The case for withdrawal from Afghanistan

Nick Turse is the editor of a new book on the US-led Afghanistan war/occupation, the title of which is The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Turse “is an award-winning journalist, historian, essayist, and the associate editor of the Nation Institute’s TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The Complex and has written “for the Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Nation, Le Monde Diplomatique, In These Times and the Village Voice.”

The Case for Withdrawal includes an introduction by Turse, followed by 22 articles written by “leading commentators, politicians, and military strategists.” The articles are organized into four “parts”: “The Wars for Afghanistan”; Incompetence, Corruption, and the War on Women”; “Facts on the Ground”; and “The Case for Withdrawal.” While there are some differences among the contributing authors, they all agree, “some tacitly, some explicitly,” that there is a need to build “a solid case for a foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan” and to make Americans cognizant of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan as a serious option (xviii).

In this post, I want to outline major points from the book’s concluding article, “How to Get Out,” by Robert Dreyfuss. Of the authors included in this collection, Dreyfuss offers the most comprehensive view, in broad outline of how the goal of withdrawing US and NATO troops can be achieved without leaving the country even worse off than it is. His proposals identify major challenges and make logical sense. At the same time, they seem highly idealistic and politically improbable both with respect to US domestic politics and in relevant international relations. There is also some confusion on the role that the UN will play. In the end, the US military involvement in Afghanistan may be more like the end of the Vietnam War.
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First, Dreyfuss joins a host of other critics and contends that the Karzai government is an obstacle to real change. He writes: “The corrupt government of President Karzai and his cronies is no long sustainable, whether or not there is a second round the fraud-marred election” [and this is true as well regarding the election that was just held].

Dreyfuss then offers his views on (1) creating a new government structure, (2) the US government as a facilitator in the transition to a new Afghan government and (3) in seeking international and regional support to buttress a new government, and (4) the need for the withdrawal of US/NATO troops.

#1 – “A new government in Kabul must emerge, in the process accommodating Pashtun nationalists, the Taliban, and other insurgents,” including as well “tribal and ethnic leaders, various warlords, and representatives of Afghanistan’s myriad political factions.” The national accord that results from this process “will probably not be a strong central government but rather a decentralized federal system, in which provinces and districts retain a significant degree of autonomy.”

“To secure international support, the United States must defer to the United Nations to convene a conference in which Afghans themselves hammer out the new way forward.”

#2 – The US government as a facilitator.

“…the president [Obama] should encourage the convening of an international Bonn II conference involving the UN, the major world powers, and Afghanistan’s neighbors – including Iran, India, and Pakistan – to support the renegotiation of the Afghanistan compact….

“In advance of that, the United States should join other nations and the UN to persuade President Karzai, his main electoral opponents, and other Afghan politicians to form a coalition that would create an interim caretaker regime until the establishment of a more broadly based government.”

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are key parts of the problem “[T]he Afghan Taliban are” in effect “a branch of Pakistan’s army and its intelligence service.” Saudi Arabia channels large sums of money to insurgent groups. Therefore, “Obama must strongly encourage Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to bring key elements of the three interlinked insurgency movements – the Taliban, the Hezb-i-Islami ofGulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Haqqani network to the bargaining table….China, Pakistan’s ally, which has a vital interest in Central America, should be willing to use its influence in Pakistan to make sure Islamabad and Rawalpindi are on board.”

“…Obama will have to work to get Iran, India, and Russia to help persuade the remnants of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (most Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras) to make room in Kabul for an enlarged Pashtun role, including the Taliban, in which could become a stable power-sharing arrangement.”

#3 – International support - “The world community must pledge its support of Afghanistan financially for years to come.”

#4 – These steps must be accompanied by “an unconditional withdrawal of US and NATO forces” and the recognition that a military victory in Afghanistan is not feasible.

In addition, “the Obama administration will have to give up its massive nation-building project, dismantling the empire of US departments, agencies, provincial reconstruction teams, and the rest….”

“With the agreement of the Afghan government, a limited US intelligence and counterterrorism mission designed to monitor the remnants of al Qaeda can remain in Afghanistan.”