Where do ordinary Afghan citizens fit in the future of the US/NATO occupation

The US/NATO strategy in Afghanistan is based mostly on some mixture of counter-terrorism (killing Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan) and counter-insurgency (forcing insurgents out of targeted areas and winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan residents). Nir Rosen and Marika Theros refer to evidence of the failure of the strategy up to now. (You can access the full article at http://www.commondreans.org/view/2011/01/18-8.) I’ll identify some of their central points with quotes from their article and few statements.

First, Rosen and Marika challenge Obama’s recent cautious but upbeat annual review of purported military progress and improved Afghan security in 2010. Their cogent summary doesn’t support Obama’s views.

“The year 2010 witnessed a significant spike in violence both in the south, with offensive military operations triggering greater Taliban intimidation [2] and assassinations of civilians, and in the north [3] in heretofore ‘stable areas’ where international neglect and government abuse provide fertile ground for insurgent expansion. Real progress has been further complicated by the increasingly poisonous relationship between the Afghan government, the international community, and the Afghan people, aggravated by a potentially catastrophic electoral crisis [4], even more predatory government corruption and brazen war-profiteering [5], and near total disregard for the average Afghan citizen. As American and NATO forces enter their tenth year in Afghanistan, Afghan communities find themselves increasingly caught in a complex system of violence generated by insurgents, criminal gangs, drug lords, corrupt officials, US-allied local strongmen, and aggressive international forces.”

Second, the US military strategy during 2010 resulted in continuing and extensive damage to the Afghan population, property, and environment. They write:
“In Kandahar, the US is bombarding populated areas with smart rocket launchers and guided warheads, razing orchards, destroying homes, and partnering with people like the brutal commander [8] Colonel Abdul Razik and his militia. This increase in offensive operations, night raids, drone attacks, and use of irregular local forces remain precisely the tactics that provoke civilian outrage [9] even as they increase Taliban losses. Even more problematic, the international community never developed a complementary and much-needed political strategy that reinforces Afghan national unity and builds trust between state and society through genuine political reform and reconciliation at all levels of society.”

Third, Rosen and Marika provide evidence on the views of ordinary Afghan cities, focusing on their own experiences and future prospects. The evidence comes from a study sponsored in 2009 by LSE Global Governance at the London School of Economics and the Civil Society Development Center in Afghanistan. Rosen and Marika

“engaged a range of selected Afghan citizens - community, religious, and tribal leaders; NGO and community activists; teachers and educators; and, students and youth leaders – in seven regions to capture their experiences of insecurity and their views on how to secure Afghanistan’s future, including the provinces of Balkh, Baghlan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, and Nangarhar.” They identify three themes from the first rounds of interviews.

“ Firstly, the Taliban movement is a symptom of larger ills, and the continued focus on defeating them obscures the fact that the post-2001 political and economic order the international community helped create is the fundamental driver of instability, violence, and recruitment into the insurgency. Secondly, the current strategy with its near exclusive focus on government and armed actors as partners in the war effort perpetuates a system of personalized politics, power-grabbing and profiteering that fosters insecurity, corrupts Afghan society, and prevents the emergence of alternative political forces…. [while continuing] more as a mutual business enterprise in which belligerents – the political and economic elites, the internationals, and the insurgents – use insecurity as a cover for personal political and economic ambitions. They point to the massive amounts of international aid underwriting a perverse political economy that has created a nexus of financial interests between corrupt government officials, warlords, international contractors, and even the Taliban….”

“Finally… most Afghans want a rational outcome that produces a participatory system of governance rooted in Afghan values and able to provide minimally adequate services of justice, health, and education. Most Afghans do not challenge the existence of the state itself and support a unified Afghanistan…. In assessing the current struggle, Afghans look to progress on questions of justice, representation and allocation of resources rather than to kill-and-capture rates or announcements of new programmes in Kandahar or Helmand that link the populace to the government.”

In short, the situation in Afghanistan remains mired in conflict, corruption, destruction, and extensive human casualties and death. A major part of the problem is that the US and its allies are out-of-touch with or are misreading the views of ordinary Afghan citizens. Rosen and Marika believe that the situation can be ameliorated, though “not all of it can be undone.” Nonetheless, they can imagine policies that would be in the interests of the broad range of Afghan citizens they have interviewed.

First, with respect to the international aid coming into the country, the interviewees say that it must be better targeted, designed, and overseen, as well as making sure “that aid produces tangible results on the ground.”

Second, the international community could use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to “crack down on corruption.” And, further, the “US Government should seriously consider prosecuting those Afghan-Americans who have participated in corrupt practices.”

Third, “the international community – particularly the US – must do more than pay lip service to a political solution and de-escalate the conflict….This requires more emphasis on issues of governance, justice, and representation; a reconsideration of the exclusive partnerships developed with the pro-government local strongmen; a genuine effort to defend the Afghan population from predatory political and economic elites (and not only insurgents); and, increased checks on impunity and marginalization.”

Unfortunately, there is little in US history that would justify much hope in seeing US foreign and military policies transformed in ways to give humanitarian and democratic values priority over the interests of those in the US who dominate the economic and political systems. It’s not out of the question, though there is no recent precedent. We’ll see. It depends in part on how the following questions are answered. Will we witness the Obama administration and the US Congress reduce the allocation of money and resources to the US military in Afghanistan? Will there be a withdrawal of a large number of troops over the course of the year? Will the US and her allies, along with other concerned nations and the UN, find ways to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan that are consistent with the views of the majority of the Afghan people?