Where do ordinary Afghan citizens fit in the future of the US/NATO occupation

The US/NATO strategy in Afghanistan is based mostly on some mixture of counter-terrorism (killing Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan) and counter-insurgency (forcing insurgents out of targeted areas and winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan residents). Nir Rosen and Marika Theros refer to evidence of the failure of the strategy up to now. (You can access the full article at http://www.commondreans.org/view/2011/01/18-8.) I’ll identify some of their central points with quotes from their article and few statements.

First, Rosen and Marika challenge Obama’s recent cautious but upbeat annual review of purported military progress and improved Afghan security in 2010. Their cogent summary doesn’t support Obama’s views.

“The year 2010 witnessed a significant spike in violence both in the south, with offensive military operations triggering greater Taliban intimidation [2] and assassinations of civilians, and in the north [3] in heretofore ‘stable areas’ where international neglect and government abuse provide fertile ground for insurgent expansion. Real progress has been further complicated by the increasingly poisonous relationship between the Afghan government, the international community, and the Afghan people, aggravated by a potentially catastrophic electoral crisis [4], even more predatory government corruption and brazen war-profiteering [5], and near total disregard for the average Afghan citizen. As American and NATO forces enter their tenth year in Afghanistan, Afghan communities find themselves increasingly caught in a complex system of violence generated by insurgents, criminal gangs, drug lords, corrupt officials, US-allied local strongmen, and aggressive international forces.”

Second, the US military strategy during 2010 resulted in continuing and extensive damage to the Afghan population, property, and environment. They write:
“In Kandahar, the US is bombarding populated areas with smart rocket launchers and guided warheads, razing orchards, destroying homes, and partnering with people like the brutal commander [8] Colonel Abdul Razik and his militia. This increase in offensive operations, night raids, drone attacks, and use of irregular local forces remain precisely the tactics that provoke civilian outrage [9] even as they increase Taliban losses. Even more problematic, the international community never developed a complementary and much-needed political strategy that reinforces Afghan national unity and builds trust between state and society through genuine political reform and reconciliation at all levels of society.”

Third, Rosen and Marika provide evidence on the views of ordinary Afghan cities, focusing on their own experiences and future prospects. The evidence comes from a study sponsored in 2009 by LSE Global Governance at the London School of Economics and the Civil Society Development Center in Afghanistan. Rosen and Marika

“engaged a range of selected Afghan citizens - community, religious, and tribal leaders; NGO and community activists; teachers and educators; and, students and youth leaders – in seven regions to capture their experiences of insecurity and their views on how to secure Afghanistan’s future, including the provinces of Balkh, Baghlan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, and Nangarhar.” They identify three themes from the first rounds of interviews.

“ Firstly, the Taliban movement is a symptom of larger ills, and the continued focus on defeating them obscures the fact that the post-2001 political and economic order the international community helped create is the fundamental driver of instability, violence, and recruitment into the insurgency. Secondly, the current strategy with its near exclusive focus on government and armed actors as partners in the war effort perpetuates a system of personalized politics, power-grabbing and profiteering that fosters insecurity, corrupts Afghan society, and prevents the emergence of alternative political forces…. [while continuing] more as a mutual business enterprise in which belligerents – the political and economic elites, the internationals, and the insurgents – use insecurity as a cover for personal political and economic ambitions. They point to the massive amounts of international aid underwriting a perverse political economy that has created a nexus of financial interests between corrupt government officials, warlords, international contractors, and even the Taliban….”

“Finally… most Afghans want a rational outcome that produces a participatory system of governance rooted in Afghan values and able to provide minimally adequate services of justice, health, and education. Most Afghans do not challenge the existence of the state itself and support a unified Afghanistan…. In assessing the current struggle, Afghans look to progress on questions of justice, representation and allocation of resources rather than to kill-and-capture rates or announcements of new programmes in Kandahar or Helmand that link the populace to the government.”

In short, the situation in Afghanistan remains mired in conflict, corruption, destruction, and extensive human casualties and death. A major part of the problem is that the US and its allies are out-of-touch with or are misreading the views of ordinary Afghan citizens. Rosen and Marika believe that the situation can be ameliorated, though “not all of it can be undone.” Nonetheless, they can imagine policies that would be in the interests of the broad range of Afghan citizens they have interviewed.

First, with respect to the international aid coming into the country, the interviewees say that it must be better targeted, designed, and overseen, as well as making sure “that aid produces tangible results on the ground.”

Second, the international community could use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to “crack down on corruption.” And, further, the “US Government should seriously consider prosecuting those Afghan-Americans who have participated in corrupt practices.”

Third, “the international community – particularly the US – must do more than pay lip service to a political solution and de-escalate the conflict….This requires more emphasis on issues of governance, justice, and representation; a reconsideration of the exclusive partnerships developed with the pro-government local strongmen; a genuine effort to defend the Afghan population from predatory political and economic elites (and not only insurgents); and, increased checks on impunity and marginalization.”

Unfortunately, there is little in US history that would justify much hope in seeing US foreign and military policies transformed in ways to give humanitarian and democratic values priority over the interests of those in the US who dominate the economic and political systems. It’s not out of the question, though there is no recent precedent. We’ll see. It depends in part on how the following questions are answered. Will we witness the Obama administration and the US Congress reduce the allocation of money and resources to the US military in Afghanistan? Will there be a withdrawal of a large number of troops over the course of the year? Will the US and her allies, along with other concerned nations and the UN, find ways to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan that are consistent with the views of the majority of the Afghan people?

Iran joins international effort to advance a non-military solution in Afghanistan

I found the following article on the BBC website: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11568799 If it is confirmed, the efforts to draw the UN, UE and states from the region around Afghanistan into a discussion of how to resolve the war in this war-beaten country through negotiations are moving ahead. According to the report, Iran is now joining the effort. It's likely that US officials did not initiate the invitation. On first reading about this non-military development, the news is good for those of us who have opposed the war and occupation and supported a full and honest withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan all along.

The article from BBC

Iran joins US for meeting on Afghanistan's future

Iran sent its special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Ghanazadeh
Iran has for the first time taken part in high-level discussions on Afghanistan after the US said it had "no problem" with its participation.

An Iranian representative joined the international "contact group" - which brings together the Afghan government, dozens of countries, Nato, the EU and UN - for the talks in Rome.

It comes amid a renewed push to end the bloody nine-year Afghan conflict.

One senior US diplomat said Iran had "a role to play" in tackling the problems.

"We recognise that Iran, with its long, almost completely open border with Afghanistan and with a huge drug problem... has a role to play in the peaceful settlement of this situation in Afghanistan," Richard Holbrooke - the US special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan - told a news conference.

"So for the United States there is no problem with their presence."

He said discussions would not be affected by the "bilateral issues" of Iran's nuclear programme, which Iran says is for purely civilian purposes but the US insists is a cover for creating atomic weapons.

Iran sent its special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Ghanazadeh, reported Associated Press.'Realistic aim'

The "contact group" also invited the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), which represents more than 50 states and promotes Muslim solidarity, to attend.

AFP news agency reported Michael Steiner, Germany's special envoy and chairman of the meeting, saying that the talks were aimed at moving towards "a realistic aim, which is sufficient stability for Afghanistan and essential human rights".

On the agenda was how to increase the handing over of responsibility for security to Afghan forces and the possibility of bringing insurgents - including the Taliban - into peace negotiations.
These issues will be further explored at a Nato summit in Lisbon next month. But Mr Holbrooke said there would be no specific announcement of provinces that would be handed over to Afghan forces at the meeting.

"We're not going to lay out specific process," he said. "We're going to talk about the transition process in general."

How to foster economic development in a post-war Afghanistan

David Waldman and Phyllis Bennis have written a highly useful book for those interested in getting a basic and comprehensive understanding of the Afghanistan war, from why it has been seen as a “good war” by US leaders, media, and many in the general public, to “what will it take to change US policy in Afghanistan so that US military forces will be soon withdrawn. The title: Ending the US War in Afghanistan: A Primer. The book is organized around informative and thought-provoking answers to 35 questions, organized into six topics or “parts.”

The thirty-third question is: “What would a responsible plan to end the US war in Afghanistan look like?” Waldman and Bennis want the war and occupation to end and US troops brought home, but this, for them, is not the end of US obligations. They write: “…it was true in Iraq and is equally true in Afghanistan that the US debt to the people of those beleaguered countries is far greater than just getting the troops out.” They continue: “After years of war, abandonment to brutal US-armed warlords, invasion, occupation, more war – the US owes a huge debt to the Afghan people. Pulling out the troops is only step one” (179). It is here that they specify eleven potential provisions of a “responsible plan.”

Their proposals amount to “good ideas” that might serve to give US readers of the book and others a notion of what it will take to bring post-US-led-war Afghanistan and its people back to some minimal but meaningfully satisfactory economic level of development.

One thing that stands out in their sketch of a “plan” is that it will take the cooperation and support of many regional governments and the [financially strapped] UN to pull it off. If such collaboration was ever to be achieved, it would mark a stunning and unprecedented historic event in Afghanistan and this region of the world - or just about anywhere. Nonetheless, good ideas are better than no ideas or bad ideas. Waldman and Bennis get us thinking of possible alternatives to the ongoing hapless and destructive policies of the Bush-Obama administrations and the military chiefs.

Here are the proposals.

First, they write that it is of utmost importance to recognize that the war is counterproductive, as US and allied troops kill Afghan civilians and thereby increasing support for insurgents. It's vicious cycle.

Second, “Immediately end troop escalation and all combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan…halt drone attacks…in Pakistan; close all US military bases…begin the full withdrawal of all US troops….”

Third, “remove all humanitarian, development, infrastructure, or other assistance programs and personnel from control [by the US, or Afghan] military.”

Fourth, “close Bagram Airbase prison” and help the Afghan government to develop cash, job training, and jobs programs for former detainees.

Fifth, develop a multifaceted program for Afghan refugees, including “financial assistance for returning refugees to Afghanistan and assistance to main refugee centers (Iran, Pakistan); accept more refuges into US.”

Sixth, cease “all anti-poppy fumigation programs; invest significant funds in infrastructure and financial assistance for alternative crop cultivation.”

Seventh, foster “and support…ceasefire, reconciliation, and negotiation processes involving all parties including Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan….”

Eighth, confront the widespread “corruption and illegitimacy in the US-backed government” by stopping “uncritical political and financial backing.”

Ninth, distribute small-scale financial assistance “to local, regional, tribal and other leaders for job creation, aiming particularly at reaching and recruiting young unemployed men who are vulnerable to militias offering pay….”

Tenth, facilitate or support – not control – of “separate negotiations including all neighboring countries, with leadership of UN, the Organization of Islamic Conference )OIC), the Shanghai Cooperation Alliance (which groups China, Russia, and five resource-rich Central Asian states, [and] other regional organizations. The negotiations should “exclude NATO, CSTO, and other military alliances.”

Eleventh, and finally, shift “the majority of Afghanistan military budgets [much of it from US assistance?] into UN and regional funds for Afghan-chosen, Afghan-planned, and Afghan-implemented construction and reconstruction….”

The case for withdrawal from Afghanistan

Nick Turse is the editor of a new book on the US-led Afghanistan war/occupation, the title of which is The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Turse “is an award-winning journalist, historian, essayist, and the associate editor of the Nation Institute’s TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The Complex and has written “for the Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Nation, Le Monde Diplomatique, In These Times and the Village Voice.”

The Case for Withdrawal includes an introduction by Turse, followed by 22 articles written by “leading commentators, politicians, and military strategists.” The articles are organized into four “parts”: “The Wars for Afghanistan”; Incompetence, Corruption, and the War on Women”; “Facts on the Ground”; and “The Case for Withdrawal.” While there are some differences among the contributing authors, they all agree, “some tacitly, some explicitly,” that there is a need to build “a solid case for a foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan” and to make Americans cognizant of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan as a serious option (xviii).

In this post, I want to outline major points from the book’s concluding article, “How to Get Out,” by Robert Dreyfuss. Of the authors included in this collection, Dreyfuss offers the most comprehensive view, in broad outline of how the goal of withdrawing US and NATO troops can be achieved without leaving the country even worse off than it is. His proposals identify major challenges and make logical sense. At the same time, they seem highly idealistic and politically improbable both with respect to US domestic politics and in relevant international relations. There is also some confusion on the role that the UN will play. In the end, the US military involvement in Afghanistan may be more like the end of the Vietnam War.
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First, Dreyfuss joins a host of other critics and contends that the Karzai government is an obstacle to real change. He writes: “The corrupt government of President Karzai and his cronies is no long sustainable, whether or not there is a second round the fraud-marred election” [and this is true as well regarding the election that was just held].

Dreyfuss then offers his views on (1) creating a new government structure, (2) the US government as a facilitator in the transition to a new Afghan government and (3) in seeking international and regional support to buttress a new government, and (4) the need for the withdrawal of US/NATO troops.

#1 – “A new government in Kabul must emerge, in the process accommodating Pashtun nationalists, the Taliban, and other insurgents,” including as well “tribal and ethnic leaders, various warlords, and representatives of Afghanistan’s myriad political factions.” The national accord that results from this process “will probably not be a strong central government but rather a decentralized federal system, in which provinces and districts retain a significant degree of autonomy.”

“To secure international support, the United States must defer to the United Nations to convene a conference in which Afghans themselves hammer out the new way forward.”

#2 – The US government as a facilitator.

“…the president [Obama] should encourage the convening of an international Bonn II conference involving the UN, the major world powers, and Afghanistan’s neighbors – including Iran, India, and Pakistan – to support the renegotiation of the Afghanistan compact….

“In advance of that, the United States should join other nations and the UN to persuade President Karzai, his main electoral opponents, and other Afghan politicians to form a coalition that would create an interim caretaker regime until the establishment of a more broadly based government.”

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are key parts of the problem “[T]he Afghan Taliban are” in effect “a branch of Pakistan’s army and its intelligence service.” Saudi Arabia channels large sums of money to insurgent groups. Therefore, “Obama must strongly encourage Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to bring key elements of the three interlinked insurgency movements – the Taliban, the Hezb-i-Islami ofGulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Haqqani network to the bargaining table….China, Pakistan’s ally, which has a vital interest in Central America, should be willing to use its influence in Pakistan to make sure Islamabad and Rawalpindi are on board.”

“…Obama will have to work to get Iran, India, and Russia to help persuade the remnants of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (most Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras) to make room in Kabul for an enlarged Pashtun role, including the Taliban, in which could become a stable power-sharing arrangement.”

#3 – International support - “The world community must pledge its support of Afghanistan financially for years to come.”

#4 – These steps must be accompanied by “an unconditional withdrawal of US and NATO forces” and the recognition that a military victory in Afghanistan is not feasible.

In addition, “the Obama administration will have to give up its massive nation-building project, dismantling the empire of US departments, agencies, provincial reconstruction teams, and the rest….”

“With the agreement of the Afghan government, a limited US intelligence and counterterrorism mission designed to monitor the remnants of al Qaeda can remain in Afghanistan.”