There are mixed results over the last two weeks, including the first days of the new year, regarding the US-dominated/NATO occupation and war in Afghanistan. There is some good news, but, sadly, the bad news remains greatly ascendant.
First the good news. Jason Ditz reports on Antiwar.com (12/30/10) that the newest CNN/Opinion Research poll finds that “63 percent of the American public opposed to the war, the largest opposition yet from the regular poll.” Another question posed by the pollsters finds that “56 percent of Americans believe the war is going either ‘moderately badly’ or ‘very badly.” Ditz notes that this poll was taken after the president’s December 16 speech on Afghanistan, indicating that Obama’s upbeat message did not resonate well with most of the American public.
While such poll findings may be momentarily uplifting for those of us who have opposed the U.S. invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from the beginning, going back to 2001 or even before, public opinion does not much affect US Afghan policies. A positive note is that such polls may reflect a growing awareness among an increasing number of Americans that the war is too costly financially and much too injurious (or lethal) for American troops and their families. One implication is that there is a growing sentiment that we need to direct our attention to the serious domestic problems in America of unemployment and underemployment, the continuing housing crisis, a pressing need to channel more support to public education through college, the overall debt-ridden American government, economy, and society, research and technology on green energy, and so forth. On this score, Tom Engelhardt comments in one of the paragraphs from his much longer article on Antiwar.com, “The Urge to Surge,” January 4, 2011:
"The U.S. economy looks increasingly sclerotic; moneys for an aging and rotting infrastructure are long gone; state and city governments are laying off teachers, police, even firefighters; Americans are unemployed in near record numbers; global oil prices (for a country that has in no way begun to wean itself from its dependence on foreign oil) are ominously on the rise; and yet taxpayer money continues to pour into the military and into our foreign wars. It has recently been estimated, for instance, that after spending $11.6 billion in 2011 on the training, supply, and support of the Afghan army and police, the U.S. will continue to spend an average of $6.2 billion a year at least through 2015 (and undoubtedly into an unknown future) – and that’s but one expense in the estimated $120 billion to $160 billion a year being spent at present on the Afghan War, what can only be described as part of America’s war stimulus package abroad." (http://original/antiwar.com/engelhardt/2011/01/04/the-urge-to-surge-4)
However, the increasingly plutocratic nature of the US political system, the power of the military-industrial complex, the foreign policy based on force as always a viable, if not preferred, option, the continuing and increasing dependence on foreign oil - all represent some of the dominant influences with respect to foreign policy generally and to Afghanistan specifically. Public opinion appears little more than a passing annoyance to the decision-makers, especially when there is yet no strong anti-Afghan war movement.
Among the other bad news items, Jason Ditz’s Antiwar.com column on January 6, 2011 offers the following example, reporting that “Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has approved yet another escalation of the war in Afghanistan, this time approving another 1,400 Marines who are expected to be sent to Afghanistan within a matter of weeks.”
How many US troops are already in Afghanistan? According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), there were 90,000 US troops in Afghanistan near the end of 2010, along with 39,215 troops with allied countries, ranging from no troops from Jordan and Tonga to 9,500 troops from the UK. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placeats/14DEC%202010%20Placemat.pdf
Other reports have indicated the US troop level closer to 100,000. With the additional 1,400 US troops, the total number now rises to 91,400 or to above 100,000.
The numbers don’t end there. There are an unknown number of CIA operatives and US Special Forces, plus US-connected contractors. Further, according to Wikipedia, there were in 2010 138,200 Afghan National Army troops and 120,500 Afghan National Police officers. There are regular reports that indicate many of the Afghan troops and police officers are not well trained, not reliable, and/or infiltrated by people who are sympathetic to the Taliban.
Despite the growing number of US and other troops and police in Afghanistan, the situation there appears to be getting worse. The Dailykos.com website quotes from Agence France-Presse, December 27, 2010, on two confidential UN maps showing “a clear deterioration in security in parts of Afghanistan.” Quoting Kieran Dwyer, “communications director of the UN mission in Afghanistan, “There are parts of the country that have become increasingly difficult to operate in during 2010 due to insecurity.” The article notes further, “Violence in the north has steadily worsened over the last two years despite the Taliban insurgency having its powerbase in the south.” (http://www.kailykos.com/story/2010/12/28/931769/-Open-thread-for-night-owls:-Insecurity-rises-in-Afghanistan
Juan Cole identifies the “top ten myths about Afghanistan,” including this one on the deteriorating security environment in the country. (“Top Ten Myths About Afghanistan,” Informed Comment, December 27, 2010.) First the myth, then the fact.
Myth: “There has been significant progress in tamping down the insurgency in Afghanistan.”
Fact: A recent National Intelligence Estimate by 16 intelligence agencies found no progress. It warned that large swathes of the country were at risk of falling to the Taliban and that they still had safe havens in Pakistan, with the Pakistani government complicit. The UN says there were over 6000 civilian casualties of war in Afghanistan in the first 10 months of 2010, a 20% increase over the same period in 2009. Also, 701 US and NATO troops have been killed this year, compared to 521 last year, a 25% increase. There were typically over 1000 insurgent attacks per month in Afghanistan this year, often twice as many per month as in 2009, recalling the guerrilla war in Iraq in 2005.
US Afghanistan policy has a pronounced surreal quality about it. Tom Engelhardt captures some of this when he compares the recent surge in US troops to how Soviet generals were thinking back in the 1980s about the future progress of their occupation. Both the Soviet generals and the US decision-makers are caught up in pipedreams, though with lots of destructive consequences. Engelhardt writes:
“As 2011 begins, what could be eerier than reading secret Soviet documents from the USSR’s Afghan debacle of the 1980s? It gives you chills to run across Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at a Politburo meeting in October 1985, almost six years after Soviet troops first flooded into Afghanistan, reading letters aloud to his colleagues from embittered Soviet citizens (‘The Politburo had made a mistake and must correct it as soon as possible – every day precious lives are lost’); or, in November 1986, insisting to those same colleagues that the Afghan war must be ended in a year, ‘at maximum, two.’ Yet, with the gut-wrenching sureness history offers, you can’t help but know that, even two years later, even with a strong desire to leave (which has yet to surface among the Washington elite a decade into our own Afghan adventure), imperial pride and fear of loss of ‘credibility’ would keep the Soviets fighting on to 1989.” (http://original/antiwar.com/engelhardt/2011/01/04/the-urge-to-surge-4)
Showing posts with label coalition forces. Show all posts
Showing posts with label coalition forces. Show all posts
Saturday, January 8, 2011
Sunday, April 18, 2010
Kandahar residents skeptical US-led assault will improve their security
The following article appeared today on the website of Progressive Democrats for America,
http://pdamerica.org/articles/news/2010-04-18-04-47-07-news.php. The title of the article is "Army Researchers: Why the Kandahar Offensive Could Backfire." The article includes highlights from a recent Army study, along with other evidence, indicating there are serious questions about the effectiveness of the planned military assualt on Kandahar and surrounding areas.
--------------------------
The southern Afghan province of Kandahar trusts the Taliban more than the government. And that’s according to a survey commissioned by the U.S. Army.
Kandahar is expected to be the focal point of operations for U.S. and NATO troops this summer, but a poll recently conducted by the Army’s controversial social science program, the Human Terrain System (HTS), is warning that rampant local corruption, and a lack of security, could undermine coalition efforts to win the support of the local population.
Among other things, the survey’s authors warned that a lack of confidence in the Afghan government “sets conditions for a disenfranchised population to respond either by not supporting the government due to its inability to deliver improvements in the quality of life or, worse yet, by supporting the Taliban.”
The unclassified report (.pdf) is worth examining for several reasons. For starters, it addresses many of the questions raised by Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, the top U.S. intelligence officer in Afghanistan. In an assessment made public earlier this year, Flynn complained that the coalition lacked a real understanding of the cultural context of the insurgency, and said troops needed richer information about the communities they were trying to engage.
That’s where HTS is supposed to come in. Originally, the program was focused on embedding social scientists and anthropologists within brigades. But as several people close to the program tell Danger Room, there is now an emphasis on larger-scale polls run by local contractors as a way to obtain a larger picture of the situation.
Both polling and embedding researchers have their risks, and their shortcomings: Two HTS social scientists have been killed in Afghanistan, but conducting surveys, even through local companies, can also be perilous. The survey draws on a total of 1,994 interviews covering nine of Kandahar Province’s 16 districts. But it leaves out seven crucial districts: As the survey’s authors note, there are “inherent dangers associated with conducting surveys in a conflict zone” like Kandahar Province, and interviewers stayed out of areas with active violence.
In other words, the survey leaves out the populations that most need to be understood, at least from the coalition’s perspective. Still, the results are telling. Interviewers queried residents of Kandahar on everything from quality of services like clean water, electricity to the availability of primary schooling for girls and boys and medical care. They also asked local residents about security government effectiveness.
Among the findings: Security on the roads is a major issue for residents of Kandahar. “When respondents are asked if they feel unsafe traveling within their district or around the province, in eight out of ten districts, at least half say they are unsafe,” the study says. And the biggest threat to security while traveling in the province, respondents said: Army and police checkpoints.
Likewise, attitudes in the south are generally sympathetic to the Taliban. Reconciliation with the insurgency is a popular concept in the province, and a significant majority of respondents viewed Taliban as “our Afghan brothers.” Some 84 percent cited “corruption” as the main reason for the conflict. But most of that corruption in on the government side: 53 percent said the Taliban cannot be corrupted.
Finally, there’s a significant amount of skepticism about the local police and security forces. “The primary reason respondents in Kandahar consider joining the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] is the desire for a job and a paycheck,” the study says. “Respondents are deterred from considering a career in the ANSF because of the dangers. Across all districts, the ANP [Afghan National Police] is viewed as a more dangerous profession than the ANA [Afghan National Army].”
http://pdamerica.org/articles/news/2010-04-18-04-47-07-news.php. The title of the article is "Army Researchers: Why the Kandahar Offensive Could Backfire." The article includes highlights from a recent Army study, along with other evidence, indicating there are serious questions about the effectiveness of the planned military assualt on Kandahar and surrounding areas.
--------------------------
The southern Afghan province of Kandahar trusts the Taliban more than the government. And that’s according to a survey commissioned by the U.S. Army.
Kandahar is expected to be the focal point of operations for U.S. and NATO troops this summer, but a poll recently conducted by the Army’s controversial social science program, the Human Terrain System (HTS), is warning that rampant local corruption, and a lack of security, could undermine coalition efforts to win the support of the local population.
Among other things, the survey’s authors warned that a lack of confidence in the Afghan government “sets conditions for a disenfranchised population to respond either by not supporting the government due to its inability to deliver improvements in the quality of life or, worse yet, by supporting the Taliban.”
The unclassified report (.pdf) is worth examining for several reasons. For starters, it addresses many of the questions raised by Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, the top U.S. intelligence officer in Afghanistan. In an assessment made public earlier this year, Flynn complained that the coalition lacked a real understanding of the cultural context of the insurgency, and said troops needed richer information about the communities they were trying to engage.
That’s where HTS is supposed to come in. Originally, the program was focused on embedding social scientists and anthropologists within brigades. But as several people close to the program tell Danger Room, there is now an emphasis on larger-scale polls run by local contractors as a way to obtain a larger picture of the situation.
Both polling and embedding researchers have their risks, and their shortcomings: Two HTS social scientists have been killed in Afghanistan, but conducting surveys, even through local companies, can also be perilous. The survey draws on a total of 1,994 interviews covering nine of Kandahar Province’s 16 districts. But it leaves out seven crucial districts: As the survey’s authors note, there are “inherent dangers associated with conducting surveys in a conflict zone” like Kandahar Province, and interviewers stayed out of areas with active violence.
In other words, the survey leaves out the populations that most need to be understood, at least from the coalition’s perspective. Still, the results are telling. Interviewers queried residents of Kandahar on everything from quality of services like clean water, electricity to the availability of primary schooling for girls and boys and medical care. They also asked local residents about security government effectiveness.
Among the findings: Security on the roads is a major issue for residents of Kandahar. “When respondents are asked if they feel unsafe traveling within their district or around the province, in eight out of ten districts, at least half say they are unsafe,” the study says. And the biggest threat to security while traveling in the province, respondents said: Army and police checkpoints.
Likewise, attitudes in the south are generally sympathetic to the Taliban. Reconciliation with the insurgency is a popular concept in the province, and a significant majority of respondents viewed Taliban as “our Afghan brothers.” Some 84 percent cited “corruption” as the main reason for the conflict. But most of that corruption in on the government side: 53 percent said the Taliban cannot be corrupted.
Finally, there’s a significant amount of skepticism about the local police and security forces. “The primary reason respondents in Kandahar consider joining the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] is the desire for a job and a paycheck,” the study says. “Respondents are deterred from considering a career in the ANSF because of the dangers. Across all districts, the ANP [Afghan National Police] is viewed as a more dangerous profession than the ANA [Afghan National Army].”
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Military bases burgeoning in Afghanistan
I've taken excerpts from an article by Nick Turse documenting the dramatic increase in US, NATO, and other coalition military bases across Afghanistan. (See below.) Based on his sources, Turse is able to count, for the first time from any public report, at least 700 bases, some large and others just outposts. Some of the larger US bases have airfields and basic provisions for the troops. Afghan bases are usually primitive and lacking such things as basic plumbing. His central point, though, is that the construction of the bases for the occupation forces indicate that the military planners are expecting to be in Afghanistan for many years. There is another implication as well, namely, that the US and its allies are spending a lot more on military logistics, accommodations, and warfare than on reconstruction and rebuilding in this long war-torn and devastated country.
Turse also reminds us of the over 700-bases in other countries that are officially acknowledged. The estimate of military bases in Afghanistan that Turse has ascertained, adds significantly to this innumeration. And, as in Afghanistan until now, the estimate of US bases outside of the US does not, by definition, include "black sites."
Bob
-------------------------------
Published on Wednesday, February 10, 2010 by TomDispatch.com
http://www.truthout.org/the-700-military-bases-afghanistan-black-sites-empire-bases56789
The 700 Military Bases of Afghanistan Black Sites in the Empire of Bases
by Nick Turse
....Nearly a decade after the Bush administration launched its invasion of Afghanistan, TomDispatch offers the first actual count of American, NATO, and other coalition bases there, as well as facilities used by the Afghan security forces. Such bases range from relatively small sites like Shinwar to mega-bases that resemble small American towns. Today, according to official sources, approximately 700 bases of every size dot the Afghan countryside, and more, like the one in Shinwar, are under construction or soon will be as part of a base-building boom [1] that began last year.
".... this base-building program is nonetheless staggering in size and scope, and heavily dependent on supplies imported from abroad, which means that it is also extraordinarily expensive. It has added significantly to the already long secret list of Pentagon property overseas and raises questions about just how long, after the planned beginning of a drawdown of American forces in 2011, the U.S. will still be garrisoning Afghanistan.
400 Foreign Bases in Afghanistan
A spokesman for the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) tells TomDispatch that there are, at present, nearly 400 U.S. and coalition bases in Afghanistan, including camps, forward operating bases, and combat outposts. In addition, there are at least 300 Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) bases, most of them built, maintained, or supported by the U.S. A small number of the coalition sites are mega-bases like Kandahar Airfield, which boasts one of the busiest runways in the world, and Bagram Air Base, a former Soviet facility that received a makeover, complete with Burger King and Popeyes outlets, and now serves more than 20,000 U.S. troops, in addition to thousands of coalition forces and civilian contractors.
"....Last fall, it was reported that more than $200 million in construction projects -- from barracks to cargo storage facilities -- were planned for or in-progress at Bagram. Substantial construction funds [3] have also been set aside by the U.S. Air Force to upgrade its air power capacity at Kandahar. For example, $65 million has been allocated to build additional apron space (where aircraft can be parked, serviced, and loaded or unloaded) to accommodate more close-air support for soldiers in the field and a greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. Another $61 million has also been earmarked for the construction of a cargo helicopter apron and a tactical airlift apron there.
"....according a spokesman for ISAF, the military plans to expand several more bases to accommodate the increase of troops as part of Afghan War commander Stanley McChrystal’s surge strategy. In addition, at least 12 more bases are slated to be built to help handle the 30,000 extra American troops and thousands of NATO forces beginning to arrive in the country.
“Currently we have over $3 billion worth of work going on in Afghanistan,” says Colonel Wilson, “and probably by the summer, when the dust settles from all the uplift, we’ll have about $1.3 billion to $1.4 billion worth of that [in the South].” By comparison, between 2002 and 2008, the Army Corps of Engineers spent more than $4.5 billion on construction projects, most of it base-building, in Afghanistan.
....
What Makes a Base?
According to an official site assessment, future construction at the Khost Farang District police headquarters will make use of sand, gravel, and stone, all available on the spot. Additionally, cement, steel, bricks, lime, and gypsum have been located for purchase in Pol-e Khomri City, about 85 miles away.
....
To facilitate U.S. base construction projects, a new “virtual storefront” -- an online shopping portal -- has been launched by the Pentagon’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The Maintenance, Repair and Operations Uzbekistan Virtual Storefront website and a defense contractor-owned and operated brick-and-mortar warehouse facility that supports it aim to provide regionally-produced construction materials to speed surge-accelerated building efforts.
From a facility located in Termez, Uzbekistan, cement, concrete, fencing, roofing, rope, sand, steel, gutters, pipe, and other construction material manufactured in countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can be rushed to nearby Afghanistan to accelerate base-building efforts. “Having the products closer to the fight will make it easier for warfighters by reducing logistics response and delivery time," says [5] Chet Evanitsky, the DLA’s construction and equipment supply chain division chief.
America’s Shadowy Base World
....After nearly a decade of war, close to 700 U.S., allied, and Afghan military bases dot Afghanistan. Until now, however, they have existed as black sites known to few Americans outside the Pentagon. It remains to be seen, a decade into the future, how many of these sites will still be occupied by U.S. and allied troops and whose flag will be planted on the ever-shifting British-Soviet-U.S./Afghan site at Shinwar.
Copyright 2010 Nick Turse
Nick Turse is the associate editor of TomDispatch.com and the winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction as well as a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism. His work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation [10], In These Times, and regularly at TomDispatch. Turse is currently a fellow at New York University's Center for the United States and the Cold War. He is the author of The Complex: How the Military Invades Our Everyday Lives [11] (Metropolitan Books). His website is NickTurse.com [12].
Turse also reminds us of the over 700-bases in other countries that are officially acknowledged. The estimate of military bases in Afghanistan that Turse has ascertained, adds significantly to this innumeration. And, as in Afghanistan until now, the estimate of US bases outside of the US does not, by definition, include "black sites."
Bob
-------------------------------
Published on Wednesday, February 10, 2010 by TomDispatch.com
http://www.truthout.org/the-700-military-bases-afghanistan-black-sites-empire-bases56789
The 700 Military Bases of Afghanistan Black Sites in the Empire of Bases
by Nick Turse
....Nearly a decade after the Bush administration launched its invasion of Afghanistan, TomDispatch offers the first actual count of American, NATO, and other coalition bases there, as well as facilities used by the Afghan security forces. Such bases range from relatively small sites like Shinwar to mega-bases that resemble small American towns. Today, according to official sources, approximately 700 bases of every size dot the Afghan countryside, and more, like the one in Shinwar, are under construction or soon will be as part of a base-building boom [1] that began last year.
".... this base-building program is nonetheless staggering in size and scope, and heavily dependent on supplies imported from abroad, which means that it is also extraordinarily expensive. It has added significantly to the already long secret list of Pentagon property overseas and raises questions about just how long, after the planned beginning of a drawdown of American forces in 2011, the U.S. will still be garrisoning Afghanistan.
400 Foreign Bases in Afghanistan
A spokesman for the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) tells TomDispatch that there are, at present, nearly 400 U.S. and coalition bases in Afghanistan, including camps, forward operating bases, and combat outposts. In addition, there are at least 300 Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) bases, most of them built, maintained, or supported by the U.S. A small number of the coalition sites are mega-bases like Kandahar Airfield, which boasts one of the busiest runways in the world, and Bagram Air Base, a former Soviet facility that received a makeover, complete with Burger King and Popeyes outlets, and now serves more than 20,000 U.S. troops, in addition to thousands of coalition forces and civilian contractors.
"....Last fall, it was reported that more than $200 million in construction projects -- from barracks to cargo storage facilities -- were planned for or in-progress at Bagram. Substantial construction funds [3] have also been set aside by the U.S. Air Force to upgrade its air power capacity at Kandahar. For example, $65 million has been allocated to build additional apron space (where aircraft can be parked, serviced, and loaded or unloaded) to accommodate more close-air support for soldiers in the field and a greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. Another $61 million has also been earmarked for the construction of a cargo helicopter apron and a tactical airlift apron there.
"....according a spokesman for ISAF, the military plans to expand several more bases to accommodate the increase of troops as part of Afghan War commander Stanley McChrystal’s surge strategy. In addition, at least 12 more bases are slated to be built to help handle the 30,000 extra American troops and thousands of NATO forces beginning to arrive in the country.
“Currently we have over $3 billion worth of work going on in Afghanistan,” says Colonel Wilson, “and probably by the summer, when the dust settles from all the uplift, we’ll have about $1.3 billion to $1.4 billion worth of that [in the South].” By comparison, between 2002 and 2008, the Army Corps of Engineers spent more than $4.5 billion on construction projects, most of it base-building, in Afghanistan.
....
What Makes a Base?
According to an official site assessment, future construction at the Khost Farang District police headquarters will make use of sand, gravel, and stone, all available on the spot. Additionally, cement, steel, bricks, lime, and gypsum have been located for purchase in Pol-e Khomri City, about 85 miles away.
....
To facilitate U.S. base construction projects, a new “virtual storefront” -- an online shopping portal -- has been launched by the Pentagon’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The Maintenance, Repair and Operations Uzbekistan Virtual Storefront website and a defense contractor-owned and operated brick-and-mortar warehouse facility that supports it aim to provide regionally-produced construction materials to speed surge-accelerated building efforts.
From a facility located in Termez, Uzbekistan, cement, concrete, fencing, roofing, rope, sand, steel, gutters, pipe, and other construction material manufactured in countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can be rushed to nearby Afghanistan to accelerate base-building efforts. “Having the products closer to the fight will make it easier for warfighters by reducing logistics response and delivery time," says [5] Chet Evanitsky, the DLA’s construction and equipment supply chain division chief.
America’s Shadowy Base World
....After nearly a decade of war, close to 700 U.S., allied, and Afghan military bases dot Afghanistan. Until now, however, they have existed as black sites known to few Americans outside the Pentagon. It remains to be seen, a decade into the future, how many of these sites will still be occupied by U.S. and allied troops and whose flag will be planted on the ever-shifting British-Soviet-U.S./Afghan site at Shinwar.
Copyright 2010 Nick Turse
Nick Turse is the associate editor of TomDispatch.com and the winner of a 2009 Ridenhour Prize for Reportorial Distinction as well as a James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism. His work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation [10], In These Times, and regularly at TomDispatch. Turse is currently a fellow at New York University's Center for the United States and the Cold War. He is the author of The Complex: How the Military Invades Our Everyday Lives [11] (Metropolitan Books). His website is NickTurse.com [12].
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