Reporting for Stars and Stripes, Leo Shane writes on the highlights of a conference call with award-winning Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard University economist Linda Bilmes. The focus of the call was on Stiglitz and Bilmes book, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict and recent estimates. The book was first published in 2008. The $3 Trillion refers to the low estimate of the military-related costs of the Iraq War, including, among other things, the medical costs for veterans, the related costs for their famiies, and the opportunity costs for government, that is, what the government could have altrernatively spent on domestic programs here in the US (e.g., education, green infrastructure, job creation, medical care for all, etc.). The costs were estimated by the authors through 2017. The high-end cost estimate was $5-trillion.
Shane reports that, in the conference call, "Bilmes said about 600,000 Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have already sought medical treatment from the Department of Veteran Affairs, and 500,000 have applied for disability benefits." Bilmes continued: "That's about 30 percent higher than initial estimates for care, and could cost the department nearly $1 trillion in costs for the current wars alone."
In addition, Shane reports, "Stiglitz said history has shown the cost of treating illness such as post-traumatic stress disorders only increase with time, and with the country still expecting a significant presence in Afghanistan for years to come, the bills will keep piling up."
See full story at: http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central_1.8040/study-wars-could-cost-4-trilliong-to-6-trillion-1.120054
From another source: A headline from Truthdig.com on August 9, 2010, indicates that "Obama Will Spend More than Bush on Military." (http://www.truthdig.com/ )
Truth.dig quotes from the New York Times as follows:
"Mr Gates [Secretary of Defense] is calling for the Pentagon's budget to keep growing in the long run at 1 percent a year after inflation, plus the cost of the war[s]. It has averaged an inflation-adjusted growth rate of 7 percent a year over the last decade (nearly 12 percent a yar without adjusting for inflation), including the costs of the wars. So far, Mr. Obama has asked Congress for an increase of total spending next year of 2.2 percent, to $708 billion - 6.1 percent higher than the peak under the Bush administration."
The implication of these estimates is that, when spending on the wars is included with other net increased in the military spending, Obama's military budget will be higher than what the Bush administration allocated in their highest military-spending year. Note also that the $708 billion does not include the costs of long-term medical care for veterans or the costs to their families of providing often extensive and long-term care, or, additionally, how rising military-related costs reduce expenditures on many important domestic programs in the US.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Veterans speak out against religious intolerance
The organization Iraq and Afghan Veterans calls for respect for Muslims, the great majority of whom are not engaged in or supporting violent actions toward US troops or others in these two countries or elsewhere, including in the US itself.
Implicitly, the organization rejects Islamophobia and groups that advance this racist, irrational, hatred, rejects the notion that there is an international war between Islam and Christianity, and rejects the justification that we are fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the Muslim faith of the people in these two countries.
Iraq, Afghan Veterans Call For Respect For Muslims: 'America, You Gotta Have Our Back'
The push by some in the media against rising anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States gained valuable voices of support over the weekend -- and now joining that chorus are veterans who fought alongside U.S. servicemembers of Islamic faith in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A small but growing group of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have signed onto an open letter, provided exclusively to the Huffington Post, which calls on the American public to respect "the values we risked our lives to protect" and to avoid endangering the mission -- and safety -- of U.S. forces in the Mideast. Like Gen. David Petraeus, the veterans warn that U.S. troops will face blowback from demonstrated intolerance for Muslims at home.
"America, you gotta have our back," reads the letter, composed by signatories Roy Scranton, Philip Klay and Perry O'Brien. "Those who would vilify and target Muslims on grounds of their religious belief not only show a deep disrespect for American values, but put American lives at risk. It's easy to burn a Koran when you won't feel the heat."
O'Brien told HuffPost that he, Scranton and Klay, all of whom are now writers living in New York City, wrote the letter together out of mutual frustration with the uptick in anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence, then learned that "many of our buddies felt the same way."
They're not alone. A Quinnipiac poll released Monday found that 50 percent of respondents said "mainstream Islam" is a peaceful religion, while only 27 percent said it encourages violence toward non-Muslims. And though the Park51 project -- the so-called "Ground Zero mosque" -- is still opposed more than two-to-one by the general populace surveyed by Quinnipiac, support for the project is growing in New York itself.
The "frenzy" whipped up in response to Park51 "was one of the key events that drove us to write the letter," O'Brien wrote in a follow-up email, along with the Muslim cab driver stabbing late last month. "I think we all feel that this city has become the center of much of this renewed intolerance, at least in the popular imagination," he wrote. "As vets living in New York, we wanted to speak on behalf of friends currently deployed and remind people that hysterical culture wars have very real, and very dangerous impact for people fighting real wars."
Read the full letter:
As veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have watched with increasing alarm the rise of anti-Islamic rhetoric within the US.We've seen attacks on Muslim citizens, intolerance toward religious expression, and even book burning. This goes against the very values we risked our lives to protect.We have served beside Muslim Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen. The success of our mission, and the safety of our lives have depended on Muslim translators, who've risked their own lives and the lives of their families to help us. For the servicemembers currently deployed, the success of their mission and the safety of their lives depends on a basic respect for, and interaction with, Islamic culture.
Those that would vilify and target Muslims on grounds of their religious belief not only show a deep disrespect for American values but put American lives at risk. It's easy to burn a Koran when you won't feel the heat.We speak as infantrymen, truck drivers, medics, and the whole host of military professions that depend on good relations with a deeply religious Muslim population. That population sees the American flag we wear on our uniform and judges us, not only by our actions but on the values our nation upholds.
We must be able to point back home and say, these are the values we respect. Chief among those values is our courage as a nation to peacefully and openly engage with differences of culture and religion.How does the squad leader in Kandahar respond to the Afghan woman who asks why Americans burned her holy book?When Americans participate in hateful rhetoric and intolerance toward Muslims, it leaves us exposed.America, you gotta have our back.--
Roy Scranton, US Army Artillery, Iraq
Philip Klay, USMC Public Affairs Officer, Iraq
Perry O'Brien, US Army Medic (Airborne), Afghanistan
James Redden Jr., USAR Journalist, Iraq
Joshua Casteel, US Army Linguist, Iraq
Logan Mehl-Laituri, US Army Forward Observer, Iraq
Hart Viges, Army, Infantry (Airborne), Iraq
Jason M Wallace, US Air Force Maintenance, Kuwait
Chantelle Bateman, USMC Supply, Iraq
Geoffrey Millard, US Army Infantry, Iraq
Nicholas Przybyla, US Navy Cameraman, Pakistan Coast
John McClelland, US Army Medic (Ranger), Afghanistan and Iraq
Andrew Johnson, US Army Radar Technician, Iraq
Daniel Paulsen, US Army Medic (Airborne), Afghanistan
Fernando Braga, US Army Supply, Iraq
Maggie Martin, US Army Signal, Iraq
Adam Kokesh, USMC Civil Affairs, Iraq
Lisa Zepeda, US Army Lab Technician, Iraq
Brian Turner, US Army Infantry, Iraq
Matt Gallagher, US Army Cavalry Officer, Iraq
Michael Anthony Ruehrwein, US Army OR Tech, Iraq
Erika Sjolander, US Army Supply, Iraq
Bryan Reinholdt, US Army Apache Maintenance, Iraq
Jason Chambers, US Air Force Air Freight Specialist, Iraq
Joe Wheeler, US Army Surgical Assistant, Iraq
Ash Woolson, US Army Combat Engineer, Iraq
Chris Hellie, US Army Cavalry Officer, Iraq
Sara Beining, US Army Intelligence Analyst, Iraq
Helen Gerhardt, US Army Transport, Iraq
Garett Reppenhagen, US Army Cavalry Scout, Iraq
Groups:
New York City
Staff
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Implicitly, the organization rejects Islamophobia and groups that advance this racist, irrational, hatred, rejects the notion that there is an international war between Islam and Christianity, and rejects the justification that we are fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the Muslim faith of the people in these two countries.
Iraq, Afghan Veterans Call For Respect For Muslims: 'America, You Gotta Have Our Back'
The push by some in the media against rising anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States gained valuable voices of support over the weekend -- and now joining that chorus are veterans who fought alongside U.S. servicemembers of Islamic faith in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A small but growing group of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have signed onto an open letter, provided exclusively to the Huffington Post, which calls on the American public to respect "the values we risked our lives to protect" and to avoid endangering the mission -- and safety -- of U.S. forces in the Mideast. Like Gen. David Petraeus, the veterans warn that U.S. troops will face blowback from demonstrated intolerance for Muslims at home.
"America, you gotta have our back," reads the letter, composed by signatories Roy Scranton, Philip Klay and Perry O'Brien. "Those who would vilify and target Muslims on grounds of their religious belief not only show a deep disrespect for American values, but put American lives at risk. It's easy to burn a Koran when you won't feel the heat."
O'Brien told HuffPost that he, Scranton and Klay, all of whom are now writers living in New York City, wrote the letter together out of mutual frustration with the uptick in anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence, then learned that "many of our buddies felt the same way."
They're not alone. A Quinnipiac poll released Monday found that 50 percent of respondents said "mainstream Islam" is a peaceful religion, while only 27 percent said it encourages violence toward non-Muslims. And though the Park51 project -- the so-called "Ground Zero mosque" -- is still opposed more than two-to-one by the general populace surveyed by Quinnipiac, support for the project is growing in New York itself.
The "frenzy" whipped up in response to Park51 "was one of the key events that drove us to write the letter," O'Brien wrote in a follow-up email, along with the Muslim cab driver stabbing late last month. "I think we all feel that this city has become the center of much of this renewed intolerance, at least in the popular imagination," he wrote. "As vets living in New York, we wanted to speak on behalf of friends currently deployed and remind people that hysterical culture wars have very real, and very dangerous impact for people fighting real wars."
Read the full letter:
As veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have watched with increasing alarm the rise of anti-Islamic rhetoric within the US.We've seen attacks on Muslim citizens, intolerance toward religious expression, and even book burning. This goes against the very values we risked our lives to protect.We have served beside Muslim Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen. The success of our mission, and the safety of our lives have depended on Muslim translators, who've risked their own lives and the lives of their families to help us. For the servicemembers currently deployed, the success of their mission and the safety of their lives depends on a basic respect for, and interaction with, Islamic culture.
Those that would vilify and target Muslims on grounds of their religious belief not only show a deep disrespect for American values but put American lives at risk. It's easy to burn a Koran when you won't feel the heat.We speak as infantrymen, truck drivers, medics, and the whole host of military professions that depend on good relations with a deeply religious Muslim population. That population sees the American flag we wear on our uniform and judges us, not only by our actions but on the values our nation upholds.
We must be able to point back home and say, these are the values we respect. Chief among those values is our courage as a nation to peacefully and openly engage with differences of culture and religion.How does the squad leader in Kandahar respond to the Afghan woman who asks why Americans burned her holy book?When Americans participate in hateful rhetoric and intolerance toward Muslims, it leaves us exposed.America, you gotta have our back.--
Roy Scranton, US Army Artillery, Iraq
Philip Klay, USMC Public Affairs Officer, Iraq
Perry O'Brien, US Army Medic (Airborne), Afghanistan
James Redden Jr., USAR Journalist, Iraq
Joshua Casteel, US Army Linguist, Iraq
Logan Mehl-Laituri, US Army Forward Observer, Iraq
Hart Viges, Army, Infantry (Airborne), Iraq
Jason M Wallace, US Air Force Maintenance, Kuwait
Chantelle Bateman, USMC Supply, Iraq
Geoffrey Millard, US Army Infantry, Iraq
Nicholas Przybyla, US Navy Cameraman, Pakistan Coast
John McClelland, US Army Medic (Ranger), Afghanistan and Iraq
Andrew Johnson, US Army Radar Technician, Iraq
Daniel Paulsen, US Army Medic (Airborne), Afghanistan
Fernando Braga, US Army Supply, Iraq
Maggie Martin, US Army Signal, Iraq
Adam Kokesh, USMC Civil Affairs, Iraq
Lisa Zepeda, US Army Lab Technician, Iraq
Brian Turner, US Army Infantry, Iraq
Matt Gallagher, US Army Cavalry Officer, Iraq
Michael Anthony Ruehrwein, US Army OR Tech, Iraq
Erika Sjolander, US Army Supply, Iraq
Bryan Reinholdt, US Army Apache Maintenance, Iraq
Jason Chambers, US Air Force Air Freight Specialist, Iraq
Joe Wheeler, US Army Surgical Assistant, Iraq
Ash Woolson, US Army Combat Engineer, Iraq
Chris Hellie, US Army Cavalry Officer, Iraq
Sara Beining, US Army Intelligence Analyst, Iraq
Helen Gerhardt, US Army Transport, Iraq
Garett Reppenhagen, US Army Cavalry Scout, Iraq
Groups:
New York City
Staff
Loading comments...
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Monday, September 27, 2010
Juan Cole on electoral and military set backs in Afghanistan
Juan Cole offers today his expert comments on and links to recent events and trends in Afghanistan. You can find this information, as well as other recent and past posts, at his award-winning blog, Informed Comment. One implication of today's post by Cole is that the US-led war in Afghanistan is on a downward spiral with respect to winning the hearts and minds of Afghan citizens or with respect to the creation of a legitimate and un-corrupted Afghan government.
Afghan Villagers Protest US Air Strike, as Ballot Fraud Evidence Surfaces
Posted on September 27, 2010 by Juan Cole
Share
According to the Afghanistan government, about 186 civilians have died in each of the last 6 months in the war. (Other studies suggest the bulk of them are killed in Taliban attacks).
While it is true that some 300 civilians were killed in Iraq in August, or nearly twice the Afghan toll, earlier in 2010 the toll there was on the order of 200 a month. That is, Afghanistan violence is creeping up toward Iraq levels.
Past 6 months in Afghanistan according to Ministry of Interior spokesman, Zemarai Bahsari (Tolo News):
Insurgent attacks:
4012 Civilians killed:
1119 Civilians wounded:
2473 Police killed:
959 Police wounded:
1345 Insurgents killed:
3098 Insurgents arrested:
2800 Insurgents wounded:
632....
Lara Logan’s report on CBS’ “60 Minutes” on Sunday struck me as highly pessimistic and as supporting with its footage the reality of these grim statistics.
One of her stories was about going out to a village with an American officer and his men. They found that the village had turned against them and would not talk to them. Then on the way back they were attacked and seemed barely to get out of it alive. It sounded to me like the surrounding countryside was full of such dangerous villages, and that the previously safe village had turned deadly strikes me as a bad sign. The officeer admits that he controls perhaps 18 sq. kilometers of the 300 sq. km. for which he is responsible; the rest is in Taliban hands and there are many villages to which he cannot go. Logan points out that the datum is astonishing. I would have said depressing.
Andrew Bacevich slams Bob Woodward for indulging in Washington salon gossip in his new book on the Afghanistan war, instead of asking the hard questions of an investigative reporter about what in the world we are doing there.
Der Spiegel is reporting that recently Afghan army and police have been boycotting joint patrols with American and German troops in Qunduz Province. The German article is here.
Meanwhile, Aljazeera English is reporting that video evidence is now emerging of ballot fraud in the recent parliamentary elections. This issue has the potential to render the Afghanistan government invalid altogether, which would be a real blow to it in the midst of a hard fought battle against the Taliban.
A recount has been ordered of ballots at voting stations across 7 provinces.
Afghans were not surprised. Before the election, only 36% though that the election would be free, fair and transparent. Some 65 percent of Afghans think Karzai is doing a bad job, and 95 percent of people in Kabul (where he actually rules) think that. Only half say that NATO & US troops make them safer.
According to this Dari Persian newspaper, hundreds of people demonstrated on Saturday in Mehtarlam, Laghman province, over a US-led raid on Masmood village in Alishang district, Laghman Province, that allegedly killed innocent, civilian villagers. The demonstrators chanted anti-American slogans.
NATO initially announced that it had killed 30 insurgents and that no civilians had been in the area.
The governor of Laghman Province, Muhammad Iqbal Azizi, initially denied the villagers’ claims. But on Sunday he met with the villagers and became convinced that 13-14 civilians had in fact been killed in the operation, which had involved 250 NATO, US and Afghanistan army and police personnel.
A provincial council member blamed an overzealous American pilot for the error.
Afghans all across the country are suspicious of the US military presence and have been demonstrating against it in recent weeks. The threat of some Christian crazies in the US to burn the Quran explains some of the failure to win hearts and minds.
Afghan Villagers Protest US Air Strike, as Ballot Fraud Evidence Surfaces
Posted on September 27, 2010 by Juan Cole
Share
According to the Afghanistan government, about 186 civilians have died in each of the last 6 months in the war. (Other studies suggest the bulk of them are killed in Taliban attacks).
While it is true that some 300 civilians were killed in Iraq in August, or nearly twice the Afghan toll, earlier in 2010 the toll there was on the order of 200 a month. That is, Afghanistan violence is creeping up toward Iraq levels.
Past 6 months in Afghanistan according to Ministry of Interior spokesman, Zemarai Bahsari (Tolo News):
Insurgent attacks:
4012 Civilians killed:
1119 Civilians wounded:
2473 Police killed:
959 Police wounded:
1345 Insurgents killed:
3098 Insurgents arrested:
2800 Insurgents wounded:
632....
Lara Logan’s report on CBS’ “60 Minutes” on Sunday struck me as highly pessimistic and as supporting with its footage the reality of these grim statistics.
One of her stories was about going out to a village with an American officer and his men. They found that the village had turned against them and would not talk to them. Then on the way back they were attacked and seemed barely to get out of it alive. It sounded to me like the surrounding countryside was full of such dangerous villages, and that the previously safe village had turned deadly strikes me as a bad sign. The officeer admits that he controls perhaps 18 sq. kilometers of the 300 sq. km. for which he is responsible; the rest is in Taliban hands and there are many villages to which he cannot go. Logan points out that the datum is astonishing. I would have said depressing.
Andrew Bacevich slams Bob Woodward for indulging in Washington salon gossip in his new book on the Afghanistan war, instead of asking the hard questions of an investigative reporter about what in the world we are doing there.
Der Spiegel is reporting that recently Afghan army and police have been boycotting joint patrols with American and German troops in Qunduz Province. The German article is here.
Meanwhile, Aljazeera English is reporting that video evidence is now emerging of ballot fraud in the recent parliamentary elections. This issue has the potential to render the Afghanistan government invalid altogether, which would be a real blow to it in the midst of a hard fought battle against the Taliban.
A recount has been ordered of ballots at voting stations across 7 provinces.
Afghans were not surprised. Before the election, only 36% though that the election would be free, fair and transparent. Some 65 percent of Afghans think Karzai is doing a bad job, and 95 percent of people in Kabul (where he actually rules) think that. Only half say that NATO & US troops make them safer.
According to this Dari Persian newspaper, hundreds of people demonstrated on Saturday in Mehtarlam, Laghman province, over a US-led raid on Masmood village in Alishang district, Laghman Province, that allegedly killed innocent, civilian villagers. The demonstrators chanted anti-American slogans.
NATO initially announced that it had killed 30 insurgents and that no civilians had been in the area.
The governor of Laghman Province, Muhammad Iqbal Azizi, initially denied the villagers’ claims. But on Sunday he met with the villagers and became convinced that 13-14 civilians had in fact been killed in the operation, which had involved 250 NATO, US and Afghanistan army and police personnel.
A provincial council member blamed an overzealous American pilot for the error.
Afghans all across the country are suspicious of the US military presence and have been demonstrating against it in recent weeks. The threat of some Christian crazies in the US to burn the Quran explains some of the failure to win hearts and minds.
Sunday, September 26, 2010
How to foster economic development in a post-war Afghanistan
David Waldman and Phyllis Bennis have written a highly useful book for those interested in getting a basic and comprehensive understanding of the Afghanistan war, from why it has been seen as a “good war” by US leaders, media, and many in the general public, to “what will it take to change US policy in Afghanistan so that US military forces will be soon withdrawn. The title: Ending the US War in Afghanistan: A Primer. The book is organized around informative and thought-provoking answers to 35 questions, organized into six topics or “parts.”
The thirty-third question is: “What would a responsible plan to end the US war in Afghanistan look like?” Waldman and Bennis want the war and occupation to end and US troops brought home, but this, for them, is not the end of US obligations. They write: “…it was true in Iraq and is equally true in Afghanistan that the US debt to the people of those beleaguered countries is far greater than just getting the troops out.” They continue: “After years of war, abandonment to brutal US-armed warlords, invasion, occupation, more war – the US owes a huge debt to the Afghan people. Pulling out the troops is only step one” (179). It is here that they specify eleven potential provisions of a “responsible plan.”
Their proposals amount to “good ideas” that might serve to give US readers of the book and others a notion of what it will take to bring post-US-led-war Afghanistan and its people back to some minimal but meaningfully satisfactory economic level of development.
One thing that stands out in their sketch of a “plan” is that it will take the cooperation and support of many regional governments and the [financially strapped] UN to pull it off. If such collaboration was ever to be achieved, it would mark a stunning and unprecedented historic event in Afghanistan and this region of the world - or just about anywhere. Nonetheless, good ideas are better than no ideas or bad ideas. Waldman and Bennis get us thinking of possible alternatives to the ongoing hapless and destructive policies of the Bush-Obama administrations and the military chiefs.
Here are the proposals.
First, they write that it is of utmost importance to recognize that the war is counterproductive, as US and allied troops kill Afghan civilians and thereby increasing support for insurgents. It's vicious cycle.
Second, “Immediately end troop escalation and all combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan…halt drone attacks…in Pakistan; close all US military bases…begin the full withdrawal of all US troops….”
Third, “remove all humanitarian, development, infrastructure, or other assistance programs and personnel from control [by the US, or Afghan] military.”
Fourth, “close Bagram Airbase prison” and help the Afghan government to develop cash, job training, and jobs programs for former detainees.
Fifth, develop a multifaceted program for Afghan refugees, including “financial assistance for returning refugees to Afghanistan and assistance to main refugee centers (Iran, Pakistan); accept more refuges into US.”
Sixth, cease “all anti-poppy fumigation programs; invest significant funds in infrastructure and financial assistance for alternative crop cultivation.”
Seventh, foster “and support…ceasefire, reconciliation, and negotiation processes involving all parties including Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan….”
Eighth, confront the widespread “corruption and illegitimacy in the US-backed government” by stopping “uncritical political and financial backing.”
Ninth, distribute small-scale financial assistance “to local, regional, tribal and other leaders for job creation, aiming particularly at reaching and recruiting young unemployed men who are vulnerable to militias offering pay….”
Tenth, facilitate or support – not control – of “separate negotiations including all neighboring countries, with leadership of UN, the Organization of Islamic Conference )OIC), the Shanghai Cooperation Alliance (which groups China, Russia, and five resource-rich Central Asian states, [and] other regional organizations. The negotiations should “exclude NATO, CSTO, and other military alliances.”
Eleventh, and finally, shift “the majority of Afghanistan military budgets [much of it from US assistance?] into UN and regional funds for Afghan-chosen, Afghan-planned, and Afghan-implemented construction and reconstruction….”
The thirty-third question is: “What would a responsible plan to end the US war in Afghanistan look like?” Waldman and Bennis want the war and occupation to end and US troops brought home, but this, for them, is not the end of US obligations. They write: “…it was true in Iraq and is equally true in Afghanistan that the US debt to the people of those beleaguered countries is far greater than just getting the troops out.” They continue: “After years of war, abandonment to brutal US-armed warlords, invasion, occupation, more war – the US owes a huge debt to the Afghan people. Pulling out the troops is only step one” (179). It is here that they specify eleven potential provisions of a “responsible plan.”
Their proposals amount to “good ideas” that might serve to give US readers of the book and others a notion of what it will take to bring post-US-led-war Afghanistan and its people back to some minimal but meaningfully satisfactory economic level of development.
One thing that stands out in their sketch of a “plan” is that it will take the cooperation and support of many regional governments and the [financially strapped] UN to pull it off. If such collaboration was ever to be achieved, it would mark a stunning and unprecedented historic event in Afghanistan and this region of the world - or just about anywhere. Nonetheless, good ideas are better than no ideas or bad ideas. Waldman and Bennis get us thinking of possible alternatives to the ongoing hapless and destructive policies of the Bush-Obama administrations and the military chiefs.
Here are the proposals.
First, they write that it is of utmost importance to recognize that the war is counterproductive, as US and allied troops kill Afghan civilians and thereby increasing support for insurgents. It's vicious cycle.
Second, “Immediately end troop escalation and all combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan…halt drone attacks…in Pakistan; close all US military bases…begin the full withdrawal of all US troops….”
Third, “remove all humanitarian, development, infrastructure, or other assistance programs and personnel from control [by the US, or Afghan] military.”
Fourth, “close Bagram Airbase prison” and help the Afghan government to develop cash, job training, and jobs programs for former detainees.
Fifth, develop a multifaceted program for Afghan refugees, including “financial assistance for returning refugees to Afghanistan and assistance to main refugee centers (Iran, Pakistan); accept more refuges into US.”
Sixth, cease “all anti-poppy fumigation programs; invest significant funds in infrastructure and financial assistance for alternative crop cultivation.”
Seventh, foster “and support…ceasefire, reconciliation, and negotiation processes involving all parties including Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan….”
Eighth, confront the widespread “corruption and illegitimacy in the US-backed government” by stopping “uncritical political and financial backing.”
Ninth, distribute small-scale financial assistance “to local, regional, tribal and other leaders for job creation, aiming particularly at reaching and recruiting young unemployed men who are vulnerable to militias offering pay….”
Tenth, facilitate or support – not control – of “separate negotiations including all neighboring countries, with leadership of UN, the Organization of Islamic Conference )OIC), the Shanghai Cooperation Alliance (which groups China, Russia, and five resource-rich Central Asian states, [and] other regional organizations. The negotiations should “exclude NATO, CSTO, and other military alliances.”
Eleventh, and finally, shift “the majority of Afghanistan military budgets [much of it from US assistance?] into UN and regional funds for Afghan-chosen, Afghan-planned, and Afghan-implemented construction and reconstruction….”
Peace and justice march in Wash DC for Oct. 2 - updated information
The following e-mail is from United for Peace and Justice, which is part of a coalition of organizations that have planned a march, called the One Nation Working Together...and For peace. The March is scheduled to take place in Washington D.C., Saturday, Oct. 2, at the Lincoln Memorial. It will begin at noon. See the information below on how to volunteer and obtain other information, plus contact addresses.
You Live So Close! Mobilize and Volunteer for Peace on 10.2.10 (Please forward widely!)
"We have guided missiles and misguided men." --- Martin Luther King
A clear demonstration of this is the FY2011 budget with $726 billion slated for war and military spending vs. $51 billion for education... You do the math... Hint: Resources wasted in war and bloated Pentagon spending short-changes our basic needs at home. Most significant are the human resources lost and lives destroyed by endless war. The world cannot prosper under violence and endless threats of violence, and our peaceful anti-war message is a cornerstone of the people's agenda.
October 2, One Nation Working Together March on Washington DC, is the Peace Movement's opportunity to mobilize for the largest gathering of progressive organizations in a long time - joining unionists, civil rights groups, immigrant rights leaders and social justice advocates to remind Washington to Fund Jobs, Not War.
Our visible presence is required - The Peace Table needs volunteer help. With only 6 days left, 10.2.10 has the potential to be the largest demonstration in decades, but we need your help to make sure it's big. Help create a clear, strong voice and visible presence for peace and prosperity to One Nation. - Please volunteer to help ensure our message is heard and seen on 10.2.10!-
Please forward this email to all your colleagues, students, neighbors, friends and family so they know not to miss this historic occasion.- Visit onenationforpeace.org and onenationworkingtogether.org for more information (events, transport, housing, volunteering, etc.). Download fliers here.
More about Volunteering in DC on 10.2.101. Peace Visibility at the Lincoln Memorial: We need scores of people to meet us at 8:30 am near the Lincoln Memorial to help distribute peace materials -posters, leaflets and stickers. When you sign up to volunteer you will be sent the exact location and other details to be assigned a site at the Lincoln Memorial grounds with banners, signs, leaflets and stickers to help guarantee peace visibility throughout the day. Please volunteer to help ensure this visibility. 2. Peace Contingent Feeder March: Assemble at 14th and Constitution at 10:30am and march to One Nation Working Together rally at the Lincoln Memorial: Please volunteer to help with the march. 3. Peace area in the Tabling Festival: many groups have reserved literature tables. If you did not reserve a table, feel free to bring some of your materials to the UFPJ table!
Click here for more details about our plans and to find out how you can help out. Even if you can't volunteer with the Peace Table on 10.2.10, we want to know if you're coming to Washington that day. Sign up with us now and we'll also place you on our email list.Finally, consider supporting an ever expanding peace movement by donating to UFPJ. Our collective effort to end U.S. wars and to put our country on a track of peace building rather than war, and prosperity rather than economic stagnation is critical.
Peace and Economic justice NOW!
Help us continue to do this critical work: Make a donation to UFPJ today.
UNITED FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE
www.unitedforpeace.org 212-868-5545PO Box 607; Times Square Station; New York, NY 10108
You Live So Close! Mobilize and Volunteer for Peace on 10.2.10 (Please forward widely!)
"We have guided missiles and misguided men." --- Martin Luther King
A clear demonstration of this is the FY2011 budget with $726 billion slated for war and military spending vs. $51 billion for education... You do the math... Hint: Resources wasted in war and bloated Pentagon spending short-changes our basic needs at home. Most significant are the human resources lost and lives destroyed by endless war. The world cannot prosper under violence and endless threats of violence, and our peaceful anti-war message is a cornerstone of the people's agenda.
October 2, One Nation Working Together March on Washington DC, is the Peace Movement's opportunity to mobilize for the largest gathering of progressive organizations in a long time - joining unionists, civil rights groups, immigrant rights leaders and social justice advocates to remind Washington to Fund Jobs, Not War.
Our visible presence is required - The Peace Table needs volunteer help. With only 6 days left, 10.2.10 has the potential to be the largest demonstration in decades, but we need your help to make sure it's big. Help create a clear, strong voice and visible presence for peace and prosperity to One Nation. - Please volunteer to help ensure our message is heard and seen on 10.2.10!-
Please forward this email to all your colleagues, students, neighbors, friends and family so they know not to miss this historic occasion.- Visit onenationforpeace.org and onenationworkingtogether.org for more information (events, transport, housing, volunteering, etc.). Download fliers here.
More about Volunteering in DC on 10.2.101. Peace Visibility at the Lincoln Memorial: We need scores of people to meet us at 8:30 am near the Lincoln Memorial to help distribute peace materials -posters, leaflets and stickers. When you sign up to volunteer you will be sent the exact location and other details to be assigned a site at the Lincoln Memorial grounds with banners, signs, leaflets and stickers to help guarantee peace visibility throughout the day. Please volunteer to help ensure this visibility. 2. Peace Contingent Feeder March: Assemble at 14th and Constitution at 10:30am and march to One Nation Working Together rally at the Lincoln Memorial: Please volunteer to help with the march. 3. Peace area in the Tabling Festival: many groups have reserved literature tables. If you did not reserve a table, feel free to bring some of your materials to the UFPJ table!
Click here for more details about our plans and to find out how you can help out. Even if you can't volunteer with the Peace Table on 10.2.10, we want to know if you're coming to Washington that day. Sign up with us now and we'll also place you on our email list.Finally, consider supporting an ever expanding peace movement by donating to UFPJ. Our collective effort to end U.S. wars and to put our country on a track of peace building rather than war, and prosperity rather than economic stagnation is critical.
Peace and Economic justice NOW!
Help us continue to do this critical work: Make a donation to UFPJ today.
UNITED FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE
www.unitedforpeace.org 212-868-5545PO Box 607; Times Square Station; New York, NY 10108
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
The case for withdrawal from Afghanistan
Nick Turse is the editor of a new book on the US-led Afghanistan war/occupation, the title of which is The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Turse “is an award-winning journalist, historian, essayist, and the associate editor of the Nation Institute’s TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The Complex and has written “for the Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Nation, Le Monde Diplomatique, In These Times and the Village Voice.”
The Case for Withdrawal includes an introduction by Turse, followed by 22 articles written by “leading commentators, politicians, and military strategists.” The articles are organized into four “parts”: “The Wars for Afghanistan”; Incompetence, Corruption, and the War on Women”; “Facts on the Ground”; and “The Case for Withdrawal.” While there are some differences among the contributing authors, they all agree, “some tacitly, some explicitly,” that there is a need to build “a solid case for a foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan” and to make Americans cognizant of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan as a serious option (xviii).
In this post, I want to outline major points from the book’s concluding article, “How to Get Out,” by Robert Dreyfuss. Of the authors included in this collection, Dreyfuss offers the most comprehensive view, in broad outline of how the goal of withdrawing US and NATO troops can be achieved without leaving the country even worse off than it is. His proposals identify major challenges and make logical sense. At the same time, they seem highly idealistic and politically improbable both with respect to US domestic politics and in relevant international relations. There is also some confusion on the role that the UN will play. In the end, the US military involvement in Afghanistan may be more like the end of the Vietnam War.
,
First, Dreyfuss joins a host of other critics and contends that the Karzai government is an obstacle to real change. He writes: “The corrupt government of President Karzai and his cronies is no long sustainable, whether or not there is a second round the fraud-marred election” [and this is true as well regarding the election that was just held].
Dreyfuss then offers his views on (1) creating a new government structure, (2) the US government as a facilitator in the transition to a new Afghan government and (3) in seeking international and regional support to buttress a new government, and (4) the need for the withdrawal of US/NATO troops.
#1 – “A new government in Kabul must emerge, in the process accommodating Pashtun nationalists, the Taliban, and other insurgents,” including as well “tribal and ethnic leaders, various warlords, and representatives of Afghanistan’s myriad political factions.” The national accord that results from this process “will probably not be a strong central government but rather a decentralized federal system, in which provinces and districts retain a significant degree of autonomy.”
“To secure international support, the United States must defer to the United Nations to convene a conference in which Afghans themselves hammer out the new way forward.”
#2 – The US government as a facilitator.
“…the president [Obama] should encourage the convening of an international Bonn II conference involving the UN, the major world powers, and Afghanistan’s neighbors – including Iran, India, and Pakistan – to support the renegotiation of the Afghanistan compact….
“In advance of that, the United States should join other nations and the UN to persuade President Karzai, his main electoral opponents, and other Afghan politicians to form a coalition that would create an interim caretaker regime until the establishment of a more broadly based government.”
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are key parts of the problem “[T]he Afghan Taliban are” in effect “a branch of Pakistan’s army and its intelligence service.” Saudi Arabia channels large sums of money to insurgent groups. Therefore, “Obama must strongly encourage Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to bring key elements of the three interlinked insurgency movements – the Taliban, the Hezb-i-Islami ofGulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Haqqani network to the bargaining table….China, Pakistan’s ally, which has a vital interest in Central America, should be willing to use its influence in Pakistan to make sure Islamabad and Rawalpindi are on board.”
“…Obama will have to work to get Iran, India, and Russia to help persuade the remnants of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (most Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras) to make room in Kabul for an enlarged Pashtun role, including the Taliban, in which could become a stable power-sharing arrangement.”
#3 – International support - “The world community must pledge its support of Afghanistan financially for years to come.”
#4 – These steps must be accompanied by “an unconditional withdrawal of US and NATO forces” and the recognition that a military victory in Afghanistan is not feasible.
In addition, “the Obama administration will have to give up its massive nation-building project, dismantling the empire of US departments, agencies, provincial reconstruction teams, and the rest….”
“With the agreement of the Afghan government, a limited US intelligence and counterterrorism mission designed to monitor the remnants of al Qaeda can remain in Afghanistan.”
The Case for Withdrawal includes an introduction by Turse, followed by 22 articles written by “leading commentators, politicians, and military strategists.” The articles are organized into four “parts”: “The Wars for Afghanistan”; Incompetence, Corruption, and the War on Women”; “Facts on the Ground”; and “The Case for Withdrawal.” While there are some differences among the contributing authors, they all agree, “some tacitly, some explicitly,” that there is a need to build “a solid case for a foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan” and to make Americans cognizant of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan as a serious option (xviii).
In this post, I want to outline major points from the book’s concluding article, “How to Get Out,” by Robert Dreyfuss. Of the authors included in this collection, Dreyfuss offers the most comprehensive view, in broad outline of how the goal of withdrawing US and NATO troops can be achieved without leaving the country even worse off than it is. His proposals identify major challenges and make logical sense. At the same time, they seem highly idealistic and politically improbable both with respect to US domestic politics and in relevant international relations. There is also some confusion on the role that the UN will play. In the end, the US military involvement in Afghanistan may be more like the end of the Vietnam War.
,
First, Dreyfuss joins a host of other critics and contends that the Karzai government is an obstacle to real change. He writes: “The corrupt government of President Karzai and his cronies is no long sustainable, whether or not there is a second round the fraud-marred election” [and this is true as well regarding the election that was just held].
Dreyfuss then offers his views on (1) creating a new government structure, (2) the US government as a facilitator in the transition to a new Afghan government and (3) in seeking international and regional support to buttress a new government, and (4) the need for the withdrawal of US/NATO troops.
#1 – “A new government in Kabul must emerge, in the process accommodating Pashtun nationalists, the Taliban, and other insurgents,” including as well “tribal and ethnic leaders, various warlords, and representatives of Afghanistan’s myriad political factions.” The national accord that results from this process “will probably not be a strong central government but rather a decentralized federal system, in which provinces and districts retain a significant degree of autonomy.”
“To secure international support, the United States must defer to the United Nations to convene a conference in which Afghans themselves hammer out the new way forward.”
#2 – The US government as a facilitator.
“…the president [Obama] should encourage the convening of an international Bonn II conference involving the UN, the major world powers, and Afghanistan’s neighbors – including Iran, India, and Pakistan – to support the renegotiation of the Afghanistan compact….
“In advance of that, the United States should join other nations and the UN to persuade President Karzai, his main electoral opponents, and other Afghan politicians to form a coalition that would create an interim caretaker regime until the establishment of a more broadly based government.”
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are key parts of the problem “[T]he Afghan Taliban are” in effect “a branch of Pakistan’s army and its intelligence service.” Saudi Arabia channels large sums of money to insurgent groups. Therefore, “Obama must strongly encourage Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to bring key elements of the three interlinked insurgency movements – the Taliban, the Hezb-i-Islami ofGulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Haqqani network to the bargaining table….China, Pakistan’s ally, which has a vital interest in Central America, should be willing to use its influence in Pakistan to make sure Islamabad and Rawalpindi are on board.”
“…Obama will have to work to get Iran, India, and Russia to help persuade the remnants of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (most Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras) to make room in Kabul for an enlarged Pashtun role, including the Taliban, in which could become a stable power-sharing arrangement.”
#3 – International support - “The world community must pledge its support of Afghanistan financially for years to come.”
#4 – These steps must be accompanied by “an unconditional withdrawal of US and NATO forces” and the recognition that a military victory in Afghanistan is not feasible.
In addition, “the Obama administration will have to give up its massive nation-building project, dismantling the empire of US departments, agencies, provincial reconstruction teams, and the rest….”
“With the agreement of the Afghan government, a limited US intelligence and counterterrorism mission designed to monitor the remnants of al Qaeda can remain in Afghanistan.”
Monday, September 20, 2010
The US Agency of International Development criticized for lack of oversight
Journalists Marisa Taylor and Warren P. Strobel report for McClatchy Newspapers on an example of the lack of oversight on contracts awarded by the US Agency of International Development. (See below.) Bear in mind that this is but one example. US taxpayer money aimed at helping to rebuild the Afghan economy is too often not monitored and thus leads to overbilling, poor quality of contracted work, or unifinished projects. Other investigative reports have also found that US assistance frequently ends up in the hands of corrupt government officials or warlords. All of this adds up to enormous sums of squandered money in a long war that lacks a compelling purpose, at least insofar as the American public is concerned.
U.S. contractor accused of fraud still winning big Afghan projects
By Marisa Taylor and Warren P. Strobel
McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON
On July 31, 2006, an employee of The Louis Berger Group, a contractor handling some of the most important U.S. rebuilding projects in Afghanistan, handed federal investigators explosive evidence that the company was intentionally and systematically overbilling American taxpayers.
Neither the whistle-blower’s computer disk full of incriminating documents nor a trail of allegations of waste, fraud and shoddy construction, however, prevented Louis Berger from continuing to reap hundreds of millions of dollars in federal contracts.
In fact, two months after the government learned of the employee’s allegations, the U.S. Agency for International Development tapped Louis Berger — which has an office in Kansas City — to oversee $1.4 billion in reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan.
The decision to brush aside the allegations and the evidence and keep doing business with Louis Berger, underscores a persistent dilemma for the Obama administration in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Cutting ties with suspect war-zone contractors in Afghanistan would threaten the administration’s effort to rebuild the country and begin withdrawing some of the nearly 100,000 U.S. troops there next July. However, as the recession, unemployment and budget deficits prompt belt-tightening at home, the billions the administration is spending to try to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq are receiving increasing scrutiny from Congress and the public.
Louis Berger’s alleged overbilling, a practice that dates at to least the mid-1990s, swelled to tens of millions in lost tax dollars, according to a person familiar with the inquiry who spoke to McClatchy Newspapers on the condition of anonymity because the allegations are the subject of a sealed court case.
Court documents, however, reveal that the Justice Department is negotiating a deal that would “aid in preserving the company’s continuing eligibility to participate” in federal contracting in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Founded in 1953, The Louis Berger Group does engineering and construction-related work domestically and in about 80 countries worldwide, according to the company’s website. It has more than 5,000 employees and is based in Morristown, N.J.
Holly Fisher, a Louis Berger spokeswoman, said the investigation into the company’s pricing shouldn’t taint its work for the government.
“While its work in Afghanistan was covered by that methodology, it is the methodology that is in question, not the work in Afghanistan,” she said.
Fisher declined to answer additional questions about the investigation or to make any corporate officers available for interviews.
USAID officials acknowledged last year in an internal report that they’d lost confidence in Louis Berger to oversee projects under the latest, $1.4 billion Afghanistan contract, which is jointly held with Black & Veatch of Overland Park.
USAID, however, didn’t respond for three weeks to repeated requests for interviews about why it continued to award contracts to Louis Berger or about the ongoing criminal investigation or on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Instead, the agency issued a statement pointing to its internal report about the joint venture.
“The assessment found vulnerabilities, and we immediately worked to address the identified issues,” USAID said.
The agency said it began to hold weekly meetings with company officials, assigned monitors to every site and changed personnel involved in the contract.
“USAID continues to take necessary actions to protect U.S. taxpayer funds in this matter,” the statement said. “We are engaged in ongoing dialogue with the Louis Berger Group, Inc. to ensure that the corporation is in full compliance with our contracts.”
However, Ashley Jackson, the head of policy in Afghanistan for the international aid organization Oxfam, said little has changed despite the Obama administration’s pledge to revamp the agency.
USAID hasn’t been an aggressive watchdog in Afghanistan, partly because it’s under political pressure to pump billions into the country without regard to the quality of the work, Jackson said.
“A system has emerged where USAID is basically like a pass-through for these contractors,” she said.
U.S. contractor accused of fraud still winning big Afghan projects
By Marisa Taylor and Warren P. Strobel
McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON
On July 31, 2006, an employee of The Louis Berger Group, a contractor handling some of the most important U.S. rebuilding projects in Afghanistan, handed federal investigators explosive evidence that the company was intentionally and systematically overbilling American taxpayers.
Neither the whistle-blower’s computer disk full of incriminating documents nor a trail of allegations of waste, fraud and shoddy construction, however, prevented Louis Berger from continuing to reap hundreds of millions of dollars in federal contracts.
In fact, two months after the government learned of the employee’s allegations, the U.S. Agency for International Development tapped Louis Berger — which has an office in Kansas City — to oversee $1.4 billion in reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan.
The decision to brush aside the allegations and the evidence and keep doing business with Louis Berger, underscores a persistent dilemma for the Obama administration in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Cutting ties with suspect war-zone contractors in Afghanistan would threaten the administration’s effort to rebuild the country and begin withdrawing some of the nearly 100,000 U.S. troops there next July. However, as the recession, unemployment and budget deficits prompt belt-tightening at home, the billions the administration is spending to try to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq are receiving increasing scrutiny from Congress and the public.
Louis Berger’s alleged overbilling, a practice that dates at to least the mid-1990s, swelled to tens of millions in lost tax dollars, according to a person familiar with the inquiry who spoke to McClatchy Newspapers on the condition of anonymity because the allegations are the subject of a sealed court case.
Court documents, however, reveal that the Justice Department is negotiating a deal that would “aid in preserving the company’s continuing eligibility to participate” in federal contracting in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Founded in 1953, The Louis Berger Group does engineering and construction-related work domestically and in about 80 countries worldwide, according to the company’s website. It has more than 5,000 employees and is based in Morristown, N.J.
Holly Fisher, a Louis Berger spokeswoman, said the investigation into the company’s pricing shouldn’t taint its work for the government.
“While its work in Afghanistan was covered by that methodology, it is the methodology that is in question, not the work in Afghanistan,” she said.
Fisher declined to answer additional questions about the investigation or to make any corporate officers available for interviews.
USAID officials acknowledged last year in an internal report that they’d lost confidence in Louis Berger to oversee projects under the latest, $1.4 billion Afghanistan contract, which is jointly held with Black & Veatch of Overland Park.
USAID, however, didn’t respond for three weeks to repeated requests for interviews about why it continued to award contracts to Louis Berger or about the ongoing criminal investigation or on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Instead, the agency issued a statement pointing to its internal report about the joint venture.
“The assessment found vulnerabilities, and we immediately worked to address the identified issues,” USAID said.
The agency said it began to hold weekly meetings with company officials, assigned monitors to every site and changed personnel involved in the contract.
“USAID continues to take necessary actions to protect U.S. taxpayer funds in this matter,” the statement said. “We are engaged in ongoing dialogue with the Louis Berger Group, Inc. to ensure that the corporation is in full compliance with our contracts.”
However, Ashley Jackson, the head of policy in Afghanistan for the international aid organization Oxfam, said little has changed despite the Obama administration’s pledge to revamp the agency.
USAID hasn’t been an aggressive watchdog in Afghanistan, partly because it’s under political pressure to pump billions into the country without regard to the quality of the work, Jackson said.
“A system has emerged where USAID is basically like a pass-through for these contractors,” she said.
Friday, September 17, 2010
No consensus in Obama administration on how to proceed in Afghanistan
Gregg Carlstrom reports for the English edition of Al Jazeera on the inability of US government and military decision-makers and various experts to identify a clear path for the war/occupation in Afghanistan. On the one hand counterinsurgency has not produced reassuring results. On the other hand, there is no alternative to this strategy around which senior officials and mainstream experts have reached agreement. In the meantime, various Taliban groups appear to be extending their influence, though Al Qaeda is not a factor. The costs of the war to the Afghan and American people continue to rise. There are no public indications that the US government has been able to advance a strategy that would bring regional governments into a process to end the conflict. In the background, there are conflicting geopolitical interests in the region on pipelines, oil, and minerals. The gigantic, oversized US military faces another dubious outcome.
Searching for Plan B in Afghanistan
Discontent is growing in Washington and London over Obama's strategy, but concrete alternatives are hard to find.
Gregg Carlstrom Last Modified: 17 Sep 2010 18:18 GMT
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/09/201091784454474302.html
The White House has sought to put a positive spin on Afghanistan's parliamentary elections on Saturday, dispatching two senior administration officials late on Thursday to host a background conference call with reporters.
They emphasised a few positive developments - new reforms that will likely reduce (though hardly eliminate) electoral fraud, the Afghan army's lead role in providing security - and called the vote another positive milestone for US president Barack Obama's new strategy.
Asked to provide concrete metrics in support of that view, though, they resorted to body counts: One official praised the "increased operational tempo" of a "campaign to target Taliban mid-grade leaders".
It was hardly a reassuring argument, given that General Stanley McChrystal, the previous US and Nato commander in Afghanistan, said enemy body counts "distract from the real objectives and [aren’t] necessary to communicate what we're trying to achieve." (He stopped releasing them.)
Obama’s Afghan strategy, unveiled last winter after a lengthy strategy review, has always sat uneasily with many observers. Some doubted his decision to escalate the war at all; others questioned his focus on southern Afghanistan, his lofty goals for training the Afghan army and police, his confidence in the Afghan government's ability to deliver basic services. There was little consensus that Obama's strategy was the right one.
Today that consensus has all but collapsed. Nato promised a major push to secure Helmand and Kandahar provinces, but seven months after the "battle of Marja" - the sparsely-populated hamlet in Helmand that somehow became a centerpiece of Obama’s new strategy - the security situation in the south remains grave: Insurgent attacks in Kandahar and Helmand have increased by 40 per cent and 219 per cent, respectively.
Security has also worsened significantly across the east, and in six provinces in northern Afghanistan; and efforts to improve governance have proceeded in fits and starts, hindered both by insecurity and by an often corrupt and predatory central government.
Against that backdrop, then, it is little surprise that calls for an alternate strategy are gaining attention in Washington, even if many of the loudest voices struggle to articulate exactly what that strategy might look like.
A vague 'Plan B'
The highest-profile effort is a report released earlier this month by the 46-member "Afghanistan Study Group (ASG)," composed mostly of academics and think tank analysts, many of them longtime critics of Obama’s strategy.
The sluggish progress in Helmand has delayed a planned military offensive in Kandahar [Reuters]
The report, "A New Way Forward," proposes a five-point policy: It recommends a "fast-tracked" reconciliation process with insurgent groups; a greatly reduced US military force; a stronger emphasis on economic development, and on "engaging regional and global stakeholders"; and a "renewed focus" on al-Qaeda.
"We've moved away from confidence in the current plan and we haven't moved towards anything," said Steve Clemons, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and one of the report's authors. "The big thing is have this report to serve as a vehicle and as a holding place for constructive, credible, alternative thinking about current policy."
But reaction to the report has been mixed, even from those who disagree sharply with current policy in Afghanistan.
Michael Cohen, a senior fellow at the American Security Project - and a frequent critic of Obama's strategy - said the ASG report "fails to deliver" an alternative. Joshua Foust, a military analyst who writes extensively on Afghanistan, called it "an exercise in determined ignorance".
Why such a critical response? One reason is that the report often seems to restate current policy. Obama's first Afghanistan strategy review, concluded 18 months ago, echoed the ASG's call for economic development: It called for a renewed focus on helping Afghanistan "develop an economy dominated by illicit drugs". And the president's second review, which wrapped up in December, urged a "more effective partnership with Pakistan," much like the ASG report does.
The goals are uncontroversial, in other words; the challenge is execution.
"For almost twenty years now, the UN has tried to gather precisely these countries to develop a common regional interest in ending the conflict inside Afghanistan," Foust wrote, referring to regional stakeholders like India, Pakistan and Iran. "It's come to naught."
In an interview, Clemons pushed back against the idea that the report simply restates current policy. He argued that the US should be doing more: setting higher barriers to capital flight in Afghanistan, for example, to prevent tens of millions of dollars from leaving the country for Dubai; or working harder to ratchet down regional tensions between India and Pakistan.
"We’re not doing the kinds of things that would be enormously significant," Clemons said. "For instance, the notion of what you could do for a billion dollars in trust-building between India and Pakistan with the Indus River valley, flood relief, a lot of these other issues... we’re just doing reactive stuff."
Internal inconsistencies
There are some other notable analytical omissions and logical contradictions in the ASG report. Steve Coll, the president of the New America Foundation, noted that "the report is silent on the question of training the Afghan security forces", a key goal if the US wants to create any kind of lasting security in Afghanistan.
The report calls for focusing on economic development, but it says little about how to provide the security that is generally a prerequisite for growth.
Clemons argued that the size of the US military presence does not necessarily correlate with stability: As the US occupation has increased over the last nine years, stability has decreased. But the reverse is not necessarily true, and security-conscious NGOs and companies might be even more reluctant to work in Afghanistan following a major pullout.
"I support the notion of stronger economic development, but how do you do both, development and a drawdown?" asked Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the liberal Center for American Progress.
Similarly, the report argues that the US occupation of Afghanistan is a major driver of radicalisation in the region. It "lends credence to jihadi propaganda about America’s alleged hostility to Islam", the authors note.
But Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani-American who tried to set off a car bomb in New York's Times Square in May, told investigators he was angry about the US drones bombing targets in northwest Pakistan - exactly the sort of "light-footprint" approach advocated by the ASG report’s authors.
A 'ballooning' war
Mosharraf Zaidi, a Pakistani journalist and one of the contributors to the report, acknowledged that the ASG does not present a comprehensive strategy. But he argued that the Pentagon and the White House, not the report's authors, should be responsible for detailed planning.
"I find much of the analysis to be reasonable, if somewhat lacking in depth," Zaidi said. "It's important to remember that this is not a policy analysis exercise; it is an exercise in trying to stimulate debate around alternatives."
And for all the criticism directed at the ASG report, there is indeed a growing debate about alternatives. Gilles Dorronsoro, an Afghanistan expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, called Obama’s strategy counterproductive and earlier this month urged an immediate dialogue with the Taliban.
And the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a respected British think tank, said in a recent report that Nato’s counterinsurgency strategy has "ballooned" out of proportion to the original goal of the war: preventing al-Qaeda from launching attacks from Afghanistan.
IISS warned that the ever-escalating war will leave "Western states... pinned down militarily and psychologically in Afghanistan", an outcome not "in the service of their wider political and security interests". John Chipman, the director of IISS, urged the US and Nato to abandon their counterinsurgency effort and focus on a narrow containment strategy.
Paul Pillar, a former CIA analyst and one of the ASG report’s contributors, echoed that point at a panel discussion in Washington earlier this month, reminding the audience that al-Qaeda has been largely driven from Afghanistan.
"Much of the discourse has lost sight of what's at stake in Afghanistan," Pillar said.
Source:
Al Jazeera
Searching for Plan B in Afghanistan
Discontent is growing in Washington and London over Obama's strategy, but concrete alternatives are hard to find.
Gregg Carlstrom Last Modified: 17 Sep 2010 18:18 GMT
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/09/201091784454474302.html
The White House has sought to put a positive spin on Afghanistan's parliamentary elections on Saturday, dispatching two senior administration officials late on Thursday to host a background conference call with reporters.
They emphasised a few positive developments - new reforms that will likely reduce (though hardly eliminate) electoral fraud, the Afghan army's lead role in providing security - and called the vote another positive milestone for US president Barack Obama's new strategy.
Asked to provide concrete metrics in support of that view, though, they resorted to body counts: One official praised the "increased operational tempo" of a "campaign to target Taliban mid-grade leaders".
It was hardly a reassuring argument, given that General Stanley McChrystal, the previous US and Nato commander in Afghanistan, said enemy body counts "distract from the real objectives and [aren’t] necessary to communicate what we're trying to achieve." (He stopped releasing them.)
Obama’s Afghan strategy, unveiled last winter after a lengthy strategy review, has always sat uneasily with many observers. Some doubted his decision to escalate the war at all; others questioned his focus on southern Afghanistan, his lofty goals for training the Afghan army and police, his confidence in the Afghan government's ability to deliver basic services. There was little consensus that Obama's strategy was the right one.
Today that consensus has all but collapsed. Nato promised a major push to secure Helmand and Kandahar provinces, but seven months after the "battle of Marja" - the sparsely-populated hamlet in Helmand that somehow became a centerpiece of Obama’s new strategy - the security situation in the south remains grave: Insurgent attacks in Kandahar and Helmand have increased by 40 per cent and 219 per cent, respectively.
Security has also worsened significantly across the east, and in six provinces in northern Afghanistan; and efforts to improve governance have proceeded in fits and starts, hindered both by insecurity and by an often corrupt and predatory central government.
Against that backdrop, then, it is little surprise that calls for an alternate strategy are gaining attention in Washington, even if many of the loudest voices struggle to articulate exactly what that strategy might look like.
A vague 'Plan B'
The highest-profile effort is a report released earlier this month by the 46-member "Afghanistan Study Group (ASG)," composed mostly of academics and think tank analysts, many of them longtime critics of Obama’s strategy.
The sluggish progress in Helmand has delayed a planned military offensive in Kandahar [Reuters]
The report, "A New Way Forward," proposes a five-point policy: It recommends a "fast-tracked" reconciliation process with insurgent groups; a greatly reduced US military force; a stronger emphasis on economic development, and on "engaging regional and global stakeholders"; and a "renewed focus" on al-Qaeda.
"We've moved away from confidence in the current plan and we haven't moved towards anything," said Steve Clemons, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation and one of the report's authors. "The big thing is have this report to serve as a vehicle and as a holding place for constructive, credible, alternative thinking about current policy."
But reaction to the report has been mixed, even from those who disagree sharply with current policy in Afghanistan.
Michael Cohen, a senior fellow at the American Security Project - and a frequent critic of Obama's strategy - said the ASG report "fails to deliver" an alternative. Joshua Foust, a military analyst who writes extensively on Afghanistan, called it "an exercise in determined ignorance".
Why such a critical response? One reason is that the report often seems to restate current policy. Obama's first Afghanistan strategy review, concluded 18 months ago, echoed the ASG's call for economic development: It called for a renewed focus on helping Afghanistan "develop an economy dominated by illicit drugs". And the president's second review, which wrapped up in December, urged a "more effective partnership with Pakistan," much like the ASG report does.
The goals are uncontroversial, in other words; the challenge is execution.
"For almost twenty years now, the UN has tried to gather precisely these countries to develop a common regional interest in ending the conflict inside Afghanistan," Foust wrote, referring to regional stakeholders like India, Pakistan and Iran. "It's come to naught."
In an interview, Clemons pushed back against the idea that the report simply restates current policy. He argued that the US should be doing more: setting higher barriers to capital flight in Afghanistan, for example, to prevent tens of millions of dollars from leaving the country for Dubai; or working harder to ratchet down regional tensions between India and Pakistan.
"We’re not doing the kinds of things that would be enormously significant," Clemons said. "For instance, the notion of what you could do for a billion dollars in trust-building between India and Pakistan with the Indus River valley, flood relief, a lot of these other issues... we’re just doing reactive stuff."
Internal inconsistencies
There are some other notable analytical omissions and logical contradictions in the ASG report. Steve Coll, the president of the New America Foundation, noted that "the report is silent on the question of training the Afghan security forces", a key goal if the US wants to create any kind of lasting security in Afghanistan.
The report calls for focusing on economic development, but it says little about how to provide the security that is generally a prerequisite for growth.
Clemons argued that the size of the US military presence does not necessarily correlate with stability: As the US occupation has increased over the last nine years, stability has decreased. But the reverse is not necessarily true, and security-conscious NGOs and companies might be even more reluctant to work in Afghanistan following a major pullout.
"I support the notion of stronger economic development, but how do you do both, development and a drawdown?" asked Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the liberal Center for American Progress.
Similarly, the report argues that the US occupation of Afghanistan is a major driver of radicalisation in the region. It "lends credence to jihadi propaganda about America’s alleged hostility to Islam", the authors note.
But Faisal Shahzad, the Pakistani-American who tried to set off a car bomb in New York's Times Square in May, told investigators he was angry about the US drones bombing targets in northwest Pakistan - exactly the sort of "light-footprint" approach advocated by the ASG report’s authors.
A 'ballooning' war
Mosharraf Zaidi, a Pakistani journalist and one of the contributors to the report, acknowledged that the ASG does not present a comprehensive strategy. But he argued that the Pentagon and the White House, not the report's authors, should be responsible for detailed planning.
"I find much of the analysis to be reasonable, if somewhat lacking in depth," Zaidi said. "It's important to remember that this is not a policy analysis exercise; it is an exercise in trying to stimulate debate around alternatives."
And for all the criticism directed at the ASG report, there is indeed a growing debate about alternatives. Gilles Dorronsoro, an Afghanistan expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, called Obama’s strategy counterproductive and earlier this month urged an immediate dialogue with the Taliban.
And the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a respected British think tank, said in a recent report that Nato’s counterinsurgency strategy has "ballooned" out of proportion to the original goal of the war: preventing al-Qaeda from launching attacks from Afghanistan.
IISS warned that the ever-escalating war will leave "Western states... pinned down militarily and psychologically in Afghanistan", an outcome not "in the service of their wider political and security interests". John Chipman, the director of IISS, urged the US and Nato to abandon their counterinsurgency effort and focus on a narrow containment strategy.
Paul Pillar, a former CIA analyst and one of the ASG report’s contributors, echoed that point at a panel discussion in Washington earlier this month, reminding the audience that al-Qaeda has been largely driven from Afghanistan.
"Much of the discourse has lost sight of what's at stake in Afghanistan," Pillar said.
Source:
Al Jazeera
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Warlords run for re-election to Afghan parliament
Jonathan S. Landay reports (article below) that 60 percent of those elected to the central Afghan parliament have "links to armed groups." Landay's report updates and further documents that the Afghan parliament does not represent the Afghan people but rather those who have acquired power and political connections.
Near the end of his report, Landay refers to Malalai Joya, an elected representative to the parliament in 2005 who promised her constituents that she would use her "position in Parliament to expose the abuse of power and corruption whenever I found it" (A Woman Among Warlords, p. 133). She found it in the newly "elected" parliament. In May 2006, Joya relates what she has learned about the grisly backgrounds of the majority of the elected officials represented in the parliament:
"Some argue that the mistakes of the past must be forgotton, but I believe that there is a big difference between mistakes and crimes. Was it just a mistake to kill more than sixty-five thousand Kabulis during the civil war? Was it just a mistake to use rape as a weapon of war, to murder and mutilate, such as those who militias cut women's breats off to terrorize the popuation. These were not just mistakes, and that is why I use the term criminal muhahideen" (p. 134).
Joya was subsequently banned from the parliament for speaking the truth. Many of those who sat with her in parliament in 2005-2006 are now running to be re-elected, and pretty assured they will again succeed in the charade of another "democratic" election process.
Landay picks up the story in his report, as follows.
Warlords and killers seek re-election to Afghan parliament
Jonathan S. Landay McClatchy Newspapers
last updated: September 15, 2010 01:54:57 PM
http://www.mcclatchyde.com/2010/09/14/100574/warlords-alleged-killers-seek.html
KABUL, Afghanistan — Mohammad Eshaq vividly remembers cowering in a crowded Kabul basement as shellfire raged above, fleeing with his family when his Afshar neighborhood's defenses collapsed and returning a year later to find scores of corpses still moldering in the rubble.
"Some were shot and some died from the rockets," said the 55-year-old sweet shop owner, standing by a mass grave on a sun-baked hillside that he helped fill. "We weren't able to wash them. We just laid them side by side and covered them."
Hundreds of minority Hazara civilians were killed in Afshar in February 1993 in one of the bloodiest chapters of the battle for Kabul, between rival U.S.-armed guerrilla factions that had ousted the Soviet-backed regime the previous year.
The man who directed the onslaught, according to residents and human rights groups, was Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayyaf, an Islamist member of parliament's lower house who's close to U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai. He's running for re-election from Kabul, and analysts say he could be the next speaker of the lower house.
Sayyaf is among a raft of former guerrilla chieftains and commanders implicated in war crimes who are likely to win re-election Saturday to the 249-seat Wolesi Jirga in polls that are expected to be marred by coercion, fraud and violence.
For many Afghans and human rights groups, these men symbolize the high-level impunity, bad governance and massive corruption that are helping to fuel the growing Taliban-led insurgency.
"If ordinary people had power they wouldn't vote for any of these men. The government is filled with traitors from top to bottom," said Najaf Ali, 57. He lost three family members in the 1993 assault on Afshar by Pashtun and Tajik forces.
That some of Afghanistan's most notorious figures haven't been barred from seeking re-election after last year's fraud-tainted presidential contest underscores for many experts a deeply flawed system for vetting the 2,513 candidates.
"I've serious concerns about the way the vetting process has gone," said Ahmad Nader Nadery, the head of the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, an independent poll watchdog.
The U.N. envoy to Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura, also voiced no confidence in the system.
"The process of vetting has not produced a satisfactory result so far," he said in a July statement.
Ninety percent of the Wolesi Jirga members who were elected in 2005 have been certified to seek re-election. One lawmaker has been disqualified, 15 are retiring and 10 died or were killed while in office.
Yet the winners of the 2005 polls included 40 commanders still associated with armed groups, 24 who belong to criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers and 19 who face serious allegations of war crimes and human rights violations, according to an analysis cited in a 2005 report by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent research center.
A second, bleaker analysis by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission cited in the report found that more than 80 percent of provincial lawmakers and more than 60 percent of those elected in Kabul had "links to armed groups."
"One of the biggest threats to Afghanistan's political stability and future comes from individuals who have committed serious human rights abuses," warned a 2005 Human Rights Watch report on the 1992-93 fighting in Kabul that implicated Sayyaf along with other top politicians and officials, including one of Karzai's two vice presidents, Mohammad Qasim Fahim. "To achieve long-term stability, the government will ultimately have to address the continuing threat from these individuals."
However, none of the former guerrilla chieftains and commanders, whom the George W. Bush administration rehabilitated and paid millions to help oust the Taliban and al Qaida in 2001, has faced criminal trial or been scrutinized by a South Africa-type truth commission.
A truth commission proposal, pushed by the United States and its allies as a way to assuage public demands for accountability, was quietly dropped amid resistance from Karzai. Citing the need for national unity, Karzai signed a bill in 2007 that granted amnesty to the former guerrilla chiefs and their followers.
The bill, which parliament passed secretly, was championed by Sayyaf, who denounced critics as being "against Islam" and "enemies of this country."
The electoral vetting system is supposed to disqualify candidates with links to private militias, or "illegal armed groups," that could be used to intimidate voters and hijack polling stations.
The Electoral Complaints Commission, which adjudicates alleged election law violations, announced the disqualification of 36 candidates in July and added eight others as they campaigned earlier this month.
The commission, however, didn't make those determinations. Officials from the Interior and Defense ministries, the National Directorate of Security — Afghanistan's top intelligence agency — and the Independent Election Commission decided them in secret.
Political activists and election experts, citing the lack of transparency, charged that there's no proof that those who were disqualified are tied to militias, while men who should have been excluded were given passes.
"A majority of the seats in parliament will belong to photocopies of Sayyaf," asserted Malalai Joya. Her fierce denunciations of Karzai and "warlords and drug lords" in parliament prompted her expulsion from her Farah province seat in 2007 in what many experts say was an unconstitutional action by the lower house. The chamber also lifted her official passport and banned her from talking to the media, which she refused to heed.
Joya, who's also an outspoken critic of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, contended that many lawmakers' police bodyguards are members of personal militias, and she called the candidate vetting process "just symbolic."
Numerous calls to a Electoral Complaints Commission spokesman requesting comment went unanswered.
ON THE WEB
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2005 report "A House Divided," by Andrew Wilder
MORE FROM MCCLATCHY
Poll violence, fraud could fuel anger against Karzai, U.S.
45-year-old U.S. infantryman does heavy lifting in Afghanistan
Patron of Afghan school is local warlord, U.S. ally
More Stryker Brigade soldiers charged with assault on Afghans
McClatchy Newspapers 2010
Near the end of his report, Landay refers to Malalai Joya, an elected representative to the parliament in 2005 who promised her constituents that she would use her "position in Parliament to expose the abuse of power and corruption whenever I found it" (A Woman Among Warlords, p. 133). She found it in the newly "elected" parliament. In May 2006, Joya relates what she has learned about the grisly backgrounds of the majority of the elected officials represented in the parliament:
"Some argue that the mistakes of the past must be forgotton, but I believe that there is a big difference between mistakes and crimes. Was it just a mistake to kill more than sixty-five thousand Kabulis during the civil war? Was it just a mistake to use rape as a weapon of war, to murder and mutilate, such as those who militias cut women's breats off to terrorize the popuation. These were not just mistakes, and that is why I use the term criminal muhahideen" (p. 134).
Joya was subsequently banned from the parliament for speaking the truth. Many of those who sat with her in parliament in 2005-2006 are now running to be re-elected, and pretty assured they will again succeed in the charade of another "democratic" election process.
Landay picks up the story in his report, as follows.
Warlords and killers seek re-election to Afghan parliament
Jonathan S. Landay McClatchy Newspapers
last updated: September 15, 2010 01:54:57 PM
http://www.mcclatchyde.com/2010/09/14/100574/warlords-alleged-killers-seek.html
KABUL, Afghanistan — Mohammad Eshaq vividly remembers cowering in a crowded Kabul basement as shellfire raged above, fleeing with his family when his Afshar neighborhood's defenses collapsed and returning a year later to find scores of corpses still moldering in the rubble.
"Some were shot and some died from the rockets," said the 55-year-old sweet shop owner, standing by a mass grave on a sun-baked hillside that he helped fill. "We weren't able to wash them. We just laid them side by side and covered them."
Hundreds of minority Hazara civilians were killed in Afshar in February 1993 in one of the bloodiest chapters of the battle for Kabul, between rival U.S.-armed guerrilla factions that had ousted the Soviet-backed regime the previous year.
The man who directed the onslaught, according to residents and human rights groups, was Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayyaf, an Islamist member of parliament's lower house who's close to U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai. He's running for re-election from Kabul, and analysts say he could be the next speaker of the lower house.
Sayyaf is among a raft of former guerrilla chieftains and commanders implicated in war crimes who are likely to win re-election Saturday to the 249-seat Wolesi Jirga in polls that are expected to be marred by coercion, fraud and violence.
For many Afghans and human rights groups, these men symbolize the high-level impunity, bad governance and massive corruption that are helping to fuel the growing Taliban-led insurgency.
"If ordinary people had power they wouldn't vote for any of these men. The government is filled with traitors from top to bottom," said Najaf Ali, 57. He lost three family members in the 1993 assault on Afshar by Pashtun and Tajik forces.
That some of Afghanistan's most notorious figures haven't been barred from seeking re-election after last year's fraud-tainted presidential contest underscores for many experts a deeply flawed system for vetting the 2,513 candidates.
"I've serious concerns about the way the vetting process has gone," said Ahmad Nader Nadery, the head of the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, an independent poll watchdog.
The U.N. envoy to Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura, also voiced no confidence in the system.
"The process of vetting has not produced a satisfactory result so far," he said in a July statement.
Ninety percent of the Wolesi Jirga members who were elected in 2005 have been certified to seek re-election. One lawmaker has been disqualified, 15 are retiring and 10 died or were killed while in office.
Yet the winners of the 2005 polls included 40 commanders still associated with armed groups, 24 who belong to criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers and 19 who face serious allegations of war crimes and human rights violations, according to an analysis cited in a 2005 report by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, an independent research center.
A second, bleaker analysis by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission cited in the report found that more than 80 percent of provincial lawmakers and more than 60 percent of those elected in Kabul had "links to armed groups."
"One of the biggest threats to Afghanistan's political stability and future comes from individuals who have committed serious human rights abuses," warned a 2005 Human Rights Watch report on the 1992-93 fighting in Kabul that implicated Sayyaf along with other top politicians and officials, including one of Karzai's two vice presidents, Mohammad Qasim Fahim. "To achieve long-term stability, the government will ultimately have to address the continuing threat from these individuals."
However, none of the former guerrilla chieftains and commanders, whom the George W. Bush administration rehabilitated and paid millions to help oust the Taliban and al Qaida in 2001, has faced criminal trial or been scrutinized by a South Africa-type truth commission.
A truth commission proposal, pushed by the United States and its allies as a way to assuage public demands for accountability, was quietly dropped amid resistance from Karzai. Citing the need for national unity, Karzai signed a bill in 2007 that granted amnesty to the former guerrilla chiefs and their followers.
The bill, which parliament passed secretly, was championed by Sayyaf, who denounced critics as being "against Islam" and "enemies of this country."
The electoral vetting system is supposed to disqualify candidates with links to private militias, or "illegal armed groups," that could be used to intimidate voters and hijack polling stations.
The Electoral Complaints Commission, which adjudicates alleged election law violations, announced the disqualification of 36 candidates in July and added eight others as they campaigned earlier this month.
The commission, however, didn't make those determinations. Officials from the Interior and Defense ministries, the National Directorate of Security — Afghanistan's top intelligence agency — and the Independent Election Commission decided them in secret.
Political activists and election experts, citing the lack of transparency, charged that there's no proof that those who were disqualified are tied to militias, while men who should have been excluded were given passes.
"A majority of the seats in parliament will belong to photocopies of Sayyaf," asserted Malalai Joya. Her fierce denunciations of Karzai and "warlords and drug lords" in parliament prompted her expulsion from her Farah province seat in 2007 in what many experts say was an unconstitutional action by the lower house. The chamber also lifted her official passport and banned her from talking to the media, which she refused to heed.
Joya, who's also an outspoken critic of U.S. policy in Afghanistan, contended that many lawmakers' police bodyguards are members of personal militias, and she called the candidate vetting process "just symbolic."
Numerous calls to a Electoral Complaints Commission spokesman requesting comment went unanswered.
ON THE WEB
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2005 report "A House Divided," by Andrew Wilder
MORE FROM MCCLATCHY
Poll violence, fraud could fuel anger against Karzai, U.S.
45-year-old U.S. infantryman does heavy lifting in Afghanistan
Patron of Afghan school is local warlord, U.S. ally
More Stryker Brigade soldiers charged with assault on Afghans
McClatchy Newspapers 2010
Drone attacks kill civilians in Waziristan
Juan Cole makes it clear today in the following report from his blog, Informed Comment, that there is not just one monolithic insurgent group of Taliban. Rather, there are five or so such groups. He refers to "fighters of the Haqqani network" as one non-Taliban group. Ironically, Cole writes, the Haqqani network was one of the group's identified by Ronald Reagan as "Freedom Fighters" during the 1980s. Now they are the target of US drone attacks, and in the process unmanned drone weapons are killing more civilians than insurgents. Drone warfare and counterinsurgency, Gen. Patraeus' strategy in Afghanistan, appear in essential ways to be contradictory and hardly to advance the goal of "winning hearts and minds."
Juan Cole, "US Drone Strikes kill 15 [60] in N. Waziristan"
http://www.juancole.com/, Sept. 15, 2010
The Associated Press does an important story about an intensive drone strike campaign by the US military since September 2 in southern Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s North Waziristan that has left 60 persons dead, among them innocent civilians.
On Tuesday alone, US drone attacks targeted suspected militants killed some 15 persons in the village of Dargah Mandi village on the outskirts of Miranshah, N. Waziristan’s main city.
The drone strikes have targeted fighters of the Haqqani network, one of five or so major insurgent groups fighting against the US & NATO presence in Afghanistan and against the Karzai government. Jalaluddin Haqqani is one of Ronald Reagan’s “Freedom Fighters,” who battled the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan in the 1980s with American aid. He could not accept the US invasion and occupation of his country, either, and organized an insurgency now mainly led by his son Siraj. The Haqqani group is not Taliban but rather Mujahidin and has only a vague tactical alliance with Mulla Omar’s Taliban and similar groups.
Pakistani opposition to the US incursions against Pakistani sovereignty has been muted because of the vast flooding that has affected much of the country, and dealing with which has pinned down the Pakistani military. Another 25 villages in the Sindh province were submerged by flood waters on Tuesday. Hundreds of more villages are menaced by the waters of Manchhal Lake, which is now full to capacity and could overflow. Incredibly, the flooding continues to displace Sindhi villagers on a massive scale without generating much in the way of news in the US. The displaced are facing lack of potable water and food shortages.
Juan Cole, "US Drone Strikes kill 15 [60] in N. Waziristan"
http://www.juancole.com/, Sept. 15, 2010
The Associated Press does an important story about an intensive drone strike campaign by the US military since September 2 in southern Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s North Waziristan that has left 60 persons dead, among them innocent civilians.
On Tuesday alone, US drone attacks targeted suspected militants killed some 15 persons in the village of Dargah Mandi village on the outskirts of Miranshah, N. Waziristan’s main city.
The drone strikes have targeted fighters of the Haqqani network, one of five or so major insurgent groups fighting against the US & NATO presence in Afghanistan and against the Karzai government. Jalaluddin Haqqani is one of Ronald Reagan’s “Freedom Fighters,” who battled the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan in the 1980s with American aid. He could not accept the US invasion and occupation of his country, either, and organized an insurgency now mainly led by his son Siraj. The Haqqani group is not Taliban but rather Mujahidin and has only a vague tactical alliance with Mulla Omar’s Taliban and similar groups.
Pakistani opposition to the US incursions against Pakistani sovereignty has been muted because of the vast flooding that has affected much of the country, and dealing with which has pinned down the Pakistani military. Another 25 villages in the Sindh province were submerged by flood waters on Tuesday. Hundreds of more villages are menaced by the waters of Manchhal Lake, which is now full to capacity and could overflow. Incredibly, the flooding continues to displace Sindhi villagers on a massive scale without generating much in the way of news in the US. The displaced are facing lack of potable water and food shortages.
Friday, September 10, 2010
US troop casualties in Afghanistan are rising, contrary to Petraeus' claim
The basic point of Gareth Porter's well written and fact-based article is that the officially documented trend in US troop casualties in Afganistan contradict what Gen. Petraeus has publicly claimed. The evidence indicates the US troop casualties are rising. This trend challenges the general's position that counterinsurgency accompanied by more troops is quelling the Afghan insurgency. Rather than conceding the point that the counterinsurgency strategy is not working, other sources (some posted elsewhere on this blog) report that Patraeus wants more troops and more time to get the job done. If recent trends continue, Patraeus' strategy, backed by the Obama and his administration, means more US casualties as well.
Petraeus Spin on Afghan War Belied by Soaring Casualties
by Gareth Porter, September 10, 2010
http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/09/09/petraeus-spin-on-afghan-war-belied-by-soaring-casualties
Gen. David Petraeus claimed limited success this week in the war within a war over the Taliban’s planting of roadside bombs, but official Pentagon data shows the Taliban clearly winning that war by planting more bombs and killing many more U.S. and NATO troops since the troop surge began in early 2010.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal published Tuesday, Petraeus asserted that the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Taliban had "flattened" over the past year and attributed that alleged success to pressures by the U.S. military, and especially the increased tempo of Special Operations Forces raids against Taliban units.
Data provided by the Pentagon’s Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), however, shows that IEDs planted by Afghan insurgents killed nearly 40 percent more U.S. and NATO troops in the first eight months of 2010 than in the comparable period of 2009.
The data also show that Taliban IEDs wounded 2,025 U.S. and NATO troops in the first eight months of this year – almost twice the 1,035 wounded in the same months last year.
In the Journal interview, Petraeus said that the data on violent incidents in Afghanistan indicate a slowly improving security situation.
[....]
The total number of IED incidents in Afghanistan began to rise steeply in March 2010 to a new high of 1,087 and then continued to climb to 1,128 in May and again to 1,258 in August.
[....]
In late 2005, the civilian population was informing U.S. and NATO troops of about 15 percent of of all IEDs planted. That proportion fell to just over nine percent in 2006, to less than seven percent in 2007 to about three percent in 2008, and again to 2.8 percent in 2009.
In the first six months of 2010, that ratio dropped to 2.6 percent, and in May and June it fell to 1.4 and one percent, respectively.
[....]
The steep decline in the proportion of IEDs turned in by the population as more U.S. and NATO troops intruded on the Pashtun countryside is another reliable indicator – supporting opinion surveys in Helmand and Kandahar provinces – of the deterioration of relations between foreign troops and the population.
Petraeus Spin on Afghan War Belied by Soaring Casualties
by Gareth Porter, September 10, 2010
http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2010/09/09/petraeus-spin-on-afghan-war-belied-by-soaring-casualties
Gen. David Petraeus claimed limited success this week in the war within a war over the Taliban’s planting of roadside bombs, but official Pentagon data shows the Taliban clearly winning that war by planting more bombs and killing many more U.S. and NATO troops since the troop surge began in early 2010.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal published Tuesday, Petraeus asserted that the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Taliban had "flattened" over the past year and attributed that alleged success to pressures by the U.S. military, and especially the increased tempo of Special Operations Forces raids against Taliban units.
Data provided by the Pentagon’s Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), however, shows that IEDs planted by Afghan insurgents killed nearly 40 percent more U.S. and NATO troops in the first eight months of 2010 than in the comparable period of 2009.
The data also show that Taliban IEDs wounded 2,025 U.S. and NATO troops in the first eight months of this year – almost twice the 1,035 wounded in the same months last year.
In the Journal interview, Petraeus said that the data on violent incidents in Afghanistan indicate a slowly improving security situation.
[....]
The total number of IED incidents in Afghanistan began to rise steeply in March 2010 to a new high of 1,087 and then continued to climb to 1,128 in May and again to 1,258 in August.
[....]
In late 2005, the civilian population was informing U.S. and NATO troops of about 15 percent of of all IEDs planted. That proportion fell to just over nine percent in 2006, to less than seven percent in 2007 to about three percent in 2008, and again to 2.8 percent in 2009.
In the first six months of 2010, that ratio dropped to 2.6 percent, and in May and June it fell to 1.4 and one percent, respectively.
[....]
The steep decline in the proportion of IEDs turned in by the population as more U.S. and NATO troops intruded on the Pashtun countryside is another reliable indicator – supporting opinion surveys in Helmand and Kandahar provinces – of the deterioration of relations between foreign troops and the population.
Thursday, September 9, 2010
High-level study group recommends significant reductions of US troops
Two high-level reports, one from the US, the other from the UK, call for policy options that
would increase the chances of significant reductions on US force levels beginning next summer.
The thrust of the reports, focusing mostly on the US report, is that the US should reduce its ambitions in Afghanistan from nation-building through counterinsurgency (winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people) because it is too costly and ineffective. Rather, the members of the US group, The Afghanistan Study Group, prefer a counter-terrorist approach, involving fewer troops and narrowly targeted at al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups. The goals in this case is one of deterrence and containment and lowered costs. It does not recommend a full withdrawal of US troops, but a reduction in troops and a different strategic goal.
I cite below sections of three articles to provide a sense of what is being reported on this alternative approach of the Afghanistan Study Group.
First, Jim Lobe provides information on the US and UK reports in an article titled “Calls for Change of Afghan Strategy Grow Louder, September 9, 2010. You can find his full report at: http://original.antiwar.com/lobe/2010/09/08/calls-for-change-of-afghan-strategy-grow-louder
“Amid continued high levels of violence and a steady stream of reports of high-level government corruption in Kabul, a growing number of foreign policy specialists are urging President Barack Obama to reconsider his counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan.
“In a new report released here Wednesday, a bipartisan group of some three dozen former senior officials, academics, and policy analysts argued that the administration’s ambitious "nation-building" efforts in Afghanistan are costing too much in U.S. blood and treasure and that, in any event, "prospects for success are dim."
“Calling for an accelerated timetable for reducing the U.S. military presence there, the "Afghanistan Study Group," which also urged intensified efforts to reach a negotiated solution with the Pashtun-based Taliban, echoed many of the points made in the latest strategic survey which was released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London Tuesday.
“‘(A)s the military surge reaches its peak and begins to wind down, it is necessary and advisable for outside powers to move to a containment and deterrence policy to deal with the international terrorist threat from the Afghan/Pakistan border regions,’ said IISS’s director-general, John Chipman, in introducing this year’s report.
"At present the COIN strategy is too ambitious, too removed from the core security goals that need to be met, and too sapping of diplomatic and military energies needed both in the region and elsewhere," he noted. "(F)or Western states to be pinned down militarily and psychologically in Afghanistan will not be in the service of their wider political and security interests."
[….]
Second, here are sections from Katrina vanden Heuvel’s article, “Finding a Way Out of Afghanistan.” The full article can be accessed at http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/09/08-5
[....]
“At a moment when the administration and too many members of Congress have failed to explore alternatives to Gen. David Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy, the importance of this clear and cogent [bipartisan] report can't be overstated.
“The report offers a thorough analysis of why and how we must dramatically reduce America's footprint in our nation's longest and most expensive war. Although the war is justified by its proponents as an effort to eradicate al-Qaeda, the report notes that "there are only some 400 hard-core al-Qaeda members remaining in the entire Af-Pak theater, most of them hiding in Pakistan's northwest provinces."
“Meanwhile, the war costs U.S. taxpayers approximately $100 billion a year -- about seven times Afghanistan's annual gross domestic product of $14 billion and more than the cost of the Obama administration's health-care plan. Considering that price tag alongside the number of troops killed or seriously wounded, the report concludes that "the U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice."
[….]
Third, Steve Clemons offers further views in his article, “Rethinking US War in Afghanistan, which can be found at: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/09/08-8
[….]
“Far from admitting defeat, the report acknowledges the many limitations of a military solution in a region where U.S. interests lie in political stability. The group's recommended policy seeks to shift resources to focus on U.S. foreign policy strengths in concert with the international community to promote reconciliation among the warring parties, advance economic development and encourage region-wide diplomatic engagement.
[….]
“….The group's core recommendations do not include full, immediate troop withdrawal, but rather a decrease in the military footprint in Afghanistan.
“The five key recommendations are:
1. Emphasize power sharing and political inclusion. Washington should fast-track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and encourage a power-sharing balance among the principal parties.
2. Downsize and eventually end military operations in Southern Afghanistan and reduce the U.S. military footprint. The United States should draw down its military presence - which radicalizes Pashtuns and aids Taliban recruitment.
3. Focus security efforts on Al Qaeda and domestic security. Special forces, intelligence assets and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to act should Al Qaeda attempt to relocate elsewhere or to build new training facilities. In addition, part of the savings from our drawdown should be reallocated to bolster U.S. domestic security efforts and to track nuclear weapons globally.
4. Encourage economic development. Because destitute states can become incubators for terrorism, drug and human trafficking and other illicit activities, efforts at reconciliation should be paired with an internationally led effort to develop Afghanistan's economy.
5. Engage regional and global stakeholders in a diplomatic effort designed to guarantee Afghan neutrality and foster regional stability. Despite their considerable differences, neighboring states, such as India, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia, share a common interest in preventing Afghanistan from being dominated by any single power or from being a permanently failed state that exports instability.
[….]
“Washington is now spending more on Afghanistan - and failing in its efforts - than the entire annual cost of the new U.S. health insurance program. This is money that could be used to better counter global terrorist threats far away from Afghanistan, reduce the $1.4 trillion annual deficit, repair and modernize a large portion of U.S. infrastructure, radically enhance U.S. educational investment, launch a massive new Manhattan Project-like effort for energy alternatives research - or put approximately 2 million Americans back to work.
“Thousands of American and allied personnel have been killed or gravely wounded. Too many innocent Afghans and Pakistanis have become victims - assuring unpredictable blowback in the years ahead.
“The U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice.
[….]
would increase the chances of significant reductions on US force levels beginning next summer.
The thrust of the reports, focusing mostly on the US report, is that the US should reduce its ambitions in Afghanistan from nation-building through counterinsurgency (winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people) because it is too costly and ineffective. Rather, the members of the US group, The Afghanistan Study Group, prefer a counter-terrorist approach, involving fewer troops and narrowly targeted at al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups. The goals in this case is one of deterrence and containment and lowered costs. It does not recommend a full withdrawal of US troops, but a reduction in troops and a different strategic goal.
I cite below sections of three articles to provide a sense of what is being reported on this alternative approach of the Afghanistan Study Group.
First, Jim Lobe provides information on the US and UK reports in an article titled “Calls for Change of Afghan Strategy Grow Louder, September 9, 2010. You can find his full report at: http://original.antiwar.com/lobe/2010/09/08/calls-for-change-of-afghan-strategy-grow-louder
“Amid continued high levels of violence and a steady stream of reports of high-level government corruption in Kabul, a growing number of foreign policy specialists are urging President Barack Obama to reconsider his counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan.
“In a new report released here Wednesday, a bipartisan group of some three dozen former senior officials, academics, and policy analysts argued that the administration’s ambitious "nation-building" efforts in Afghanistan are costing too much in U.S. blood and treasure and that, in any event, "prospects for success are dim."
“Calling for an accelerated timetable for reducing the U.S. military presence there, the "Afghanistan Study Group," which also urged intensified efforts to reach a negotiated solution with the Pashtun-based Taliban, echoed many of the points made in the latest strategic survey which was released by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London Tuesday.
“‘(A)s the military surge reaches its peak and begins to wind down, it is necessary and advisable for outside powers to move to a containment and deterrence policy to deal with the international terrorist threat from the Afghan/Pakistan border regions,’ said IISS’s director-general, John Chipman, in introducing this year’s report.
"At present the COIN strategy is too ambitious, too removed from the core security goals that need to be met, and too sapping of diplomatic and military energies needed both in the region and elsewhere," he noted. "(F)or Western states to be pinned down militarily and psychologically in Afghanistan will not be in the service of their wider political and security interests."
[….]
Second, here are sections from Katrina vanden Heuvel’s article, “Finding a Way Out of Afghanistan.” The full article can be accessed at http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/09/08-5
[....]
“At a moment when the administration and too many members of Congress have failed to explore alternatives to Gen. David Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy, the importance of this clear and cogent [bipartisan] report can't be overstated.
“The report offers a thorough analysis of why and how we must dramatically reduce America's footprint in our nation's longest and most expensive war. Although the war is justified by its proponents as an effort to eradicate al-Qaeda, the report notes that "there are only some 400 hard-core al-Qaeda members remaining in the entire Af-Pak theater, most of them hiding in Pakistan's northwest provinces."
“Meanwhile, the war costs U.S. taxpayers approximately $100 billion a year -- about seven times Afghanistan's annual gross domestic product of $14 billion and more than the cost of the Obama administration's health-care plan. Considering that price tag alongside the number of troops killed or seriously wounded, the report concludes that "the U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice."
[….]
Third, Steve Clemons offers further views in his article, “Rethinking US War in Afghanistan, which can be found at: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/09/08-8
[….]
“Far from admitting defeat, the report acknowledges the many limitations of a military solution in a region where U.S. interests lie in political stability. The group's recommended policy seeks to shift resources to focus on U.S. foreign policy strengths in concert with the international community to promote reconciliation among the warring parties, advance economic development and encourage region-wide diplomatic engagement.
[….]
“….The group's core recommendations do not include full, immediate troop withdrawal, but rather a decrease in the military footprint in Afghanistan.
“The five key recommendations are:
1. Emphasize power sharing and political inclusion. Washington should fast-track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and encourage a power-sharing balance among the principal parties.
2. Downsize and eventually end military operations in Southern Afghanistan and reduce the U.S. military footprint. The United States should draw down its military presence - which radicalizes Pashtuns and aids Taliban recruitment.
3. Focus security efforts on Al Qaeda and domestic security. Special forces, intelligence assets and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to act should Al Qaeda attempt to relocate elsewhere or to build new training facilities. In addition, part of the savings from our drawdown should be reallocated to bolster U.S. domestic security efforts and to track nuclear weapons globally.
4. Encourage economic development. Because destitute states can become incubators for terrorism, drug and human trafficking and other illicit activities, efforts at reconciliation should be paired with an internationally led effort to develop Afghanistan's economy.
5. Engage regional and global stakeholders in a diplomatic effort designed to guarantee Afghan neutrality and foster regional stability. Despite their considerable differences, neighboring states, such as India, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia, share a common interest in preventing Afghanistan from being dominated by any single power or from being a permanently failed state that exports instability.
[….]
“Washington is now spending more on Afghanistan - and failing in its efforts - than the entire annual cost of the new U.S. health insurance program. This is money that could be used to better counter global terrorist threats far away from Afghanistan, reduce the $1.4 trillion annual deficit, repair and modernize a large portion of U.S. infrastructure, radically enhance U.S. educational investment, launch a massive new Manhattan Project-like effort for energy alternatives research - or put approximately 2 million Americans back to work.
“Thousands of American and allied personnel have been killed or gravely wounded. Too many innocent Afghans and Pakistanis have become victims - assuring unpredictable blowback in the years ahead.
“The U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant this level of sacrifice.
[….]
Demonstration for peace and justice planned in DC for Oct 2, 2010
United for Peace and Justice is helping to mobilize a demonstration for October 2nd in Washington DC. The purposes of the event are to call for an end to the war and occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq and to redirect the money saved to domestic programs addressing the needs of US citizens. (See their call for support after my comments.)
The evidence so far suggests that 50,000 US military troops, some number of US military bases, a large contingent of government contractors and their employees, along with US air and naval forces, will remain in Iraq for some unspecified period of time.
In Afghanistan, the US troop level has risen to 100,000, along with 30,000 or so troops from allied countries. There are US special forces largely hidden from view working on counter-terrorist projects. General Patraeus is requesting and additional 2,000 troops. There are hundreds of US military bases in the country. The number of contractors working for the US military is going up. There is little progress in building a viable and effective national police or military force. Recent news stories continue to report on widespread corruption in the Afghan government. The majority of Afghans who are polled want an end to the occupation. There is little sign of an end to the conflict.
Leading the way, US policies have left both countries devastated, driving them into poverty or deeper into poverty, created the conditions for civil war, and, especially in Iraq, produced four million refugees and the lowest overall standard of living since 1991. As yet, neither country has a stable government.
United for Peace and Justice, One Nation Working Together
http://www.unitedforpeace.org/, 221-868-5545, P.O. Box 607, Times Square Station, New York, NY, 10108.
Will We See You There?
Two weeks ago we asked if you were ready to hit the streets again. The answer is coming in from every corner of the country: YES.
Even with the usual challenges of end-of-summer organizing, momentum for the One Nation Working Together mobilization in Washington, DC on Saturday, October 2nd is growing every day. New organizations - both national and local groups - are signing on. New organizing committees in cities big and small are coming together. Buses are being reserved, carpools are being organized, and people are getting ready. Without exaggeration, all signs point to the 10.2.10 mobilization being of historical proportion. To put it simply: This is one you do not want to miss!
With the long Labor Day weekend behind us, now is the time to take our organizing to the next level. What we do - what we all do - in the next few weeks will determine if 10.2.10 is one of the largest and most powerful expressions of the progressive agenda that our nation as ever seen. The peace movement has a tremendous role to play, if we step up now. We know how to turn out people: Remember the massive protests against the war in Iraq that we made happen? Those events were critically important in and of themselves, and they also laid the foundation for the work we are now engaged in.
Our work as a movement goes beyond turning out large numbers of people for an historic event. We have an opportunity to help millions of people understand how the struggle to end the wars and occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq is directly tied to the urgent need to re-direct this nation's economic and social priorities. We can bring our clear call for cuts in military spending into the efforts to fund the needs of all of our communities, including creating millions of new, green jobs.
Making these connections will only be as strong as our presence within the One Nation Working Together movement. This means being part of the local organizing coalitions that are already in place, or building new ones in the cities where they don't exist yet. It means turning out massive numbers of people in Washington, DC on 10.2.10. And it means helping us build the peace presence there.
Here's what you can do:
1) Find out if there's an organized coalition in your area. Click here to see a list of what's already in place.
2) If there is not a coalition, start right now to form one. If you need help, let us know by contacting us at onenationforpeace@gmail.com or 973 666-4605.
3) Be sure to add your group's name to the growing list of groups participating in the 10.2.10 March on Washington. Click Join Our Coalition here.
4) Join the Peace Table of the ONWT effort. We are the umbrella structure organizing to make sure the issues the peace movement works on every day are visible on October 2nd and a part of the overall agenda for this new movement.
5) Donate today to help support the work of the Peace Table. With a relatively small budget we can have a tremendous impact, but we need to your help now to make that possible. Or mail a check to: UFPJ, PO Box 607, Times Square Station, NY, NY 10108
We will soon send you more details about what will happen in Washington, DC on October 2, including how the Peace Table will make our messages a visible part of the day and how your group can help make that happen. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please contact us at 973 666-4605.
Help us continue to do this critical work: Make a donation to UFPJ today.
The evidence so far suggests that 50,000 US military troops, some number of US military bases, a large contingent of government contractors and their employees, along with US air and naval forces, will remain in Iraq for some unspecified period of time.
In Afghanistan, the US troop level has risen to 100,000, along with 30,000 or so troops from allied countries. There are US special forces largely hidden from view working on counter-terrorist projects. General Patraeus is requesting and additional 2,000 troops. There are hundreds of US military bases in the country. The number of contractors working for the US military is going up. There is little progress in building a viable and effective national police or military force. Recent news stories continue to report on widespread corruption in the Afghan government. The majority of Afghans who are polled want an end to the occupation. There is little sign of an end to the conflict.
Leading the way, US policies have left both countries devastated, driving them into poverty or deeper into poverty, created the conditions for civil war, and, especially in Iraq, produced four million refugees and the lowest overall standard of living since 1991. As yet, neither country has a stable government.
United for Peace and Justice, One Nation Working Together
http://www.unitedforpeace.org/, 221-868-5545, P.O. Box 607, Times Square Station, New York, NY, 10108.
Will We See You There?
Two weeks ago we asked if you were ready to hit the streets again. The answer is coming in from every corner of the country: YES.
Even with the usual challenges of end-of-summer organizing, momentum for the One Nation Working Together mobilization in Washington, DC on Saturday, October 2nd is growing every day. New organizations - both national and local groups - are signing on. New organizing committees in cities big and small are coming together. Buses are being reserved, carpools are being organized, and people are getting ready. Without exaggeration, all signs point to the 10.2.10 mobilization being of historical proportion. To put it simply: This is one you do not want to miss!
With the long Labor Day weekend behind us, now is the time to take our organizing to the next level. What we do - what we all do - in the next few weeks will determine if 10.2.10 is one of the largest and most powerful expressions of the progressive agenda that our nation as ever seen. The peace movement has a tremendous role to play, if we step up now. We know how to turn out people: Remember the massive protests against the war in Iraq that we made happen? Those events were critically important in and of themselves, and they also laid the foundation for the work we are now engaged in.
Our work as a movement goes beyond turning out large numbers of people for an historic event. We have an opportunity to help millions of people understand how the struggle to end the wars and occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq is directly tied to the urgent need to re-direct this nation's economic and social priorities. We can bring our clear call for cuts in military spending into the efforts to fund the needs of all of our communities, including creating millions of new, green jobs.
Making these connections will only be as strong as our presence within the One Nation Working Together movement. This means being part of the local organizing coalitions that are already in place, or building new ones in the cities where they don't exist yet. It means turning out massive numbers of people in Washington, DC on 10.2.10. And it means helping us build the peace presence there.
Here's what you can do:
1) Find out if there's an organized coalition in your area. Click here to see a list of what's already in place.
2) If there is not a coalition, start right now to form one. If you need help, let us know by contacting us at onenationforpeace@gmail.com or 973 666-4605.
3) Be sure to add your group's name to the growing list of groups participating in the 10.2.10 March on Washington. Click Join Our Coalition here.
4) Join the Peace Table of the ONWT effort. We are the umbrella structure organizing to make sure the issues the peace movement works on every day are visible on October 2nd and a part of the overall agenda for this new movement.
5) Donate today to help support the work of the Peace Table. With a relatively small budget we can have a tremendous impact, but we need to your help now to make that possible. Or mail a check to: UFPJ, PO Box 607, Times Square Station, NY, NY 10108
We will soon send you more details about what will happen in Washington, DC on October 2, including how the Peace Table will make our messages a visible part of the day and how your group can help make that happen. In the meantime, if you have any questions, please contact us at 973 666-4605.
Help us continue to do this critical work: Make a donation to UFPJ today.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
US military plans and requests suggest a long occupation in Afghanistan
The website Antiwar.com is an excellent source of news and reports on countries around the world. The focus is usually critical and on situations that have some relevance to US foreign and military policies.
Today, one of the many articles posted is about Gen. Patraeus request for 2,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. You can find the full article at: http://news.antiwar.com/2010/09/06/patraeus-seeks-more-troops-for-afghanistan.
Another article (see below) deals with plans for the US to spend $6 billion a year on the Afghan police and military forces, probably a low-ball estimate.
These articles unfortunately suggest that US military leaders in Afghanistan are expecting to be in the country for many years. This follows the pattern of US military wars and interventions around the world since at least the Korean War. Once in a country, stay there.
US Plans to Spend $6 Billion a Year on Afghan Troops
Posted By Jason Ditz On September 6, 2010
http://news.antiwar.com/2010/09/06/us-plans-to-spend-6-billion-a-year-on-afghan-troops
According to previously undisclosed estimates, the United States is planning to spend $6 billion annually on supporting Afghanistan’s military and police starting in 2011, an expense which given the weak Afghan economy will probably continue more or less forever.
But the estimate could also be unrealistically low, as the administration spent about $9 billion this year and is planning to spend $11.6 billion next year on this expense. As US plans to increase the size of Afghanistan’s military seem to grow virtually annually, it seems the expected “drop” past 2011 is not based on anything.
Training pledges and goals seem to constantly go unfulfilled, and most officials openly say that it will take another decade, at best, to build the Afghan security forces, so the $6 billion “maintenance” level, which will be quite a bit lower than the training costs, will likely not come for quite some time.
This cost is only a comparatively small percentage of the overall amount the US spends annually on its occupation of Afghanistan. But it serves as perhaps the clearest reminder of how long the Obama Administration intends to keep the US chained to Afghanistan.
Article printed from News From Antiwar.com: http://news.antiwar.com
Today, one of the many articles posted is about Gen. Patraeus request for 2,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. You can find the full article at: http://news.antiwar.com/2010/09/06/patraeus-seeks-more-troops-for-afghanistan.
Another article (see below) deals with plans for the US to spend $6 billion a year on the Afghan police and military forces, probably a low-ball estimate.
These articles unfortunately suggest that US military leaders in Afghanistan are expecting to be in the country for many years. This follows the pattern of US military wars and interventions around the world since at least the Korean War. Once in a country, stay there.
US Plans to Spend $6 Billion a Year on Afghan Troops
Posted By Jason Ditz On September 6, 2010
http://news.antiwar.com/2010/09/06/us-plans-to-spend-6-billion-a-year-on-afghan-troops
According to previously undisclosed estimates, the United States is planning to spend $6 billion annually on supporting Afghanistan’s military and police starting in 2011, an expense which given the weak Afghan economy will probably continue more or less forever.
But the estimate could also be unrealistically low, as the administration spent about $9 billion this year and is planning to spend $11.6 billion next year on this expense. As US plans to increase the size of Afghanistan’s military seem to grow virtually annually, it seems the expected “drop” past 2011 is not based on anything.
Training pledges and goals seem to constantly go unfulfilled, and most officials openly say that it will take another decade, at best, to build the Afghan security forces, so the $6 billion “maintenance” level, which will be quite a bit lower than the training costs, will likely not come for quite some time.
This cost is only a comparatively small percentage of the overall amount the US spends annually on its occupation of Afghanistan. But it serves as perhaps the clearest reminder of how long the Obama Administration intends to keep the US chained to Afghanistan.
Article printed from News From Antiwar.com: http://news.antiwar.com
Monday, September 6, 2010
Number of street kids rises along with poverty in Afghanistan
Andrew Hammond reports that the number of street children in Afghanistan is in the hundreds of thousands. This horrendous problem is the result of a high level of poverty, which in turn has been exacerbated by three decades of war and civil war. The US has been indirectly or directly involved all this time in generating the devastating conditions that deepen poverty, destabilize or destroy communities and families, and result in a large and growing number of street children.
[....]
...the disturbing reality in this war-torn nation -- where Western powers battle Islamist forces to maintain a friendly government in power -- is that at least 600,000 street children have no safety net to catch them.
The problem, experts say, is getting worse because of the deepening war and the scourge of corruption, despite the inflow of more than $35 billion from foreign donors since the Taliban were removed from power in 2001.
The dangers for children are many, they say: from drugs to the insurgency, from criminal gangs to sexual abuse.
"Poverty is getting worse in Afghanistan and children are forced to find work," said Shafiqa Zaher, a social worker with Aschiana, the group receiving U.S. aid for its work.
[....]
Some 7,000 in the main cities of Afghanistan are attending Aschiana schools, where food and stationery costs are taken care of and some families are assigned sponsors.
Most have a home to go to, even if it is the shell of a building struck in the country's unending wars, Zaher says, but their guardians are often disabled and cannot work.
WAR AND CORRUPTION
A study by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) in 2008 found around 60,000 minors involved in child labour in Kabul alone.
Nader Nadery, a senior commissioner at the AIHRC, says it's a consequence of Afghanistan's decades of conflict. "In the last three to four years an increasing number of displaced from the war affected areas -- Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni -- have poured into Kabul city to seek refuge," he said.
A community of refugees mainly from Sangin in Helmand, where U.S. forces led an operation against insurgents last year, relies on Aschiana help in a Kabul slum quarter of plastic awnings.
In three decades of war the country's population has doubled to more than 30 million and the dusty mountain capital has swelled to a city of four million, much of it pot-holed and crumbling, with chronic traffic.
"Historically Kabul and Afghanistan have never had this crisis of people not having a ceiling or a roof. They're all poor but at least they had a home," Nadery said.
He says corruption, the subject of an ongoing diplomatic scuffle between Karzai and Washington and a major issue in parliamentary elections this month, makes a bad situation worse.
A United Nations report said in March that entrenched corruption was leaving the poor at the mercy of the powerful while security-obsessed foreign forces turn a blind eye.
"The direct link between poverty and corruption is always there," Nadery said. "Most development projects are halted or don't reach areas where it would affect the life of the poor because of the corruption involved."
[....]
Deprivation and abuse pushes some teenagers to join the insurgents, she says. "The worst was children who the Taliban were forcing to go with them for an amount of money. They were from 7 to 18 years old, with guns and regular training."
[....]
I found Hammond's article, "War, corruption swell number of street kids," at: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SGE68400H.htm, September 6, 2010. Here are excerpts from the article.
Andrew Hammond:[....]
...the disturbing reality in this war-torn nation -- where Western powers battle Islamist forces to maintain a friendly government in power -- is that at least 600,000 street children have no safety net to catch them.
The problem, experts say, is getting worse because of the deepening war and the scourge of corruption, despite the inflow of more than $35 billion from foreign donors since the Taliban were removed from power in 2001.
The dangers for children are many, they say: from drugs to the insurgency, from criminal gangs to sexual abuse.
"Poverty is getting worse in Afghanistan and children are forced to find work," said Shafiqa Zaher, a social worker with Aschiana, the group receiving U.S. aid for its work.
[....]
Some 7,000 in the main cities of Afghanistan are attending Aschiana schools, where food and stationery costs are taken care of and some families are assigned sponsors.
Most have a home to go to, even if it is the shell of a building struck in the country's unending wars, Zaher says, but their guardians are often disabled and cannot work.
WAR AND CORRUPTION
A study by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) in 2008 found around 60,000 minors involved in child labour in Kabul alone.
Nader Nadery, a senior commissioner at the AIHRC, says it's a consequence of Afghanistan's decades of conflict. "In the last three to four years an increasing number of displaced from the war affected areas -- Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni -- have poured into Kabul city to seek refuge," he said.
A community of refugees mainly from Sangin in Helmand, where U.S. forces led an operation against insurgents last year, relies on Aschiana help in a Kabul slum quarter of plastic awnings.
In three decades of war the country's population has doubled to more than 30 million and the dusty mountain capital has swelled to a city of four million, much of it pot-holed and crumbling, with chronic traffic.
"Historically Kabul and Afghanistan have never had this crisis of people not having a ceiling or a roof. They're all poor but at least they had a home," Nadery said.
He says corruption, the subject of an ongoing diplomatic scuffle between Karzai and Washington and a major issue in parliamentary elections this month, makes a bad situation worse.
A United Nations report said in March that entrenched corruption was leaving the poor at the mercy of the powerful while security-obsessed foreign forces turn a blind eye.
"The direct link between poverty and corruption is always there," Nadery said. "Most development projects are halted or don't reach areas where it would affect the life of the poor because of the corruption involved."
[....]
Deprivation and abuse pushes some teenagers to join the insurgents, she says. "The worst was children who the Taliban were forcing to go with them for an amount of money. They were from 7 to 18 years old, with guns and regular training."
[....]
Friday, September 3, 2010
Afghan bank caught in huge ponzi scheme
Historian Juan Cole writes informed and insightful commentary on events in the Middle East, important political developments in the US, and much more, on his award-winning blog, Informed Comment. On today's blog, his first post deals with another case of corruption among friends of President Karzai. (See below.) The focus of the article is on the present crisis of Da Kabul Bank, which is embroiled in financial irregularities, suggesting a ponzi scheme, having a debt of $300 million, and facing a run on the bank by depositors. Cole writes that this corruption "could be catastrophic for the country." He is angered by the thought that so many troops from the US, NATO, and Afghanistan have given their lives for what is a corrupt and illegitimate government and for the rich thieves associated with it.
From our perspective, this is yet more evidence that we are on a fool's errand in Afghanistan, compounded immensely by a US military policy that lurches from one strategy to another and calls for extending the US-led occupation of Afghanistan for years into the future. In the meantime, there are profound costs to US taxpayers, in Afghan and US lives, and to the waning credibility of the US in Central Asia, the Middle East and around the world.
Collapse of Kabul Bank Points to Fatal Corruption of Karzai Government
Posted on September 3, 2010 by Juan Cole at http://juancole.com
I write in anger. Not blind rage, mind you. A cool, searing, steady anger. I think it is a righteous anger. It is not consequential, but it is my reality. I am angry about the 1,172 US troops dead in the Afghanistan War, and all the other brave NATO and Afghan soldiers who gave their lives for a new Afghanistan. Because they haven’t gotten a new Afghanistan. They have paid the ultimate sacrifice for a ponzi scheme masquerading as a reformist government. And, as usual, you and I may well get stuck with the bill for the economic damage done by the fraud.
The house of cards that is the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul may be falling before our eyes, as vast, globe-spanning webs of corruption, formerly hidden in shadows, have suddenly had a spotlight thrown on them. The crisis raises the severest questions about whether the Obama administration can plausibly hope to stand up a stable government in Afghanistan before US troops depart.
As with the second phase of the Great Depression in the United States, the crisis begins with a run on Da Kabul Bank. Depositors took out $85 million on Wednesday, after a damning story appeared in the Washington Post. They took out another $70 million on Thursday. The bank, which owes $300 million, may now have as little as $120 million left in the kitty, though it had once been worth over a billion. But the problem is not just a run on one bank. Can Afghanistan’s whole financial system and economy emerge unscathed?
Pajhwok News Service reports,
‘The immediate concern was that news of the bank’s financial irregularities, already spreading through the capital, would prompt a run on the bank itself and that the panic would spread to other financial institutions. Bank deposits in Afghanistan are not guaranteed by the central government, officials here said. “This could be catastrophic for the country,” a senior Afghan banking official said. “The next few days are critical. I am worried.” ‘
The same world-wide real estate crisis that abruptly revealed the ponzi scheme of Bernie Madoff has undone Da Bank Kabul. But imagine if Madoff had not merely been a criminal who preyed on the wealthy, but had bankrolled a president’s political campaign with his ill-gotten gains and had brought the president’s brother and the brother of the vice-president into his inner circle. And imagine if he had been only one of a handful of financiers in New York with substantial capital.
The story begins with Sherkhan Farnood, a financier who founded Da Kabul Bank after the fall of the Taliban. Over the years he appears to have used the institution for patronage for politicians and their families. Farnood gave millions to the presidential campaign of Hamid Karzai last summer, a campaign that Karzai was accused of only winning through substantial ballot fraud. (Hint: a vote wouldn’t cost much to buy in Afghanistan, and ‘millions’ would buy a lot). The other top executive at the bank, Khalilu’llah Frozi, was a campaign adviser to Karzai. Hamid Karzai’s brother Mahmoud has a 9% share in the bank.
Instead of wiring money overseas, as banks typically do, Farnood used a traditional money-transfer or hawala service, the New Ansari, which is also alleged to have been resorted to by drug smugglers, some of whose proceeds go to the Taliban and other insurgents that kill US troops. Money transferred by hawala cannot be traced electronically. The New Ansari itself is under investigation by US authorities. Persistent news reports suggest that billions of dollars in cash are being flown out of Afghanistan to Dubai, and that, let us say, irregularities are involved.
Farnood often gave out loans without proper collateral or other formalities. He loaned $100 million to Haseen Fahim, the brother of Marshal Mohammad Fahim (an old-time Northern Alliance warlord whom Karzai brought back into government as his vice-presidential running mate in summer of 2009). Haseen Fahim has substantial investments in Afghanistan’s small natural gas sector.
Farnood also apparently loaned himself $140 million to invest in real estate in Dubai, including in villas on the world islands off Jumeirah. These artificial islands made of landfill were to resemble the map of the globe once constructed, and were intended to give the wealthy the opportunity to own an entire faux country. Farnood has been flying out connected people like Mahmoud Karzai and Haseen Fahim and putting them up in the fancy chalets. Afghanistan is the fifth-poorest country in the world, with 36% of the population under the poverty line.
With the world economic downturn and real estate crash of 2008-2009, the Dubai world project largely fell apart, with investors going bankrupt in droves. Indeed, Dubai itself had to be bailed out by its rich sibling Abu Dhabi (which has petroleum; Dubai just has a financial sector). The artificial islands appear from NASA photos to have been abandoned since late 2009 when the own, Nakheel Properties, asked for a delay in repaying $29 billion in debt. Some seem to be sinking back into the lagoon or their boundaries are blurring. Close-up pictures of some of them show an eyesore.
So Farnood’s $140 million investment was suddenly not worth anything at all, and his bank began spiraling down. The details of his other bad investments have not yet emerged. The bank went from having over $1 billion in capital to now having only $120 million and owing $300 million.
President Hamid Karzai is notorious for running interference for his corrupt cronies, and that Farnood and Frozi were out of control appears to have been known for some time but nothing was allowed to be done about it. The two have now been forced out, but the question is whether it is in time to save not only the bank (doubtful) but also the entire Afghan financial system, rebuilt after the fall of the Taliban.
The Karzai government is corrupt and rotten to the core. Not a single US soldier should die to prop it up. The lie that we are fighting “al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan needs to be exposed. The US and NATO are fighting four or five groups of Pashtun insurgents, some of them until fairly recently US allies. The goal of the fighting is to keep the Karzai government from falling to the guerrillas and to train up an army and police force that could go on defending Kabul. The Afghanistan National Army from all accounts has poor morale. No wonder. What Afghan soldier or policeman would die for a ponzi scheme?
NATO should not have allowed Karzai to steal the presidential election. (At least now we have more of an idea how the theft was accomplished). It should not have allowed him to block corruption investigations.
You have to wonder if the Afghanistan parliament is up to impeaching Karzai. One thing is certain. He is part of the problem, not the solution, and as long as he is at the helm, the situation is highly unlikely to get better.
And our troops will go on dying for a vague and probably unattainable goal that the politicians dress up in idealistic flourishes, and worse, dying for a lie.
From our perspective, this is yet more evidence that we are on a fool's errand in Afghanistan, compounded immensely by a US military policy that lurches from one strategy to another and calls for extending the US-led occupation of Afghanistan for years into the future. In the meantime, there are profound costs to US taxpayers, in Afghan and US lives, and to the waning credibility of the US in Central Asia, the Middle East and around the world.
Collapse of Kabul Bank Points to Fatal Corruption of Karzai Government
Posted on September 3, 2010 by Juan Cole at http://juancole.com
I write in anger. Not blind rage, mind you. A cool, searing, steady anger. I think it is a righteous anger. It is not consequential, but it is my reality. I am angry about the 1,172 US troops dead in the Afghanistan War, and all the other brave NATO and Afghan soldiers who gave their lives for a new Afghanistan. Because they haven’t gotten a new Afghanistan. They have paid the ultimate sacrifice for a ponzi scheme masquerading as a reformist government. And, as usual, you and I may well get stuck with the bill for the economic damage done by the fraud.
The house of cards that is the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul may be falling before our eyes, as vast, globe-spanning webs of corruption, formerly hidden in shadows, have suddenly had a spotlight thrown on them. The crisis raises the severest questions about whether the Obama administration can plausibly hope to stand up a stable government in Afghanistan before US troops depart.
As with the second phase of the Great Depression in the United States, the crisis begins with a run on Da Kabul Bank. Depositors took out $85 million on Wednesday, after a damning story appeared in the Washington Post. They took out another $70 million on Thursday. The bank, which owes $300 million, may now have as little as $120 million left in the kitty, though it had once been worth over a billion. But the problem is not just a run on one bank. Can Afghanistan’s whole financial system and economy emerge unscathed?
Pajhwok News Service reports,
‘The immediate concern was that news of the bank’s financial irregularities, already spreading through the capital, would prompt a run on the bank itself and that the panic would spread to other financial institutions. Bank deposits in Afghanistan are not guaranteed by the central government, officials here said. “This could be catastrophic for the country,” a senior Afghan banking official said. “The next few days are critical. I am worried.” ‘
The same world-wide real estate crisis that abruptly revealed the ponzi scheme of Bernie Madoff has undone Da Bank Kabul. But imagine if Madoff had not merely been a criminal who preyed on the wealthy, but had bankrolled a president’s political campaign with his ill-gotten gains and had brought the president’s brother and the brother of the vice-president into his inner circle. And imagine if he had been only one of a handful of financiers in New York with substantial capital.
The story begins with Sherkhan Farnood, a financier who founded Da Kabul Bank after the fall of the Taliban. Over the years he appears to have used the institution for patronage for politicians and their families. Farnood gave millions to the presidential campaign of Hamid Karzai last summer, a campaign that Karzai was accused of only winning through substantial ballot fraud. (Hint: a vote wouldn’t cost much to buy in Afghanistan, and ‘millions’ would buy a lot). The other top executive at the bank, Khalilu’llah Frozi, was a campaign adviser to Karzai. Hamid Karzai’s brother Mahmoud has a 9% share in the bank.
Instead of wiring money overseas, as banks typically do, Farnood used a traditional money-transfer or hawala service, the New Ansari, which is also alleged to have been resorted to by drug smugglers, some of whose proceeds go to the Taliban and other insurgents that kill US troops. Money transferred by hawala cannot be traced electronically. The New Ansari itself is under investigation by US authorities. Persistent news reports suggest that billions of dollars in cash are being flown out of Afghanistan to Dubai, and that, let us say, irregularities are involved.
Farnood often gave out loans without proper collateral or other formalities. He loaned $100 million to Haseen Fahim, the brother of Marshal Mohammad Fahim (an old-time Northern Alliance warlord whom Karzai brought back into government as his vice-presidential running mate in summer of 2009). Haseen Fahim has substantial investments in Afghanistan’s small natural gas sector.
Farnood also apparently loaned himself $140 million to invest in real estate in Dubai, including in villas on the world islands off Jumeirah. These artificial islands made of landfill were to resemble the map of the globe once constructed, and were intended to give the wealthy the opportunity to own an entire faux country. Farnood has been flying out connected people like Mahmoud Karzai and Haseen Fahim and putting them up in the fancy chalets. Afghanistan is the fifth-poorest country in the world, with 36% of the population under the poverty line.
With the world economic downturn and real estate crash of 2008-2009, the Dubai world project largely fell apart, with investors going bankrupt in droves. Indeed, Dubai itself had to be bailed out by its rich sibling Abu Dhabi (which has petroleum; Dubai just has a financial sector). The artificial islands appear from NASA photos to have been abandoned since late 2009 when the own, Nakheel Properties, asked for a delay in repaying $29 billion in debt. Some seem to be sinking back into the lagoon or their boundaries are blurring. Close-up pictures of some of them show an eyesore.
So Farnood’s $140 million investment was suddenly not worth anything at all, and his bank began spiraling down. The details of his other bad investments have not yet emerged. The bank went from having over $1 billion in capital to now having only $120 million and owing $300 million.
President Hamid Karzai is notorious for running interference for his corrupt cronies, and that Farnood and Frozi were out of control appears to have been known for some time but nothing was allowed to be done about it. The two have now been forced out, but the question is whether it is in time to save not only the bank (doubtful) but also the entire Afghan financial system, rebuilt after the fall of the Taliban.
The Karzai government is corrupt and rotten to the core. Not a single US soldier should die to prop it up. The lie that we are fighting “al-Qaeda” in Afghanistan needs to be exposed. The US and NATO are fighting four or five groups of Pashtun insurgents, some of them until fairly recently US allies. The goal of the fighting is to keep the Karzai government from falling to the guerrillas and to train up an army and police force that could go on defending Kabul. The Afghanistan National Army from all accounts has poor morale. No wonder. What Afghan soldier or policeman would die for a ponzi scheme?
NATO should not have allowed Karzai to steal the presidential election. (At least now we have more of an idea how the theft was accomplished). It should not have allowed him to block corruption investigations.
You have to wonder if the Afghanistan parliament is up to impeaching Karzai. One thing is certain. He is part of the problem, not the solution, and as long as he is at the helm, the situation is highly unlikely to get better.
And our troops will go on dying for a vague and probably unattainable goal that the politicians dress up in idealistic flourishes, and worse, dying for a lie.
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