In his State of the Union address to the nation, President Obama did not spend much time on foreign policy and, with respect to Afghanistan, offered an upbeat picture that doesn’t jive with many reports of the actual conditions in that country. Consider some of the highlights from just a few of the sources that challenge Obama’s things-are-going-well assessment.
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Mismanaged War, Corrupt Afghan Government, Spreading Taliban Control –
Robert Dreyfuss provides an excellent analysis of the foreign-policy aspects of Obama’s speech in an article titled, “State of the Union Glosses Over Obama’s Foreign Policy Failures.” Of particular interest for this website, Dreyfuss makes the following points on some of the bad news from Afghanistan that Obama disregards.
“On Afghanistan... Obama put a rosy gloss on the catastrophically mismanaged war, in which more and more Afghan provinces have fallen under Taliban control or influence, with impregnable safe havens in neighboring Pakistan feeding an insurgency that won’t go away, in a country whose government is irreparably corrupt and feckless. To Obama, though, everything’s fine.”
Source: http://www.thenation.com/blog/158034/obamas-sotu-make-world-go-away
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No clear withdrawal date for bringing US troops home. Even Obama is unsure.
Jason Ditz focuses on the on contradictory statements coming from the White House regarding a withdrawal date for at least a start of withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. Here Ditz refers to President Obama’s SOTU speech.
“…he [President Obama] lauded the Afghan War and the “enduring partnership” it was creating. Perhaps the only interesting thing, and I say this only for desperation to find something, is that he insisted troops would begin to withdraw from Afghanistan in July.
“Of course, he announced the July drawdown in December, and the comments seem to be taken largely from that, but it seems that his speechwriters forget that he publicly disavowed the July 2011 drawdown date in June, and several more times since then.”
Source: http://news/antiwar.com/2011/01/25/president-obama-rehashes-dubious-claims-about-wars/
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Some officials believe the occupation of Afghan will continue well beyond 2014. Obama has not rejected this belief.
In another post, Jason Ditz quotes a EU envoy who can imagine another 30 years of NATO (including US) occupation, while less effusive US and other officials see the war/occupation lasting past 2014, the latest target date mentioned by Obama.
“Speaking today from Kabul, European Union Special Representative Vygaudas Usackas mocked the notion of ending the Afghan War in 2014, insisting it was time to “be honest with ourselves” that the war will last much, much longer.
“How long? Well according to Usackas, who was the former Foreign Minister of Luthuania, he believes NATO will have to commit to another 30 years of war, though he conceded that somewhere along the line, the 150,000 NATO troops could probably be reduced before then.
“…Despite repeated claims of vague “progress” in the war a number of officials from the US and Britain have openly talked about the war lasting another decade or longer.”
Source: http://news/antiwar.com/2011/01/26/eu-envoy-eyes-another-30-years-of-nato-occupation-in-afghanistan
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US building more military bases in Afghanistan – another fact Obama failed to include in his State of the Union address
The Skeptics, writing on The National Interest blog, note that President Obama is not much interested in informing the American people about “the expansion of America’s Afghan military bases.” The Skeptic draw their evidence from Nick Turse, associate editor of TomDispatch.com, who “has done a fantastic job collating which of America’s forward operating bases (FOBs) are being expanded, improved, and hardened.” Here’s one example:
“FOB Shank in Logar Province has a new $12 million, 1.4-mile-long airstrip that can accommodate Lockheed C-130 Hercules and Boeing C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft. According to Turse, government documents released in August show that in addition, FOB Shank ‘will be adding a new two-story barracks, constructed of containerized housing units known as ‘relocatable buildings’ or RLBs, to accommodate 1,100 more troops. Support facilities, access roads, parking areas, new utilities, and other infrastructure required to sustain the housing complex will also be installed for an estimated $5 million to $10 million….New aircraft maintenance facilities and 80,000 square feet more of taxiways will also be built at the cost of another $10 million to $25 million.’”
You can find the full list at: The Skeptics Base Building in Afghanistan? The National Interest, Jan 25, 2011-01-29. Source: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/base-building-afghanistan-4774
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Jason Ditz points to recent evidence of a “dramatic increase in US troops killed by Afghanistan IEDs in 2010.” Obama stayed away from this subject.
Citing “official war data,” the trend in US military fatalities and wounded continues upward.
“The toll showed a 60 percent increase in deaths, with 268 US troops killed in 2010. This was also about the same number as were killed in all of 2007, 2008 and 2009 combined. This was despite claims from officials that the Pentagon several times during 2010 that the number of IEDs was ‘falling’.”
“The number of wounded was even worse, however, with figures showing a 178 percent increase from 2009 to 2010, and 3,366 confirmed injuries from IED attacks. This was dramatically more than had been wounded by IEDs in the entire rest of the war.”
Source: http://news.antiwar.com/2011/01/26/dramatic-increase-in-us-troops-killed-by-afghanistan-ieds-in-2010
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US plans for supporting Afghan national security forces ineffective and a waste of billions. Nothing like this from Obama.
Marisa Taylor writes for McClatchy Newspapers on a report by “auditors with the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction” who find that the “Obama administration’s $11.4 billion plan to bolster Afghanistan’s security forces is ‘at risk’ because of poor planning.” The report was released on Wednesday, January 26.
“Auditors with the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said the U.S. government ‘could not provide the plans or justifications’ for building nearly 900 police stations and garrisons and other facilities for Afghanistan's national security forces.
“The report confirms earlier findings in a series late last year by McClatchy that found the ambitious strategy, like much of the wider Afghan reconstruction effort, is faltering. The program is a linchpin of President Barack Obama's strategy to strengthen Afghan security forces so 100,000 U.S. troops can come home by the end of 2014.”
[….]
“McClatchy also discovered that dozens of structures across the country either were poorly constructed or never completed at all. Tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers who were supposed to be living in garrisons were still housed in tents.”
[….]
"’The government of Afghanistan does not have the financial or technical capacity to sustain’" buildings once they are completed, the auditors concluded.
“As a result, the U.S. has awarded two contracts to ITT Corp. totaling $800 million to help maintain the facilities.”
[….]
“McClatchy found that ITT's work was one of nearly $4.5 billion in contracts in Afghanistan that were awarded to companies even though they violated laws or had high-profile disputes over previous projects.”
Source: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/26/107500/watchdog-faults-obamas-afghan.html#
Also see: http://thehill.com/news-by-subjetc-defense-homeland-security/139729-afghanistan-watchdog-says-11-billion-in-us-funds-are-at-risk
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Other failures in US-funded reconstruction projects, including the largest power plant in Kabul. Generally, projects are over-budget, of poor construction, involving corrupt officials, unfinished, unmaintained if and when completed. Another subject the Obama administration leaves alone.
Reporting for McClatchy Newspapers, Marisa Taylor and Dion Nissenbaum write on “Kabul's largest power plant project” and how it has been held up by US officials as “a shining example of how American taxpayers' dollars would pull Afghanistan out of grinding poverty and decades of demoralizing conflict.” This is just one of the examples of inefficiency on which they report. Here I quote from the article.
“But behind the scenes…officials were voicing outrage over the slow pace of the [power plant] project and its skyrocketing costs. The problems were so numerous that one company official told the U.S. government that he'd understand if the contract were canceled.
“‘We are discouraged and exhausted with the continued flow of bad information,’ one U.S. official complained in an internal memo that McClatchy obtained. ‘This is a huge example of poor performance on an extremely important development project.’
“Despite expressing serious misgivings in internal memos and meetings, the U.S. agency [USAID] that was overseeing the project more than doubled the plant's budget.
[….]
“In the rush to rebuild Afghanistan, the U.S. government has charged ahead with ever-expanding development programs despite questions about their impact, cost and value to America's multi-billion-dollar campaign to shore up the pro-Western Afghan president and prevent Taliban insurgents from seizing control.
[….]
“An approach that experts denounce as ad hoc and politicized has led to programs with mixed, if not poor, results and has soured many Afghans on the U.S. military's presence in their country, even as the Obama administration is banking on their support.
“McClatchy found that U.S. government funding for at least 15 large-scale programs and projects grew from just over $1 billion to nearly $3 billion despite the government's questions about their effectiveness or cost.
[….]
“The projects, overseen by the U.S. Agency for International Development, are designed to address different goals in Afghanistan but all offer evidence that the U.S. has downplayed their waste and inefficiency in its zeal to demonstrate short-term success.”
"Meanwhile, Afghanistan is littered with scores of unfinished or hazardous buildings constructed with American money. Programs continue to receive tens of millions of dollars in U.S. aid even as contractors or government officials concede that the goals are unrealistic or inappropriate for Afghanistan. For instance, the U.S. is seeking to dramatically increase the number of women employed by local governments, even though previous projects with similar aims have failed because of threats to female workers.
“While many of the programs were launched under the Bush administration, several have continued and have been given more money on President Barack Obama's watch.
[….]
“Adding to the problems, the list of recipients seemed to include thousands of phantom farmers: Fingerprints collected as proof that the farmers had received vouchers for buying seeds appeared to be falsified in more than half the 4,500 records the auditors reviewed.
“Even so, the Obama administration revamped the program's safeguards, dramatically increased its budget and transformed it into a broader counterinsurgency initiative that hands out jobs, fertilizer and support to farmers who are willing to cooperate with the U.S-backed government.
The program's original price tag: $33 million. Since the questions were raised: $431 million.
[….]
Some U.S. officials and contractors acknowledge privately that they're spending more on high-profile, flawed projects because of the pressure to show results quickly that could help bolster the government of President Hamid Karzai.
[….]
“To manage spending in Afghanistan, the USAID increased its staff, but it still struggles to keep tabs on programs. One U.S. official said the agency got "tied down doing paperwork and can't get out into the field to see if the projects are moving ahead." At the same time, it's quadrupled its overall spending to $300 million a month, with more than a quarter of it going directly to the Afghan government.
“When it comes to large-scale, ambitious aid programs, many outside experts are at a loss as how to handle programs in Afghanistan better, and they say the problems raise fundamental questions about whether the U.S.'s efforts to rebuild the country can work.”
[….]
Source: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/12/106681/troubled-us-afghan-projects-mushroom.html#
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Poppy eradication efforts by NATO and Afghan government backfiring. Such efforts have frequently ended up supporting large heroin dealers and corrupt government officials, while driving farmers to look for protection from various Taliban groups. Obama - not a word.
Ryan Harvey explores how large poppy growers and high government officials have benefited from the Afghan governments “efforts” to eradicate poppy farms. That’s called counter-productive, not counter-insurgency. Here I quote the first paragraphs from Harvey’s long and informative article.
“It has long been known inside Afghanistan that heroin dealers in high positions benefit from the United States and Afghan governments' counternarcotics policies.
“Now the American public can get a glimpse. US embassy cables published recently by WikiLeaks expose the insider opinion that Afghan officials are using poppy eradication teams to weed out the competitors of major traffickers with whom they are linked.
“The leaked cables follow previous observations, investigations, government reports and testimonials by former contractors that say eradication efforts have long been corrupted and misused, and that Afghan officials have consistently thwarted any serious attempts at stemming the heroin trade.
“The US and Britain began the operations in 2002, with the Afghan government acting as a silent partner and contractors like DynCorp pulling security. The theory was that if the Taliban was to be defeated, it would largely be through removing their access to the heroin industry and its associated taxes and bribes.
[….]
“But many of the people who were and still are responsible for the eradication program are corrupt officials in the Afghan government, most of whom are just as involved in the heroin economy, if not more, as the growers they are targeting.
“Indeed, instead of hurting the Taliban, the operations, in the words of former US special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, were ‘driving farmers into the hands of the Taliban.’
“It was for that reason that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has stepped back recently, giving the Afghan government the reins in order to give the programs an "Afghan face." Consolidating Power
“But there's more to NATO's shift than farmers running to the Taliban after having their livelihoods destroyed by eradication teams.
“US embassy cables written in 2007 and leaked this December suggest that poppy eradication teams have been used by warlords and other powerful provincial leaders to consolidate power.”
Source: http://www.truth-out.org/how-afghan-poppy-eradication-efforts-are-helping-worlds-largest-heroin-dealers67175
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In short, Obama’s words begin to appear hollow when the darker aspects of the US/NATO war/occupation of Afghanistan are put forth. Politically, the President's upbeat message and references to a hopeful future may temporarily grip his audience and raise their spirits, but it is not sustainable in light of the facts.
David Swanson concludes his fine article, “Why Pentagon Claims MLK Would Love War in Afghanistan, with the following words from Martin Luther King, Jr,” making clear that the Obama administration is hardly in the King tradition when it comes of Afghanistan.
"I am convinced," King said, "that if we are to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values. We must rapidly begin the shift from a thing-oriented society into a person-oriented society. . . . On the one hand we are called to play the Good Samaritan on life's roadside; but that will be only an initial act. One day we must come to see that the whole Jericho road must be transformed so that men and women will not be constantly beaten and robbed as they make their journey on life's highway. . . . The Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others and nothing to learn from them is not just. A true revolution of values will lay hands on the world order and say of war: 'This way of settling differences is not just.' This business of burning human beings with napalm, of filling our nation's homes with orphans and widows, of injecting poisonous drugs of hate into veins of people normally humane, of sending men home from dark and bloody battlefields physically handicapped and psychologically deranged, cannot be reconciled with wisdom, justice and love. A nation that continues year after year to spend more on military 'defense' than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death."
Source: http://zcommunications.org/why-pentagon-claims-mlk-would-love-war-on-afghanistan-by-david-swanson
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Saturday, January 29, 2011
Saturday, January 22, 2011
Where do ordinary Afghan citizens fit in the future of the US/NATO occupation
The US/NATO strategy in Afghanistan is based mostly on some mixture of counter-terrorism (killing Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan) and counter-insurgency (forcing insurgents out of targeted areas and winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan residents). Nir Rosen and Marika Theros refer to evidence of the failure of the strategy up to now. (You can access the full article at http://www.commondreans.org/view/2011/01/18-8.) I’ll identify some of their central points with quotes from their article and few statements.
First, Rosen and Marika challenge Obama’s recent cautious but upbeat annual review of purported military progress and improved Afghan security in 2010. Their cogent summary doesn’t support Obama’s views.
“The year 2010 witnessed a significant spike in violence both in the south, with offensive military operations triggering greater Taliban intimidation [2] and assassinations of civilians, and in the north [3] in heretofore ‘stable areas’ where international neglect and government abuse provide fertile ground for insurgent expansion. Real progress has been further complicated by the increasingly poisonous relationship between the Afghan government, the international community, and the Afghan people, aggravated by a potentially catastrophic electoral crisis [4], even more predatory government corruption and brazen war-profiteering [5], and near total disregard for the average Afghan citizen. As American and NATO forces enter their tenth year in Afghanistan, Afghan communities find themselves increasingly caught in a complex system of violence generated by insurgents, criminal gangs, drug lords, corrupt officials, US-allied local strongmen, and aggressive international forces.”
Second, the US military strategy during 2010 resulted in continuing and extensive damage to the Afghan population, property, and environment. They write:
“In Kandahar, the US is bombarding populated areas with smart rocket launchers and guided warheads, razing orchards, destroying homes, and partnering with people like the brutal commander [8] Colonel Abdul Razik and his militia. This increase in offensive operations, night raids, drone attacks, and use of irregular local forces remain precisely the tactics that provoke civilian outrage [9] even as they increase Taliban losses. Even more problematic, the international community never developed a complementary and much-needed political strategy that reinforces Afghan national unity and builds trust between state and society through genuine political reform and reconciliation at all levels of society.”
Third, Rosen and Marika provide evidence on the views of ordinary Afghan cities, focusing on their own experiences and future prospects. The evidence comes from a study sponsored in 2009 by LSE Global Governance at the London School of Economics and the Civil Society Development Center in Afghanistan. Rosen and Marika
“engaged a range of selected Afghan citizens - community, religious, and tribal leaders; NGO and community activists; teachers and educators; and, students and youth leaders – in seven regions to capture their experiences of insecurity and their views on how to secure Afghanistan’s future, including the provinces of Balkh, Baghlan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, and Nangarhar.” They identify three themes from the first rounds of interviews.
“ Firstly, the Taliban movement is a symptom of larger ills, and the continued focus on defeating them obscures the fact that the post-2001 political and economic order the international community helped create is the fundamental driver of instability, violence, and recruitment into the insurgency. Secondly, the current strategy with its near exclusive focus on government and armed actors as partners in the war effort perpetuates a system of personalized politics, power-grabbing and profiteering that fosters insecurity, corrupts Afghan society, and prevents the emergence of alternative political forces…. [while continuing] more as a mutual business enterprise in which belligerents – the political and economic elites, the internationals, and the insurgents – use insecurity as a cover for personal political and economic ambitions. They point to the massive amounts of international aid underwriting a perverse political economy that has created a nexus of financial interests between corrupt government officials, warlords, international contractors, and even the Taliban….”
“Finally… most Afghans want a rational outcome that produces a participatory system of governance rooted in Afghan values and able to provide minimally adequate services of justice, health, and education. Most Afghans do not challenge the existence of the state itself and support a unified Afghanistan…. In assessing the current struggle, Afghans look to progress on questions of justice, representation and allocation of resources rather than to kill-and-capture rates or announcements of new programmes in Kandahar or Helmand that link the populace to the government.”
In short, the situation in Afghanistan remains mired in conflict, corruption, destruction, and extensive human casualties and death. A major part of the problem is that the US and its allies are out-of-touch with or are misreading the views of ordinary Afghan citizens. Rosen and Marika believe that the situation can be ameliorated, though “not all of it can be undone.” Nonetheless, they can imagine policies that would be in the interests of the broad range of Afghan citizens they have interviewed.
First, with respect to the international aid coming into the country, the interviewees say that it must be better targeted, designed, and overseen, as well as making sure “that aid produces tangible results on the ground.”
Second, the international community could use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to “crack down on corruption.” And, further, the “US Government should seriously consider prosecuting those Afghan-Americans who have participated in corrupt practices.”
Third, “the international community – particularly the US – must do more than pay lip service to a political solution and de-escalate the conflict….This requires more emphasis on issues of governance, justice, and representation; a reconsideration of the exclusive partnerships developed with the pro-government local strongmen; a genuine effort to defend the Afghan population from predatory political and economic elites (and not only insurgents); and, increased checks on impunity and marginalization.”
Unfortunately, there is little in US history that would justify much hope in seeing US foreign and military policies transformed in ways to give humanitarian and democratic values priority over the interests of those in the US who dominate the economic and political systems. It’s not out of the question, though there is no recent precedent. We’ll see. It depends in part on how the following questions are answered. Will we witness the Obama administration and the US Congress reduce the allocation of money and resources to the US military in Afghanistan? Will there be a withdrawal of a large number of troops over the course of the year? Will the US and her allies, along with other concerned nations and the UN, find ways to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan that are consistent with the views of the majority of the Afghan people?
First, Rosen and Marika challenge Obama’s recent cautious but upbeat annual review of purported military progress and improved Afghan security in 2010. Their cogent summary doesn’t support Obama’s views.
“The year 2010 witnessed a significant spike in violence both in the south, with offensive military operations triggering greater Taliban intimidation [2] and assassinations of civilians, and in the north [3] in heretofore ‘stable areas’ where international neglect and government abuse provide fertile ground for insurgent expansion. Real progress has been further complicated by the increasingly poisonous relationship between the Afghan government, the international community, and the Afghan people, aggravated by a potentially catastrophic electoral crisis [4], even more predatory government corruption and brazen war-profiteering [5], and near total disregard for the average Afghan citizen. As American and NATO forces enter their tenth year in Afghanistan, Afghan communities find themselves increasingly caught in a complex system of violence generated by insurgents, criminal gangs, drug lords, corrupt officials, US-allied local strongmen, and aggressive international forces.”
Second, the US military strategy during 2010 resulted in continuing and extensive damage to the Afghan population, property, and environment. They write:
“In Kandahar, the US is bombarding populated areas with smart rocket launchers and guided warheads, razing orchards, destroying homes, and partnering with people like the brutal commander [8] Colonel Abdul Razik and his militia. This increase in offensive operations, night raids, drone attacks, and use of irregular local forces remain precisely the tactics that provoke civilian outrage [9] even as they increase Taliban losses. Even more problematic, the international community never developed a complementary and much-needed political strategy that reinforces Afghan national unity and builds trust between state and society through genuine political reform and reconciliation at all levels of society.”
Third, Rosen and Marika provide evidence on the views of ordinary Afghan cities, focusing on their own experiences and future prospects. The evidence comes from a study sponsored in 2009 by LSE Global Governance at the London School of Economics and the Civil Society Development Center in Afghanistan. Rosen and Marika
“engaged a range of selected Afghan citizens - community, religious, and tribal leaders; NGO and community activists; teachers and educators; and, students and youth leaders – in seven regions to capture their experiences of insecurity and their views on how to secure Afghanistan’s future, including the provinces of Balkh, Baghlan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, and Nangarhar.” They identify three themes from the first rounds of interviews.
“ Firstly, the Taliban movement is a symptom of larger ills, and the continued focus on defeating them obscures the fact that the post-2001 political and economic order the international community helped create is the fundamental driver of instability, violence, and recruitment into the insurgency. Secondly, the current strategy with its near exclusive focus on government and armed actors as partners in the war effort perpetuates a system of personalized politics, power-grabbing and profiteering that fosters insecurity, corrupts Afghan society, and prevents the emergence of alternative political forces…. [while continuing] more as a mutual business enterprise in which belligerents – the political and economic elites, the internationals, and the insurgents – use insecurity as a cover for personal political and economic ambitions. They point to the massive amounts of international aid underwriting a perverse political economy that has created a nexus of financial interests between corrupt government officials, warlords, international contractors, and even the Taliban….”
“Finally… most Afghans want a rational outcome that produces a participatory system of governance rooted in Afghan values and able to provide minimally adequate services of justice, health, and education. Most Afghans do not challenge the existence of the state itself and support a unified Afghanistan…. In assessing the current struggle, Afghans look to progress on questions of justice, representation and allocation of resources rather than to kill-and-capture rates or announcements of new programmes in Kandahar or Helmand that link the populace to the government.”
In short, the situation in Afghanistan remains mired in conflict, corruption, destruction, and extensive human casualties and death. A major part of the problem is that the US and its allies are out-of-touch with or are misreading the views of ordinary Afghan citizens. Rosen and Marika believe that the situation can be ameliorated, though “not all of it can be undone.” Nonetheless, they can imagine policies that would be in the interests of the broad range of Afghan citizens they have interviewed.
First, with respect to the international aid coming into the country, the interviewees say that it must be better targeted, designed, and overseen, as well as making sure “that aid produces tangible results on the ground.”
Second, the international community could use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to “crack down on corruption.” And, further, the “US Government should seriously consider prosecuting those Afghan-Americans who have participated in corrupt practices.”
Third, “the international community – particularly the US – must do more than pay lip service to a political solution and de-escalate the conflict….This requires more emphasis on issues of governance, justice, and representation; a reconsideration of the exclusive partnerships developed with the pro-government local strongmen; a genuine effort to defend the Afghan population from predatory political and economic elites (and not only insurgents); and, increased checks on impunity and marginalization.”
Unfortunately, there is little in US history that would justify much hope in seeing US foreign and military policies transformed in ways to give humanitarian and democratic values priority over the interests of those in the US who dominate the economic and political systems. It’s not out of the question, though there is no recent precedent. We’ll see. It depends in part on how the following questions are answered. Will we witness the Obama administration and the US Congress reduce the allocation of money and resources to the US military in Afghanistan? Will there be a withdrawal of a large number of troops over the course of the year? Will the US and her allies, along with other concerned nations and the UN, find ways to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan that are consistent with the views of the majority of the Afghan people?
Saturday, January 15, 2011
Afghanistan as deepening quagmire
One definition of “quagmire” is “a difficult or inextricable position,” and some definitions of the word inextricable are (1) “cannot be disentangled or untied” and (2) “so complicated or involved as to be insolvable.” As time passes, the 9-year-plus US/NATO war/occupation of Afghanistan seems more and more like a quagmire, or (let me expand a bit) being bogged down in a deteriorating and increasingly insolvable, harmful, and costly circumstances that alienate a growing number of Afghan people and citizens in other countries of the Middle East and Central Asia, leads to growing opposition to the war among the American public, and helps to perpetuate the idea that military force, once deployed, must continue.
In human terms, the casualty rates among US and allied forces are climbing and the civilian casualty rates are going up.
Here is just one example of the human damage from a Reuters article, January 11, 2011, based on reporting by Hamid Shalizi, writing by Michelle Nichols, and editing by Ron Popeski.
KABUL “Afghan and foreign forces have caused more than $100 million damage to fruit crops and homes during security operations in southern Kandahar province, a government delegation said on Tuesday.
“Tens of thousands of foreign and Afghan troops are deployed in Kandahar, a traditional stronghold of the Afghan Taliban, where they have been conducting military offensives over the past year.
“Violence is at its worst since U.S.-backed Afghan forces overthrew the Islamist government in 2001 after it refused to hand over al Qaeda militants, including Osama bin Laden, after the September 11 attacks on the United States.
“The government delegation, led by President Hamid Karzai's adviser, Mohammad Sadiq Aziz, said Afghan and foreign forces caused unreasonable damage to homes and orchards, just as the harvest was about to begin, and displaced a number of people.
[….]
“In November, the Afghan Rights Monitor (ARM), a human rights group, reported widespread damage to hundreds of houses in the same three districts, home to about 300,000 of the province's more than one million inhabitants.
“It said foreign forces had used aerial bombing to strike Taliban strongholds and to set off mines and homemade bombs sometimes hidden as booby traps in private homes.”
In addition, the economic costs for the US are soaring and adding as much as $120 billion for the next fiscal year. The rising US expenditures on the war/occupation are off budget and identified as “supplementary funding,” just like they were during the eight years of the Bush administration. But the expenditures don’t vanish. They show up – or will show up - in the US annual deficit, expected to be well over $1.5 trillion in 2011-2012, and to the ever-climbing, now $14 trillion plus, US national debt. What an awful, stupid waste.
Furthermore, the economy of Afghanistan, outside of the world-leading poppy and opium sectors, and outside of some neighborhoods in Kabul, remains largely in shambles.
This is not to say there are not some success stories. The Central Asia Institute, inspired by Greg Mortenson’s work, had by 2009 “established 131 schools that currently serve more than 58,000 students, most of them girls” (Stones into Schools, p. 15).
But the larger picture is grim, and reflected in one of the highest poverty and illiteracy rates in the world, in the increased US air war as well as in the increased ground war, and in the destruction and corruption spurred by it all. The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provides some gruesome facts in a report titled “Massive human rights deficit”:
“Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries on earth with two out of every three of its citizens struggling to provide naan-o-chai (bread and tea) for their families. The maternal mortality rate is the second highest in the world, it ranks at three for child mortality, only a quarter of the population have access to supplies of drinking water and less than 15 percent of women are literate.” (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/massivehrdeficit.aspx)
Also counterproductive as well as disaffecting. Juan Cole posts the following headline on his blog Informed Comment (Jan. 4, 2011): “Taliban getting stronger as US public support for Afghanistan War collapses.” Cole continues:
“Afghan President Hamid Karzai is getting weaker over time, and the Taliban are getting stronger, according to Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Matthews says that there will be a lull in the winter, but insurgent operations will pick up in the spring. As NATO allies draw down (many have announced their intention to leave the country), the US will likely need more troops to replace the departing European ones and to confront the growing insurgent challenge, she says. She does not think Afghanistan will emerge as a political issue in the next presidential race.”
Cole also refers to a recent CNN poll and its implications.
“A recent CNN poll found that only 35% of Americans support the US military mission in Afghanistan, and 63% oppose it. Even among Republicans, where there is a slight majority in favor, some 44% oppose the war! And, 56% of Americans think the war is going badly. Since Americans like a winner, that statistic is perhaps the most deadly for the Obama administration and the Pentagon. As recently as March, 2010, the country was evenly divided and a majority thought that the war was going well. But note that March was just after the Marjah campaign in Helmand province, which created a press image of activity and progress, and there was talk about a big offensive in Qandahar. But Marjah was not the quick victory Americans had hoped for and the Qandahar campaign is a far subtler and less dramatic affair than had been envisioned last spring.”
“But in postmodern warfare, it doesn’t seem to matter if the public supports the war or not.”
[….]
In his final sentence, Cole writes:
“In a recent paper at Chatham House, Kate Clark argues that lack of social justice and bad government policy are driving the increasing insurgency” – and it appears to be getting worse.
We should be reminded of what Malalai Joya pointed out in her book, A Woman Among Warlords (2009): “Today we Afghans remain trapped, between two enemies: the Taliban on one side and US/NATO forces and their warlord hirelings on the other” (p. 227). But it may be that the corruption and terror for Afghans has spread since Joya wrote her book a couple of years ago.
For example, Mujib Mashal finds evidence on “Rogue militias abuse rural Afghans” in an article for Al Jazeera (Jan. 12, 2011). He writes:
“’At night, they come out on the roads with their faces covered,’" said Obaid Sediq, a resident of Central Baghlan in northeastern Afghanistan. ‘Many times they have stopped our car and emptied our pockets. They have guns and you can't say anything back.’
“The Arbakai, semi-official local militias, have committed tremendous abuses in Afghanistan's northeastern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan. President Hamid Karzai finally ordered their disarmament last month.
“These militias are known to collect forced ‘taxes’ from feeble locals, create illegal checkpoints, seize property, and detain people in private jails - all at gun point and sanctioned by the government in Kabul.
“This widespread abuse damages government legitimacy and casts doubt over a recent program to create local police forces in other parts of the country. It also brings into question the effectiveness of the quick solutions sought to the security problems in Afghanistan.
“Historically, Arbakai militias were a major part of the tribal security apparatus in southeastern Afghanistan. Loosely linked to the central government, these groups typically came together from village families and provided security in times of need. A standing police force in these areas was a rarity.
“In the north, however, the idea of Arbakai is new. In fact, they are largely made up of former Mujahideen from the civil war period who were disarmed in the early years of President Karzai's government. In the past couple years, they have regrouped under their former commanders, re-christened as Arbakai with new weapons.”
[….]
“In the past three years, however, the security situation has deteriorated, even in the north. The national police, nine years after its rebirth, failed to meet security needs. The central government has resorted to arming local groups. Those who had recently been disarmed found themselves in a position of power again - by gathering as Arbakai militias to fill the security void. These men were to defend against any Taliban spread within the bounds of their village. But, as has happened so many times in Afghanistan, some Arbakai militias turned on the locals and used their guns for abuse of every kind.
[….]
“According to the governor, over 800 Arbakai forces have been active in Khanabad for the past year and half. In this period, they have occupied people's land, forced people to pay their everyday expenses, imprisoned people over personal animosities, and have been involved in murder and mayhem, much of which has gone unaccounted.
"’As the governor, I feel ashamed in my helplessness,’ says Nizamuldin. ‘People come to complain of their abuses often, but my hands are tied because my police cannot match them.’ According to the governor, there are 152 registered villages in Khanabad but only 117 active police officers at the governor's disposal.
[….]
"’In theory, the Afghan Local Police are different from the Arbakais, and steps to prevent abuse might exist,’ says Lt. General Hadi Khaled, a former Deputy Minister of the Interior. ‘The implementation is usually hasty and left to powerful locals. That's where the problem begins.’
“According to General Khaled, the creation of such groups - under any name - will make governance difficult. In appearance, he says, security might improve. But beneath the surface, tremendous problems will arise.
"’Lets face up to the reality,’ says General Khaled. ‘These men will answer to their own bosses, and not to the government. With their presence, law and order will be impossible.’”
So many Afghans suffer. And yet US military and political leaders insist that the same approach to Afghanistan must continue until at least 2014 and probably for many years thereafter. This is not so unusual, this foolhardy and counterproductive pattern. Go back and read the books by William Blum (e.g., Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II) or the new book by David Swanson, War is a Lie.
Let me finish with a quote from Kurt Vonnegut’s book, A Man Without a Country (2005):
“I apologize to all of you who are the same age as my grandchildren. And many of you reading this are probably the same age as my grandchildren.
“They, like you, are being royally shafted and lied to by our Baby Bomber corporations and government.
Yes, this planet is in a terrible mess. But it has always been a mess. There have never been any ‘Good Old Days,’ there have just been days. And as I say to my grandchildren, ‘Don’t look at me, I just got here.’”
In human terms, the casualty rates among US and allied forces are climbing and the civilian casualty rates are going up.
Here is just one example of the human damage from a Reuters article, January 11, 2011, based on reporting by Hamid Shalizi, writing by Michelle Nichols, and editing by Ron Popeski.
KABUL “Afghan and foreign forces have caused more than $100 million damage to fruit crops and homes during security operations in southern Kandahar province, a government delegation said on Tuesday.
“Tens of thousands of foreign and Afghan troops are deployed in Kandahar, a traditional stronghold of the Afghan Taliban, where they have been conducting military offensives over the past year.
“Violence is at its worst since U.S.-backed Afghan forces overthrew the Islamist government in 2001 after it refused to hand over al Qaeda militants, including Osama bin Laden, after the September 11 attacks on the United States.
“The government delegation, led by President Hamid Karzai's adviser, Mohammad Sadiq Aziz, said Afghan and foreign forces caused unreasonable damage to homes and orchards, just as the harvest was about to begin, and displaced a number of people.
[….]
“In November, the Afghan Rights Monitor (ARM), a human rights group, reported widespread damage to hundreds of houses in the same three districts, home to about 300,000 of the province's more than one million inhabitants.
“It said foreign forces had used aerial bombing to strike Taliban strongholds and to set off mines and homemade bombs sometimes hidden as booby traps in private homes.”
In addition, the economic costs for the US are soaring and adding as much as $120 billion for the next fiscal year. The rising US expenditures on the war/occupation are off budget and identified as “supplementary funding,” just like they were during the eight years of the Bush administration. But the expenditures don’t vanish. They show up – or will show up - in the US annual deficit, expected to be well over $1.5 trillion in 2011-2012, and to the ever-climbing, now $14 trillion plus, US national debt. What an awful, stupid waste.
Furthermore, the economy of Afghanistan, outside of the world-leading poppy and opium sectors, and outside of some neighborhoods in Kabul, remains largely in shambles.
This is not to say there are not some success stories. The Central Asia Institute, inspired by Greg Mortenson’s work, had by 2009 “established 131 schools that currently serve more than 58,000 students, most of them girls” (Stones into Schools, p. 15).
But the larger picture is grim, and reflected in one of the highest poverty and illiteracy rates in the world, in the increased US air war as well as in the increased ground war, and in the destruction and corruption spurred by it all. The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provides some gruesome facts in a report titled “Massive human rights deficit”:
“Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries on earth with two out of every three of its citizens struggling to provide naan-o-chai (bread and tea) for their families. The maternal mortality rate is the second highest in the world, it ranks at three for child mortality, only a quarter of the population have access to supplies of drinking water and less than 15 percent of women are literate.” (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/massivehrdeficit.aspx)
Also counterproductive as well as disaffecting. Juan Cole posts the following headline on his blog Informed Comment (Jan. 4, 2011): “Taliban getting stronger as US public support for Afghanistan War collapses.” Cole continues:
“Afghan President Hamid Karzai is getting weaker over time, and the Taliban are getting stronger, according to Jessica Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Matthews says that there will be a lull in the winter, but insurgent operations will pick up in the spring. As NATO allies draw down (many have announced their intention to leave the country), the US will likely need more troops to replace the departing European ones and to confront the growing insurgent challenge, she says. She does not think Afghanistan will emerge as a political issue in the next presidential race.”
Cole also refers to a recent CNN poll and its implications.
“A recent CNN poll found that only 35% of Americans support the US military mission in Afghanistan, and 63% oppose it. Even among Republicans, where there is a slight majority in favor, some 44% oppose the war! And, 56% of Americans think the war is going badly. Since Americans like a winner, that statistic is perhaps the most deadly for the Obama administration and the Pentagon. As recently as March, 2010, the country was evenly divided and a majority thought that the war was going well. But note that March was just after the Marjah campaign in Helmand province, which created a press image of activity and progress, and there was talk about a big offensive in Qandahar. But Marjah was not the quick victory Americans had hoped for and the Qandahar campaign is a far subtler and less dramatic affair than had been envisioned last spring.”
“But in postmodern warfare, it doesn’t seem to matter if the public supports the war or not.”
[….]
In his final sentence, Cole writes:
“In a recent paper at Chatham House, Kate Clark argues that lack of social justice and bad government policy are driving the increasing insurgency” – and it appears to be getting worse.
We should be reminded of what Malalai Joya pointed out in her book, A Woman Among Warlords (2009): “Today we Afghans remain trapped, between two enemies: the Taliban on one side and US/NATO forces and their warlord hirelings on the other” (p. 227). But it may be that the corruption and terror for Afghans has spread since Joya wrote her book a couple of years ago.
For example, Mujib Mashal finds evidence on “Rogue militias abuse rural Afghans” in an article for Al Jazeera (Jan. 12, 2011). He writes:
“’At night, they come out on the roads with their faces covered,’" said Obaid Sediq, a resident of Central Baghlan in northeastern Afghanistan. ‘Many times they have stopped our car and emptied our pockets. They have guns and you can't say anything back.’
“The Arbakai, semi-official local militias, have committed tremendous abuses in Afghanistan's northeastern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan. President Hamid Karzai finally ordered their disarmament last month.
“These militias are known to collect forced ‘taxes’ from feeble locals, create illegal checkpoints, seize property, and detain people in private jails - all at gun point and sanctioned by the government in Kabul.
“This widespread abuse damages government legitimacy and casts doubt over a recent program to create local police forces in other parts of the country. It also brings into question the effectiveness of the quick solutions sought to the security problems in Afghanistan.
“Historically, Arbakai militias were a major part of the tribal security apparatus in southeastern Afghanistan. Loosely linked to the central government, these groups typically came together from village families and provided security in times of need. A standing police force in these areas was a rarity.
“In the north, however, the idea of Arbakai is new. In fact, they are largely made up of former Mujahideen from the civil war period who were disarmed in the early years of President Karzai's government. In the past couple years, they have regrouped under their former commanders, re-christened as Arbakai with new weapons.”
[….]
“In the past three years, however, the security situation has deteriorated, even in the north. The national police, nine years after its rebirth, failed to meet security needs. The central government has resorted to arming local groups. Those who had recently been disarmed found themselves in a position of power again - by gathering as Arbakai militias to fill the security void. These men were to defend against any Taliban spread within the bounds of their village. But, as has happened so many times in Afghanistan, some Arbakai militias turned on the locals and used their guns for abuse of every kind.
[….]
“According to the governor, over 800 Arbakai forces have been active in Khanabad for the past year and half. In this period, they have occupied people's land, forced people to pay their everyday expenses, imprisoned people over personal animosities, and have been involved in murder and mayhem, much of which has gone unaccounted.
"’As the governor, I feel ashamed in my helplessness,’ says Nizamuldin. ‘People come to complain of their abuses often, but my hands are tied because my police cannot match them.’ According to the governor, there are 152 registered villages in Khanabad but only 117 active police officers at the governor's disposal.
[….]
"’In theory, the Afghan Local Police are different from the Arbakais, and steps to prevent abuse might exist,’ says Lt. General Hadi Khaled, a former Deputy Minister of the Interior. ‘The implementation is usually hasty and left to powerful locals. That's where the problem begins.’
“According to General Khaled, the creation of such groups - under any name - will make governance difficult. In appearance, he says, security might improve. But beneath the surface, tremendous problems will arise.
"’Lets face up to the reality,’ says General Khaled. ‘These men will answer to their own bosses, and not to the government. With their presence, law and order will be impossible.’”
So many Afghans suffer. And yet US military and political leaders insist that the same approach to Afghanistan must continue until at least 2014 and probably for many years thereafter. This is not so unusual, this foolhardy and counterproductive pattern. Go back and read the books by William Blum (e.g., Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II) or the new book by David Swanson, War is a Lie.
Let me finish with a quote from Kurt Vonnegut’s book, A Man Without a Country (2005):
“I apologize to all of you who are the same age as my grandchildren. And many of you reading this are probably the same age as my grandchildren.
“They, like you, are being royally shafted and lied to by our Baby Bomber corporations and government.
Yes, this planet is in a terrible mess. But it has always been a mess. There have never been any ‘Good Old Days,’ there have just been days. And as I say to my grandchildren, ‘Don’t look at me, I just got here.’”
Saturday, January 8, 2011
Afghanistan in the first days of 2011 - bad news overwhelms good news
There are mixed results over the last two weeks, including the first days of the new year, regarding the US-dominated/NATO occupation and war in Afghanistan. There is some good news, but, sadly, the bad news remains greatly ascendant.
First the good news. Jason Ditz reports on Antiwar.com (12/30/10) that the newest CNN/Opinion Research poll finds that “63 percent of the American public opposed to the war, the largest opposition yet from the regular poll.” Another question posed by the pollsters finds that “56 percent of Americans believe the war is going either ‘moderately badly’ or ‘very badly.” Ditz notes that this poll was taken after the president’s December 16 speech on Afghanistan, indicating that Obama’s upbeat message did not resonate well with most of the American public.
While such poll findings may be momentarily uplifting for those of us who have opposed the U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from the beginning, going back to 2001 or even before, public opinion does not much affect US Afghan policies. A positive note is that such polls may reflect a growing awareness among an increasing number of Americans that the war is too costly financially and much too injurious (or lethal) for American troops and their families. One implication is that there is a growing sentiment that we need to direct our attention to the serious domestic problems in America of unemployment and underemployment, the continuing housing crisis, a pressing need to channel more support to public education through college, the overall debt-ridden American government, economy, and society, research and technology on green energy, and so forth. On this score, Tom Engelhardt comments in one of the paragraphs from his much longer article on Antiwar.com, “The Urge to Surge,” January 4, 2011:
"The U.S. economy looks increasingly sclerotic; moneys for an aging and rotting infrastructure are long gone; state and city governments are laying off teachers, police, even firefighters; Americans are unemployed in near record numbers; global oil prices (for a country that has in no way begun to wean itself from its dependence on foreign oil) are ominously on the rise; and yet taxpayer money continues to pour into the military and into our foreign wars. It has recently been estimated, for instance, that after spending $11.6 billion in 2011 on the training, supply, and support of the Afghan army and police, the U.S. will continue to spend an average of $6.2 billion a year at least through 2015 (and undoubtedly into an unknown future) – and that’s but one expense in the estimated $120 billion to $160 billion a year being spent at present on the Afghan War, what can only be described as part of America’s war stimulus package abroad." (http://original/antiwar.com/engelhardt/2011/01/04/the-urge-to-surge-4)
However, the increasingly plutocratic nature of the US political system, the power of the military-industrial complex, the foreign policy based on force as always a viable, if not preferred, option, the continuing and increasing dependence on foreign oil - all represent some of the dominant influences with respect to foreign policy generally and to Afghanistan specifically. Public opinion appears little more than a passing annoyance to the decision-makers, especially when there is yet no strong anti-Afghan war movement.
Among the other bad news items, Jason Ditz’s Antiwar.com column on January 6, 2011 offers the following example, reporting that “Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has approved yet another escalation of the war in Afghanistan, this time approving another 1,400 Marines who are expected to be sent to Afghanistan within a matter of weeks.”
How many US troops are already in Afghanistan? According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), there were 90,000 US troops in Afghanistan near the end of 2010, along with 39,215 troops with allied countries, ranging from no troops from Jordan and Tonga to 9,500 troops from the UK. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placeats/14DEC%202010%20Placemat.pdf
Other reports have indicated the US troop level closer to 100,000. With the additional 1,400 US troops, the total number now rises to 91,400 or to above 100,000.
The numbers don’t end there. There are an unknown number of CIA operatives and US Special Forces, plus US-connected contractors. Further, according to Wikipedia, there were in 2010 138,200 Afghan National Army troops and 120,500 Afghan National Police officers. There are regular reports that indicate many of the Afghan troops and police officers are not well trained, not reliable, and/or infiltrated by people who are sympathetic to the Taliban.
Despite the growing number of US and other troops and police in Afghanistan, the situation there appears to be getting worse. The Dailykos.com website quotes from Agence France-Presse, December 27, 2010, on two confidential UN maps showing “a clear deterioration in security in parts of Afghanistan.” Quoting Kieran Dwyer, “communications director of the UN mission in Afghanistan, “There are parts of the country that have become increasingly difficult to operate in during 2010 due to insecurity.” The article notes further, “Violence in the north has steadily worsened over the last two years despite the Taliban insurgency having its powerbase in the south.” (http://www.kailykos.com/story/2010/12/28/931769/-Open-thread-for-night-owls:-Insecurity-rises-in-Afghanistan
Juan Cole identifies the “top ten myths about Afghanistan,” including this one on the deteriorating security environment in the country. (“Top Ten Myths About Afghanistan,” Informed Comment, December 27, 2010.) First the myth, then the fact.
Myth: “There has been significant progress in tamping down the insurgency in Afghanistan.”
Fact: A recent National Intelligence Estimate by 16 intelligence agencies found no progress. It warned that large swathes of the country were at risk of falling to the Taliban and that they still had safe havens in Pakistan, with the Pakistani government complicit. The UN says there were over 6000 civilian casualties of war in Afghanistan in the first 10 months of 2010, a 20% increase over the same period in 2009. Also, 701 US and NATO troops have been killed this year, compared to 521 last year, a 25% increase. There were typically over 1000 insurgent attacks per month in Afghanistan this year, often twice as many per month as in 2009, recalling the guerrilla war in Iraq in 2005.
US Afghanistan policy has a pronounced surreal quality about it. Tom Engelhardt captures some of this when he compares the recent surge in US troops to how Soviet generals were thinking back in the 1980s about the future progress of their occupation. Both the Soviet generals and the US decision-makers are caught up in pipedreams, though with lots of destructive consequences. Engelhardt writes:
“As 2011 begins, what could be eerier than reading secret Soviet documents from the USSR’s Afghan debacle of the 1980s? It gives you chills to run across Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at a Politburo meeting in October 1985, almost six years after Soviet troops first flooded into Afghanistan, reading letters aloud to his colleagues from embittered Soviet citizens (‘The Politburo had made a mistake and must correct it as soon as possible – every day precious lives are lost’); or, in November 1986, insisting to those same colleagues that the Afghan war must be ended in a year, ‘at maximum, two.’ Yet, with the gut-wrenching sureness history offers, you can’t help but know that, even two years later, even with a strong desire to leave (which has yet to surface among the Washington elite a decade into our own Afghan adventure), imperial pride and fear of loss of ‘credibility’ would keep the Soviets fighting on to 1989.” (http://original/antiwar.com/engelhardt/2011/01/04/the-urge-to-surge-4)
First the good news. Jason Ditz reports on Antiwar.com (12/30/10) that the newest CNN/Opinion Research poll finds that “63 percent of the American public opposed to the war, the largest opposition yet from the regular poll.” Another question posed by the pollsters finds that “56 percent of Americans believe the war is going either ‘moderately badly’ or ‘very badly.” Ditz notes that this poll was taken after the president’s December 16 speech on Afghanistan, indicating that Obama’s upbeat message did not resonate well with most of the American public.
While such poll findings may be momentarily uplifting for those of us who have opposed the U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from the beginning, going back to 2001 or even before, public opinion does not much affect US Afghan policies. A positive note is that such polls may reflect a growing awareness among an increasing number of Americans that the war is too costly financially and much too injurious (or lethal) for American troops and their families. One implication is that there is a growing sentiment that we need to direct our attention to the serious domestic problems in America of unemployment and underemployment, the continuing housing crisis, a pressing need to channel more support to public education through college, the overall debt-ridden American government, economy, and society, research and technology on green energy, and so forth. On this score, Tom Engelhardt comments in one of the paragraphs from his much longer article on Antiwar.com, “The Urge to Surge,” January 4, 2011:
"The U.S. economy looks increasingly sclerotic; moneys for an aging and rotting infrastructure are long gone; state and city governments are laying off teachers, police, even firefighters; Americans are unemployed in near record numbers; global oil prices (for a country that has in no way begun to wean itself from its dependence on foreign oil) are ominously on the rise; and yet taxpayer money continues to pour into the military and into our foreign wars. It has recently been estimated, for instance, that after spending $11.6 billion in 2011 on the training, supply, and support of the Afghan army and police, the U.S. will continue to spend an average of $6.2 billion a year at least through 2015 (and undoubtedly into an unknown future) – and that’s but one expense in the estimated $120 billion to $160 billion a year being spent at present on the Afghan War, what can only be described as part of America’s war stimulus package abroad." (http://original/antiwar.com/engelhardt/2011/01/04/the-urge-to-surge-4)
However, the increasingly plutocratic nature of the US political system, the power of the military-industrial complex, the foreign policy based on force as always a viable, if not preferred, option, the continuing and increasing dependence on foreign oil - all represent some of the dominant influences with respect to foreign policy generally and to Afghanistan specifically. Public opinion appears little more than a passing annoyance to the decision-makers, especially when there is yet no strong anti-Afghan war movement.
Among the other bad news items, Jason Ditz’s Antiwar.com column on January 6, 2011 offers the following example, reporting that “Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has approved yet another escalation of the war in Afghanistan, this time approving another 1,400 Marines who are expected to be sent to Afghanistan within a matter of weeks.”
How many US troops are already in Afghanistan? According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), there were 90,000 US troops in Afghanistan near the end of 2010, along with 39,215 troops with allied countries, ranging from no troops from Jordan and Tonga to 9,500 troops from the UK. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placeats/14DEC%202010%20Placemat.pdf
Other reports have indicated the US troop level closer to 100,000. With the additional 1,400 US troops, the total number now rises to 91,400 or to above 100,000.
The numbers don’t end there. There are an unknown number of CIA operatives and US Special Forces, plus US-connected contractors. Further, according to Wikipedia, there were in 2010 138,200 Afghan National Army troops and 120,500 Afghan National Police officers. There are regular reports that indicate many of the Afghan troops and police officers are not well trained, not reliable, and/or infiltrated by people who are sympathetic to the Taliban.
Despite the growing number of US and other troops and police in Afghanistan, the situation there appears to be getting worse. The Dailykos.com website quotes from Agence France-Presse, December 27, 2010, on two confidential UN maps showing “a clear deterioration in security in parts of Afghanistan.” Quoting Kieran Dwyer, “communications director of the UN mission in Afghanistan, “There are parts of the country that have become increasingly difficult to operate in during 2010 due to insecurity.” The article notes further, “Violence in the north has steadily worsened over the last two years despite the Taliban insurgency having its powerbase in the south.” (http://www.kailykos.com/story/2010/12/28/931769/-Open-thread-for-night-owls:-Insecurity-rises-in-Afghanistan
Juan Cole identifies the “top ten myths about Afghanistan,” including this one on the deteriorating security environment in the country. (“Top Ten Myths About Afghanistan,” Informed Comment, December 27, 2010.) First the myth, then the fact.
Myth: “There has been significant progress in tamping down the insurgency in Afghanistan.”
Fact: A recent National Intelligence Estimate by 16 intelligence agencies found no progress. It warned that large swathes of the country were at risk of falling to the Taliban and that they still had safe havens in Pakistan, with the Pakistani government complicit. The UN says there were over 6000 civilian casualties of war in Afghanistan in the first 10 months of 2010, a 20% increase over the same period in 2009. Also, 701 US and NATO troops have been killed this year, compared to 521 last year, a 25% increase. There were typically over 1000 insurgent attacks per month in Afghanistan this year, often twice as many per month as in 2009, recalling the guerrilla war in Iraq in 2005.
US Afghanistan policy has a pronounced surreal quality about it. Tom Engelhardt captures some of this when he compares the recent surge in US troops to how Soviet generals were thinking back in the 1980s about the future progress of their occupation. Both the Soviet generals and the US decision-makers are caught up in pipedreams, though with lots of destructive consequences. Engelhardt writes:
“As 2011 begins, what could be eerier than reading secret Soviet documents from the USSR’s Afghan debacle of the 1980s? It gives you chills to run across Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at a Politburo meeting in October 1985, almost six years after Soviet troops first flooded into Afghanistan, reading letters aloud to his colleagues from embittered Soviet citizens (‘The Politburo had made a mistake and must correct it as soon as possible – every day precious lives are lost’); or, in November 1986, insisting to those same colleagues that the Afghan war must be ended in a year, ‘at maximum, two.’ Yet, with the gut-wrenching sureness history offers, you can’t help but know that, even two years later, even with a strong desire to leave (which has yet to surface among the Washington elite a decade into our own Afghan adventure), imperial pride and fear of loss of ‘credibility’ would keep the Soviets fighting on to 1989.” (http://original/antiwar.com/engelhardt/2011/01/04/the-urge-to-surge-4)
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