This post focuses on excerpts from one of two classified cables sent by US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Gen. Eikenberry, to the Secretary of State in November, 2009. The cables were leaked that month and published in the New York Times shortly thereafter. You can see the original cables in their entirety at: http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan#document/p1 The text of the cables is now available and/or commented on at numerous Internet sites. The cables have thus become a part of the public record, whatever their original status.
On the Democracy Now program yesterday (3-30-10), Daniel Ellsberg was interviewed. He is the citizen, then employed at the RAND Corporation with access to classified materials, who leaked the classified Pentagon Papers to the public during the Vietnam War. During the DN interview, Ellsberg drew parallels between the Pentagon Papers and the Eichenberry cables and discussed the implications and the need to have transparent public discussions on matters of importance to the American citizenry.
New York Time journalists Elisabeth Bumiller and Mark Landler provide some background and context for understanding the implications of the Eikenberry cables in their article, "US Envoy Urges Caution on Forces for Afghanistan," Nov. 11. 2009. You can find the article at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/us/politics/12policy.html_r=2.
In the first of the two cables, Amb. Eikenberry offers his views on why President Obama should not send additional US troops to Afghanistan, or "surge" the number of troops going there. We here at stopafghanwar are in accord with Eikenberry's position, as far as it goes. We would also support a firm timetable for the withdrawal of US troops from the country.
Amb. Eikenberry later modified his views, at least publicly at congressional hearings, and did not then demur from the surge-of-troops policy.
Bob
-----------------------------
First Eikenberry cable: (excerpts follow)
....Here are my reasons for this assessment:
1) President Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner. The proposed counterinsurgency strategy assumes an Afghan political leadership that is both able to take responsibiltiy and to exert sovereignty in the furtherance of our goal—a secure, peaceful, minimally self-sufficient Afghanistan hardened against transnational groups. Yet Karzai continues to shun responssibiliy for any sovereign burden, whether defense, governance, or development. He and much of his circle do not want the U.S. to leave and are only too happy to see us invest futher. They assume we covet their territory for a never-ending “war on terror” and for military bases to use against surrounding powers....
2) We overestimate the ability of Afghan security forces to take over. Success of the proposed counterinsurgency strategy hinges upon Afghan forces steadily assuming responsibility for security and fully taking over this duty by 2013....The Army’s high attrition and low recruitment rates for Pashtuns in the south are crippling. Simply keeping the force at current levels requires tens of thousands of new recruits every year to replace attrition losses and battlefield casualties; those requirements would steepen dramatically under the proposed strategy. Building an effective Afghan National Police, which is in many ways more crucial to extend the Afghan government’s reach into villages and districts will prove even tougher. The Police receive lower benefits and face higher risks in many places than the Army....
3) We underestimate how long it will take to restore or establish civilian government. The proposed strategy assumes that once the clearing and holding process has been accomplished in a given area, the rebuilding and tranferring to Afghans can proceed apace followed by a relatively rapid U.S. withdrawal. In reality, the process of restoring Afghan government is likely to be slow and uneven, no matter how many U.S. and other foreign civilian experts are involved. Many areas need not just security but healthcare, education, justice, infrastructure, and almost every other basic government function. Many have never had these services at all. Establishing them requires trained and honest Afghan officials to replace our own personnel. That cadre of Afghan civilians does not now exist and would take years to build....
5) The proposed strategy may not be cost-effective. Sending additional combat brigades will require tens of billions of dollars annually for years to come, costs not detailed in DOD [Department of Defense] charts....
– In particular, we should weigh whether a relatively small additional investment in programs for development and governance would yield results that, if not as visible as those from sending more troops, would move us closer to achieving our goals at far lesser cost and risk, both in lives and dollars. Accelerating our work on signature projects to deliver greater access to electricity, water, and education could have a high payoff in stability over the long term. With a greatly stepped-up development effort we can could be in a position at some point to call off further troop deployments, as Afghans begin to see their lives improving and their needs addressed....
Respectfully,EIKENBERY
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment