The information below, following my comments and quotes from another source, is from a section of the CIA's latest World Factbook, a section offering an overview of the Afghan economy. The thrust of the CIA's analysis is that Afghanistan is among the poorest countries in the world and any economic gains are mostly linked to international assistance. The statements begin by referring to how the "economy is recovering from decades of conflict."
Keep in mind, that the U.S. has been a direct or indirect actor in the conflict from 1979 and thus bears some responsibility for the current conditions of the Afghan economy. Before going to the CIA's information, here are just a few reminders about the history of U.S. involvemen from David Wildman and Phyllis Bennis' very informative book, Ending the US War in Afghanistan: A Primer. I quote parts of a section of their book, where the authors respond to the question "What is the history of US involvement in Afghanistan before 9/11?" (After these quotes, I go to the CIA "overview.")
"Throughout the sequence of empires that have risen and fallen in the region, the land is now Afghanistan, a nation-state since the middle of the eighteenth century....
"The US was not directly involved in Afghanistan until the Cold War. In 1973 Afghanistan's monarchy was overthrown, and a republic declared. A left-wing rebellion in 1978 resulted in the creation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA was a community party whose program tended toward liberal, secular, and socialist reforms, building on some of the social reforms (including outlawing the purdah, a form of isolating women from social contact) that had started in Afghanistan in the 1950s. Although much of the reformist social agenda did not reach beyond Kabul, land reform and support for farmers in the rural areas were high on the PDPA agenda. At least in the cities, Afghan women played a major role in the emerging political and economic life of the country....
"President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, began a secret campaign of arming, training, and funding Islamist guerrillas known as the Mujahideen against the government in Afghanistan, funneling arms and US and Saudi money through Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI. One of the Mujahideen leaders was the young Osama bin Laden, whose organization trained and funded the ISI- and US-backed Mujahideen....
[....]
"In 1985 Reagan's CIA director, William Casey, crafted National Security Decision Directive 166, which provided the legal justification for a huge escalation of the CIA's role inside Afghanistan. During that time the Reagan administration also became special patrons of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of one of the most powerful and most extreme Islamist guerrilla organizations. Hekmatyar had the closest ties to the ISI, received most of the funds from the US and the Saudis, and was the main recipient of the much-coveted Stinger anti-aircraft misiles provided by the US.
"From 1985 on, the US- and Pakistan-backed Islamist guerrillas escalated the fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The violence forced almost half the population of the country from their homes, and millions feld Afghanistan to seek refuge in neighboring Iran or especially Pakistan...."
CIA World Factbook
Afghanistan: Economy-Overview
Last updated August 19, 2010
http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/goes/af.html
Afghanistan's economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth.
Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, weak governance, and the Afghan Government's inability to extend rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth. Afghanistan's living standards are among the lowest in the world.
While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan's development, pledging over $57 billion at three donors' conferences since 2002, the Government of Afghanistan will need to overcome a number of challenges, including low revenue collection, anemic job creation, high levels of corruption, weak government capacity, and poor public infrastructure.
Showing posts with label Phyllis Bennis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Phyllis Bennis. Show all posts
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Friday, July 30, 2010
Released documents by Wikileaks evidence of a failed mission in Afghanistan
Phyllis Bennis is a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C. and of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam. Her most recent book is Ending the US War in Afghanistan: A Primer. In the article below she comments on the controversy and impact of the 90,000 or so classified government documents released last week.
She thinks that the documents, recording operations and other events from the years 2004 through 2009, represent the most detailed source of information on the Afghan war/occupation yet available. The Obama administration does not contest the accuracy or truth of the documents. Contrary to the administration, Bennis does not think the occupations compromise US military operations in Afghanistan. Why? They are historical and edited to take out names.
She also points out that the information is not new for policy makers, the military, or those who have followed the Afghanistan situation in the US or Pakistan and Afghanistan. The documents do indicate, Bennis finds, that military operations have not accomplished much, US forces are relying more on special forces and drone attacks as time passes, the documents provide evidence of civilian casualties not reported in the press, and there are "continuing links between Pakistani' top military intelligence agency, the ISI, and the top leadership of the Taliban."
The Wikileaks Afghan War Diary: More Evidence of a Failed Mission
The leaks just fill in details of what we already knew: that the Afghan War is too costly to continue.
By Phyllis Bennis
Source: IPS; Found at http://www/zcommunications.org
Friday, July 30, 2010
Phyllis Bennis's ZSpace Page
I wrote an assessment of last week’s meeting in Kabul on Friday, before news had, ahem, leaked of Wikileaks' extraordinary new trove of documents, the Pentagon Papers: Afghanistan. I think the earlier piece is still useful.
But first, a couple of quick thoughts on the Wikileaks documents. There will be much more to come, as we find the time to dig through the reports.
This set of documents is unquestionably an important first history of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Of course, mistakes will be found — but these are reports of military leaders to others in the military. This is where they tell the truth. It's significant that the Obama administration has carefully avoided claiming the reports aren't accurate. Instead, they're claiming that disclosure of the reports somehow endangers U.S. troops while at the same time disparaging the documents as having no new information. There's no way these reports will endanger the troops — Afghans and Pakistanis clearly know far better than we do what U.S./NATO forces are actually doing in their countries.
What the leaks will do is stoke even greater global anger around the world, as evidence comes to those who didn’t know firsthand what the U.S./NATO occupation means for Afghans and Pakistanis. That will certainly mean rising anger toward U.S. policy and Americans as a whole. But more importantly, it will spur enormous antiwar activity in places like Europe, Canada, Australia, and Turkey. And that means greater pressure on those governments now providing troops for the war in Afghanistan — and on the Obama administration to end the war.
There is no evidence yet of a new smoking gun among the documents. But taken as a whole, the documents provide a collective arsenal of evidence of a brutal war that never did have a chance to succeed — and evidence of two administrations of a government determined to mislead its own people and the rest of the world.
The documents indicate significant shifts in the nature of how the war is being fought, with documentation of escalating Special Forces operations and drone attacks. The Pentagon's "nation-building" efforts are failing in places like Marja, last spring’s poster-city of a U.S.-backed government-in-a-box.The handpicked mayor-in-a-box, who spent most of the last 15 years living in Germany, is so unpopular that he has to be ferried into town on military helicopters for occasional meetings and then quickly whisked away.
So perhaps it isn't surprising that the new documents describe activities like those of Task Force 373, a death-squad that goes after identified individuals on a kill-or-capture list. No trial, of course. And if drones are called in to do more of the dirty work so U.S. troops are not at risk, and more Afghan or Pakistani civilians are killed as a result — well, that’s just part of the cost of war.
The documents include evidence of civilian deaths never reported in the press, many of them probably never even mentioned or asked about in the virtually nonexistent congressional oversight of the years documented in these reports. They detail massive levels of corruption, extortion, and constant violence inflicted on Afghan civilians by the U.S.-backed, U.S.-trained and U.S.-funded militias known as the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.
And they demonstrate, again, the continuing links between Pakistan’s top military intelligence agency, the ISI, and the top leadership of the Taliban — despite claims by Secretary of State Clinton and others in the Obama administration that Pakistan is a reliable U.S. ally that just needs to work a little harder on going after terrorists. Ironically, the Obama administration’s answer to the documents repeats the effort to blur the very distinct organizations known as the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban into a generic presence in Pakistan known as “the terrorists” or “the Taliban.”
The Wikileaks documents provide a treasure trove of evidence — of what we already knew. This war has already failed. Every death, of civilian and soldier, is needless. The cost of this occupation and this war — in Afghan blood, in U.S. and NATO military blood, in billions of dollars needed for jobs at home and real reconstruction in Afghanistan and elsewhere — is too high.
We need to stop the funding now, bring the troops and contractors home, support regional diplomacy, and begin the long effort of repaying our huge debt to the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. Loading comments...
She thinks that the documents, recording operations and other events from the years 2004 through 2009, represent the most detailed source of information on the Afghan war/occupation yet available. The Obama administration does not contest the accuracy or truth of the documents. Contrary to the administration, Bennis does not think the occupations compromise US military operations in Afghanistan. Why? They are historical and edited to take out names.
She also points out that the information is not new for policy makers, the military, or those who have followed the Afghanistan situation in the US or Pakistan and Afghanistan. The documents do indicate, Bennis finds, that military operations have not accomplished much, US forces are relying more on special forces and drone attacks as time passes, the documents provide evidence of civilian casualties not reported in the press, and there are "continuing links between Pakistani' top military intelligence agency, the ISI, and the top leadership of the Taliban."
The Wikileaks Afghan War Diary: More Evidence of a Failed Mission
The leaks just fill in details of what we already knew: that the Afghan War is too costly to continue.
By Phyllis Bennis
Source: IPS; Found at http://www/zcommunications.org
Friday, July 30, 2010
Phyllis Bennis's ZSpace Page
I wrote an assessment of last week’s meeting in Kabul on Friday, before news had, ahem, leaked of Wikileaks' extraordinary new trove of documents, the Pentagon Papers: Afghanistan. I think the earlier piece is still useful.
But first, a couple of quick thoughts on the Wikileaks documents. There will be much more to come, as we find the time to dig through the reports.
This set of documents is unquestionably an important first history of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Of course, mistakes will be found — but these are reports of military leaders to others in the military. This is where they tell the truth. It's significant that the Obama administration has carefully avoided claiming the reports aren't accurate. Instead, they're claiming that disclosure of the reports somehow endangers U.S. troops while at the same time disparaging the documents as having no new information. There's no way these reports will endanger the troops — Afghans and Pakistanis clearly know far better than we do what U.S./NATO forces are actually doing in their countries.
What the leaks will do is stoke even greater global anger around the world, as evidence comes to those who didn’t know firsthand what the U.S./NATO occupation means for Afghans and Pakistanis. That will certainly mean rising anger toward U.S. policy and Americans as a whole. But more importantly, it will spur enormous antiwar activity in places like Europe, Canada, Australia, and Turkey. And that means greater pressure on those governments now providing troops for the war in Afghanistan — and on the Obama administration to end the war.
There is no evidence yet of a new smoking gun among the documents. But taken as a whole, the documents provide a collective arsenal of evidence of a brutal war that never did have a chance to succeed — and evidence of two administrations of a government determined to mislead its own people and the rest of the world.
The documents indicate significant shifts in the nature of how the war is being fought, with documentation of escalating Special Forces operations and drone attacks. The Pentagon's "nation-building" efforts are failing in places like Marja, last spring’s poster-city of a U.S.-backed government-in-a-box.The handpicked mayor-in-a-box, who spent most of the last 15 years living in Germany, is so unpopular that he has to be ferried into town on military helicopters for occasional meetings and then quickly whisked away.
So perhaps it isn't surprising that the new documents describe activities like those of Task Force 373, a death-squad that goes after identified individuals on a kill-or-capture list. No trial, of course. And if drones are called in to do more of the dirty work so U.S. troops are not at risk, and more Afghan or Pakistani civilians are killed as a result — well, that’s just part of the cost of war.
The documents include evidence of civilian deaths never reported in the press, many of them probably never even mentioned or asked about in the virtually nonexistent congressional oversight of the years documented in these reports. They detail massive levels of corruption, extortion, and constant violence inflicted on Afghan civilians by the U.S.-backed, U.S.-trained and U.S.-funded militias known as the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.
And they demonstrate, again, the continuing links between Pakistan’s top military intelligence agency, the ISI, and the top leadership of the Taliban — despite claims by Secretary of State Clinton and others in the Obama administration that Pakistan is a reliable U.S. ally that just needs to work a little harder on going after terrorists. Ironically, the Obama administration’s answer to the documents repeats the effort to blur the very distinct organizations known as the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban into a generic presence in Pakistan known as “the terrorists” or “the Taliban.”
The Wikileaks documents provide a treasure trove of evidence — of what we already knew. This war has already failed. Every death, of civilian and soldier, is needless. The cost of this occupation and this war — in Afghan blood, in U.S. and NATO military blood, in billions of dollars needed for jobs at home and real reconstruction in Afghanistan and elsewhere — is too high.
We need to stop the funding now, bring the troops and contractors home, support regional diplomacy, and begin the long effort of repaying our huge debt to the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. Loading comments...
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
All relevant actors should be at the bargaining table
After the Karzai Visit, Who's at the Negotiating Table?
By Phyllis Bennis
Source: Yes! Magazine
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Phyllis Bennis's ZSpace PageJoin ZSpace
An overview of what an alternative to war in Afghanistan might look like - negotiations, what a concept...The high-profile Washington visit of U.S.-backed Afghan President Hamid Karzai is only partly about smoothing over what has become his extraordinarily prickly relationship with the Obama administration. Even the appearance of smoothing over those rough edges, corruption-related and otherwise, is only part of the story. (Although that part is pretty important to the White House as the Congressional vote nears on President Obama's demand for $33 billion more in taxpayer money to fund the current military escalation in Afghanistan.)
The most important part of the Karzai visit has to do with resolving the huge strategic disagreement between the Afghan president and his U.S. benefactor on the fundamental question of negotiations and reconciliation. Everybody admits-and history confirms-that every war ultimately involves negotiations at the end. But for the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the Obama administration is increasingly isolated from its friends, allies, and even dependents over the key issues of when, with whom, and over what, those negotiations should take place.
The Obama administration agrees that negotiating with the Taliban will be necessary. In January, when U.S., British, and other NATO leaders met in London to discuss Afghan strategy, Pentagon CentCom chief General David Petraeus told the Times of London that he recognized the possibility of "the concept of reconciliation, of talks between senior Afghan officials and senior Taliban or other insurgent leaders.
Kill More Afghans FirstTheir big hesitation, they say, is on the timing. President Obama's hand-picked Afghanistan commander General Stanley McChrystal said in London that he hoped the recently announced escalation of 30,000 new troops would weaken the Taliban enough that its leaders would accept a peace deal. In other words they want to weaken the Taliban first-Pentagon-speak for "kill more Afghans." We should negotiate, but only from "a position of strength." They're wrong. Whatever other things the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan, winning a "position of strength" is not one of them. The biggest U.S./NATO offensive since the beginning of the war in 2001 began in February in Marjah. It failed. According to a survey of Marjah's men conducted by the International Council on Security and Development, 61 percent feel more negative about the occupation forces after the get-rid-of-the-Taliban-and-win-the-Afghans'-hearts-and-minds military offensive than they did before. Hardly the definition of a position of strength.An even larger-scale U.S./NATO offensive is scheduled to begin in earnest in early June in and around Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city and the original home of the Taliban. The prospect of U.S. troops emerging in a "position of strength" from that almost certain debacle is, not to put too fine a point on it, pretty lousy. There is simply no reason to believe that the Taliban leadership will be any more likely to negotiate after more of them (and many more civilians) have been killed, than they are now. U.S. influence over events in Afghanistan is diminishing despite the increase in military attacks. Karzai is eager to initiate negotiations with the Taliban ASAP, and may have already begun moves to do so; he knows that his corrupt and delegitimized government may well not survive any lessening of U.S. support. But because Karzai's government is widely viewed by most Afghans as not only corrupt but largely unable to implement any serious governance outside of parts of Kabul, the current U.S. prohibition on talks guarantees that negotiations that could lead to real reconciliation cannot go forward. The Taliban needs the U.S. at the table, not just Karzai.
Negotiations Over What? The Obama administration also insists that any negotiations with the Taliban, whenever they happen, must be limited essentially to terms of surrender. Low-ranking Taliban foot soldiers might be offered "de-radicalization" programs and maybe even some job possibilities, but key regional and national Taliban commanders, the ones who would actually have to sign off on any deal to make it work, would be offered only the option of complete surrender, giving up their weapons and any claim to power or influence, plus maybe the possibility of exile in another country. Saudi Arabia has been mentioned. But the Taliban are Afghans, not Saudis; their goal has always been to rule Afghanistan, not to go abroad. They speak a different language than Saudis do, they are not Arabs. Saudi exile is not likely to win negotiators' hearts and minds-or acquiescence. It seems those in the Administration floating such trial balloons have forgotten what their own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, answered when challenged by a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Taliban have no tanks, no planes, said the senator, so how is it that they're winning? "It's their country," Mullen answered. So who's saying what about all this? The U.S. position is pretty clear (despite already visible disagreements even within the administration). Efforts to bribe and buy off low-level Taliban foot soldiers are grudgingly acceptable. Serious negotiations with Taliban leadership is forbidden until more Taliban soldiers or leaders (or civilians near them?) have been killed or, more rarely, captured. Any future negotiations with Taliban leaders will be limited to the terms of their surrender; power-sharing in a unified Afghanistan is not an option.
The Afghan government-or at least President Karzai himself, since it's unclear who else he speaks for even within his own government-wants to begin negotiations with the Taliban right away. He disagrees with his U.S. sponsors on timing, but appears to accept their view that only surrender is an option for top Taliban commanders; he has no interest in sharing power with them. Pakistan's primary concern is to insure a reliable surrogate to defend its interests in a post-U.S., post-occupation Afghanistan where arch-rival India will have influence. In the past that surrogate has been the Afghan Taliban, and there's no indication Islamabad is making a different choice. Pakistan is determined to have a say in when, whether, with whom and over what negotiations might occur; the recent arrest of a top Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar, after years of providing him with safe haven in Pakistan, was widely viewed as a message to the U.S. and Kabul, reminding them that if negotiations are going to occur, Pakistan is going to be part of them. Pakistan supports immediate negotiations aimed at a power-sharing role for the Taliban in the future.
The British position and that of some other NATO countries is close to that of Karzai, accepting negotiations with the Taliban at all levels right away. London has accepted (though it is unclear what changes the new government under David Cameron's Conservative-Lib/Dem coalition might make) the idea of some sort of power-sharing in Afghanistan that could include the Taliban. Who else needs to be at the table? Of those commentators and pundits who recognized the centrality of the reconciliation issue, almost all focused on whether/when/what the U.S. should negotiate with the Talilban. But that's not enough. If negotiations are to be taken seriously, if there is any hope that reconciliation is possible, who is present is also crucial. Everyone must be at the table. Does that include the Taliban? Of course it does. But Afghanistan isn't a two-sided country, where the only local players are the U.S.-backed government and the anti-U.S. Taliban. The resistance isn't only the Taliban, and the government doesn't reflect much of the population. Afghan society is richly complex, with men and women, rural and urban, cosmopolitan and traditional, a wide variety of ethnicities, languages, and cultures playing important roles. And Afghanistan doesn't exist in a vacuum; it is bordered directly by six complicated countries in a strategic region roiling with political, economic, and social tensions.
Real negotiations mean everyone who has a legitimate stake in the outcome must be at the table. That means the U.S.-backed Afghan government and the Taliban, and inevitably some of the other warlords, often longtime clients of the United States, who remain as regressive and repressive towards women as the Taliban ever were. Those warlords exist both within the Afghan government and among the anti-government resistance forces. But it also means including representatives of Afghanistan's traditional governing structures, the tribe- and village-based leaders, mosque-linked and otherwise, who are recognized as holding the country's legitimacy. It means women must be involved, both as an organized sector and as individuals, including the professional women's associations who have recently publicly called for negotiating with the Taliban. It means the traditional and newly rebuilding civil society of both cities and rural areas, including farmers' alliances and trade unions, organizations of teachers and doctors, students, and so many more. If the national peace jirga, or council, is held as planned, all of these components of Afghan society must be present. They must be empowered to speak and to participate in the consensus process that Afghan governance has long relied on.And if an Afghan peace jirga is to succeed, it will have to be part of a much broader international diplomatic process. That means bringing together all of Afghanistan's neighbors, including Iran and Pakistan, and all of the regional powers, including China and India. Key Muslim countries such as Turkey and perhaps the Organization of the Islamic Conference will play vital roles, all under the umbrella of the United Nations. And once all its troops are on their way out the U.S. will have to endorse, bankroll, and support such a campaign-but, crucially, will have to break from its long and painful pattern of dominating such efforts. With U.S. and NATO troops and mercenaries withdrawn and serious diplomatic efforts underway both inside Afghanistan and in the region, perhaps we can finally begin making good on the enormous debt-financial, humanitarian, developmental and so much more-that we owe to the people of Afghanistan.
But first, everybody has to be at the table.Thanks,Phyllis Bennis
Source: Yes! Magazine
By Phyllis Bennis
Source: Yes! Magazine
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Phyllis Bennis's ZSpace PageJoin ZSpace
An overview of what an alternative to war in Afghanistan might look like - negotiations, what a concept...The high-profile Washington visit of U.S.-backed Afghan President Hamid Karzai is only partly about smoothing over what has become his extraordinarily prickly relationship with the Obama administration. Even the appearance of smoothing over those rough edges, corruption-related and otherwise, is only part of the story. (Although that part is pretty important to the White House as the Congressional vote nears on President Obama's demand for $33 billion more in taxpayer money to fund the current military escalation in Afghanistan.)
The most important part of the Karzai visit has to do with resolving the huge strategic disagreement between the Afghan president and his U.S. benefactor on the fundamental question of negotiations and reconciliation. Everybody admits-and history confirms-that every war ultimately involves negotiations at the end. But for the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the Obama administration is increasingly isolated from its friends, allies, and even dependents over the key issues of when, with whom, and over what, those negotiations should take place.
The Obama administration agrees that negotiating with the Taliban will be necessary. In January, when U.S., British, and other NATO leaders met in London to discuss Afghan strategy, Pentagon CentCom chief General David Petraeus told the Times of London that he recognized the possibility of "the concept of reconciliation, of talks between senior Afghan officials and senior Taliban or other insurgent leaders.
Kill More Afghans FirstTheir big hesitation, they say, is on the timing. President Obama's hand-picked Afghanistan commander General Stanley McChrystal said in London that he hoped the recently announced escalation of 30,000 new troops would weaken the Taliban enough that its leaders would accept a peace deal. In other words they want to weaken the Taliban first-Pentagon-speak for "kill more Afghans." We should negotiate, but only from "a position of strength." They're wrong. Whatever other things the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan, winning a "position of strength" is not one of them. The biggest U.S./NATO offensive since the beginning of the war in 2001 began in February in Marjah. It failed. According to a survey of Marjah's men conducted by the International Council on Security and Development, 61 percent feel more negative about the occupation forces after the get-rid-of-the-Taliban-and-win-the-Afghans'-hearts-and-minds military offensive than they did before. Hardly the definition of a position of strength.An even larger-scale U.S./NATO offensive is scheduled to begin in earnest in early June in and around Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city and the original home of the Taliban. The prospect of U.S. troops emerging in a "position of strength" from that almost certain debacle is, not to put too fine a point on it, pretty lousy. There is simply no reason to believe that the Taliban leadership will be any more likely to negotiate after more of them (and many more civilians) have been killed, than they are now. U.S. influence over events in Afghanistan is diminishing despite the increase in military attacks. Karzai is eager to initiate negotiations with the Taliban ASAP, and may have already begun moves to do so; he knows that his corrupt and delegitimized government may well not survive any lessening of U.S. support. But because Karzai's government is widely viewed by most Afghans as not only corrupt but largely unable to implement any serious governance outside of parts of Kabul, the current U.S. prohibition on talks guarantees that negotiations that could lead to real reconciliation cannot go forward. The Taliban needs the U.S. at the table, not just Karzai.
Negotiations Over What? The Obama administration also insists that any negotiations with the Taliban, whenever they happen, must be limited essentially to terms of surrender. Low-ranking Taliban foot soldiers might be offered "de-radicalization" programs and maybe even some job possibilities, but key regional and national Taliban commanders, the ones who would actually have to sign off on any deal to make it work, would be offered only the option of complete surrender, giving up their weapons and any claim to power or influence, plus maybe the possibility of exile in another country. Saudi Arabia has been mentioned. But the Taliban are Afghans, not Saudis; their goal has always been to rule Afghanistan, not to go abroad. They speak a different language than Saudis do, they are not Arabs. Saudi exile is not likely to win negotiators' hearts and minds-or acquiescence. It seems those in the Administration floating such trial balloons have forgotten what their own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, answered when challenged by a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Taliban have no tanks, no planes, said the senator, so how is it that they're winning? "It's their country," Mullen answered. So who's saying what about all this? The U.S. position is pretty clear (despite already visible disagreements even within the administration). Efforts to bribe and buy off low-level Taliban foot soldiers are grudgingly acceptable. Serious negotiations with Taliban leadership is forbidden until more Taliban soldiers or leaders (or civilians near them?) have been killed or, more rarely, captured. Any future negotiations with Taliban leaders will be limited to the terms of their surrender; power-sharing in a unified Afghanistan is not an option.
The Afghan government-or at least President Karzai himself, since it's unclear who else he speaks for even within his own government-wants to begin negotiations with the Taliban right away. He disagrees with his U.S. sponsors on timing, but appears to accept their view that only surrender is an option for top Taliban commanders; he has no interest in sharing power with them. Pakistan's primary concern is to insure a reliable surrogate to defend its interests in a post-U.S., post-occupation Afghanistan where arch-rival India will have influence. In the past that surrogate has been the Afghan Taliban, and there's no indication Islamabad is making a different choice. Pakistan is determined to have a say in when, whether, with whom and over what negotiations might occur; the recent arrest of a top Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar, after years of providing him with safe haven in Pakistan, was widely viewed as a message to the U.S. and Kabul, reminding them that if negotiations are going to occur, Pakistan is going to be part of them. Pakistan supports immediate negotiations aimed at a power-sharing role for the Taliban in the future.
The British position and that of some other NATO countries is close to that of Karzai, accepting negotiations with the Taliban at all levels right away. London has accepted (though it is unclear what changes the new government under David Cameron's Conservative-Lib/Dem coalition might make) the idea of some sort of power-sharing in Afghanistan that could include the Taliban. Who else needs to be at the table? Of those commentators and pundits who recognized the centrality of the reconciliation issue, almost all focused on whether/when/what the U.S. should negotiate with the Talilban. But that's not enough. If negotiations are to be taken seriously, if there is any hope that reconciliation is possible, who is present is also crucial. Everyone must be at the table. Does that include the Taliban? Of course it does. But Afghanistan isn't a two-sided country, where the only local players are the U.S.-backed government and the anti-U.S. Taliban. The resistance isn't only the Taliban, and the government doesn't reflect much of the population. Afghan society is richly complex, with men and women, rural and urban, cosmopolitan and traditional, a wide variety of ethnicities, languages, and cultures playing important roles. And Afghanistan doesn't exist in a vacuum; it is bordered directly by six complicated countries in a strategic region roiling with political, economic, and social tensions.
Real negotiations mean everyone who has a legitimate stake in the outcome must be at the table. That means the U.S.-backed Afghan government and the Taliban, and inevitably some of the other warlords, often longtime clients of the United States, who remain as regressive and repressive towards women as the Taliban ever were. Those warlords exist both within the Afghan government and among the anti-government resistance forces. But it also means including representatives of Afghanistan's traditional governing structures, the tribe- and village-based leaders, mosque-linked and otherwise, who are recognized as holding the country's legitimacy. It means women must be involved, both as an organized sector and as individuals, including the professional women's associations who have recently publicly called for negotiating with the Taliban. It means the traditional and newly rebuilding civil society of both cities and rural areas, including farmers' alliances and trade unions, organizations of teachers and doctors, students, and so many more. If the national peace jirga, or council, is held as planned, all of these components of Afghan society must be present. They must be empowered to speak and to participate in the consensus process that Afghan governance has long relied on.And if an Afghan peace jirga is to succeed, it will have to be part of a much broader international diplomatic process. That means bringing together all of Afghanistan's neighbors, including Iran and Pakistan, and all of the regional powers, including China and India. Key Muslim countries such as Turkey and perhaps the Organization of the Islamic Conference will play vital roles, all under the umbrella of the United Nations. And once all its troops are on their way out the U.S. will have to endorse, bankroll, and support such a campaign-but, crucially, will have to break from its long and painful pattern of dominating such efforts. With U.S. and NATO troops and mercenaries withdrawn and serious diplomatic efforts underway both inside Afghanistan and in the region, perhaps we can finally begin making good on the enormous debt-financial, humanitarian, developmental and so much more-that we owe to the people of Afghanistan.
But first, everybody has to be at the table.Thanks,Phyllis Bennis
Source: Yes! Magazine
Monday, January 25, 2010
The Afghanistan War is costly and makes us less safe
Phyllis Bennis is the author of the following article. She focuses on the human and economic costs of the war and contends that the US occupation makes us less safe, not more safe. We could, she writes, use the money to fund jobs for a green economy or for health care for some of the tens of millions who do not have insurance.
Bennis' new book will be published in the next week: Ending the US War in Afghanistan: A Primer. See a short bio at the end of the article.
Bob
---------------------------
Published on Monday, January 25, 2010 by CommonDreams.org
Afghanistan: This War Won't Work
by Phyllis Bennis
The recent Taliban attacks on Kabul provide another wake-up call about why this war in Afghanistan simply isn't going to work. It won't bring security to Afghans. It won't turn Afghanistan into a democracy. And it won't make us safer.
In fact, the war killed more people in Afghanistan last year than the year before-40 percent more civilians, according to the United Nations. And the body count this year is already shaping up to be higher than last year. That goes for U.S. troops too.
And President Obama's escalation, the 30,000 new troops he just announced he's sending to Afghanistan? That's not helping either. The Taliban have mostly stayed in the countryside, based in the small villages where almost 80 percent of Afghans live. But now, after Obama announced that the additional troops would be deployed in Afghanistan's "population centers," meaning the cities, guess where the Taliban headed for their most recent assault?
The same thing happens when U.S. troops go after Taliban or al-Qaeda targets-they may or may not kill the "right" person, but they consistently do kill a whole bunch of people guilty only of being in the very wrong place at the very wrong time. The "wrong" people get killed.
And what happens then? The grieving and outraged family, friends, and tribe members of those "wrong" people get angry. Very angry. They start to hate those who killed their family members-us-even if they never did before. And some of them turn to violence when they never would have before. This isn't new-military and political leaders acknowledge that we're creating more terrorists than we're killing. And still the policymakers aren't hearing it.
So it doesn't make us safer. And here at home we have another problem too. Alongside the horrifying human cost-young soldiers killed, others coming home with horrifying life-shattering injuries, others returning to face traumatic brain injury and PTSD-we have to pay the financial cost for this war.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have already cost us $950 billion. Yes, BILLION. That's not counting the $137 billion Congress appropriated for spending between now and September. And that also doesn't count the cost of those 30,000 new troops going to Afghanistan, which will cost roughly $30 billion more just for their first year.
Altogether, that means by the end of this year we will have spent about $1.08 trillion. Yes, TRILLION-a number so big it's practically incomprehensible.
What else could we do with that money? Well, just the cost of the current escalation could provide about six million people with health care. Or generate 600,000 well-paid green jobs.
Which is more likely to make us safer? Opposition to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, which peaked at almost 60 percent just a month or so ago, has dropped after Obama's escalation speech at West Point. We've got a lot of work to do to make sure his administration knows this war won't make us safer, and it just costs too much-too many lives and too much money. Are you listening, President Obama?
Distributed by Minuteman Media
Phyllis Bennis is a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies [1]. Her books include Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Primer [2] and more recently Ending the Iraq War: A Primer [3]. If you want to receive her talking points and articles on a regular basis, click here [4] and choose "New Internationalism."
Article printed from www.CommonDreams.org
URL to article: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/01/25-7
Bennis' new book will be published in the next week: Ending the US War in Afghanistan: A Primer. See a short bio at the end of the article.
Bob
---------------------------
Published on Monday, January 25, 2010 by CommonDreams.org
Afghanistan: This War Won't Work
by Phyllis Bennis
The recent Taliban attacks on Kabul provide another wake-up call about why this war in Afghanistan simply isn't going to work. It won't bring security to Afghans. It won't turn Afghanistan into a democracy. And it won't make us safer.
In fact, the war killed more people in Afghanistan last year than the year before-40 percent more civilians, according to the United Nations. And the body count this year is already shaping up to be higher than last year. That goes for U.S. troops too.
And President Obama's escalation, the 30,000 new troops he just announced he's sending to Afghanistan? That's not helping either. The Taliban have mostly stayed in the countryside, based in the small villages where almost 80 percent of Afghans live. But now, after Obama announced that the additional troops would be deployed in Afghanistan's "population centers," meaning the cities, guess where the Taliban headed for their most recent assault?
The same thing happens when U.S. troops go after Taliban or al-Qaeda targets-they may or may not kill the "right" person, but they consistently do kill a whole bunch of people guilty only of being in the very wrong place at the very wrong time. The "wrong" people get killed.
And what happens then? The grieving and outraged family, friends, and tribe members of those "wrong" people get angry. Very angry. They start to hate those who killed their family members-us-even if they never did before. And some of them turn to violence when they never would have before. This isn't new-military and political leaders acknowledge that we're creating more terrorists than we're killing. And still the policymakers aren't hearing it.
So it doesn't make us safer. And here at home we have another problem too. Alongside the horrifying human cost-young soldiers killed, others coming home with horrifying life-shattering injuries, others returning to face traumatic brain injury and PTSD-we have to pay the financial cost for this war.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have already cost us $950 billion. Yes, BILLION. That's not counting the $137 billion Congress appropriated for spending between now and September. And that also doesn't count the cost of those 30,000 new troops going to Afghanistan, which will cost roughly $30 billion more just for their first year.
Altogether, that means by the end of this year we will have spent about $1.08 trillion. Yes, TRILLION-a number so big it's practically incomprehensible.
What else could we do with that money? Well, just the cost of the current escalation could provide about six million people with health care. Or generate 600,000 well-paid green jobs.
Which is more likely to make us safer? Opposition to the U.S. war in Afghanistan, which peaked at almost 60 percent just a month or so ago, has dropped after Obama's escalation speech at West Point. We've got a lot of work to do to make sure his administration knows this war won't make us safer, and it just costs too much-too many lives and too much money. Are you listening, President Obama?
Distributed by Minuteman Media
Phyllis Bennis is a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies [1]. Her books include Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Primer [2] and more recently Ending the Iraq War: A Primer [3]. If you want to receive her talking points and articles on a regular basis, click here [4] and choose "New Internationalism."
Article printed from www.CommonDreams.org
URL to article: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/01/25-7
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