portfolio in Afghanistan contained 58 projects with a value of about £520 million, including £317 million for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank.
[….]

http://www.rawa/org/temp/runews/2009/05/22/public-millions-fail-to-provide-wells-schools-and-clinics-in-afghanistan.html
Read more: http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2009/05/22/public-millions-fail-to-provide-wells-schools-and-clinics-in-afghanistan.html#ixzz1D6OaqfnN
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ARTICLE #2: American taxpayers lose when billions of dollars in development funds from US to Afghanistan wasted

Sara A. Carter, “Commission tracks billions of contracting dollars wasted in Afghanistan, The Washington Examiner, August 23, 2010.

“American taxpayers have picked up the tab for billions of dollars worth of shoddy schools, phantom health care clinics and government buildings abandoned before completion in Afghanistan, according to members of a U.S. team that arrived in Kabul on Monday to document the waste and fraud.

“The Commission on Wartime Contracting will look into charges ranging from massive contracting fraud to abandoned foreign laborers on U.S. military installations that have left American taxpayers ripped off and the people of Afghanistan disappointed by broken promises.

“Christopher Shays, a former Republican congressman from Connecticut who co-chairs the commission, said the allegations warrant a full investigation and that the scams involving foreign workers are presenting security risks on the bases as well as human rights abuses.

"’We are looking into cases of some contractors or outright scam artists who charge people from other countries to fly them to supposed jobs in Dubai but instead dump them with no jobs or documents on airbases in Afghanistan. That's a human-rights abuse that cannot be tolerated,’ said Shays, who heads a four-man team.

“Foreign workers -- many from the Philippines -- paid up to $2,000 dollars to contracting companies for airfare and housing "only to be left alone on the bases without identification and no way home," said one official who asked not to be named.

"’The bigger problem is that we don't know who they are but they are inside our installations without identification or jobs, and this presents a security risk for the troops on base, civilians, as well as the innocent victims of the scams," the official said.

“The commission, which will issue a semi-annual report in December to Congress and a final report next July as the administration begins a troop draw-down from Afghanistan, is investigating a host of other problems.

“Abandoned and substandard school projects, unfinished government buildings and health care facilities without management staffs are among the reported failures being reviewed by the commission.
[….]

“Other projects paid for by American taxpayers that will be examined by the commissioners include military bases, power plants, office buildings, fuel storage, schools and training centers for Afghan security forces. Many times these projects are abandoned before completion or the supplies needed to sustain their operations never arrive.

“Examples are evident throughout Afghanistan. Last October, in the small village of Hutal, American soldiers set out to get school supplies from local contractors in Kandahar. Money was made available, the supplier was contacted and the village elders were promised that the thousands of dollars in educational materials would arrive in three weeks. The supplies never arrived. It is uncertain how much money was lost on the project.
[….]

"Construction contracting in a war zone half a world away involves real challenges on cost, quality, timeliness, suitability and sustainability," commission co-chair Michael Thibault said.

‘The government needs a clearer view on the way these projects are planned, contracted and supervised. We often don't know how many people are working on U.S. bases, whether prime contractors are effectively managing their subcontractors, whether employee vetting and access control are adequate and whether Afghans can sustain projects like the $300 million Kabul power plant after U.S. personnel leave.’”

Sara A. Carter is The Washington Examiner's national security correspondent. She can be reached at scarter@washingtonexaminer.com.

http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/commission-tracks-billions-contracting-dollars-wasted-afghanistan
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ARTICLE #3 – Billions contracted with US corporations for “development” projects in Afghanistan unaccounted for and open up massive opportunities for corruption.

Iman Hasan, “Afghans point finger at US: Who’s corrupt now?” The Express Tribune with the International Tribune, November 2010.

“Many Afghans, from government officials and parliamentarians to the common man are disgruntled with the US officials relentlessly accusing them of being corrupt – while ignoring their own government’s fraud and misappropriations in the $56 billion development budget approved by the Congress for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Afghans deem US responsible for corrupting their society.

“For Obama’s administration, ‘corruption warnings’ are a new blackmail tool to use against the Karzai government. There has been constant rhetoric to ‘eradicate corruption’ and ‘stop misusing US tax payers’ money,’ without realising that only 20% of the allocated funds are at the disposal of the Afghan government while 80% are utilised by the US Department of State, Defence and USAID. These three departments rely extensively on private contractors for the implementation of various projects, ranging from reconstruction of Afghanistan, eradicating drugs, training of Afghan security forces and officials and providing security to Nato supply convoys.

“Since 2001, the US congress has appropriated nearly $56 billion for the reconstruction funds of Afghanistan, which cannot be tracked down. It has either been wasted, stolen or abused.
Missing records

“There is absolutely no record of the amount utilised from 2001 to 2006 except for the vague documentation of $17.7 billion spent during the financial year 2007 – 2009, which only identifies the 7000 contractors hired to implement the projects – but does not evaluate the projects. Therefore, there is no guarantee if the US tax payers’ money amounting to $56 billion is fairly spent or abused.

“Bush’s government after eight years of engagement in Afghanistan established the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2008 ‘to conduct independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds’.

“Even the Office of the Special Inspector General is unable to track down the money spent during 2001 to 2006. It recently released a report on the ‘waste, fraud and abuse’ of $17.7 billion (spent during the financial year 2007 – 2009) of the total reconstruction fund of $56 billion.

“The report is essentially a document holding the US responsible for the corruption in Afghanistan. ‘The large US investment in Afghanistan remains at risk of being wasted or subject to waste, fraud and abuse,’ reads the document.

Who benefits from America’s wars?

“65 per cent of the $17.7 billion has been channelled through the Department of Defence, which hired largely those companies who are essentially part of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC). These huge corporations depend mostly or entirely on the Pentagon for their profits and have hugely benefited from the US wars.
[….]

“Some of the largest defense contractors belonging to the Military Industrial Complex hired by the Defence Department, for Afghanistan are DynCorp, Black Water (Xe Services), Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Louis Berger and Bearing Pont.
[….]

“Besides the Military Industrial Complex, there is also the intelligence complex which has been playing a greater role in corrupting the Afghan society since 2001, whose billions of dollars of expenditure has never been accounted for.

“The intelligence complex’s profligate distribution of boxes and suitcases of cash amongst the different segments of Afghan society – Afghan media, NGOs and allegedly government officials – has also encouraged other countries. India is one of the countries which has taken a leaf out of the CIA’s book.
[….]

Lack of transparency

“This is still not the complete picture of US corruption and lack of oversight of reconstruction funds – meant for achieving long term goals in Afghanistan. There is no transparency even in the salary support provided to the Afghan government employees and technical advisors since 2002. The US government is unable to determine the amount it has been paying, the identity and the total number of recipients. Since the number and identity of the recipients is not clear the salaries can go to anyone in anyone’s name.
[….]

http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/2955/afghans-point-finger-at-us-whos-corrupt-now
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ARTICLE #4: Another report on the missing billions of US taxpayer development funds for Afghanistan

Michael Tennant, “Afghanistan Reconstruction: Billions Spent, But No One Knows Just How,” New American, Dec. 29, 2010

[….]

“In Iraq, for example, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction found over $5 billion had been wasted on various projects, including hundreds of abandoned or incomplete projects such as a $40 million prison, a $5.7 million convention center, and a roughly $100 million wastewater treatment plant. In addition, the special inspector general discovered that the Pentagon could not account for over 95 percent of $9.1 billion in Iraqi funds set aside for reconstruction.“To no one’s great surprise, the situation in Afghanistan, site of another undeclared U.S. war, is no better. David Francis of the Fiscal Times reports:

'In its bid to win the hearts and minds of Afghanistan’s teeming population, the United States has spent more than $55 billion to rebuild and bolster the war-ravaged country. That money was meant to cover everything from the construction of government buildings and economic development projects to the salaries of U.S. government employees working closely with Afghans.Yet no one can say with any authority or precision how that money was spent and who profited from it. Most of the funds were funneled to a vast array of U.S. and foreign contractors. But according to a recent audit by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), there is no way of knowing whether the money went for the intended purposes.'
[….]

“The reason for these agencies’ inability to say where taxpayers’ money is going is simply that the government hasn’t demanded any sort of accountability from its recipients. ‘The money,’ Francis writes, ‘flows from Washington to Afghanistan, with little oversight and accountability, and at every step along the way someone else takes a cut.’[….]

From Francis article:
“Another report found that the United States has spent nearly $200 million on Afghan security service buildings that cannot be used. SIGAR also found that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) couldn’t account for nearly $18 billion that was paid to some 7,000 U.S. and Afghan contractors for development projects. Afghan contractors often pay kickbacks to local warlords, like Ahmad Wali Karzai, the president’s brother and the so-called “King of Kandahar.” Their actions often undermine the work of the coalition."
[….]

http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/foreignpolicy/5695-afghanistan-reconstruction-billions-spent-but-no-one-knows-just-how
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ARTICLE #5: The head watchdog against the massive corruption in Afghanistan resigns because of weakness of enforcement authority.

Jason Ditz, “US Watchdog for Afghan Projects Resigns,” Antiwar.com, Jan 10, 2011

“Special Inspector General Arnold Fields, the Obama Administration’s top watchdog against the massive corruption in Afghanistan, followed up last week’s pledge not to resign with a formal announcement of his resignation.

“Fields has been regularly presenting reports on the corruption surrounding US aid programmes in occupied Afghanistan, and has cautioned that there are virtually no controls in place and that much of the aid is being stolen or wasted as a result.
[….]

http://news.antiwar.com/2011/01/10/us-watchdog-for-afghan-projects-resigns