Medea Benjamin identifies some of the highlights of Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke's testimony before and exchanges with members of the Foreign Relations Comittee. Her observations are incisive.
Holbrooke paints a rosy portrait of developments in Afghanistan, though he doesn't identify a timetable for the withdrawal of troops. He also doesn't give up the notion that the US would like to have access to some of Afghanistan's considerable mineral wealth. Sen. Kerry and others on the committe see parallels in Afghanistan with our terrible and failed war on Vietnam. If true, and it seems true, the US-led occupation of Afghanistan means more loss of Afghanistan and American lives and an enormous squandering of resources before it ends in defeat.
Afghan Envoy Holbrooke and Senate in La La Land
by Medea Benjamin, July 15, 2010
Article printed from speakeasy: http://blogs.alternet.org/speakeasy
URL to article: http://blogs.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/07/15/afghan-envoy-holbrooke-and-senate-in-la-la-land/
“Man, those dudes are in La La Land,” a young intern said to me on the way out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Afghanistan on June 14, his eyes rolling. “You can’t win in Afghanistan. Don’t they read history?”
It had been hard to sit through hours of Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke’s storytelling about some far-off land he called Afghanistan. In his Afghanistan, there were new gains in agriculture and a reduction on poppy production for opium. We were empowering women and rebuilding everything from the rule of law to the electrical grid. President Karzai was really intent on tackling corruption. There was an exciting soon-to-be-unveiled program to integrate the lower-level Taliban. We were making significant gains in training the Afghan security forces, and we had real commitments from the Pakistani government to crush Al Qaeda.
We’ve heard this tall tale for the past eight years, which made some of the Senators a bit skeptical—although not skeptical enough to stop funding the war.
The most skeptical were the Republicans, who also happen to be the most anxious to keep fighting there, indefinitely. Senator Bob Corker said that despite more than an hour of testimony by Holbrooke, “I have heard nothing, nothing” about how progress will be measured. “I have no earthly idea what our objectives are on the civilian front.”
Ranking Republican Richard Lugar was also confused about our objectives. Sometimes, he said, it seems that we are trying to “remake Afghan economic, political and security culture”, which is “beyond our resources and powers.” Other times it seems the goal is simply to prevent Afghanistan from being a haven for terrorists. Either way, Lugar didn’t think we could accomplish the President’s desire to begin withdrawal by July 2011.
Holbrooke, while trying to support the President, admitted that he was leery of setting a date certain for leaving. This is, after all, “not where you would choose to defend the American homeland…It’s the most remote and logistically difficult place the U.S. has ever fought in our history,” Holbrooke said, adding that “Fate and destiny have put us there.”
Senator John Kerry, the Committee chair, showed his imperial stripes when he complained that the Afghans weren’t stepping up to the plate. “The problem is that the key element of this strategy is the one over which we have the least control, and that is the willingness and ability of Afghans to assume ownership of the efforts,” Kerry lamented. All the billions and our best efforts are irrelevant, he said, if the Afghans continue to be bystanders in what they perceive as a fight between the West and Al Qaeda.
Holbrooke chided his predecessors who had trained Afghan security forces for years, at enormous costs, without realizing that we had to also teach them to read and write. Literacy, he assured the senators, is now part of our training. No one asked why the Taliban fighters, who are also illiterate, were outmaneuvering both the Afghan security forces and U.S. military.
Referring to the pending U.S. offensive in Kandahar, Kerry admitted that the presence of the U.S. military whips up the insurgency. “Prior to American troops announcing they were going to go in (to Kandahar), there were not assassinations. There was not a level of violence,” Kerry said. “The mere announcement has now brought on the process of assassination and intimidation, and I doubt that we are going to have enough troops to be able to pacify the city.”
Several times during the hearing Holbrooke insisted that Afghanistan was not the unwinnable war of Vietnam, and that we had real security issues in Afghanistan. Ironically, on the very same day of the hearing, Senator Kerry released—for the first time ever—some 1,200 pages of transcripts from private meetings 40 years ago of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the Vietnam War. They showed the Senators expressing the same concerns about not having a reliable partner, getting overly-rosy reports from the administration, wondering how much the war would cost in lives and dollars, and having hard time picturing what victory might look like.
“Some of the parallels are almost eerie,” Kerry said, insisting the lawmakers should learn from the past. But that learning has escaped Kerry himself, who continues to support what has now become Obama’s Vietnam and America’s longest war.
The most concrete rationale for staying in Afghanistan emerged when the senators asked about recent reports of enormous mineral wealth such as copper and lithium. Holbrooke said the mineral wealth not a new discovery, but there were now modern techniques that now allowed the minerals to be more easily mined. Holbrooke assured the senators that we are helping Afghans develop their resources and strengthen their economy. Oh yes, he added, we want to make sure that the U.S. has “a level playing field” in getting access to those minerals.
Meanwhile, on the ground in Afghanistan, young soldiers are assuring that “level playing field” with their lives. On the day of the hearing, eight soldiers were killed, bringing to 33 the number of American troops killed this month amid the worst bloodshed of the nine-year conflict.
The young intern who spoke to me about La La Land has more sense than Obama, Holbrooke or the Congress that continues to fund this disaster. Or maybe he is just less jaded than politicians like Senator Lugar who supports the war but remarked, during the hearing, that the U.S. had become stuck in a “slow-motion caravan to ultimate failure.” La La Land, it seems, is not poor Afghanistan, but Washington DC, where politicians send our youth off to fight and die in an endless war they themselves don’t believe in.
Medea Benjamin is cofounder of CODEPINK (www.codepink.org) and Global Exchange (www.globalexchange.org).
Showing posts with label Vietnam War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vietnam War. Show all posts
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Thursday, June 17, 2010
US goal of creating a "client state" in Afghanistan not achievable
Counter Punch
June 17, 2010
Echoes of Vietnam
Washington's False Promise in Afghanistan
By RON JACOBS
One of the predominant rationales put forth by US civilian and military officials regarding the nature of the insurgency categorized as the Taliban in Afghanistan is that their support is derived from coercion. Pronouncements from these officials stating this belief as objective truth are obediently parroted in media reports and repeated by politicians. Yet, according to US Army General McChrystal, there is not enough support among Afghans for his proposed pacification effort in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan. “When you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them," are the words McChrystal used when asked about why he was delaying the proposed operation. In other words, the Afghans do not see the US military as its protector and want nothing to do with them and their plans.
While one must acknowledge that McChrystal's honesty is a welcome rarity from the Pentagon, the more appropriate question is how long will it be before Washington decides that it doesn't really care whether or not it has Afghan support and launches its Kandahar operation anyhow. After all, there is a supposed deadline in 2011 that McChrystal is operating under that requires him to be able to at least say things are different for Washington in Afghanistan than they were in summer 2009. Of course, that deadline becomes more nebulous by the week, just like those deadlines always do without popular pressure in the US demanding an end to a particular military operation.
Let's go back to that recruitment by coercion supposition that the Pentagon is operating on at least in public. Despite the seeming impossibility of a recruitment effort based primarily on coercion to raise a devoted guerrilla force capable not only of survival for ten years under fire, but also of expanding its reach and numbers, that is exactly what Washington wants us to believe is occurring with the Taliban. It's as if the military and political establishment found an old playbook from the 1960s, scribbled out the words "Viet Cong" and replaced them with "the Taliban." For example, here's a quote from a CIA cable dated October 5, 1961.
The Viet Cong live upon locally produced food which they either grow themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by robbery, or by blackmail.
Newspaper accounts that reported on the war echoed this interpretation of events in southern Vietnam. Stories of torture and execution style shootings by Viet Cong cadre were given as reasons for Vietnamese support for the National Liberation Front (NLF). The refusal or inability of the Pentagon and its supporters to see and understand that the bombing raids, search and destroy missions, and the removal of entire populations from villages under Operation Phoenix by US troops made any such transgressions by the NLF forces minor by comparison.
Other misunderstandings were of a more philosophical nature. In a column on February 2, 1968, while the Tet offensive raged on, New York Times columnist James Reston described the men and women fighting for the NLF as essentially suicidal given the armed might arrayed against them and wondered when these "men (and women) whose religion teaches them that death is preferable to life" would come to their sense and accept the greater power of Washington's forces. When one reads articles speculating as to the motivations of the Afghan insurgents (or the Iraqis in that unresolved war of the very recent past), a phrase about "seventy virgins" is never far from being repeated. Without getting into a debate about whether or not Buddhism or Islam teaches that death is preferable to life any more than Christianity does, this barely qualifies as motivation to leave one's family just to go and fight other people. Indeed, perhaps the motivation has much more to do with the desire to chase invaders from your village and homeland. or maybe you just want to battle those who have killed your family members.
There is a current of thought in the United States that believes Washington had its chance in the early months of the Afghan occupation to achieve its goal of an obedient Afghan nation. According to this line of reasoning, Washington failed because the Bush White House invaded Iraq. leaving its mission to founder in Afghanistan. I am unconvinced of this argument's veracity. After all, the stated intention of the invasion of Afghanistan was the capture of Bin Laden and the destruction of the Taliban. The invasion did not achieve either of these stated goals and the years since that day in October 2001 when the troops first landed have erased much of the memory of those goals. Instead, the world has watched while foreign militaries under the direction of the Pentagon have attempted to create a client state whose real leadership is in Washington, DC. Meanwhile, the continued failure of the US to perceive the elements of the Afghan insurgency as homegrown forces intent on keeping the invaders out of their homes and villages insures its continued inability to achieve its goal of pacifying the Afghan people under a government chosen by Washington.
Ron Jacobs is author of The Way the Wind Blew: a history of the Weather Underground, which is just republished by Verso. Jacobs' essay on Big Bill Broonzy is featured in CounterPunch's collection on music, art and sex, Serpents in the Garden. His first novel, Short Order Frame Up, is published by Mainstay Press. He can be reached at: rjacobs3625@charter.net
June 17, 2010
Echoes of Vietnam
Washington's False Promise in Afghanistan
By RON JACOBS
One of the predominant rationales put forth by US civilian and military officials regarding the nature of the insurgency categorized as the Taliban in Afghanistan is that their support is derived from coercion. Pronouncements from these officials stating this belief as objective truth are obediently parroted in media reports and repeated by politicians. Yet, according to US Army General McChrystal, there is not enough support among Afghans for his proposed pacification effort in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan. “When you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them," are the words McChrystal used when asked about why he was delaying the proposed operation. In other words, the Afghans do not see the US military as its protector and want nothing to do with them and their plans.
While one must acknowledge that McChrystal's honesty is a welcome rarity from the Pentagon, the more appropriate question is how long will it be before Washington decides that it doesn't really care whether or not it has Afghan support and launches its Kandahar operation anyhow. After all, there is a supposed deadline in 2011 that McChrystal is operating under that requires him to be able to at least say things are different for Washington in Afghanistan than they were in summer 2009. Of course, that deadline becomes more nebulous by the week, just like those deadlines always do without popular pressure in the US demanding an end to a particular military operation.
Let's go back to that recruitment by coercion supposition that the Pentagon is operating on at least in public. Despite the seeming impossibility of a recruitment effort based primarily on coercion to raise a devoted guerrilla force capable not only of survival for ten years under fire, but also of expanding its reach and numbers, that is exactly what Washington wants us to believe is occurring with the Taliban. It's as if the military and political establishment found an old playbook from the 1960s, scribbled out the words "Viet Cong" and replaced them with "the Taliban." For example, here's a quote from a CIA cable dated October 5, 1961.
The Viet Cong live upon locally produced food which they either grow themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by robbery, or by blackmail.
Newspaper accounts that reported on the war echoed this interpretation of events in southern Vietnam. Stories of torture and execution style shootings by Viet Cong cadre were given as reasons for Vietnamese support for the National Liberation Front (NLF). The refusal or inability of the Pentagon and its supporters to see and understand that the bombing raids, search and destroy missions, and the removal of entire populations from villages under Operation Phoenix by US troops made any such transgressions by the NLF forces minor by comparison.
Other misunderstandings were of a more philosophical nature. In a column on February 2, 1968, while the Tet offensive raged on, New York Times columnist James Reston described the men and women fighting for the NLF as essentially suicidal given the armed might arrayed against them and wondered when these "men (and women) whose religion teaches them that death is preferable to life" would come to their sense and accept the greater power of Washington's forces. When one reads articles speculating as to the motivations of the Afghan insurgents (or the Iraqis in that unresolved war of the very recent past), a phrase about "seventy virgins" is never far from being repeated. Without getting into a debate about whether or not Buddhism or Islam teaches that death is preferable to life any more than Christianity does, this barely qualifies as motivation to leave one's family just to go and fight other people. Indeed, perhaps the motivation has much more to do with the desire to chase invaders from your village and homeland. or maybe you just want to battle those who have killed your family members.
There is a current of thought in the United States that believes Washington had its chance in the early months of the Afghan occupation to achieve its goal of an obedient Afghan nation. According to this line of reasoning, Washington failed because the Bush White House invaded Iraq. leaving its mission to founder in Afghanistan. I am unconvinced of this argument's veracity. After all, the stated intention of the invasion of Afghanistan was the capture of Bin Laden and the destruction of the Taliban. The invasion did not achieve either of these stated goals and the years since that day in October 2001 when the troops first landed have erased much of the memory of those goals. Instead, the world has watched while foreign militaries under the direction of the Pentagon have attempted to create a client state whose real leadership is in Washington, DC. Meanwhile, the continued failure of the US to perceive the elements of the Afghan insurgency as homegrown forces intent on keeping the invaders out of their homes and villages insures its continued inability to achieve its goal of pacifying the Afghan people under a government chosen by Washington.
Ron Jacobs is author of The Way the Wind Blew: a history of the Weather Underground, which is just republished by Verso. Jacobs' essay on Big Bill Broonzy is featured in CounterPunch's collection on music, art and sex, Serpents in the Garden. His first novel, Short Order Frame Up, is published by Mainstay Press. He can be reached at: rjacobs3625@charter.net
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