US efforts to build a Taliban army and counterforce are questionable

The part of the US strategy in Afghanistan that concerns counterinsurgency implies a number of tactics. One is to clear out the Taliban from villages and surrounding areas, village by village. Two is to secure them so that the Taliban cannot return to the villages. Three is start reconstruction projects, which will create jobs and generate demand for local businesses.

US forces do not have the resources to advance this counterinsurgency policy very far, or in a sustainable way. Therefore, the Obama administration is betting that, in time, there will be an Afghan army capable of dealing with the Taliban. There seem to be two plans for doing this.

The first, and dominant, plan is to build up the Afghan army so that its soldiers can take responsibility for the counterinsurgency efforts in the countryside. The article below indicates that there is little progress in creating a viable Afghan army.

The second plan, just being reported in various sources, is to pay rank-and-file members of the Taliban who pledge to leave the insurgency. Underlying this strategy is the assumption that many young Afghan men have been members of the Taliban for economic reasons. The Taliban pay their rank-and-file recruites monthly wages, while there are few or no opportunities beyond the Taliban. The US now plans to offer these men a wage and job to leave the Taliban.

This plan has been addressed in an early blog and raises the issues of how long the US will have to go on paying the Afghans, whether the jobs they will be given are of value to the villages and surrounding areas, and whether the recruits will be able or willing to secure these places from Taliban incursions. We don't see much merit in this approach, unless the elders or other leaders in the villages can be included in the process and be convinced that the plan is in the interest of their tribes.

Bob

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Juan Cole, Informed Comment, January 28, 2010
Cole's comments and references on the parts of Obama speech that focus on Afghanistan

Understandably, President Obama concentrated on domestic issues, especially job creation, in his State of the Union address. But there were a few paragraphs toward the end about foreign affairs that I want to talk about. While I thought the speech generally strong, and the flash polls suggest that the public did, as well, I felt that there were significant problems with the foreign policy passages that signal trouble ahead.

' In Afghanistan, we are increasing our troops and training Afghan Security Forces so they can begin to take the lead in July of 2011, and our troops can begin to come home. We will reward good governance, reduce corruption, and support the rights of all Afghans – men and women alike. We are joined by allies and partners who have increased their own commitment, and who will come together tomorrow in London to reaffirm our common purpose. There will be difficult days ahead. But I am confident we will succeed.'

This passage was one of the few lauded by Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell in the Republican response. But it is among the weaker parts of the speech.

1. Reserve Col. Lawrence Sellin, a Ph.D. and a veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, summarized the problems with training the Afghan army:

a. The US has already spent more than $17 bn. since 2001 building the Afghanistan National Army, but without much success.

b. Although the government of President Hamid Karzai claims that the army numbers 100,000 now, in fact some battalions are at half strength and not combat ready. The chance that the ANA can be expanded to 240,000 effective soldiers for another $16 bn. in a year or two is slim to none.

c. If a new Afghan army can be built at all, it will take at least 4 years, and it is not plausible that US troops will withdraw beginning in 2011. Moreover, Memos of US ambassador Karl Eikenberry in Kabul insist that President Hamid Karzai is unreliable and refuses to try to take command of the country, so that he is not deploying the army he already has. The profound divisions within the Obama camp, among the most experienced Afghan hands, make it anything but certain that the counter-insurgency strategy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, to which Obama committed himself, can succeed.

d. Veteran NBC war correspondent Richard Engel maintains that staff officers work short hours and are corrupt. Only some of the small companies of troops deployed in the countryside can effectively be said to be at war. Even these are 90% illiterate, and some have received only 2 weeks of 'show and tell' training. Drug use is rampant among troops, and some 25 percent go AWOL. See Engle on the Rachel Maddow show:

Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economyAs is often the case, in this paragraph Obama was attempting to please both right and left, with a troop escalation advertised as a mere prelude to withdrawal. But the task, of training an effective 240,000-man AFghanistan National Army is an enormous one and cannot be even partially completed by summer 2011.