Paul Woodward, "The Price of Perpetual War," June 29, 2010 - http://warincontext.org
If wars could be won through slick advertising, no one would be better qualified to become the US commander in Afghanistan than General David Petraeus.
This is how he recently encapsulated his wisdom on counterinsurgency:
We have learned above all that, in campaigns such as those in Iraq or Afghanistan, the human terrain is the decisive terrain. We have to understand the people, their culture, their social structures and how systems to support them are supposed to work — and how they do work. And our most important tasks have to be to secure and to serve the people, as well as to respect them and to facilitate the provision of basic services, the establishment of local governance and the revival of local economies.
That’s a fine wish list — and to be fair, Petraeus makes no claims about the success of the US military in accomplishing these aims. Indeed, he concedes that success in the war is likely to go to whichever side is swifter to learn and adapt.
It might not quite rise to the level of being a law of physics, but the capacity for massive organizations to swiftly learn and adapt is about as great as the ability of oil tankers to make sudden U-turns. It doesn’t matter who’s in charge or how gifted he might be in charming the US Congress.
But Petraeus’ problems run deeper than the structural limitations of the military. As Andrew Bacevich makes clear, the US military is now suffering the corrupting effect of endless war. Far from seeing Gen Stanley McChrystal’s recently revealed contempt for civilian command as exceptional, Bacevich sees strong indications that the problem is systemic.
In the seemingly endless wars of the post-Sept. 11 era, a military that has demonstrated remarkable durability now shows signs of coming undone at the top. The officer corps is losing its bearings.
Americans might do well to contemplate a famous warning issued by another frustrated commander from a much earlier age.
“We had been told, on leaving our native soil,” wrote the centurion Marcus Flavius to a cousin back in Rome, “that we were going to defend the sacred rights conferred on us by so many of our citizens [and to aid] populations in need of our assistance and our civilization.” For such a cause, he and his comrades had willingly offered to “shed our quota of blood, to sacrifice our youth and our hopes.” Yet the news from the homeland was disconcerting: The capital was seemingly rife with factions, treachery and petty politics. “Make haste,” Marcus Flavius continued, “and tell me that our fellow citizens understand us, support us and protect us as we ourselves are protecting the glory of the empire.”
“If it should be otherwise, if we should have to leave our bleached bones on these desert sands in vain, then beware of the anger of the legions!”
Stanley McChrystal is no Marcus Flavius, lacking the Roman’s eloquence, among other things. Yet in ending his military career on such an ignominious note, he has, however clumsily, issued a warning that deserves our attention.
The responsibility facing the American people is clear. They need to reclaim ownership of their army. They need to give their soldiers respite, by insisting that Washington abandon its de facto policy of perpetual war. Or, alternatively, the United States should become a nation truly “at” war, with all that implies in terms of civic obligation, fiscal policies and domestic priorities. Should the people choose neither course — and thereby subject their troops to continuing abuse — the damage to the army and to American democracy will be severe.
Whether for an individual or an nation, change often hinges on reaching a point where the status quo is intolerable.
Over the last decade, perpetual war, far from becoming less tolerable has on the contrary become easier to ignore. It is the backdrop to normalcy — just like climate change — in a culture that barely has any sense of gravity.
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
Afghan's toxic sand, another threat to the health of troops
Spencer Akerman, New Threat to US Troops in Afghanistan - Toxic Sand. http://wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/new-threat-to-u-s-troops-in-afghanistan-toxic-sand
U.S. troops already face plenty of threats in Afghanistan: AK-47–wielding insurgents, improvised bombs, an intransigent and incompetent government. Now add a less familiar challenge to that list of woes: Afghanistan’s toxic sand.
The pulverized turf, it turns out, contains high levels of manganese, silicon, iron, magnesium, aluminum, chromium and other metals that act as neurotoxic agents when ingested. Combine the country’s frequent sandstorms and the kicked-up dust that results from helicopter travel with troops’ nostrils, mouths and pores, and you’ve got an unexpected example of how inhospitable the terrain is for the soon-to-be 98,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines fighting the war.
That’s all according to new research presented this month to a neurotoxicology conference in Oregon by a senior scientist with the Navy Environmental Health Effects Laboratory. That scientist, Palur G. Gunasekar, tells Politics Daily’s Sheila Kaplan that “[a]s the sand extract dose increases at the higher concentration you see cell death.” As the late Ronnie James Dio told us time and again, metal is evil.
A Navy spokesman tells Kaplan that more research is necessary to determine whether a connection exists between Afghan sand and neurotoxicology, as the service has yet to receive complaints from troops about “cognitive difficulties that are unrelated to traumatic brain injuries.” Those injuries have become the signature trauma of nine years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices, with nearly 64,000 cases diagnosed between 2003 and 2009.
According to ProPublica, Congress has dedicated an estimated $1.7 billion over the last few years to help troops recover from traumatic brain injuries, even standing up six new “Defense Centers of Excellence” in 2007 to provide research support as well as medical care.
But now it looks like there’s a new, tragic and expensive unintended health consequence of the war. And if the Defense Department’s late start in combating traumatic brain injuries is instructive, it’s going to take a lot more than research and the glacial pace of the defense health bureaucracy to deal with neurotoxic sand.
A September 2009 Defense Department overview of its anti-TBI efforts (.PDF) to date found that grappling with the scope of such a multifaceted health problem required “collaborative efforts” with “state-of-the-art science, technology and knowledge-based outcomes.” And the Department still isn’t there yet, years later.
Until something like that kicks into gear for toxic sand, troops are going to be left on their own to mitigate their exposure, so that may mean enterprising commanders ordering their troops to wear black sunglasses and face masks this summer in the Afghan desert. If there’s any upside to a covered face in baking heat, at least it’ll look pretty metal.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/new-threat-to-u-s-troops-in-afghanistan-toxic-sand/#ixzz0sGmFrL9n
U.S. troops already face plenty of threats in Afghanistan: AK-47–wielding insurgents, improvised bombs, an intransigent and incompetent government. Now add a less familiar challenge to that list of woes: Afghanistan’s toxic sand.
The pulverized turf, it turns out, contains high levels of manganese, silicon, iron, magnesium, aluminum, chromium and other metals that act as neurotoxic agents when ingested. Combine the country’s frequent sandstorms and the kicked-up dust that results from helicopter travel with troops’ nostrils, mouths and pores, and you’ve got an unexpected example of how inhospitable the terrain is for the soon-to-be 98,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines fighting the war.
That’s all according to new research presented this month to a neurotoxicology conference in Oregon by a senior scientist with the Navy Environmental Health Effects Laboratory. That scientist, Palur G. Gunasekar, tells Politics Daily’s Sheila Kaplan that “[a]s the sand extract dose increases at the higher concentration you see cell death.” As the late Ronnie James Dio told us time and again, metal is evil.
A Navy spokesman tells Kaplan that more research is necessary to determine whether a connection exists between Afghan sand and neurotoxicology, as the service has yet to receive complaints from troops about “cognitive difficulties that are unrelated to traumatic brain injuries.” Those injuries have become the signature trauma of nine years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices, with nearly 64,000 cases diagnosed between 2003 and 2009.
According to ProPublica, Congress has dedicated an estimated $1.7 billion over the last few years to help troops recover from traumatic brain injuries, even standing up six new “Defense Centers of Excellence” in 2007 to provide research support as well as medical care.
But now it looks like there’s a new, tragic and expensive unintended health consequence of the war. And if the Defense Department’s late start in combating traumatic brain injuries is instructive, it’s going to take a lot more than research and the glacial pace of the defense health bureaucracy to deal with neurotoxic sand.
A September 2009 Defense Department overview of its anti-TBI efforts (.PDF) to date found that grappling with the scope of such a multifaceted health problem required “collaborative efforts” with “state-of-the-art science, technology and knowledge-based outcomes.” And the Department still isn’t there yet, years later.
Until something like that kicks into gear for toxic sand, troops are going to be left on their own to mitigate their exposure, so that may mean enterprising commanders ordering their troops to wear black sunglasses and face masks this summer in the Afghan desert. If there’s any upside to a covered face in baking heat, at least it’ll look pretty metal.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/new-threat-to-u-s-troops-in-afghanistan-toxic-sand/#ixzz0sGmFrL9n
Monday, June 28, 2010
McChrystal resignation connected to his pessimistic assessment of conditions in Afghanistan
Here are excerpts from an article by Jonathan Owen and Brian Brady printed in The Independent (UK) online site, and my interpretations or comments preceding the excerpted sections (in red).
The last post: McChrystal's bleak outlook
President Obama lost patience with Runaway General's failed strategy
By Jonathan Owen and Brian Brady
Sunday, 27 June 2010
The Independent – http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-last-post-mcchrystals-bleak-outlook.html
The real reason General McChrystal resigned his position as military head of the U.S.-led occupation and war in Afghanistan is that McChrystal assessed the situation in Afghanistan as going poorly.
Sacked US General Stanley McChrystal issued a devastatingly critical assessment of the war against a "resilient and growing insurgency" just days before being forced out.
Using confidential military documents, copies of which have been seen by the IoS, the "runaway general" briefed defence ministers from Nato and the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) earlier this month, and warned them not to expect any progress in the next six months. During his presentation, he raised serious concerns over levels of security, violence, and corruption within the Afghan administration.
General McChystal made gave a pessimistic presentation at the G8 summit in Toronto. The G8 subsequently
...called for "concrete progress" within five years on improving the justice system and for Afghan forces to assume greater responsibility for security. The implication here is that a large contingent of allied troops will remain in Afghanistan for at least five more years, and that the G8 members agreed with McChrystal's assessment.
Specific points made by McChrystal in his assessment, or "campaign overview":
...only a fraction of the areas key to long-term success are "secure", governed with "full authority", or enjoying "sustainable growth". He warned of a critical shortage of "essential" military trainers needed to build up Afghan forces – of which only a fraction is classed as "effective".
...pinpointed an "ineffective or discredited" Afghan government and a failure by Pakistan "to curb insurgent support" as "critical risks" to success. "Waning" political support and a "divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines" are among the key challenges faced, according to the general.
According to "informed sources," McChrystal's assessment was as important in convincing President Obama to call for the general's resignation as the article in the Rolling Stone article.
[....]
Obama may have a political motivation as well.
General McChrystal's presentation to Nato defence ministers and Isaf representatives provided an uncompromising obstacle to Mr Obama's plan to bring [some] troops home in time to give him a shot at a second term, according to senior military sources. The general was judged to be "off message" in his warning to ministers not to expect quick results and that they were facing a "resilient and growing insurgency".
[....]
The reality, according to a senior military source, is that General McChrystal's candour about the reality of the situation was an obstacle to Mr Obama's search for an "early, face-saving exit" to help his chances in the 2012 presidential elections. "Stan argued for time, and would not compromise. Rolling Stone provided an excuse for Obama to fire the opposition to his plan without having to win an intellectual argument," he said (or being put in a situation where Obama had to provide more details about his plan to withdraw troops by next summer).
[....]
U.S. Afghan policy will continue as before.
Admiral Mike Mullen met with President Karzai yesterday to assure him that the new Nato commander will pursue the same strategy followed by his predecessor. He pledged that General
Petraeus would also do his best to reduce civilian casualties.
McChrystal was too frank about his position that a successful occupation in Afghanistan will take more than six months and, implictly, some years rather than some months.
General McChrystal said progress in the next six months was unlikely. He raised serious concerns over levels of security, violence, and corruption within the Afghan administration. Only five areas out of 116 assessed were classed as "secure" – the rest suffering various degrees of insecurity and more than 40 described as "dangerous" or "unsecure".
[....]
A strategic assessment referred to in the presentation revealed just how close the strategy in Afghanistan is to failing. It stated that the campaign was "on track temporarily" – but this was defined as meaning that there was "a low level of confidence that positive trends will be sustained over the next six-month period".
[....]
The last post: McChrystal's bleak outlook
President Obama lost patience with Runaway General's failed strategy
By Jonathan Owen and Brian Brady
Sunday, 27 June 2010
The Independent – http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-last-post-mcchrystals-bleak-outlook.html
The real reason General McChrystal resigned his position as military head of the U.S.-led occupation and war in Afghanistan is that McChrystal assessed the situation in Afghanistan as going poorly.
Sacked US General Stanley McChrystal issued a devastatingly critical assessment of the war against a "resilient and growing insurgency" just days before being forced out.
Using confidential military documents, copies of which have been seen by the IoS, the "runaway general" briefed defence ministers from Nato and the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) earlier this month, and warned them not to expect any progress in the next six months. During his presentation, he raised serious concerns over levels of security, violence, and corruption within the Afghan administration.
General McChystal made gave a pessimistic presentation at the G8 summit in Toronto. The G8 subsequently
...called for "concrete progress" within five years on improving the justice system and for Afghan forces to assume greater responsibility for security. The implication here is that a large contingent of allied troops will remain in Afghanistan for at least five more years, and that the G8 members agreed with McChrystal's assessment.
Specific points made by McChrystal in his assessment, or "campaign overview":
...only a fraction of the areas key to long-term success are "secure", governed with "full authority", or enjoying "sustainable growth". He warned of a critical shortage of "essential" military trainers needed to build up Afghan forces – of which only a fraction is classed as "effective".
...pinpointed an "ineffective or discredited" Afghan government and a failure by Pakistan "to curb insurgent support" as "critical risks" to success. "Waning" political support and a "divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines" are among the key challenges faced, according to the general.
According to "informed sources," McChrystal's assessment was as important in convincing President Obama to call for the general's resignation as the article in the Rolling Stone article.
[....]
Obama may have a political motivation as well.
General McChrystal's presentation to Nato defence ministers and Isaf representatives provided an uncompromising obstacle to Mr Obama's plan to bring [some] troops home in time to give him a shot at a second term, according to senior military sources. The general was judged to be "off message" in his warning to ministers not to expect quick results and that they were facing a "resilient and growing insurgency".
[....]
The reality, according to a senior military source, is that General McChrystal's candour about the reality of the situation was an obstacle to Mr Obama's search for an "early, face-saving exit" to help his chances in the 2012 presidential elections. "Stan argued for time, and would not compromise. Rolling Stone provided an excuse for Obama to fire the opposition to his plan without having to win an intellectual argument," he said (or being put in a situation where Obama had to provide more details about his plan to withdraw troops by next summer).
[....]
U.S. Afghan policy will continue as before.
Admiral Mike Mullen met with President Karzai yesterday to assure him that the new Nato commander will pursue the same strategy followed by his predecessor. He pledged that General
Petraeus would also do his best to reduce civilian casualties.
McChrystal was too frank about his position that a successful occupation in Afghanistan will take more than six months and, implictly, some years rather than some months.
General McChrystal said progress in the next six months was unlikely. He raised serious concerns over levels of security, violence, and corruption within the Afghan administration. Only five areas out of 116 assessed were classed as "secure" – the rest suffering various degrees of insecurity and more than 40 described as "dangerous" or "unsecure".
[....]
A strategic assessment referred to in the presentation revealed just how close the strategy in Afghanistan is to failing. It stated that the campaign was "on track temporarily" – but this was defined as meaning that there was "a low level of confidence that positive trends will be sustained over the next six-month period".
[....]
Friday, June 25, 2010
Obama backs off of a withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in July 2011
Jason Ditz offers confirmation that President Obama is not likely to adhere to a deadline for the beginning of withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The President has given himself the discretion of whether to commence the reduction in troop levels in July 2011. All along his statements have been ambiguous. The idea of a "beginning" of a troop withdrawal does not specify how many troops would be withdrawn.
Further, under certain conditions, there may not be a withdrawal at all, that is, if the conditions on the ground and the judgement of generals in the field indicate more time - and perhaps additional troops - are necessary. This may well be the case if the central Afghan government is still weak, has significant warlord influence, and is plagued by corruption. This is the case if there is too little progress in creating an effective Afghan police and army forces. This is the case if groups associated with the Taliban or other insurgents continue to be a threat to the Afghan government and various parts of Afghanistan. This is the case if the Pashtun continue to feel alienated and targeted by the Karzai government, police, and army. This is the case if the great majority of the Afghan people remain impoverished and without hope, except for anger at and getting revenge on the occupation and government.
Such conditions prove counterproductive in the sense that they create additional insurgents and Taliban adherents. In his recent book, hopes and prospects, Noam Chomsky refers to a study of Taliban foot soldiers that has relevance for how the occupation itself is generating insurgency and implies as well how the prospects for a negotiated peaceful settlement are immproved if the occupation is drawn down. He writes:
"A study of the Taliban foot soldiers carried out by the Toronto Globe and Mail, though not a scientific survey as they point out, nevertheless yields considerable insight. All were Pashtuns, from the Kandahar area. They described themselves as mujahideen, following the ancient tradition of driving out foreign invaders. Almost a third reported that at least one family member had died in aerial bombings in recent years. Many siad that they were fighting to defend Afghan villagers from air strikes by foreign troops. Few claimed to be fighting a global jihad, or had allegiance to Taliban leader Mullh Omar....Most saw themselves as fighting for principles - an Islamic government - not a particular leader. Again, the results suggest possibilities for a negotiated settlement, without foreign interference" (p. 244).
Despite findings like these, Obama appears to be committed to an indefinite occupation in Afghanistan. Other evidence is consistent with this view. For example, Chomsky points out:
"The Obama administration is also constructing mega-embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan that are completely without precedent. Throughout the Gulf region, billions of dollars are being spent to develop 'critical base and port facilities,' along with military training and arms shipments expanding the US global system of militarization" (p. 63). And there are minerals in Afghanistan and the possibility of oil/gas pipeplines as well as the strategic location of the country. In the meantime, the Obama administration pushes the U.S. Congress to grant it supplemental funds for the war/occupation in Afghanistan.
In a word, indications are that the Afghanistan war/occupation is going to be a "long war."
“We didn’t say we’d be switching off the lights,” Obama insisted, adding that “we said we’d begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility.”
Officials have been dismissing the July 2011 date as largely meaningless in the first place, but President Obama has avoided comment on it, since his announcement of the most recent escalation in December.
Actually what President Obama said was that the US would begin to “start the pullout” in July 2011 at the time, and Vice President Biden was sticking with that story as recently as last week, saying that a “whole lot of people” would be moving out in July.
Biden’s comments were quickly disavowed by a number of officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Since Gen. David Petraeus was tapped to head the war yesterday, it has been expected that the date would be quickly disavowed, as President Obama did.
The date was little but an excuse to convince opponents of the surge to withhold judgement on the war at any rate, but its new role as the “beginning of a transition phase” has downgraded it to complete irrelevance, as officials have been claiming for years that they have been encouraging the Afghan government to take “more and more responsibility” to no real effect.
European nations which have attempted to put realistic timetables on the war have predicted several more decades of conflict on a number of fronts. The reality however is that there is no end in sight on this war, and even ridiculously far-sighted dates are just guesses of when the war will, for some reason, stop getting worse and start getting better. The evidence suggests that every escalation will just make matters worse, and officials have no strategy other than more escalation, making the prospect of such a turn-around unlikely, at best.
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Send a letter to the editor Letters Antiwar Forum
Further, under certain conditions, there may not be a withdrawal at all, that is, if the conditions on the ground and the judgement of generals in the field indicate more time - and perhaps additional troops - are necessary. This may well be the case if the central Afghan government is still weak, has significant warlord influence, and is plagued by corruption. This is the case if there is too little progress in creating an effective Afghan police and army forces. This is the case if groups associated with the Taliban or other insurgents continue to be a threat to the Afghan government and various parts of Afghanistan. This is the case if the Pashtun continue to feel alienated and targeted by the Karzai government, police, and army. This is the case if the great majority of the Afghan people remain impoverished and without hope, except for anger at and getting revenge on the occupation and government.
Such conditions prove counterproductive in the sense that they create additional insurgents and Taliban adherents. In his recent book, hopes and prospects, Noam Chomsky refers to a study of Taliban foot soldiers that has relevance for how the occupation itself is generating insurgency and implies as well how the prospects for a negotiated peaceful settlement are immproved if the occupation is drawn down. He writes:
"A study of the Taliban foot soldiers carried out by the Toronto Globe and Mail, though not a scientific survey as they point out, nevertheless yields considerable insight. All were Pashtuns, from the Kandahar area. They described themselves as mujahideen, following the ancient tradition of driving out foreign invaders. Almost a third reported that at least one family member had died in aerial bombings in recent years. Many siad that they were fighting to defend Afghan villagers from air strikes by foreign troops. Few claimed to be fighting a global jihad, or had allegiance to Taliban leader Mullh Omar....Most saw themselves as fighting for principles - an Islamic government - not a particular leader. Again, the results suggest possibilities for a negotiated settlement, without foreign interference" (p. 244).
Despite findings like these, Obama appears to be committed to an indefinite occupation in Afghanistan. Other evidence is consistent with this view. For example, Chomsky points out:
"The Obama administration is also constructing mega-embassies in Pakistan and Afghanistan that are completely without precedent. Throughout the Gulf region, billions of dollars are being spent to develop 'critical base and port facilities,' along with military training and arms shipments expanding the US global system of militarization" (p. 63). And there are minerals in Afghanistan and the possibility of oil/gas pipeplines as well as the strategic location of the country. In the meantime, the Obama administration pushes the U.S. Congress to grant it supplemental funds for the war/occupation in Afghanistan.
In a word, indications are that the Afghanistan war/occupation is going to be a "long war."
The article:
Obama Disavows July 2011 Afghan Drawdown Date
Insists Date Just the 'Beginning of a Transition Phase'
by Jason Ditz, June 24, 2010
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“We didn’t say we’d be switching off the lights,” Obama insisted, adding that “we said we’d begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility.”
Officials have been dismissing the July 2011 date as largely meaningless in the first place, but President Obama has avoided comment on it, since his announcement of the most recent escalation in December.
Actually what President Obama said was that the US would begin to “start the pullout” in July 2011 at the time, and Vice President Biden was sticking with that story as recently as last week, saying that a “whole lot of people” would be moving out in July.
Biden’s comments were quickly disavowed by a number of officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Since Gen. David Petraeus was tapped to head the war yesterday, it has been expected that the date would be quickly disavowed, as President Obama did.
The date was little but an excuse to convince opponents of the surge to withhold judgement on the war at any rate, but its new role as the “beginning of a transition phase” has downgraded it to complete irrelevance, as officials have been claiming for years that they have been encouraging the Afghan government to take “more and more responsibility” to no real effect.
European nations which have attempted to put realistic timetables on the war have predicted several more decades of conflict on a number of fronts. The reality however is that there is no end in sight on this war, and even ridiculously far-sighted dates are just guesses of when the war will, for some reason, stop getting worse and start getting better. The evidence suggests that every escalation will just make matters worse, and officials have no strategy other than more escalation, making the prospect of such a turn-around unlikely, at best.
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Wednesday, June 23, 2010
British Envoy to Afghanistan Resigns over failed US military policy
Here is one of the headlines from today's Democracy Now program. You can find other headlines and featured interviews at http://www.democracynow.org.
British Envoy to Afghanistan Resigns
The news comes as Britain’s special representative to Afghanistan, Sherard Cowper-Coles, has resigned. Formerly Britain’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Cowper-Coles has frequently clashed with US counterparts on Afghan policy. He has been a proponent of reconciliation efforts, including negotiations with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, and has questioned the US push for a military solution in Afghanistan. In 2008, he was quoted saying the US strategy in Afghanistan is "destined to fail" and calling the occupation "part of the problem, not the solution."
British Envoy to Afghanistan Resigns
The news comes as Britain’s special representative to Afghanistan, Sherard Cowper-Coles, has resigned. Formerly Britain’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Cowper-Coles has frequently clashed with US counterparts on Afghan policy. He has been a proponent of reconciliation efforts, including negotiations with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, and has questioned the US push for a military solution in Afghanistan. In 2008, he was quoted saying the US strategy in Afghanistan is "destined to fail" and calling the occupation "part of the problem, not the solution."
Oppose supplemental funding request for wars
The following message is from Democrats.com. It asks for people to oppose the Obama administration's request for a $33 billion supplement to the wars/occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq. See the reasons for the position taken by Democrats.com.
The "war" in Afghanistan is now the longest "war" in U.S. history. For what?George W. Bush let Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora way back in 2001, and then pulled troops and supplies out of Afghanistan so he could conquer Iraq.Since then, we've been "fighting" the Taliban, not the few remaining Al Qaeda. But we're not really "fighting" them, we're actually paying them protection money to let supply trucks reach our troops.
Rather than pay extortion to the Taliban - with our tax dollars! - it's time to bring our troops safely home.Tell Congress to vote NO on the $33 Billion supplemental for Afghanistanhttp://www.democrats.com/oppose-33-billion-war-supplemental-for-2010
To make matters worse, Gen. Stanley McChrystal made headlines with insubordinate attacks on his superiors. One year ago, Gen. McChrystal was put in charge of the "war" to devise a "winning" strategy. One year later, his strategy isn't "winning" because Afghanistan remains as massively corrupt as ever, under the hopelessly corrupt leadership of Hamid Karzai.
Tell Congress to vote NO on the $33 Billion supplemental for Afghanistanhttp://www.democrats.com/oppose-33-billion-war-supplemental-for-2010
American taxpayers can't afford the endless occcupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. We've already "spent" (actually just borrowed) over $1 trillion and sacrificed over 5,535 brave soldiers.
As our national debt spirals out of control, President Obama's Deficit Commission is secretly plotting cuts in Social Security and Medicare - instead of ending the disastrous "wars."
Under the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to fund wars. After eight disastrous years, it's time for Congress to use its power to bring our troops safely home from Afghanistan.
Tell Congress to vote NO on the $33 Billion supplemental for Afghanistanhttp://www.democrats.com/oppose-33-billion-war-supplemental-for-2010
Thanks for all you do!
Bob Fertik
Democrats.com Activist Alerts.
The "war" in Afghanistan is now the longest "war" in U.S. history. For what?George W. Bush let Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora way back in 2001, and then pulled troops and supplies out of Afghanistan so he could conquer Iraq.Since then, we've been "fighting" the Taliban, not the few remaining Al Qaeda. But we're not really "fighting" them, we're actually paying them protection money to let supply trucks reach our troops.
Rather than pay extortion to the Taliban - with our tax dollars! - it's time to bring our troops safely home.Tell Congress to vote NO on the $33 Billion supplemental for Afghanistanhttp://www.democrats.com/oppose-33-billion-war-supplemental-for-2010
To make matters worse, Gen. Stanley McChrystal made headlines with insubordinate attacks on his superiors. One year ago, Gen. McChrystal was put in charge of the "war" to devise a "winning" strategy. One year later, his strategy isn't "winning" because Afghanistan remains as massively corrupt as ever, under the hopelessly corrupt leadership of Hamid Karzai.
Tell Congress to vote NO on the $33 Billion supplemental for Afghanistanhttp://www.democrats.com/oppose-33-billion-war-supplemental-for-2010
American taxpayers can't afford the endless occcupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. We've already "spent" (actually just borrowed) over $1 trillion and sacrificed over 5,535 brave soldiers.
As our national debt spirals out of control, President Obama's Deficit Commission is secretly plotting cuts in Social Security and Medicare - instead of ending the disastrous "wars."
Under the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to fund wars. After eight disastrous years, it's time for Congress to use its power to bring our troops safely home from Afghanistan.
Tell Congress to vote NO on the $33 Billion supplemental for Afghanistanhttp://www.democrats.com/oppose-33-billion-war-supplemental-for-2010
Thanks for all you do!
Bob Fertik
Democrats.com Activist Alerts.
McChystal episode reveals a war without coherence
Joshua Holland's article focuses on the media interest on General Stanley McChrystal, the commanding military officer in Afghanistan. The article appearing in the magazine Rolling Stone. Written by Matt Hastings, he reports on "derogatory comments McChrystal and his staff made about the White House. Media pundits and hosts are speculating on whether President Obama will fire McChrystal from his job because of the general's insubordination. While this part of Hastings' story has been covered widely in the media, the most important part of the story, Holland points out, is overlooked, namely, that the US-led war and occupation in Afghanistan is failing and has no coherent direction. Military leaders think that with enough time and more troops the war in Afghanistan can still be won. Here are excerpts from Holland's article.
Dont Let the McChrystal Frenzy Obscure the Dirty Truth About Afghanistan
By Joshua Holland, Printed on June 23, 2010
http://www.alternet.org/story/147302/
It should come as no surprise that General Stanley McChrystal’s return to Washington to explain a series of derogatory comments he and his staff made about the White House has ignited a media frenzy.
[....]
....the most important part of Hastings’ article is largely being ignored by the corporate media.
Hastings told a tale of a project with no hope for success. His story shows us that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is all about tactics dressed up as a strategy. It’s a profile of a military establishment running on inertia -- unable to withdraw because withdrawing is an admission of defeat, but also unable to accomplish the wholly unrealistic tasks put before it.
This is perhaps the most revealing passage from Hastings’ report:
"[Team Obama] are trying to manipulate perceptions because there is no definition of victory – because victory is not even defined or recognizable," says Celeste Ward, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation who served as a political adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq in 2006. "That's the game we're in right now. What we need, for strategic purposes, is to create the perception that we didn't get run off. The facts on the ground are not great, and are not going to become great in the near future."
...."If Americans pulled back and started paying attention to this war, it would become even less popular," a senior adviser to McChrystal says. Such realism, however, doesn't prevent advocates of counterinsurgency from dreaming big: Instead of beginning to withdraw troops next year, as Obama promised, the military hopes to ramp up its counterinsurgency campaign even further.
[....]
Anan Gobal noted that in 2008, after seven years of fighting, less than a third of the country was under the control of the central government in Kabul, and added: “Many say even that is now an optimistic assessment.” Earlier this month, Bloomberg reported that the Pentagon was making cash payments to Afghan warlords. According to Bloomberg, “Contractors told congressional investigators they believe that, in turn, the ‘warlords make protection payments to insurgents’ who are fighting the U.S.”
[....]
According to a report released in January, the U.S.-backed government is also awash in corruption, which Afghans now view “as a bigger concern than security and unemployment.” The government we’re backing may be extracting as much as one quarter of Afghanistan’s gross national product in bribes. And Karzai’s own brother has been implicated in Afghanistan’s rich drug trade.
[....]
Max Bergmann of the Center for American Progress didn’t miss what lies at the heart of the Rolling Stone report. “The significance of this food fight is not in what was said,” he wrote, “but in what it says about where the United States is in Afghanistan":
What has become apparent is that … the mythic status now given to the surge in Iraq led to a significant degree of over-confidence on the part of McChrystal and others about their ability to turn the Afghan war around after it had utterly deteriorated year after year under the neglectful watch of the Bush administration.
Joshua Holland is an editor and senior writer at AlterNet.
Dont Let the McChrystal Frenzy Obscure the Dirty Truth About Afghanistan
By Joshua Holland, Printed on June 23, 2010
http://www.alternet.org/story/147302/
It should come as no surprise that General Stanley McChrystal’s return to Washington to explain a series of derogatory comments he and his staff made about the White House has ignited a media frenzy.
[....]
....the most important part of Hastings’ article is largely being ignored by the corporate media.
Hastings told a tale of a project with no hope for success. His story shows us that the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is all about tactics dressed up as a strategy. It’s a profile of a military establishment running on inertia -- unable to withdraw because withdrawing is an admission of defeat, but also unable to accomplish the wholly unrealistic tasks put before it.
This is perhaps the most revealing passage from Hastings’ report:
"[Team Obama] are trying to manipulate perceptions because there is no definition of victory – because victory is not even defined or recognizable," says Celeste Ward, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation who served as a political adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq in 2006. "That's the game we're in right now. What we need, for strategic purposes, is to create the perception that we didn't get run off. The facts on the ground are not great, and are not going to become great in the near future."
...."If Americans pulled back and started paying attention to this war, it would become even less popular," a senior adviser to McChrystal says. Such realism, however, doesn't prevent advocates of counterinsurgency from dreaming big: Instead of beginning to withdraw troops next year, as Obama promised, the military hopes to ramp up its counterinsurgency campaign even further.
[....]
Anan Gobal noted that in 2008, after seven years of fighting, less than a third of the country was under the control of the central government in Kabul, and added: “Many say even that is now an optimistic assessment.” Earlier this month, Bloomberg reported that the Pentagon was making cash payments to Afghan warlords. According to Bloomberg, “Contractors told congressional investigators they believe that, in turn, the ‘warlords make protection payments to insurgents’ who are fighting the U.S.”
[....]
According to a report released in January, the U.S.-backed government is also awash in corruption, which Afghans now view “as a bigger concern than security and unemployment.” The government we’re backing may be extracting as much as one quarter of Afghanistan’s gross national product in bribes. And Karzai’s own brother has been implicated in Afghanistan’s rich drug trade.
[....]
Max Bergmann of the Center for American Progress didn’t miss what lies at the heart of the Rolling Stone report. “The significance of this food fight is not in what was said,” he wrote, “but in what it says about where the United States is in Afghanistan":
What has become apparent is that … the mythic status now given to the surge in Iraq led to a significant degree of over-confidence on the part of McChrystal and others about their ability to turn the Afghan war around after it had utterly deteriorated year after year under the neglectful watch of the Bush administration.
Joshua Holland is an editor and senior writer at AlterNet.
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
Democracy Now interview on extortion by warlords and insurgents in Afghanistan taken up by Congressional Committee
Congressional Probe Confirms US Indirectly Funding Afghan Insurgents with Protection Payoffs
A congressional investigation has affirmed the findings of a Nation magazine report that revealed the US government is indirectly financing warlords and insurgent forces they’re fighting in Afghanistan. Investigative journalist Aram Roston reported the Pentagon’s civilian contractors in Afghanistan have paid insurgent groups to protect US supply routes from attack. Roston discussed his findings on Democracy Now! in November.
Aram Roston: "The security companies reach arrangements with the local Taliban, the local warlords and various insiders to pay them off for protection. It’s very much like an extortion racket and very much like a protection racket, and it amounts to huge amounts of money. Some say ten percent, some say far more than ten percent, of the convoys. Some say that most of the security budgets are going towards these payments to the Taliban and to the tribal leaders and the warlords."
Roston’s story prompted the congressional probe. The military has now opened a criminal investigation into the payoffs.
A congressional investigation has affirmed the findings of a Nation magazine report that revealed the US government is indirectly financing warlords and insurgent forces they’re fighting in Afghanistan. Investigative journalist Aram Roston reported the Pentagon’s civilian contractors in Afghanistan have paid insurgent groups to protect US supply routes from attack. Roston discussed his findings on Democracy Now! in November.
Aram Roston: "The security companies reach arrangements with the local Taliban, the local warlords and various insiders to pay them off for protection. It’s very much like an extortion racket and very much like a protection racket, and it amounts to huge amounts of money. Some say ten percent, some say far more than ten percent, of the convoys. Some say that most of the security budgets are going towards these payments to the Taliban and to the tribal leaders and the warlords."
Roston’s story prompted the congressional probe. The military has now opened a criminal investigation into the payoffs.
Counter-terrorism rather than counter-insurgency, Juan Cole contends
Below you can find some major parts of Juan Cole's post today, June 22, 2010, on his blog Informed Comment, and my outline/comments on them. You can go to Cole's award-winning blog for the full article.
Cole reconstructs some of the present sniping within the Obama Administration over what the appropriate strategy in Afghanistan should be. The conflict revolves around the counter-insurgency strategy of General McChrystal, a strategy that now is in effect. On the other side, Cole identifies some of those who are opposed to this strategy, including Cole himself. The other strategy worth considering - and supporting - is a "minimalist" strategy of counter-terrorism. He also thinks that a third approach endorsing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country would result in a brutal Taliban victory, which he finds unacceptable.
If you have been following the posts on our blog, you know that we have been in support of a planned withdrawal of troops. Our position has been influenced by Afghan citizens like Malalai Joya. My impression of Cole's position is that he is grasping at straws when he discribes - and supports- a counter-terrorism strategy.
So, Cole says, it is counter-insurgency versus counter-terrorism, with the withdrawal of troops off the table. It is up to President Obama to decide the strategy that will prevail [between two bad options]. Here is some of what Cole suggests.
One, get rid of Gen. McChrystal, and plan to disgard the counter-insurgency strategy.
If Obama doesn’t fire McChrystal, he will never be respected by anybody in the chain of command that leads to his desk. Moreover, moving McChrystal out now would be a perfect opportunity to pull the plug on the impractical counter-insurgency campaign that the latter has been pursuing, which probably has only a 10% chance of success. (A RAND study found that where a government that claimed to be a democracy actually was not, and where it faced an insurgency, it prevailed only 10% of the time. Sounds like President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan to me.)
[....]
Two, Obama should move toward support of a counter-terrorism strategy. [This approach would preclude bringing additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan. It is not clear whether the number of troops already stationed in the country would be kept at the same level or reduced.] He does offer an idea of what counter-terrorism would include: "intelligence work, deployment of special operations forces against small, specific targets, and use of air strikes and drones."
The most recent roots of this grudge match go back to the dispute within the Obama administration last year over how to deal with Afghanistan. Eikenberry, a former general, had been one of McChrystal’s predecessors as commander of US troops in Afghanistan. And Biden had spent decades either chairing or being ranking minority member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These seasoned observers of Central and South Asia concluded that the best the US could do in Afghanistan was small-scale targeted counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism implies intelligence work, deployment of special operations forces against small, specific targets, and use of air strikes and drones. Biden is said to have suggested getting most US troops out of Afghanistan and just striking at al-Qaeda wherever it popped up, especially in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Three, more on what the ineffective counter-insurgency strategy entails.
In contrast, McChrystal’s plan called for counter-insurgency, which implies large-scale conventional military campaigns, to “take, clear, hold and build.” That is, the US troops would take territory now held by insurgents, would clear it of Taliban or other militants, would hold it for the medium or long term so as to reassure local elders that they were in no danger from returning Taliban, and would use the opportunity to build infrastructure and services. Biden’s target was the largely Arab, foreign al-Qaeda, organized as small terrorist cells; but McChrystal wanted to root out the Taliban and their new Mujahidin allies, a much larger force that had roots in Pashtun society in a way that al-Qaeda does not. McChrystal’s plan required a massive troop escalation and the conquest by the US of large swathes of Pashtun territory in the southeast and southwest of the country. The hope was that while the US did counter-insurgency on a large scale, NATO and US troops would be training and equipping a large Afghanistan National Army of 200,000 and a similarly sized police force, and that in a few years the country could be turned over to them.
Four, reasons why counter-insurgency will fail.
Eikenberry worried, in cables later leaked, that going beyond counter-terrorism to large-scale counter-insurgency was impractical because:
A big US troop escalation would have the effect of actually making the Afghanistan security forces more dependent on the US, not less, and so significantly delay the day when they could or would step up to security duties on their own;
A large-scale counter-insurgency campaign requires a strong Afghan political partner for the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ phases. But there is no such partner. President Hamid Karzai stole the presidential election last year, and is notoriously unreliable. The Afghanistan National Army will not soon be able to take over from the US troops as they take and clear wide swathes of territory.
Five, Obama hedged.
Obama backed McChrystal against Biden and Eikenberry, but threw McChrystal a curve ball by talking about beginning a troop withdrawal in summer of 2011 (thus taking a little piece of the Biden plan and inserting it awkwardly in the middle of Gen. McChrystal’s years-long counter-insurgency struggle– and thus inevitably undermining the latter).
Six, all the strategies have shortcomings, but counter-terrosim makes more sense than the other, Coal suggests.
Both the Biden/ Eikenberry and the McChrystal approaches have drawbacks. Counter-terrorism focusing like a laser on al-Qaeda would be largely irrelevant now in Afghanistan, where there is virtually no al-Qaeda. But that policy is being pursued in the tribal belt in Pakistan, alienating the Pakistani public because the drones often also kill innocent civilians. And, a rapid draw-down of US troops in favor of newly trained Afghan recruits may not be practical, given the poor esprit de corps, illiteracy, drug use, corruption and over-representation of minorities in the Afghanistan National Army and police. What would happen if, as the US drew down, the provinces around Kabul started swiftly falling to the Taliban or allied insurgents?
Seven, but withdrawal is out of the question, at least for some, perhaps, lengthy period of time.
I know one Afghan scholar who for years went back and forth consulting with the Karzai government, who is convinced that if the US and NATO suddenly pulled up stakes, the Karzai government would fall within 3 days. Whatever you think of President Karzai, the prospect of him being hanged by Mulla Omar is hard to contemplate with equanimity.
Eight, the counter-insurgency strategy is far too ambitious and should therefore be phased out.
On the other hand, McChrystal’s plan is in my view far too ambitious and likely completely impractical. It assumes that the Pashtuns want US Marines in their villages and would prefer them to the Taliban or other insurgents (most of whom are actually from the same tribes as and therefore cousins to these villagers). It assumes that the Kabul government can provide a ‘government in a box’ (in McChrystal’s words) to the provinces once the US military has conquered them. But Kabul is not well governed itself, much less being able swiftly to provide services and expertise in the provinces on demand. It assumes that the US push won’t alienate ever more Pashtuns, pushing them into the arms of the Taliban. It makes no distinction between Eastern and Western Pashtuns. And it assumes that an Afghanistan National Army of double the current size can be swiftly trained and deployed to replace the US troops as they move on to the next conquest. None of these assumptions is warranted, as is becoming clear in Helmand Province, where McChrystal’s demonstration project was the small farming villages of Marjah. It hasn’t gone as well as was initially suggested.
Nine, the next planned phase of counter-insurgency is counterproductive and should, implicitly, be discontinued.
McChrystal’s next Big Idea was to attack Taliban strongholds the major southwestern Pashtun city of Qandahar (pop. about 1 million). Such an operation is extremely dangerous. If urban Pashtuns were alienated by it, they could go over to the insurgency in much greater numbers. (Right now, the Pashtuns are probably split 80-20 in favor of Karzai against the Taliban, but the US could easily push the rest of the Pashtuns into the arms of the insurgents if it isn’t careful. That would set the stage for another Afghanistan Civil War, since the northern ethnic groups– Tajiks, Hazarahs, Uzbeks, etc., absolutely despise the Taliban).
Ten, Afghanistan is a mess.
Afghanistan is a mess and likely will go on being a mess. It is the fifth poorest country in the world, is a major center of opium production and trafficking, has been wracked by decades of war (for much of which Washington is responsible), has a literacy rate of only 28%, and suffers from poor infrastructure and weak, corrupt, inefficient government. Its most troubled regions are populated by tribal people who have it as a code of honor to engage in feuds, and some of what the US sees as insurgency is just ordinary feuding. Tribes fall out with each other, and fight for a while until they make up. That way of life will eventually subside, when people become more settled, urban, and educated. But that day is a ways off for most Pashtuns.
Eleven, Cole supports counter-terrorism with reservations, that is intelligence work, special forces' operations, and air-attacks including drones. The focus is on suspected Al Qaeda areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He conveys great ambivalence about drone attacks on Pakistan
In the meantime, I think counter-terrorism in Afghanistan is the right policy, though I think the drone strikes on Pakistani territory are very problematic and concur with those CIA officers who hold that they do more harm than good.
Twelve, Cole suggests that a counter-terrorism strategy will require the U.S.-led occupation to have the capacity to keep the Karzai government from falling and at the same time become effective, and also have the time to train new Afghan security forces so they can stand up to the enemy or die. But this seems to conflict with his ideas of accelerating the training of Afghan troops [which is bound to take a long time, if ever], holding the number of U.S. troops where it is. and, implicitly, winning support from Afghan villagers. Cole does not refer to reconstruction as an element of counter-terrorism. It is also not clear how a counter-terrorism strategy would keep the government from falling, let alone rising.
What you need in Afghanistan is a way of keeping the government from falling while you train up the new security forces (which must be put in a position where they either stand and fight or risk destruction– without the ability to depend on US infantrymen). I think this minimalist goal can be achieved via counter-terrorism. The counter-insurgency campaign was a dead end.
Cole reconstructs some of the present sniping within the Obama Administration over what the appropriate strategy in Afghanistan should be. The conflict revolves around the counter-insurgency strategy of General McChrystal, a strategy that now is in effect. On the other side, Cole identifies some of those who are opposed to this strategy, including Cole himself. The other strategy worth considering - and supporting - is a "minimalist" strategy of counter-terrorism. He also thinks that a third approach endorsing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country would result in a brutal Taliban victory, which he finds unacceptable.
If you have been following the posts on our blog, you know that we have been in support of a planned withdrawal of troops. Our position has been influenced by Afghan citizens like Malalai Joya. My impression of Cole's position is that he is grasping at straws when he discribes - and supports- a counter-terrorism strategy.
So, Cole says, it is counter-insurgency versus counter-terrorism, with the withdrawal of troops off the table. It is up to President Obama to decide the strategy that will prevail [between two bad options]. Here is some of what Cole suggests.
One, get rid of Gen. McChrystal, and plan to disgard the counter-insurgency strategy.
If Obama doesn’t fire McChrystal, he will never be respected by anybody in the chain of command that leads to his desk. Moreover, moving McChrystal out now would be a perfect opportunity to pull the plug on the impractical counter-insurgency campaign that the latter has been pursuing, which probably has only a 10% chance of success. (A RAND study found that where a government that claimed to be a democracy actually was not, and where it faced an insurgency, it prevailed only 10% of the time. Sounds like President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan to me.)
[....]
Two, Obama should move toward support of a counter-terrorism strategy. [This approach would preclude bringing additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan. It is not clear whether the number of troops already stationed in the country would be kept at the same level or reduced.] He does offer an idea of what counter-terrorism would include: "intelligence work, deployment of special operations forces against small, specific targets, and use of air strikes and drones."
The most recent roots of this grudge match go back to the dispute within the Obama administration last year over how to deal with Afghanistan. Eikenberry, a former general, had been one of McChrystal’s predecessors as commander of US troops in Afghanistan. And Biden had spent decades either chairing or being ranking minority member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These seasoned observers of Central and South Asia concluded that the best the US could do in Afghanistan was small-scale targeted counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism implies intelligence work, deployment of special operations forces against small, specific targets, and use of air strikes and drones. Biden is said to have suggested getting most US troops out of Afghanistan and just striking at al-Qaeda wherever it popped up, especially in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
Three, more on what the ineffective counter-insurgency strategy entails.
In contrast, McChrystal’s plan called for counter-insurgency, which implies large-scale conventional military campaigns, to “take, clear, hold and build.” That is, the US troops would take territory now held by insurgents, would clear it of Taliban or other militants, would hold it for the medium or long term so as to reassure local elders that they were in no danger from returning Taliban, and would use the opportunity to build infrastructure and services. Biden’s target was the largely Arab, foreign al-Qaeda, organized as small terrorist cells; but McChrystal wanted to root out the Taliban and their new Mujahidin allies, a much larger force that had roots in Pashtun society in a way that al-Qaeda does not. McChrystal’s plan required a massive troop escalation and the conquest by the US of large swathes of Pashtun territory in the southeast and southwest of the country. The hope was that while the US did counter-insurgency on a large scale, NATO and US troops would be training and equipping a large Afghanistan National Army of 200,000 and a similarly sized police force, and that in a few years the country could be turned over to them.
Four, reasons why counter-insurgency will fail.
Eikenberry worried, in cables later leaked, that going beyond counter-terrorism to large-scale counter-insurgency was impractical because:
A big US troop escalation would have the effect of actually making the Afghanistan security forces more dependent on the US, not less, and so significantly delay the day when they could or would step up to security duties on their own;
A large-scale counter-insurgency campaign requires a strong Afghan political partner for the ‘hold’ and ‘build’ phases. But there is no such partner. President Hamid Karzai stole the presidential election last year, and is notoriously unreliable. The Afghanistan National Army will not soon be able to take over from the US troops as they take and clear wide swathes of territory.
Five, Obama hedged.
Obama backed McChrystal against Biden and Eikenberry, but threw McChrystal a curve ball by talking about beginning a troop withdrawal in summer of 2011 (thus taking a little piece of the Biden plan and inserting it awkwardly in the middle of Gen. McChrystal’s years-long counter-insurgency struggle– and thus inevitably undermining the latter).
Six, all the strategies have shortcomings, but counter-terrosim makes more sense than the other, Coal suggests.
Both the Biden/ Eikenberry and the McChrystal approaches have drawbacks. Counter-terrorism focusing like a laser on al-Qaeda would be largely irrelevant now in Afghanistan, where there is virtually no al-Qaeda. But that policy is being pursued in the tribal belt in Pakistan, alienating the Pakistani public because the drones often also kill innocent civilians. And, a rapid draw-down of US troops in favor of newly trained Afghan recruits may not be practical, given the poor esprit de corps, illiteracy, drug use, corruption and over-representation of minorities in the Afghanistan National Army and police. What would happen if, as the US drew down, the provinces around Kabul started swiftly falling to the Taliban or allied insurgents?
Seven, but withdrawal is out of the question, at least for some, perhaps, lengthy period of time.
I know one Afghan scholar who for years went back and forth consulting with the Karzai government, who is convinced that if the US and NATO suddenly pulled up stakes, the Karzai government would fall within 3 days. Whatever you think of President Karzai, the prospect of him being hanged by Mulla Omar is hard to contemplate with equanimity.
Eight, the counter-insurgency strategy is far too ambitious and should therefore be phased out.
On the other hand, McChrystal’s plan is in my view far too ambitious and likely completely impractical. It assumes that the Pashtuns want US Marines in their villages and would prefer them to the Taliban or other insurgents (most of whom are actually from the same tribes as and therefore cousins to these villagers). It assumes that the Kabul government can provide a ‘government in a box’ (in McChrystal’s words) to the provinces once the US military has conquered them. But Kabul is not well governed itself, much less being able swiftly to provide services and expertise in the provinces on demand. It assumes that the US push won’t alienate ever more Pashtuns, pushing them into the arms of the Taliban. It makes no distinction between Eastern and Western Pashtuns. And it assumes that an Afghanistan National Army of double the current size can be swiftly trained and deployed to replace the US troops as they move on to the next conquest. None of these assumptions is warranted, as is becoming clear in Helmand Province, where McChrystal’s demonstration project was the small farming villages of Marjah. It hasn’t gone as well as was initially suggested.
Nine, the next planned phase of counter-insurgency is counterproductive and should, implicitly, be discontinued.
McChrystal’s next Big Idea was to attack Taliban strongholds the major southwestern Pashtun city of Qandahar (pop. about 1 million). Such an operation is extremely dangerous. If urban Pashtuns were alienated by it, they could go over to the insurgency in much greater numbers. (Right now, the Pashtuns are probably split 80-20 in favor of Karzai against the Taliban, but the US could easily push the rest of the Pashtuns into the arms of the insurgents if it isn’t careful. That would set the stage for another Afghanistan Civil War, since the northern ethnic groups– Tajiks, Hazarahs, Uzbeks, etc., absolutely despise the Taliban).
Ten, Afghanistan is a mess.
Afghanistan is a mess and likely will go on being a mess. It is the fifth poorest country in the world, is a major center of opium production and trafficking, has been wracked by decades of war (for much of which Washington is responsible), has a literacy rate of only 28%, and suffers from poor infrastructure and weak, corrupt, inefficient government. Its most troubled regions are populated by tribal people who have it as a code of honor to engage in feuds, and some of what the US sees as insurgency is just ordinary feuding. Tribes fall out with each other, and fight for a while until they make up. That way of life will eventually subside, when people become more settled, urban, and educated. But that day is a ways off for most Pashtuns.
Eleven, Cole supports counter-terrorism with reservations, that is intelligence work, special forces' operations, and air-attacks including drones. The focus is on suspected Al Qaeda areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He conveys great ambivalence about drone attacks on Pakistan
In the meantime, I think counter-terrorism in Afghanistan is the right policy, though I think the drone strikes on Pakistani territory are very problematic and concur with those CIA officers who hold that they do more harm than good.
Twelve, Cole suggests that a counter-terrorism strategy will require the U.S.-led occupation to have the capacity to keep the Karzai government from falling and at the same time become effective, and also have the time to train new Afghan security forces so they can stand up to the enemy or die. But this seems to conflict with his ideas of accelerating the training of Afghan troops [which is bound to take a long time, if ever], holding the number of U.S. troops where it is. and, implicitly, winning support from Afghan villagers. Cole does not refer to reconstruction as an element of counter-terrorism. It is also not clear how a counter-terrorism strategy would keep the government from falling, let alone rising.
What you need in Afghanistan is a way of keeping the government from falling while you train up the new security forces (which must be put in a position where they either stand and fight or risk destruction– without the ability to depend on US infantrymen). I think this minimalist goal can be achieved via counter-terrorism. The counter-insurgency campaign was a dead end.
Sunday, June 20, 2010
Bombings by US air force and Taliban, increase in violence and casualties
As usual, Juan Cole provides information that keeps readers up-to-date on events in Afghanistan and across the region and in the Middle East. The substance of Juan's post today, June 20, 2010, is captured by his headlines: "U.S. Strikes Kill Civlians in Khost. Bombings Rock Helmand Capital. Roadside Bombings Double."
Juan Cole, Informed Comment, June 20, 2010
Things are not going well for the Obama administration in Afghanistan, and the only good news for the White House is that almost no one in the United States seems to be paying attention.
Supposedly precision strikes by the US air force against the militant Haqqani Network in Khost province in the south of the country appear to have gone awry and killed 10 civilians. Errant fighter-jet and drone strikes that kill civilians is the number one complaint of Afghans against the growing US military presence, and this incident will further fan the flames of that fuel.
The USG Open Source Center translated an article about the innocent civilians being mistakenly bombarded, which appeared in the Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto on Saturday June 19. It claims not 10 dead but 20, and note that it is getting these figures from officials of the Karzai government.
Khost, 19 June: A bombardment has inflicted heavy civilian casualties.Last night, from 18 to 19 June, foreign aircraft bombarded some villages in Mosakhel District of Khost Province, inflicting civilian casualties.
The Khost security commander, Abdol Hakim Ishaqzai, told Afghan Islamic Press in this regard that foreign aircraft had bombarded Mosakhel District during an operation, as a result of which five civilians were killed. The security commander confirmed that women and children were also among the killed people.
On the other hand, the head of the provincial council in Khost, Mohammad Shafiq Mojahed, told Afghan Islamic Press about civilian casualties that based on his primary information, six civilians had been killed and four others wounded in the bombardments. He added that the bombardments continued by the foreign aircraft this morning as well, but he did not know why the foreign aircraft bombarded the area.
The ISAF press office in Khost told Afghan Islamic Press that the foreign aircraft had dropped only one bomb on a military training centre of the Taleban in the area, which inflicted no casualties to civilians.
While the NATO press office denies civilian casualties, a resident of Mosakhel District, Hazrat Wali, told Afghan Islamic Press this afternoon that at least 20 civilians had been killed and 16 others wounded in the bombardments. Speaking angrily to the Afghan Islamic Press, Hazrat Wali added “The aircraft started bombardments on four villages in the areas of Madar, Tishanki, Lezhagi and Khairi at 2200 (local time; 1730 gmt) while the helicopters still fly over the area.”
He said: “We have taken 20 bodies from under debris so far. The killed include women, children and old people who are all civilians and there are no Taleban among them.”Giving more details, Hazrat Wali said: “We took five dead bodies from under debris in Madar village, four of whom were children and one of them was a woman. We also took seven bodies out of debris in Tishanki village, three bodies in Khairi village and four bodies in Lezhagi village. Also, a young kid who was running away from the bombardment near Lezhagi village was martyred.”
Hazrat Wali further said that 16 wounded people had also been taken out of debris in these villages and taken to nearby health centres in the area for treatment.
Regarding the current situation in the area, he said: “Some people have packed their belongings and escaped to different directions. They do not know where to go and do not know why they were bombarded.”
The Taleban have not commented on the incident.
(Description of Source: Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto — Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto — Peshawar-based agency, staffed by Afghans, that describes itself as an independent “news agency” but whose history and reporting pattern reveal a perceptible pro-Taliban bias; the AIP’s founder-director, Mohammad Yaqub Sharafat, has long been associated with a mujahidin faction that merged with the Taliban’s “Islamic Emirate” led by Mullah Omar; subscription required to access content; http://www.afghanislamicpress.com)
More bad news. On Sunday, two bombs rocked the provincial city of Lashkar Gah, killing 3 and wounding 23 other civilians. A bank and a school were the two targets.
The reason these bombings are bad news is that Lashkar Gah is the capital of Helmand province and is the city from which the Marjah campaign of this winter-spring was launched. Bombings in Lashkar Gah are a worrisome sign that the Marjah campaign did not entirely succeed. (That Marjah was not the success it was ballyhooed to be was first recognized by the McClatchy wire service reporters, who have consistently been ahead of the curve in both Afghanistan and Iraq.)
And then to cap it all off, the UN came out with a report this weekend that reveals that the number of suicide bombings has doubled in 2010 as opposed to 2009.z And, the number of assassinations is also up, to one a day.
Finally, the LAT reports that attempts by the US to set up anti-Taliban militias have not yielded the desired results.
Juan Cole, Informed Comment, June 20, 2010
Things are not going well for the Obama administration in Afghanistan, and the only good news for the White House is that almost no one in the United States seems to be paying attention.
Supposedly precision strikes by the US air force against the militant Haqqani Network in Khost province in the south of the country appear to have gone awry and killed 10 civilians. Errant fighter-jet and drone strikes that kill civilians is the number one complaint of Afghans against the growing US military presence, and this incident will further fan the flames of that fuel.
The USG Open Source Center translated an article about the innocent civilians being mistakenly bombarded, which appeared in the Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto on Saturday June 19. It claims not 10 dead but 20, and note that it is getting these figures from officials of the Karzai government.
Khost, 19 June: A bombardment has inflicted heavy civilian casualties.Last night, from 18 to 19 June, foreign aircraft bombarded some villages in Mosakhel District of Khost Province, inflicting civilian casualties.
The Khost security commander, Abdol Hakim Ishaqzai, told Afghan Islamic Press in this regard that foreign aircraft had bombarded Mosakhel District during an operation, as a result of which five civilians were killed. The security commander confirmed that women and children were also among the killed people.
On the other hand, the head of the provincial council in Khost, Mohammad Shafiq Mojahed, told Afghan Islamic Press about civilian casualties that based on his primary information, six civilians had been killed and four others wounded in the bombardments. He added that the bombardments continued by the foreign aircraft this morning as well, but he did not know why the foreign aircraft bombarded the area.
The ISAF press office in Khost told Afghan Islamic Press that the foreign aircraft had dropped only one bomb on a military training centre of the Taleban in the area, which inflicted no casualties to civilians.
While the NATO press office denies civilian casualties, a resident of Mosakhel District, Hazrat Wali, told Afghan Islamic Press this afternoon that at least 20 civilians had been killed and 16 others wounded in the bombardments. Speaking angrily to the Afghan Islamic Press, Hazrat Wali added “The aircraft started bombardments on four villages in the areas of Madar, Tishanki, Lezhagi and Khairi at 2200 (local time; 1730 gmt) while the helicopters still fly over the area.”
He said: “We have taken 20 bodies from under debris so far. The killed include women, children and old people who are all civilians and there are no Taleban among them.”Giving more details, Hazrat Wali said: “We took five dead bodies from under debris in Madar village, four of whom were children and one of them was a woman. We also took seven bodies out of debris in Tishanki village, three bodies in Khairi village and four bodies in Lezhagi village. Also, a young kid who was running away from the bombardment near Lezhagi village was martyred.”
Hazrat Wali further said that 16 wounded people had also been taken out of debris in these villages and taken to nearby health centres in the area for treatment.
Regarding the current situation in the area, he said: “Some people have packed their belongings and escaped to different directions. They do not know where to go and do not know why they were bombarded.”
The Taleban have not commented on the incident.
(Description of Source: Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto — Peshawar Afghan Islamic Press in Pashto — Peshawar-based agency, staffed by Afghans, that describes itself as an independent “news agency” but whose history and reporting pattern reveal a perceptible pro-Taliban bias; the AIP’s founder-director, Mohammad Yaqub Sharafat, has long been associated with a mujahidin faction that merged with the Taliban’s “Islamic Emirate” led by Mullah Omar; subscription required to access content; http://www.afghanislamicpress.com)
More bad news. On Sunday, two bombs rocked the provincial city of Lashkar Gah, killing 3 and wounding 23 other civilians. A bank and a school were the two targets.
The reason these bombings are bad news is that Lashkar Gah is the capital of Helmand province and is the city from which the Marjah campaign of this winter-spring was launched. Bombings in Lashkar Gah are a worrisome sign that the Marjah campaign did not entirely succeed. (That Marjah was not the success it was ballyhooed to be was first recognized by the McClatchy wire service reporters, who have consistently been ahead of the curve in both Afghanistan and Iraq.)
And then to cap it all off, the UN came out with a report this weekend that reveals that the number of suicide bombings has doubled in 2010 as opposed to 2009.z And, the number of assassinations is also up, to one a day.
Finally, the LAT reports that attempts by the US to set up anti-Taliban militias have not yielded the desired results.
U.S. for nation-building from the bottom-up - another potential reason for extending occupation
Carlotta Gall reports in the New York Times about a U.S. effort in Afghanistan to build democracy from the bottom up in the form of elected district councils in some of the most unstable parts of the country. The article was published on June 19, 2010, with the title "U.S. Hopes Afghan Councils Will Weaken Taliban." Taimoor Shah contributed reporting from Kandahar, Afghanistan. Here is a summary of key points from the article and some quotes.
The council in Nadali, are, Gall writes, "part of a pilot program to set up 100 district" by July 2011 "to provide representative government in places where government has largely been absent...[and] convince people that there is a viable option to the Taliban."
The project runs up against Afghan populations that have "suffered at the hands of predatory officials and repeated military operations by foreign forces in recent years."
Another key element of the project is a "National Solidarty Program," designed to "set up small development councils...[and] to undertake small reconstruction projects in every village."
The process take times. Aside from insurgents or Taliban, "it takes six months just to elect and train community councilors and two years to complete a village project."
Even prior to reaching the stage where there are elections, it may take a year or more "of visiting villages and persuading people to cooperate with the government...."
Gall does not make clear how a village's representatives are "selected" for a district's council. Once selected, though, they elect the councilors. Thus, the plan is to have only local people participating in these local governance structures.
Another task is "to persuade local insurgents to give up the fight and return to a peaceful life in the community." One district chief who is quotes, says: "It takes time; you have to go and talk a lot and spend money."
Two questions:
(1) Can a locally-focused program succeed, given a continuing occupation by foreign troops, a weak central government, along with weak government at other levels and warlord domination in many districts, and insurgents or Taliban who have yet to be defeated or reconciled?
(2) My impression is that the whole idea will take many years to implement. If it is taken seriously by the Obama administration, the Pentagon, and the generals in the field, then the U.S. occupation may well continued beyond the summer of 2011, the scheduled time for the "beginning" of the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
NADALI, Afghanistan — More than 600 men, most of them farmers with weathered faces and rough hands, sat on the ground under an awning, waiting all day to deposit their ballots in plastic boxes. They had braved Taliban threats and road mines to come here to select a district council, part of a plan to strengthen local government in the most unstable parts of Afghanistan.
“The important thing is we are trying to build trust between the people and the government,” said Qari Mukhtar Ahmad, a senior cleric attending the election last month. “This district was under fighting for a long time, but now there is peace and we have to listen to the people and bring them together.”
Peace is a relative term in Nadali, a district in the southern province of Helmand with one of highest levels of roadside bombs per square mile. Government officials still have to fly by helicopter from the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, rather than risk the 20-minute drive.
The district encompasses Marja, a Taliban stronghold where United States Marines have been battling insurgents since February. Marja remains largely ungovernable, but the operation broke the hold of the Taliban in the rest of the district, making it stable enough to try to set up some local representation.
The election here, an exercise in nation-building from the ground up, is part of a pilot program to set up 100 district councils to provide representative government in places where government has largely been absent. But the councils, backed by the British and American governments, also represent a critical element of counterinsurgency strategy: if they succeed, the hope is they will convince people that there is a viable alternative to Taliban rule.
Since the beginning of the year, 35 such councils have begun work in nine provinces, and the American and British governments have pledged financing to establish 100 by July 2011, officials said. The ultimate goal is to have directly elected councils nationwide.
“It is a vital, basic element of administration,” said Christopher Demers, an adviser for the Agency for International Development in Kandahar. “Building a people’s body like this is important; it is giving people an opportunity to speak with the government.”
Military officials in the United States-led coalition have often expressed frustration at the inability of the Afghan government to move quickly into secured areas and start governing. Yet Afghan officials say that it is a lengthy task to build an administration from scratch and gain the trust of a population that has suffered at the hands of predatory officials and repeated military operations by foreign forces in recent years.
In many districts, like Nadali, there is little government presence, often only a district chief and a police chief, both appointed by the central government in Kabul. They have few resources or personnel. Most district chiefs have no official car and an official budget of only $12 a year, the United Nations said last year.
One of the successes of the Afghan government over the past eight years has been the National Solidarity Program, which set up small development councils across the country to undertake small reconstruction projects in every village. Yet it takes six months just to elect and train community councilors and two years to complete a village project, said Wais Ahmad Barmak, deputy minister in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, who has 30 years experience in community development.
In the most insecure areas, like Helmand, the ministry has had to suspend its work, he said.
In Nadali it has taken a year of visiting villages and persuading people to cooperate with the government to get them to the point of electing the district council, said the district chief, Habibullah Shamlani, a former police academy instructor.
After several gatherings around the district, 600 representatives were selected to come and vote for 45 councilors, all of whom must live in the district, a change from the absentee landlords or tribal chiefs who have traditionally made the decisions.
“This district council should make all the decisions which affect the life of the district,” said Jelani Popal, who leads the local government directorate, an arm of the national government that is running the program. “We will use them for security reasons, like reintegration; they will be very active in deciding about development, but also governance; they can communicate or channel the grievances of the people to the governor and district governor.”
Those who took part in the selection said they were taking the risk because they needed representatives to intercede with the government and the foreign forces on a variety of problems, from securing the release of detainees and compensation for war damage to resolving tribal and land disputes and winning development assistance for their areas.
“We hope the government will do something for us if we have this district council and we can share our problems with the higher authorities,” said Feda Muhammad Khan, an elected councilor. “We are fed up with the fighting, and there is a drought, and we are hoping peace will knock on our door.”
One of the main tasks of the council will be to persuade local insurgents to give up the fight and return to a peaceful life in the community, or if not to move away and stop destabilizing the area, Mr. Shamlani, the district chief, said. Already 40 people who were with the Taliban have been persuaded to quit fighting, he said.
“We are working step by step,” he said. “We cannot put too much pressure on the people to reject the Taliban. Gradually now, people have found some courage to point out who are Taliban. If things are sustained the same as now I am hoping by next year we will know who is behind it all.”
The key has been to deliver on promises of assistance and treat the people well, he said. “It takes time; you have to go and talk a lot and spend money,” he said.
But there is already evidence that the Taliban are fighting the councils much as they have resisted other government initiatives.
Some of the participants said they risked assassination if the Taliban in their area discovered that they were cooperating with the government. At least five councilors have been killed and one has been wounded since the four councils were formed in Helmand Province, officials said, presumably by the Taliban.
And the representatives choosing the council here included Taliban members, several participants said. They, too, wanted representation to help win the release of their people who have been detained.
Maj. Abdul Salam, who runs the police criminal department in Nadali, said the fact that 600 representatives showed up was itself a vote of confidence in the process.
“These people are here because they have some hope that the government is gaining strength and they are hoping they can defend themselves,” he said. “But you are right, they are in some danger.”
The council in Nadali, are, Gall writes, "part of a pilot program to set up 100 district" by July 2011 "to provide representative government in places where government has largely been absent...[and] convince people that there is a viable option to the Taliban."
The project runs up against Afghan populations that have "suffered at the hands of predatory officials and repeated military operations by foreign forces in recent years."
Another key element of the project is a "National Solidarty Program," designed to "set up small development councils...[and] to undertake small reconstruction projects in every village."
The process take times. Aside from insurgents or Taliban, "it takes six months just to elect and train community councilors and two years to complete a village project."
Even prior to reaching the stage where there are elections, it may take a year or more "of visiting villages and persuading people to cooperate with the government...."
Gall does not make clear how a village's representatives are "selected" for a district's council. Once selected, though, they elect the councilors. Thus, the plan is to have only local people participating in these local governance structures.
Another task is "to persuade local insurgents to give up the fight and return to a peaceful life in the community." One district chief who is quotes, says: "It takes time; you have to go and talk a lot and spend money."
Two questions:
(1) Can a locally-focused program succeed, given a continuing occupation by foreign troops, a weak central government, along with weak government at other levels and warlord domination in many districts, and insurgents or Taliban who have yet to be defeated or reconciled?
(2) My impression is that the whole idea will take many years to implement. If it is taken seriously by the Obama administration, the Pentagon, and the generals in the field, then the U.S. occupation may well continued beyond the summer of 2011, the scheduled time for the "beginning" of the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
NADALI, Afghanistan — More than 600 men, most of them farmers with weathered faces and rough hands, sat on the ground under an awning, waiting all day to deposit their ballots in plastic boxes. They had braved Taliban threats and road mines to come here to select a district council, part of a plan to strengthen local government in the most unstable parts of Afghanistan.
“The important thing is we are trying to build trust between the people and the government,” said Qari Mukhtar Ahmad, a senior cleric attending the election last month. “This district was under fighting for a long time, but now there is peace and we have to listen to the people and bring them together.”
Peace is a relative term in Nadali, a district in the southern province of Helmand with one of highest levels of roadside bombs per square mile. Government officials still have to fly by helicopter from the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, rather than risk the 20-minute drive.
The district encompasses Marja, a Taliban stronghold where United States Marines have been battling insurgents since February. Marja remains largely ungovernable, but the operation broke the hold of the Taliban in the rest of the district, making it stable enough to try to set up some local representation.
The election here, an exercise in nation-building from the ground up, is part of a pilot program to set up 100 district councils to provide representative government in places where government has largely been absent. But the councils, backed by the British and American governments, also represent a critical element of counterinsurgency strategy: if they succeed, the hope is they will convince people that there is a viable alternative to Taliban rule.
Since the beginning of the year, 35 such councils have begun work in nine provinces, and the American and British governments have pledged financing to establish 100 by July 2011, officials said. The ultimate goal is to have directly elected councils nationwide.
“It is a vital, basic element of administration,” said Christopher Demers, an adviser for the Agency for International Development in Kandahar. “Building a people’s body like this is important; it is giving people an opportunity to speak with the government.”
Military officials in the United States-led coalition have often expressed frustration at the inability of the Afghan government to move quickly into secured areas and start governing. Yet Afghan officials say that it is a lengthy task to build an administration from scratch and gain the trust of a population that has suffered at the hands of predatory officials and repeated military operations by foreign forces in recent years.
In many districts, like Nadali, there is little government presence, often only a district chief and a police chief, both appointed by the central government in Kabul. They have few resources or personnel. Most district chiefs have no official car and an official budget of only $12 a year, the United Nations said last year.
One of the successes of the Afghan government over the past eight years has been the National Solidarity Program, which set up small development councils across the country to undertake small reconstruction projects in every village. Yet it takes six months just to elect and train community councilors and two years to complete a village project, said Wais Ahmad Barmak, deputy minister in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, who has 30 years experience in community development.
In the most insecure areas, like Helmand, the ministry has had to suspend its work, he said.
In Nadali it has taken a year of visiting villages and persuading people to cooperate with the government to get them to the point of electing the district council, said the district chief, Habibullah Shamlani, a former police academy instructor.
After several gatherings around the district, 600 representatives were selected to come and vote for 45 councilors, all of whom must live in the district, a change from the absentee landlords or tribal chiefs who have traditionally made the decisions.
“This district council should make all the decisions which affect the life of the district,” said Jelani Popal, who leads the local government directorate, an arm of the national government that is running the program. “We will use them for security reasons, like reintegration; they will be very active in deciding about development, but also governance; they can communicate or channel the grievances of the people to the governor and district governor.”
Those who took part in the selection said they were taking the risk because they needed representatives to intercede with the government and the foreign forces on a variety of problems, from securing the release of detainees and compensation for war damage to resolving tribal and land disputes and winning development assistance for their areas.
“We hope the government will do something for us if we have this district council and we can share our problems with the higher authorities,” said Feda Muhammad Khan, an elected councilor. “We are fed up with the fighting, and there is a drought, and we are hoping peace will knock on our door.”
One of the main tasks of the council will be to persuade local insurgents to give up the fight and return to a peaceful life in the community, or if not to move away and stop destabilizing the area, Mr. Shamlani, the district chief, said. Already 40 people who were with the Taliban have been persuaded to quit fighting, he said.
“We are working step by step,” he said. “We cannot put too much pressure on the people to reject the Taliban. Gradually now, people have found some courage to point out who are Taliban. If things are sustained the same as now I am hoping by next year we will know who is behind it all.”
The key has been to deliver on promises of assistance and treat the people well, he said. “It takes time; you have to go and talk a lot and spend money,” he said.
But there is already evidence that the Taliban are fighting the councils much as they have resisted other government initiatives.
Some of the participants said they risked assassination if the Taliban in their area discovered that they were cooperating with the government. At least five councilors have been killed and one has been wounded since the four councils were formed in Helmand Province, officials said, presumably by the Taliban.
And the representatives choosing the council here included Taliban members, several participants said. They, too, wanted representation to help win the release of their people who have been detained.
Maj. Abdul Salam, who runs the police criminal department in Nadali, said the fact that 600 representatives showed up was itself a vote of confidence in the process.
“These people are here because they have some hope that the government is gaining strength and they are hoping they can defend themselves,” he said. “But you are right, they are in some danger.”
Pentagon promotes idea of Afghanistan's mineral wealth
Five points stand out in David Sirota's essay below. One, U.S. scientists have confirmed that Afghanistan has vast mineral resources worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Two, this information has long been known. Three, it is being tauted now as a possible additional justification for keeping U.S. occupation forces in Afghanistan longer than otherwise - indeed, indefinitely. Four, the American people may have warmed up to the idea that foreign wars are worth figthing for valuable resources that the country needs. Five, if the later point is valid, then the Pentagon can count on public support for an increasing number and longer wars in the near future.
Michael T. Klare has written extensively about how the global economy is being increasingly shaped by competition for resources. Goggle his name for a host of his article and check out his two most recent books: Resource Wars: The News Landscape of Global Conflict and Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy.
By David Sirota, AlterNetPosted on June 19, 2010, Printed on June 20, 2010http://www.alternet.org/story/147259/
Excerpts:
Point one: ...."New York Times headline – "U.S. Identifies Vast Riches of Minerals in Afghanistan" – many probably wondered how this information was being presented as "news" in 2010."
Point two: "After all, humanity has long been aware of the country's vast natural resources.... This 'discovery' in fact is ancient history tracing back to the times of Marco Polo."
Point three: ..."the Pentagon is probably trying to bolster Americans' support for the flagging Afghanistan campaign by "publicizing or re-publicizing valid but already public information about the region's potential wealth."
Point four:... "Remember, the idea that the U.S. invades countries to pilfer natural resources was once written off as an inflammatory insult and/or an unsubstantiated conspiracy theory.... This manufactured construct, though, began eroding as soon as George W. Bush started turning the "war for oil" aspersion into a proud clarion call."
....
"Whereas it was previously considered uncouth for anyone to even suggest that economic hegemony might motivate U.S. military action, our leaders are now boldly selling wars as commendable instruments of such profit-focused imperialism."
Point five: "Importantly, this revised message relies on the new assumption that the public now sees resource conflicts not as detestable – but as worthy and even admirable. And should that assumption prove true, it would mean that this latest exercise in martial propaganda represents more than mere marketing innovation. It would signal a disturbing change in what the population thinks is – and is not – a just reason for war."
David Sirota is the author of the best-selling books Hostile Takeover and The Uprising. He hosts the morning show on AM760 in Colorado and blogs at OpenLeft.com. E-mail him at ds@davidsirota.com or follow him on Twitter @davidsirota.
Michael T. Klare has written extensively about how the global economy is being increasingly shaped by competition for resources. Goggle his name for a host of his article and check out his two most recent books: Resource Wars: The News Landscape of Global Conflict and Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy.
By David Sirota, AlterNetPosted on June 19, 2010, Printed on June 20, 2010http://www.alternet.org/story/147259/
Excerpts:
Point one: ...."New York Times headline – "U.S. Identifies Vast Riches of Minerals in Afghanistan" – many probably wondered how this information was being presented as "news" in 2010."
Point two: "After all, humanity has long been aware of the country's vast natural resources.... This 'discovery' in fact is ancient history tracing back to the times of Marco Polo."
Point three: ..."the Pentagon is probably trying to bolster Americans' support for the flagging Afghanistan campaign by "publicizing or re-publicizing valid but already public information about the region's potential wealth."
Point four:... "Remember, the idea that the U.S. invades countries to pilfer natural resources was once written off as an inflammatory insult and/or an unsubstantiated conspiracy theory.... This manufactured construct, though, began eroding as soon as George W. Bush started turning the "war for oil" aspersion into a proud clarion call."
....
"Whereas it was previously considered uncouth for anyone to even suggest that economic hegemony might motivate U.S. military action, our leaders are now boldly selling wars as commendable instruments of such profit-focused imperialism."
Point five: "Importantly, this revised message relies on the new assumption that the public now sees resource conflicts not as detestable – but as worthy and even admirable. And should that assumption prove true, it would mean that this latest exercise in martial propaganda represents more than mere marketing innovation. It would signal a disturbing change in what the population thinks is – and is not – a just reason for war."
David Sirota is the author of the best-selling books Hostile Takeover and The Uprising. He hosts the morning show on AM760 in Colorado and blogs at OpenLeft.com. E-mail him at ds@davidsirota.com or follow him on Twitter @davidsirota.
Friday, June 18, 2010
Value of Afghanistan's minerals is questioned
The following item is from Just Foreign Policy, http://www.justforeignpolicy.org, June 18, 2010. It cites a "business insider" who raises a serious question about the reported estimated value of Afghanistan's minerals.
Writing in Business Insider, Louis James of the investment advising company Casey Research says the New York Times had no basis for reporting a figure of $1 trillion for the economic value of mineral deposits in Afghanistan. No responsible geologist would circulate a valuation figure at this stage of the process in Afghanistan. In fact, if a public company put out a press release like this story in the NYT, the exchange would likely reprimand them severely and require a retraction.
Writing in Business Insider, Louis James of the investment advising company Casey Research says the New York Times had no basis for reporting a figure of $1 trillion for the economic value of mineral deposits in Afghanistan. No responsible geologist would circulate a valuation figure at this stage of the process in Afghanistan. In fact, if a public company put out a press release like this story in the NYT, the exchange would likely reprimand them severely and require a retraction.
Malalai Joya - the unrepresentative Afghan government, the occupation, warlords, and Taliban are all the enemies of the people
Malalai Joya talks about her hopes for her country, her heroes and the London conference
The US government doesn't want a democratic Afghanistan, so it counts on its puppets who are anti-democracy and anti-woman to the marrow of their bones.
Interview by Mehdi Hasan
What is your earliest memory?
I was only four days old when the coup of 27 April took place and the Russian puppet regime was installed in Afghanistan [in 1978]. One of my earliest memories is of clinging to my mother's legs while police ransacked our house, looking for my father. They turned it upside down searching for clues, emptying everything out of drawers, ripping open mattresses and pillows.
Do you still hope to return to the Afghan parliament?
Yes. I have challenged my illegal suspension in court, although in two years there has been no progress. My case is being followed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, but it is also deeply fed up with the Afghan parliament, as it only makes empty promises.
I knew from the very first day in parliament that it is a meeting place for the worst enemies of the Afghan people. The majority are warlords, drug lords and human rights violators. The parliament in occupied Afghanistan is a show of democracy. It has not brought anything positive to the Afghan people in the past five years and it will not do anything for my people in future. They have only passed laws that are anti-democratic and anti-woman.
When I was in parliament, these brutal men and women gave me a hard time. They regarded me as an obstacle to their sinister plans. My suspension was a political conspiracy. But I still want to return to this defamed and undemocratic parliament, as I regard it as a good platform from which to raise the voice of my voiceless people and expose the parliament's reactionary nature from within. There, I can challenge the brutal and powerful warlords, so they cannot pass their laws easily, far from the eyes of the Afghan people.
Who are your political heroes?
I don't want to name a specific person. My people, the suppressed millions, are my heroes. They are the real source of any positive change in Afghanistan and their power is stronger than anything else. And anti-war protesters around the world, those who are standing against the destructive policies of world powers. There is a superpower in the world besides the US government -- world public opinion.
What inspires you to keep going?
The suffering of my people, especially women.
Do you live in fear, or hope?
Both. I fear that I will not live to see freedom for Afghanistan and a joyful life for my people in a democratic and just society. But I have great hope that we will eventually be free, democratic and prosperous and that this can be achieved by the men and women of my own country.
In the past 30 years of conflict, we lost everything in Afghanistan. But it also taught us many things. Our people's political consciousness and awareness were raised and they do not accept the domination of national and foreign invaders or criminal forces. This is a great asset in the Afghan people's struggle for liberation and it gives me hope for a bright future.
What do you believe the Afghanistan summit in London can achieve?
I don't expect anything positive from the London conference at all. Since 2001, there have been a number of conferences. They have only pushed Afghanistan further into the hands of the occupying forces and their local agents.
The Afghan government begs for funding from the international community in the name of its people, but the billions of dollars poured into the country are looted by warlords, drug lords, national and international NGOs and government officials. Much of it goes back into the pockets of the donor countries.
According to US government sources, more than $60bn in aid has been given to Afghanistan since 2001. Such a huge amount could have turned Afghanistan into a paradise, if it were properly spent. But that money did not reach the needy people, so I am sure that any other amount sent in future will have no impact on poor Afghans and will only widen the gap between rich and poor.
Over 70 per cent of Afghans are living below the poverty line, but the Afghan government spent $4.2m on a luxury apartment in the Trump World Tower in New York for Zahir Tanin, the permanent representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations. This is one small example how the international aid is wasted.
The conference will prepare the ground for the return to power of the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Islamic Party [Hezb-e-Islami]. The Afghan government says it will ask the world leaders there to remove the name of Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, from the Security Council's blacklist. Ordinary Afghans have no faith in such conferences.
What is your opinion of Hamid Karzai?
Among Afghans, a king called Shah Shuja is hated for being an agent of 19th-century British rule. When the Russians installed Babrak Karmal, he was called the second Shah Shuja. The US and its allies have tried hard over the years to portray Hamid Karzai as a powerful leader but, for Afghans, his government is the most corrupt and unpopular in our modern history. Karzai is the third Shah Shuja -- a US puppet who has also joined hands with our internal enemies.
His own brothers have been accused of involvement in the drugs trade. Ahmed Wali Karzai, his half-brother, is allegedly on the payroll of the CIA.
What about Barack Obama?
It is now clear to many people around the world that Obama is a warmonger, no different from Bush. The big hopes that the US people had for him are gradually turning into despair. His popularity is dropping faster than any previous US president's at this stage of office.
Obama is making the world more unjust and insecure by waging new wars in Pakistan, Iran and Yemen, and also by increasing troops in Afghanistan. While billions of people around the world and inside the US are living in poverty, he is increasing the Pentagon's overall budget in fiscal 2011 to a record $708bn, which is ridiculous. Spent in the right way, this huge amount could ensure peace and prosperity around the world
Those who supported Obama as a hope for change should have reviewed his past. During his time in the US Senate, he voted for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he voted for the Patriot Act, he refused to support a bill for single-payer health care, he supported the death penalty, and so on. He came to power with corporate backers. They want him to continue the US's militarism and he obeys.
I hope Obama will be a lesson to the US people that, as long as the current political system is in place there, no president, white or black, will bring any major "change". In the best case, they will cause some cosmetic changes, nothing more.
How has Afghanistan changed since the fall of the Taliban?
The US and its allies occupied Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 under the banner of bringing peace, democracy and women's rights. But they replaced the barbaric Taliban with the brutal Northern Alliance -- who look different but are mentally similar. This act betrayed human rights.
Afghanistan is not only a safe haven for terrorism today, it is a mafia state and is ranked at the top of the most unstable countries in the world. Afghanistan produces 93 per cent of world opium and even some ministers and Karzai's family have been implicated in the dirty business. Turning Afghanistan into the world capital of opium was part of the US's and Nato's hidden agenda and they have reached their goal.
The situation for women is as catastrophic today as it was before. In some big cities, some women and girls have access to jobs and education, but in most provinces women's lives are hell. In rural areas, most women do not even have a human life. Forced marriages, child brides and domestic violence are very common. Gang rape is becoming more common day by day in Afghanistan, more common than it has ever been in the history of our country. Self-immolation is at a peak. Every day, we receive news of women who burn themselves to death to get out of their awful destitution and plight.
What was the last book you read?
Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam by Robert Dreyfuss. Reading this book, one can better understand that the current "war on terror" is a hoax -- a family issue between the US government and its fundamentalist creations. I do not agree with certain points in the book, but I recommend it to everyone who wants to know about the hidden, dirty games played by the US and its allies in Afghanistan over the past decades. It will be an eye-opener for those who regard the Taliban, Iran's fascist regime and other fundamentalist forces as "anti-imperialist".
What security precautions do you have to take, now that your life is under threat?
Since I was expelled from parliament, life has been very difficult for me inside Afghanistan. I have been restricted from free movement and meeting people in different parts of Afghanistan, so I have tried to advance my efforts on international platforms. I change homes often and can't have an office. I wear a burqa outside and travel with bodyguards, and I don't attend public meetings. But I still don't feel safe. I receive threats.
Do you think the majority of Afghan women support your view of the Karzai government?
Yes, I am very sure they do. I am talking about women who are suffering and have no voice, those women who mostly live in the countryside, deprived of everything. They are completely ignored by the media, too.
Your critics say you don't represent them.
ost of my critics are warlords, Taliban or US puppets. Many of the women in the Afghan parliament are critics, as they are, unfortunately, female warlords. The US government has a handful of Afghan women in Kabul who are used as showpieces: they are given awards, featured by the western mainstream media and sent to important international meetings as representatives of Afghanistan. Such women try to whitewash the wrongdoings of the US and its puppet regime and justify the US occupation of Afghanistan.
They comprise a small minority, living luxurious lives in Kabul or other major Afghan cities, and have not experienced the brutalities of recent years. From the occupation, they have gained wealth and fame, and they are afraid to lose it from the withdrawal of the US troops. It is natural that such Afghans rise against me.
What are the chances for a better life for Afghan women while foreign troops are still in the country? Do you believe that is part of their purpose in being there, as they say it is?
"A Woman Among Warlords", a book by Malalai Joya.
Only some cosmetic and symbolic changes have been made. Most of the 68 women sent to the parliament are pro-warlord; the women's ministry has done nothing for women at all.
We Afghans know well that the US and its allies occupied Afghanistan for their own strategic, economic and regional interests and don't care about the wishes of our people. So the "liberation" of Afghan women was never part of the real agenda. It is just a lie. The so-called freedom given by the US to Afghanistan is enjoyed mainly by the warlords and drug lords, who are free to commit their crimes and do their drug trafficking.
Don't polls show Afghan support for the western military presence?
This is not only a military war, but also a war of propaganda. A recent BBC survey said that 70 per cent of Afghans think that the country is headed in the right direction and 71 per cent support Karzai. Even animals make fun of the figures! If Karzai is so popular, why did he have to win the election by fraud? Unfortunately, the western mainstream media are playing a very negative role. It is not honest to the Afghan people.
You want foreign forces out -- but what then?
Afghans face three enemies: the occupying forces, the Taliban and the warlords. When the US pulls out, the Taliban and the warlords will lose their guardian. It will be easier for Afghans to unite and crush these internal enemies.
The US government doesn't want a democratic Afghanistan, so it counts on its puppets who are anti-democracy and anti-woman to the marrow of their bones. Today, friends of the US in Afghanistan are dark-minded, criminal people.
Afghanistan will never see democracy and freedom when such dirty elements are real power-holders and policymakers.
Can democracy ever flourish in a tribal and conservative society like Afghanistan?
We are living in the 21st century. The world has turned into a global village. Years of conflict have changed Afghanistan and its people's political knowledge has increased. It is the US and its puppets who try to give a bad name to democracy in Afghanistan.
Our people want democracy but now know that occupation will never bring democracy for them. Because democracy without independence has no meaning. When Afghan people raise their voice for independence, western forces call them "tribal" and "anti-democracy", while those barbaric warlords and Taliban who have accepted the US occupation and are in the parliament are called "democrats"!
What would you like to forget?
The cheap attacks of my enemies.
Are we all doomed?
No. We can change our destiny by our struggle and efforts.
This interview is originally published in the New Statesman Magazine on January 25, 2010
Category: Taliban, Women, US-NATO, HR Violations, Corruption - Views: 3435
The US government doesn't want a democratic Afghanistan, so it counts on its puppets who are anti-democracy and anti-woman to the marrow of their bones.
Interview by Mehdi Hasan
What is your earliest memory?
I was only four days old when the coup of 27 April took place and the Russian puppet regime was installed in Afghanistan [in 1978]. One of my earliest memories is of clinging to my mother's legs while police ransacked our house, looking for my father. They turned it upside down searching for clues, emptying everything out of drawers, ripping open mattresses and pillows.
Do you still hope to return to the Afghan parliament?
Yes. I have challenged my illegal suspension in court, although in two years there has been no progress. My case is being followed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, but it is also deeply fed up with the Afghan parliament, as it only makes empty promises.
I knew from the very first day in parliament that it is a meeting place for the worst enemies of the Afghan people. The majority are warlords, drug lords and human rights violators. The parliament in occupied Afghanistan is a show of democracy. It has not brought anything positive to the Afghan people in the past five years and it will not do anything for my people in future. They have only passed laws that are anti-democratic and anti-woman.
When I was in parliament, these brutal men and women gave me a hard time. They regarded me as an obstacle to their sinister plans. My suspension was a political conspiracy. But I still want to return to this defamed and undemocratic parliament, as I regard it as a good platform from which to raise the voice of my voiceless people and expose the parliament's reactionary nature from within. There, I can challenge the brutal and powerful warlords, so they cannot pass their laws easily, far from the eyes of the Afghan people.
Who are your political heroes?
I don't want to name a specific person. My people, the suppressed millions, are my heroes. They are the real source of any positive change in Afghanistan and their power is stronger than anything else. And anti-war protesters around the world, those who are standing against the destructive policies of world powers. There is a superpower in the world besides the US government -- world public opinion.
What inspires you to keep going?
The suffering of my people, especially women.
Do you live in fear, or hope?
Both. I fear that I will not live to see freedom for Afghanistan and a joyful life for my people in a democratic and just society. But I have great hope that we will eventually be free, democratic and prosperous and that this can be achieved by the men and women of my own country.
In the past 30 years of conflict, we lost everything in Afghanistan. But it also taught us many things. Our people's political consciousness and awareness were raised and they do not accept the domination of national and foreign invaders or criminal forces. This is a great asset in the Afghan people's struggle for liberation and it gives me hope for a bright future.
What do you believe the Afghanistan summit in London can achieve?
I don't expect anything positive from the London conference at all. Since 2001, there have been a number of conferences. They have only pushed Afghanistan further into the hands of the occupying forces and their local agents.
The Afghan government begs for funding from the international community in the name of its people, but the billions of dollars poured into the country are looted by warlords, drug lords, national and international NGOs and government officials. Much of it goes back into the pockets of the donor countries.
According to US government sources, more than $60bn in aid has been given to Afghanistan since 2001. Such a huge amount could have turned Afghanistan into a paradise, if it were properly spent. But that money did not reach the needy people, so I am sure that any other amount sent in future will have no impact on poor Afghans and will only widen the gap between rich and poor.
Over 70 per cent of Afghans are living below the poverty line, but the Afghan government spent $4.2m on a luxury apartment in the Trump World Tower in New York for Zahir Tanin, the permanent representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations. This is one small example how the international aid is wasted.
The conference will prepare the ground for the return to power of the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Islamic Party [Hezb-e-Islami]. The Afghan government says it will ask the world leaders there to remove the name of Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, from the Security Council's blacklist. Ordinary Afghans have no faith in such conferences.
What is your opinion of Hamid Karzai?
Among Afghans, a king called Shah Shuja is hated for being an agent of 19th-century British rule. When the Russians installed Babrak Karmal, he was called the second Shah Shuja. The US and its allies have tried hard over the years to portray Hamid Karzai as a powerful leader but, for Afghans, his government is the most corrupt and unpopular in our modern history. Karzai is the third Shah Shuja -- a US puppet who has also joined hands with our internal enemies.
His own brothers have been accused of involvement in the drugs trade. Ahmed Wali Karzai, his half-brother, is allegedly on the payroll of the CIA.
What about Barack Obama?
It is now clear to many people around the world that Obama is a warmonger, no different from Bush. The big hopes that the US people had for him are gradually turning into despair. His popularity is dropping faster than any previous US president's at this stage of office.
Obama is making the world more unjust and insecure by waging new wars in Pakistan, Iran and Yemen, and also by increasing troops in Afghanistan. While billions of people around the world and inside the US are living in poverty, he is increasing the Pentagon's overall budget in fiscal 2011 to a record $708bn, which is ridiculous. Spent in the right way, this huge amount could ensure peace and prosperity around the world
Those who supported Obama as a hope for change should have reviewed his past. During his time in the US Senate, he voted for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he voted for the Patriot Act, he refused to support a bill for single-payer health care, he supported the death penalty, and so on. He came to power with corporate backers. They want him to continue the US's militarism and he obeys.
I hope Obama will be a lesson to the US people that, as long as the current political system is in place there, no president, white or black, will bring any major "change". In the best case, they will cause some cosmetic changes, nothing more.
How has Afghanistan changed since the fall of the Taliban?
The US and its allies occupied Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 under the banner of bringing peace, democracy and women's rights. But they replaced the barbaric Taliban with the brutal Northern Alliance -- who look different but are mentally similar. This act betrayed human rights.
Afghanistan is not only a safe haven for terrorism today, it is a mafia state and is ranked at the top of the most unstable countries in the world. Afghanistan produces 93 per cent of world opium and even some ministers and Karzai's family have been implicated in the dirty business. Turning Afghanistan into the world capital of opium was part of the US's and Nato's hidden agenda and they have reached their goal.
The situation for women is as catastrophic today as it was before. In some big cities, some women and girls have access to jobs and education, but in most provinces women's lives are hell. In rural areas, most women do not even have a human life. Forced marriages, child brides and domestic violence are very common. Gang rape is becoming more common day by day in Afghanistan, more common than it has ever been in the history of our country. Self-immolation is at a peak. Every day, we receive news of women who burn themselves to death to get out of their awful destitution and plight.
What was the last book you read?
Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam by Robert Dreyfuss. Reading this book, one can better understand that the current "war on terror" is a hoax -- a family issue between the US government and its fundamentalist creations. I do not agree with certain points in the book, but I recommend it to everyone who wants to know about the hidden, dirty games played by the US and its allies in Afghanistan over the past decades. It will be an eye-opener for those who regard the Taliban, Iran's fascist regime and other fundamentalist forces as "anti-imperialist".
What security precautions do you have to take, now that your life is under threat?
Since I was expelled from parliament, life has been very difficult for me inside Afghanistan. I have been restricted from free movement and meeting people in different parts of Afghanistan, so I have tried to advance my efforts on international platforms. I change homes often and can't have an office. I wear a burqa outside and travel with bodyguards, and I don't attend public meetings. But I still don't feel safe. I receive threats.
Do you think the majority of Afghan women support your view of the Karzai government?
Yes, I am very sure they do. I am talking about women who are suffering and have no voice, those women who mostly live in the countryside, deprived of everything. They are completely ignored by the media, too.
Your critics say you don't represent them.
ost of my critics are warlords, Taliban or US puppets. Many of the women in the Afghan parliament are critics, as they are, unfortunately, female warlords. The US government has a handful of Afghan women in Kabul who are used as showpieces: they are given awards, featured by the western mainstream media and sent to important international meetings as representatives of Afghanistan. Such women try to whitewash the wrongdoings of the US and its puppet regime and justify the US occupation of Afghanistan.
They comprise a small minority, living luxurious lives in Kabul or other major Afghan cities, and have not experienced the brutalities of recent years. From the occupation, they have gained wealth and fame, and they are afraid to lose it from the withdrawal of the US troops. It is natural that such Afghans rise against me.
What are the chances for a better life for Afghan women while foreign troops are still in the country? Do you believe that is part of their purpose in being there, as they say it is?
"A Woman Among Warlords", a book by Malalai Joya.
Only some cosmetic and symbolic changes have been made. Most of the 68 women sent to the parliament are pro-warlord; the women's ministry has done nothing for women at all.
We Afghans know well that the US and its allies occupied Afghanistan for their own strategic, economic and regional interests and don't care about the wishes of our people. So the "liberation" of Afghan women was never part of the real agenda. It is just a lie. The so-called freedom given by the US to Afghanistan is enjoyed mainly by the warlords and drug lords, who are free to commit their crimes and do their drug trafficking.
Don't polls show Afghan support for the western military presence?
This is not only a military war, but also a war of propaganda. A recent BBC survey said that 70 per cent of Afghans think that the country is headed in the right direction and 71 per cent support Karzai. Even animals make fun of the figures! If Karzai is so popular, why did he have to win the election by fraud? Unfortunately, the western mainstream media are playing a very negative role. It is not honest to the Afghan people.
You want foreign forces out -- but what then?
Afghans face three enemies: the occupying forces, the Taliban and the warlords. When the US pulls out, the Taliban and the warlords will lose their guardian. It will be easier for Afghans to unite and crush these internal enemies.
The US government doesn't want a democratic Afghanistan, so it counts on its puppets who are anti-democracy and anti-woman to the marrow of their bones. Today, friends of the US in Afghanistan are dark-minded, criminal people.
Afghanistan will never see democracy and freedom when such dirty elements are real power-holders and policymakers.
Can democracy ever flourish in a tribal and conservative society like Afghanistan?
We are living in the 21st century. The world has turned into a global village. Years of conflict have changed Afghanistan and its people's political knowledge has increased. It is the US and its puppets who try to give a bad name to democracy in Afghanistan.
Our people want democracy but now know that occupation will never bring democracy for them. Because democracy without independence has no meaning. When Afghan people raise their voice for independence, western forces call them "tribal" and "anti-democracy", while those barbaric warlords and Taliban who have accepted the US occupation and are in the parliament are called "democrats"!
What would you like to forget?
The cheap attacks of my enemies.
Are we all doomed?
No. We can change our destiny by our struggle and efforts.
This interview is originally published in the New Statesman Magazine on January 25, 2010
Category: Taliban, Women, US-NATO, HR Violations, Corruption - Views: 3435
Thursday, June 17, 2010
RAWA statement: peace jirga dominated by criminals of war
The key point made by RAWA in the following statement is that representatives of the ordinary people of Afghanistan are not included in the peace jirga called by President Karzai. We have included articles that have called for negotiations with Taliban leaders to lead to the end of violence. However, RAWA believes that negotiations between warlords and Taliban will perpetuate the misery and domination of the majority of Afghanis. This is also the position of Malalai Joya, in which she articulates a position very similar to that of RAWA. (You can see statements by Joya on this site.)
“Consultative Peace Jirga”
http:// www.rawa.org/rawa/2010/06/01/peace-with-criminals-war-with-people.html
By inviting criminals like the Taliban, the leaders of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party and other “Jehadi leaders” to be part of a “Consultative Peace Jirga,” Mr. Karzai is committing yet another treason against the Afghan people. Like any puppet, anti-people ruler, he initially compromised with all the murderers associated with April 27th 1978 (former Russian puppets) and April 28 1992 (the Northern Alliance warlords) and installed them in key posts of his government. He then went to the extent of assigning the two most notorious warlords Karim Khalili and Qasim Fahim as his vice presidents. Now, he calls the Taliban and Hekmatyar party terrorists “Afghan sons” and tries to either share power with them, or offer them the opportunity of asylum and amnesty to their leaders in any country of their choice. He is also offering jobs to their gunmen so he can prolong his mafia-style rule with ease of mind.
A known terrorist from Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party called Farooq Wardak has been awarded the responsibility of running the Jirga. Additionally, the delegates from Hekmatyar’s blood-thirsty party in Kabul were received like showbiz celebrities with local Afghan media being offered in their service. The infamous criminals Mullah Wakil Ahmad Motawakal, Mullah Zaef, Humayun Jarir, Abdul Hadi Arghandewal, Sabaoon, Mullah Rocketi and many other such terrorists of the Taliban and Islamic Party have had their reputations sugarcoated in the past few years. All these things not only illuminate the true nature and goal of this Jirga, but also constitute an insult to our people who have sought their liberation in the prosecution and punishment of Khaliqi, Parchami, Jehadi and Taliban criminals, but instead still feel the heavy load of these brutal enemies on their wounded bodies.
Without receiving a green light from their US masters, the puppet government of Afghanistan could never raise a hue and cry about this “Consultative Peace Jirga.” It could also not consider making peace with the Taliban and Islamic Party assassins while they are apparently still on the “Black List” of the US government. This in itself proves that the US doesn’t just want a puppet government, but also a stable and efficient government to easily change Afghanistan into a strong military base in Asia, extend its grip on the oil and gas of the Central Asian Republics and maintain its supremacy in competition with rivals such as China and other regional powers. For the US and allies, the deeply criminal, treacherous, anti-democracy and anti-independence essence of this puppet regime has no significance at all. Apart from a handful of sold-off intellectuals of Afghanistan, this reality is crystal clear to even our children that the claim of the US about bringing “democracy” and “women’s liberation” to Afghanistan was the biggest lie of the century. In fact, it was even more striking than the claims of the US about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and more comic than its pretence of having an opposition to fundamentalist bands and governments.
At the height of a piercing outcry over a “Peace Jirga,” the Taliban intensified their inhuman brutalities by killing school children, teachers, men, and women of Kabul and other cities, but Karzai and his spokesmen expressed with detestable indifference that, “Inshallah, with national unity soon we will emerge from these problems”! If their own sister, mother or daughter were raped, killed publicly or torn to pieces by suicide bombings, would they still call these killings “problems” they have with Taliban, their “disaffected brothers”? But considering the power-lust and impunity of the ruling mafia, they may still not call the Taliban criminals, and their acts as crimes, because despite having some differences, in the final stage they regard themselves from the same ranks and deem it necessary to become united in order to run the state machinery in front of people’s wrath. Both the Taliban and the ruling mafia know well that the day US/NATO occupation forces leave Afghanistan; all the tribes of Afghanistan will consider unity amongst themselves to topple their bloody rule.
While the US is trying to unite its lackeys through the “Peace Jirga” and other means, it is afraid of unity and integration among Afghan people. Therefore, through its puppet government and Northern Alliance agents, the US is trying hard to sow disruption and animosity among the different tribes of Afghanistan. For example, in Behsood and Daimirdad they inflamed fighting between Hazaras and Nomads and similarly in Northern Afghanistan among Tajiks, Pushtoons and Uzbeks so they can continue the occupation of a divided and disarrayed nation.
The so-called intellectuals of Afghanistan who directly or indirectly hope that the Taliban will end the US occupation, are carving a dark mark of history on their forehead. They are like those who rely on the US and the bloodthirsty Iranian regime to emancipate them from the yoke of the Taliban. If such people are not foolish, then they are spineless because they neither remember the marks of the Taliban flogging our mothers, sisters and fathers nor the beheading of our children and poor women (in the name of rooting out “spies”), or the spraying of acid on innocent school-girls. If they believe that by relying on tribal issues, corruption, and looting of the puppet regime they can find an argument for their support of the brutal Taliban, then by what trick can they ignore the ISI-born nature and medieval mentality of the Taliban? Can they point out any example anywhere in the world of such an anti-democratic and anti-women group dominated by drug lords and dependent on the intelligence agency of a foreign country that dares to struggle for independence and liberation? The intellectual supporters of the Taliban are possibly agents of the US CIA and other agencies who by upholding the Taliban and calling them a “resistance movement” want to pave the way for their joint domination with President Karzai and the “National Front” mafia.
In the past, through the meddling of Zalmay Khalilzad and Hamid Karzai as representatives of UNOCAL, the US dealt with the Taliban and pumped tens of millions of dollars into their pockets. Today if the Taliban once again comes to power, the US will easily “work” with them and prefer their bloody and suffocating rule of Afghanistan to an independent, pro-democracy and pro-women’s rights government, because the US counts on them as the most loyal group to safeguard its interests in the region. The Taliban also will not forget that the US was their creator, trainer and mentor through Pakistan’s ISI god-fathers.
The current conflict between the US, Taliban, and Northern Alliance is in fact a family matter between them which will be solved sooner or later. When that happens, the ranks of friends and enemies of our people will become clear and the illusion spread by pro-Taliban, pro-April 27 and April 28 treacherous intellectuals will be countered. Under such conditions, it is the duty of pro-independence, pro-democracy and pro-women’s rights intellectuals to increase their organized efforts for a coordinated uprising of our people against all traitors to Afghanistan.
Let the puppet mafia government of Karzai bring together all its agents in the “Peace Jirga” and similar ridiculous shows and by organizing luxury meetings, dance over the dead bodies of our innocent people, but the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), alongside the aggrieved Afghan people thinks that such deceitful games mean throwing salt on the wounds of our people caught in the US/NATO bombings, insecurity, poverty, unemployment and desperation all over Afghanistan.
Shame to the “Peace Jirga” of criminals with criminals!Neither USA, Nor Taliban and the National Front murderers!An independent and democratic Afghanistan!
Category: English, RAWA Documents
Peace with Criminals, War with People!
Statement of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) on
“Consultative Peace Jirga”
http:// www.rawa.org/rawa/2010/06/01/peace-with-criminals-war-with-people.html
By inviting criminals like the Taliban, the leaders of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party and other “Jehadi leaders” to be part of a “Consultative Peace Jirga,” Mr. Karzai is committing yet another treason against the Afghan people. Like any puppet, anti-people ruler, he initially compromised with all the murderers associated with April 27th 1978 (former Russian puppets) and April 28 1992 (the Northern Alliance warlords) and installed them in key posts of his government. He then went to the extent of assigning the two most notorious warlords Karim Khalili and Qasim Fahim as his vice presidents. Now, he calls the Taliban and Hekmatyar party terrorists “Afghan sons” and tries to either share power with them, or offer them the opportunity of asylum and amnesty to their leaders in any country of their choice. He is also offering jobs to their gunmen so he can prolong his mafia-style rule with ease of mind.
A known terrorist from Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party called Farooq Wardak has been awarded the responsibility of running the Jirga. Additionally, the delegates from Hekmatyar’s blood-thirsty party in Kabul were received like showbiz celebrities with local Afghan media being offered in their service. The infamous criminals Mullah Wakil Ahmad Motawakal, Mullah Zaef, Humayun Jarir, Abdul Hadi Arghandewal, Sabaoon, Mullah Rocketi and many other such terrorists of the Taliban and Islamic Party have had their reputations sugarcoated in the past few years. All these things not only illuminate the true nature and goal of this Jirga, but also constitute an insult to our people who have sought their liberation in the prosecution and punishment of Khaliqi, Parchami, Jehadi and Taliban criminals, but instead still feel the heavy load of these brutal enemies on their wounded bodies.
Without receiving a green light from their US masters, the puppet government of Afghanistan could never raise a hue and cry about this “Consultative Peace Jirga.” It could also not consider making peace with the Taliban and Islamic Party assassins while they are apparently still on the “Black List” of the US government. This in itself proves that the US doesn’t just want a puppet government, but also a stable and efficient government to easily change Afghanistan into a strong military base in Asia, extend its grip on the oil and gas of the Central Asian Republics and maintain its supremacy in competition with rivals such as China and other regional powers. For the US and allies, the deeply criminal, treacherous, anti-democracy and anti-independence essence of this puppet regime has no significance at all. Apart from a handful of sold-off intellectuals of Afghanistan, this reality is crystal clear to even our children that the claim of the US about bringing “democracy” and “women’s liberation” to Afghanistan was the biggest lie of the century. In fact, it was even more striking than the claims of the US about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and more comic than its pretence of having an opposition to fundamentalist bands and governments.
At the height of a piercing outcry over a “Peace Jirga,” the Taliban intensified their inhuman brutalities by killing school children, teachers, men, and women of Kabul and other cities, but Karzai and his spokesmen expressed with detestable indifference that, “Inshallah, with national unity soon we will emerge from these problems”! If their own sister, mother or daughter were raped, killed publicly or torn to pieces by suicide bombings, would they still call these killings “problems” they have with Taliban, their “disaffected brothers”? But considering the power-lust and impunity of the ruling mafia, they may still not call the Taliban criminals, and their acts as crimes, because despite having some differences, in the final stage they regard themselves from the same ranks and deem it necessary to become united in order to run the state machinery in front of people’s wrath. Both the Taliban and the ruling mafia know well that the day US/NATO occupation forces leave Afghanistan; all the tribes of Afghanistan will consider unity amongst themselves to topple their bloody rule.
While the US is trying to unite its lackeys through the “Peace Jirga” and other means, it is afraid of unity and integration among Afghan people. Therefore, through its puppet government and Northern Alliance agents, the US is trying hard to sow disruption and animosity among the different tribes of Afghanistan. For example, in Behsood and Daimirdad they inflamed fighting between Hazaras and Nomads and similarly in Northern Afghanistan among Tajiks, Pushtoons and Uzbeks so they can continue the occupation of a divided and disarrayed nation.
The so-called intellectuals of Afghanistan who directly or indirectly hope that the Taliban will end the US occupation, are carving a dark mark of history on their forehead. They are like those who rely on the US and the bloodthirsty Iranian regime to emancipate them from the yoke of the Taliban. If such people are not foolish, then they are spineless because they neither remember the marks of the Taliban flogging our mothers, sisters and fathers nor the beheading of our children and poor women (in the name of rooting out “spies”), or the spraying of acid on innocent school-girls. If they believe that by relying on tribal issues, corruption, and looting of the puppet regime they can find an argument for their support of the brutal Taliban, then by what trick can they ignore the ISI-born nature and medieval mentality of the Taliban? Can they point out any example anywhere in the world of such an anti-democratic and anti-women group dominated by drug lords and dependent on the intelligence agency of a foreign country that dares to struggle for independence and liberation? The intellectual supporters of the Taliban are possibly agents of the US CIA and other agencies who by upholding the Taliban and calling them a “resistance movement” want to pave the way for their joint domination with President Karzai and the “National Front” mafia.
In the past, through the meddling of Zalmay Khalilzad and Hamid Karzai as representatives of UNOCAL, the US dealt with the Taliban and pumped tens of millions of dollars into their pockets. Today if the Taliban once again comes to power, the US will easily “work” with them and prefer their bloody and suffocating rule of Afghanistan to an independent, pro-democracy and pro-women’s rights government, because the US counts on them as the most loyal group to safeguard its interests in the region. The Taliban also will not forget that the US was their creator, trainer and mentor through Pakistan’s ISI god-fathers.
The current conflict between the US, Taliban, and Northern Alliance is in fact a family matter between them which will be solved sooner or later. When that happens, the ranks of friends and enemies of our people will become clear and the illusion spread by pro-Taliban, pro-April 27 and April 28 treacherous intellectuals will be countered. Under such conditions, it is the duty of pro-independence, pro-democracy and pro-women’s rights intellectuals to increase their organized efforts for a coordinated uprising of our people against all traitors to Afghanistan.
Let the puppet mafia government of Karzai bring together all its agents in the “Peace Jirga” and similar ridiculous shows and by organizing luxury meetings, dance over the dead bodies of our innocent people, but the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), alongside the aggrieved Afghan people thinks that such deceitful games mean throwing salt on the wounds of our people caught in the US/NATO bombings, insecurity, poverty, unemployment and desperation all over Afghanistan.
Shame to the “Peace Jirga” of criminals with criminals!Neither USA, Nor Taliban and the National Front murderers!An independent and democratic Afghanistan!
Category: English, RAWA Documents
US goal of creating a "client state" in Afghanistan not achievable
Counter Punch
June 17, 2010
Echoes of Vietnam
Washington's False Promise in Afghanistan
By RON JACOBS
One of the predominant rationales put forth by US civilian and military officials regarding the nature of the insurgency categorized as the Taliban in Afghanistan is that their support is derived from coercion. Pronouncements from these officials stating this belief as objective truth are obediently parroted in media reports and repeated by politicians. Yet, according to US Army General McChrystal, there is not enough support among Afghans for his proposed pacification effort in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan. “When you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them," are the words McChrystal used when asked about why he was delaying the proposed operation. In other words, the Afghans do not see the US military as its protector and want nothing to do with them and their plans.
While one must acknowledge that McChrystal's honesty is a welcome rarity from the Pentagon, the more appropriate question is how long will it be before Washington decides that it doesn't really care whether or not it has Afghan support and launches its Kandahar operation anyhow. After all, there is a supposed deadline in 2011 that McChrystal is operating under that requires him to be able to at least say things are different for Washington in Afghanistan than they were in summer 2009. Of course, that deadline becomes more nebulous by the week, just like those deadlines always do without popular pressure in the US demanding an end to a particular military operation.
Let's go back to that recruitment by coercion supposition that the Pentagon is operating on at least in public. Despite the seeming impossibility of a recruitment effort based primarily on coercion to raise a devoted guerrilla force capable not only of survival for ten years under fire, but also of expanding its reach and numbers, that is exactly what Washington wants us to believe is occurring with the Taliban. It's as if the military and political establishment found an old playbook from the 1960s, scribbled out the words "Viet Cong" and replaced them with "the Taliban." For example, here's a quote from a CIA cable dated October 5, 1961.
The Viet Cong live upon locally produced food which they either grow themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by robbery, or by blackmail.
Newspaper accounts that reported on the war echoed this interpretation of events in southern Vietnam. Stories of torture and execution style shootings by Viet Cong cadre were given as reasons for Vietnamese support for the National Liberation Front (NLF). The refusal or inability of the Pentagon and its supporters to see and understand that the bombing raids, search and destroy missions, and the removal of entire populations from villages under Operation Phoenix by US troops made any such transgressions by the NLF forces minor by comparison.
Other misunderstandings were of a more philosophical nature. In a column on February 2, 1968, while the Tet offensive raged on, New York Times columnist James Reston described the men and women fighting for the NLF as essentially suicidal given the armed might arrayed against them and wondered when these "men (and women) whose religion teaches them that death is preferable to life" would come to their sense and accept the greater power of Washington's forces. When one reads articles speculating as to the motivations of the Afghan insurgents (or the Iraqis in that unresolved war of the very recent past), a phrase about "seventy virgins" is never far from being repeated. Without getting into a debate about whether or not Buddhism or Islam teaches that death is preferable to life any more than Christianity does, this barely qualifies as motivation to leave one's family just to go and fight other people. Indeed, perhaps the motivation has much more to do with the desire to chase invaders from your village and homeland. or maybe you just want to battle those who have killed your family members.
There is a current of thought in the United States that believes Washington had its chance in the early months of the Afghan occupation to achieve its goal of an obedient Afghan nation. According to this line of reasoning, Washington failed because the Bush White House invaded Iraq. leaving its mission to founder in Afghanistan. I am unconvinced of this argument's veracity. After all, the stated intention of the invasion of Afghanistan was the capture of Bin Laden and the destruction of the Taliban. The invasion did not achieve either of these stated goals and the years since that day in October 2001 when the troops first landed have erased much of the memory of those goals. Instead, the world has watched while foreign militaries under the direction of the Pentagon have attempted to create a client state whose real leadership is in Washington, DC. Meanwhile, the continued failure of the US to perceive the elements of the Afghan insurgency as homegrown forces intent on keeping the invaders out of their homes and villages insures its continued inability to achieve its goal of pacifying the Afghan people under a government chosen by Washington.
Ron Jacobs is author of The Way the Wind Blew: a history of the Weather Underground, which is just republished by Verso. Jacobs' essay on Big Bill Broonzy is featured in CounterPunch's collection on music, art and sex, Serpents in the Garden. His first novel, Short Order Frame Up, is published by Mainstay Press. He can be reached at: rjacobs3625@charter.net
June 17, 2010
Echoes of Vietnam
Washington's False Promise in Afghanistan
By RON JACOBS
One of the predominant rationales put forth by US civilian and military officials regarding the nature of the insurgency categorized as the Taliban in Afghanistan is that their support is derived from coercion. Pronouncements from these officials stating this belief as objective truth are obediently parroted in media reports and repeated by politicians. Yet, according to US Army General McChrystal, there is not enough support among Afghans for his proposed pacification effort in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan. “When you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them," are the words McChrystal used when asked about why he was delaying the proposed operation. In other words, the Afghans do not see the US military as its protector and want nothing to do with them and their plans.
While one must acknowledge that McChrystal's honesty is a welcome rarity from the Pentagon, the more appropriate question is how long will it be before Washington decides that it doesn't really care whether or not it has Afghan support and launches its Kandahar operation anyhow. After all, there is a supposed deadline in 2011 that McChrystal is operating under that requires him to be able to at least say things are different for Washington in Afghanistan than they were in summer 2009. Of course, that deadline becomes more nebulous by the week, just like those deadlines always do without popular pressure in the US demanding an end to a particular military operation.
Let's go back to that recruitment by coercion supposition that the Pentagon is operating on at least in public. Despite the seeming impossibility of a recruitment effort based primarily on coercion to raise a devoted guerrilla force capable not only of survival for ten years under fire, but also of expanding its reach and numbers, that is exactly what Washington wants us to believe is occurring with the Taliban. It's as if the military and political establishment found an old playbook from the 1960s, scribbled out the words "Viet Cong" and replaced them with "the Taliban." For example, here's a quote from a CIA cable dated October 5, 1961.
The Viet Cong live upon locally produced food which they either grow themselves or levy upon villages. They meet most of their currency needs by taxing areas under their control, by robbery, or by blackmail.
Newspaper accounts that reported on the war echoed this interpretation of events in southern Vietnam. Stories of torture and execution style shootings by Viet Cong cadre were given as reasons for Vietnamese support for the National Liberation Front (NLF). The refusal or inability of the Pentagon and its supporters to see and understand that the bombing raids, search and destroy missions, and the removal of entire populations from villages under Operation Phoenix by US troops made any such transgressions by the NLF forces minor by comparison.
Other misunderstandings were of a more philosophical nature. In a column on February 2, 1968, while the Tet offensive raged on, New York Times columnist James Reston described the men and women fighting for the NLF as essentially suicidal given the armed might arrayed against them and wondered when these "men (and women) whose religion teaches them that death is preferable to life" would come to their sense and accept the greater power of Washington's forces. When one reads articles speculating as to the motivations of the Afghan insurgents (or the Iraqis in that unresolved war of the very recent past), a phrase about "seventy virgins" is never far from being repeated. Without getting into a debate about whether or not Buddhism or Islam teaches that death is preferable to life any more than Christianity does, this barely qualifies as motivation to leave one's family just to go and fight other people. Indeed, perhaps the motivation has much more to do with the desire to chase invaders from your village and homeland. or maybe you just want to battle those who have killed your family members.
There is a current of thought in the United States that believes Washington had its chance in the early months of the Afghan occupation to achieve its goal of an obedient Afghan nation. According to this line of reasoning, Washington failed because the Bush White House invaded Iraq. leaving its mission to founder in Afghanistan. I am unconvinced of this argument's veracity. After all, the stated intention of the invasion of Afghanistan was the capture of Bin Laden and the destruction of the Taliban. The invasion did not achieve either of these stated goals and the years since that day in October 2001 when the troops first landed have erased much of the memory of those goals. Instead, the world has watched while foreign militaries under the direction of the Pentagon have attempted to create a client state whose real leadership is in Washington, DC. Meanwhile, the continued failure of the US to perceive the elements of the Afghan insurgency as homegrown forces intent on keeping the invaders out of their homes and villages insures its continued inability to achieve its goal of pacifying the Afghan people under a government chosen by Washington.
Ron Jacobs is author of The Way the Wind Blew: a history of the Weather Underground, which is just republished by Verso. Jacobs' essay on Big Bill Broonzy is featured in CounterPunch's collection on music, art and sex, Serpents in the Garden. His first novel, Short Order Frame Up, is published by Mainstay Press. He can be reached at: rjacobs3625@charter.net
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
Skepticism about the timing of story on Afghanistan's potential mineral wealth
Timing of Afghan Mineral Story Wealth Evokes Skepticism
by Jim Lobe,
June 15, 2010 - http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/2010/06/14/timing-of-afghan-mineral-wealth-evokes-skepticism
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The timing of the publication of a major New York Times story on the vast untapped mineral wealth that lies beneath Afghanistan’s soil is raising major questions about the intent of the Pentagon, which released the information.
Given the increasingly negative news that has come out of Afghanistan – and of U.S. strategy there – some analysts believe the front-page article is designed to reverse growing public sentiment that the war is not worth the cost.
“What better way to remind people about the country’s potential bright future – and by people I mean the Chinese, the Russians, the Pakistanis, and the Americans – than by publicizing or re-publicizing valid (but already public) information about the region’s potential wealth?” wrote Marc Ambinder, the political editor of The Atlantic magazine, on his blog.
“The way in which the story was presented – with on-the- record quotations from the Commander in Chief of CENTCOM [Gen. David Petraeus], no less – and the weird promotion of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to Undersecretary of Defense [Paul Brinkley] suggest a broad and deliberate information operation designed to influence public opinion on the course of the war,” he added.
The nearly 1,500-word article, based almost entirely on Pentagon sources and featured as the lead story in Monday’s “Early Bird,” a compilation of major national security stories that the Pentagon distributes each morning, asserted that Afghanistan may have close to $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits. These include “huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold, and critical industrial metals like lithium,” the story said.
Afghanistan’s total annual gross domestic product (GDP) last year came to about $13 billion.
One “internal Pentagon memo” provided to the Times‘ author, James Risen, predicted that Afghanistan could become “the ‘Saudi Arabia of lithium,’ a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and Blackberrys.”
“There is stunning potential here,” Petraeus told Risen in an interview Saturday. “There are a lot of ifs, of course, but I think potentially it is hugely significant,” he said of the conclusions of a study by a “small team of Pentagon officials and American geologists.”
The government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose recent efforts to begin a reconciliation process with the insurgent Taliban have been criticized by the Pentagon, quickly seized on the report.
In a hastily arranged press briefing Monday, Karzai’s spokesman, Waheed Omar, said the report was “the best news we have had over many years in Afghanistan.”
Other commentators, however, suggested the news about Afghanistan’s underground wealth was not all that new.
As noted by Blake Hounshell, managing editor at Foreign Policy magazine, the U.S. Geological Service (USGS) already published a comprehensive inventory of Afghanistan’s non-oil mineral resources on the Internet in 2007, as did the British Geological Survey. Much of their work was based on explorations and surveys undertaken by the Soviet Union during its occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s.
The nearly trillion-dollar figure is based on a simple tabulation of the previous estimates for each mineral according to its current market price, according to Hounshell.
So, the question for many observers was why the article, which dominated much of the foreign news in the network and cable broadcast media during Monday’s news cycle, was published now.
Risen himself suggested an answer in his story, noting “American and Afghan officials agreed to discuss the mineral discoveries at a difficult moment in the war in Afghanistan.”
Indeed, U.S. and NATO casualties have risen sharply in recent weeks; a four-month-old counterinsurgency offensive to “clear, hold, and build” in the strategic region around Marjah in Pashtun-dominated Helmand province appears to have stalled badly; and a planned campaign in and around the critical city of Kandahar has been delayed for at least two months.
The latest polling shows a noticeable erosion of support for Washington’s commitment to the war compared to eight months ago, when President Barack Obama agreed to the Pentagon’s recommendations to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan to bring the total U.S. military presence there to around 100,000 later this summer.
Moreover, what little support for the war remains among the publics of Washington’s NATO allies – never as high as in the U.S. in any event – is also fading quickly. NATO and non-NATO countries, excluding the U.S., currently have about 34,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan.
On the eve of a NATO ministerial conference in Brussels last week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that Washington and its NATO allies had very little time to convince their publics that their strategy against the Taliban was working – a message that has since been strongly echoed the coalition’s commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and by Petraeus himself.
Indeed, the administration is committed to a major review of its strategy in Afghanistan at the end of the year, and Obama himself has pledged to begin withdrawing U.S. troops in July 2011.
Obama is already coming under pressure from right-wing and neoconservative media – some of which have been cultivated by Petraeus, in particular – and Republican lawmakers to delay that date.
That view was seconded last week by former Petraeus aide, Lt. Col. John Nagl (ret.), a counterinsurgency specialist who is now president of the influential Center for a New American Security.
Nagl worked closely with Petraeus in authoring the much- lauded 2006 U.S. Counter-Insurgency Field Manual, which stressed the importance of efforts to influence media perceptions in any counterinsurgency campaign.
“The media directly influence the attitude of key audiences toward counter-insurgents, their operations, and the opposing insurgency,” they wrote. “This situation creates a war of perceptions between insurgents and counter-insurgents conducted continuously using the news media.”
In that respect, the appearance of the Times story Monday looked to many observers like part of an effort to strengthen the case for giving the counterinsurgency effort more time.
In an interview with Politico’s Laura Rozen Monday, former Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani said he had commissioned the assessment of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. “As to why it came out today… I cannot explain,” he said.
(Inter Press Service)
by Jim Lobe,
June 15, 2010 - http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/2010/06/14/timing-of-afghan-mineral-wealth-evokes-skepticism
Email This Print This
Share This
Antiwar Forum
The timing of the publication of a major New York Times story on the vast untapped mineral wealth that lies beneath Afghanistan’s soil is raising major questions about the intent of the Pentagon, which released the information.
Given the increasingly negative news that has come out of Afghanistan – and of U.S. strategy there – some analysts believe the front-page article is designed to reverse growing public sentiment that the war is not worth the cost.
“What better way to remind people about the country’s potential bright future – and by people I mean the Chinese, the Russians, the Pakistanis, and the Americans – than by publicizing or re-publicizing valid (but already public) information about the region’s potential wealth?” wrote Marc Ambinder, the political editor of The Atlantic magazine, on his blog.
“The way in which the story was presented – with on-the- record quotations from the Commander in Chief of CENTCOM [Gen. David Petraeus], no less – and the weird promotion of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to Undersecretary of Defense [Paul Brinkley] suggest a broad and deliberate information operation designed to influence public opinion on the course of the war,” he added.
The nearly 1,500-word article, based almost entirely on Pentagon sources and featured as the lead story in Monday’s “Early Bird,” a compilation of major national security stories that the Pentagon distributes each morning, asserted that Afghanistan may have close to $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits. These include “huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold, and critical industrial metals like lithium,” the story said.
Afghanistan’s total annual gross domestic product (GDP) last year came to about $13 billion.
One “internal Pentagon memo” provided to the Times‘ author, James Risen, predicted that Afghanistan could become “the ‘Saudi Arabia of lithium,’ a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and Blackberrys.”
“There is stunning potential here,” Petraeus told Risen in an interview Saturday. “There are a lot of ifs, of course, but I think potentially it is hugely significant,” he said of the conclusions of a study by a “small team of Pentagon officials and American geologists.”
The government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose recent efforts to begin a reconciliation process with the insurgent Taliban have been criticized by the Pentagon, quickly seized on the report.
In a hastily arranged press briefing Monday, Karzai’s spokesman, Waheed Omar, said the report was “the best news we have had over many years in Afghanistan.”
Other commentators, however, suggested the news about Afghanistan’s underground wealth was not all that new.
As noted by Blake Hounshell, managing editor at Foreign Policy magazine, the U.S. Geological Service (USGS) already published a comprehensive inventory of Afghanistan’s non-oil mineral resources on the Internet in 2007, as did the British Geological Survey. Much of their work was based on explorations and surveys undertaken by the Soviet Union during its occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s.
The nearly trillion-dollar figure is based on a simple tabulation of the previous estimates for each mineral according to its current market price, according to Hounshell.
So, the question for many observers was why the article, which dominated much of the foreign news in the network and cable broadcast media during Monday’s news cycle, was published now.
Risen himself suggested an answer in his story, noting “American and Afghan officials agreed to discuss the mineral discoveries at a difficult moment in the war in Afghanistan.”
Indeed, U.S. and NATO casualties have risen sharply in recent weeks; a four-month-old counterinsurgency offensive to “clear, hold, and build” in the strategic region around Marjah in Pashtun-dominated Helmand province appears to have stalled badly; and a planned campaign in and around the critical city of Kandahar has been delayed for at least two months.
The latest polling shows a noticeable erosion of support for Washington’s commitment to the war compared to eight months ago, when President Barack Obama agreed to the Pentagon’s recommendations to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan to bring the total U.S. military presence there to around 100,000 later this summer.
Moreover, what little support for the war remains among the publics of Washington’s NATO allies – never as high as in the U.S. in any event – is also fading quickly. NATO and non-NATO countries, excluding the U.S., currently have about 34,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan.
On the eve of a NATO ministerial conference in Brussels last week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that Washington and its NATO allies had very little time to convince their publics that their strategy against the Taliban was working – a message that has since been strongly echoed the coalition’s commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, and by Petraeus himself.
Indeed, the administration is committed to a major review of its strategy in Afghanistan at the end of the year, and Obama himself has pledged to begin withdrawing U.S. troops in July 2011.
Obama is already coming under pressure from right-wing and neoconservative media – some of which have been cultivated by Petraeus, in particular – and Republican lawmakers to delay that date.
That view was seconded last week by former Petraeus aide, Lt. Col. John Nagl (ret.), a counterinsurgency specialist who is now president of the influential Center for a New American Security.
Nagl worked closely with Petraeus in authoring the much- lauded 2006 U.S. Counter-Insurgency Field Manual, which stressed the importance of efforts to influence media perceptions in any counterinsurgency campaign.
“The media directly influence the attitude of key audiences toward counter-insurgents, their operations, and the opposing insurgency,” they wrote. “This situation creates a war of perceptions between insurgents and counter-insurgents conducted continuously using the news media.”
In that respect, the appearance of the Times story Monday looked to many observers like part of an effort to strengthen the case for giving the counterinsurgency effort more time.
In an interview with Politico’s Laura Rozen Monday, former Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani said he had commissioned the assessment of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. “As to why it came out today… I cannot explain,” he said.
(Inter Press Service)
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