In the following segment of his Informed Comment blog, historian and Middle East expert Juan Cole reviews highlights of a poll done with Aghan citizens in war zones and draws some implications. The poll finds that the majority of respondents are more negative toward US and NATO than toward the Taliban. One implication is that the recent surge in US troops and the adoption of a "counterinsurgency" strategy by US generals are not yielding the hopeful results that were expected in Pashtun areas of Helman Province and Qandahar. Cole fears that the US-led offenses will end up strengthening the position of Taliban insurgents, perceived as the lesser of evils. The majority of Afghans interviewed want security, but believe that US military offenses have led and will lead to more killing, refugees, and destruction, without permanently dislodging the Taliban.
--------------------------
Juan Cole, Informed Consent, May 4, 2010
Opinion polling in war zones is fraught with difficulties, but the results of a new poll by the International Council on Security and Development carried out among over 400 male respondents in parts of Helmand Province and Qandahar, Afghanistan, in March, 2010, are extremely troubling. (Executive summary here in html, the whole report is here in pdf format.) I conclude from this sounding that the planned US invasion of Qandahar city is likely to be a disaster that turns millions of Western Pashtuns against the US and NATO. The Eastern Pashtuns are already regularly demonstrating and demanding that the foreign troops depart their provinces.
The Marjah campaign this winter involved US and British troops coming into a rural part of Helmand province in the Pashtun southwest of Afghanistan that had been dominated by the Taliban. The farms in this region specialize in poppy growing, and there are reputedly many makeshift heroin labs there. Some observers estimate that 40 % of drug profits overall flow to the Afghanistan insurgent groups, so presumably the US wanted to damage a profit center of the enemy.
But what you’d like to hear from the people of Marjah and nearby Lashkargah, and from Qandahar (the next US target) is that they are sick and tired of the Taliban, felt oppressed by them, and are really glad to see NATO and Afghanistan national army troops show up. Such anti-Taliban sentiments appear common, after all, in the Swat Valley of Pakistan, where from all accounts locals were glad that the Pakistani army cleaned the Taliban out last summer, even though they are dissatisfied with the resulting displacements, property damage and slowness in the delivery of reconstruction aid.
But the Pashtuns of southern Helmand and of Qandahar are not talking like the people of Swat Valley. The report finds that “61% of those interviewed feel more negative about NATO forces than before the military offensive. ” We aren’t winning hearts and minds, folks.
In a startling statistic, nearly 80% of these Pashtun men say that they are now often or always angry, a doubling of this response from one year ago. Nearly half are specifically furious at NATO (over “occupation, civilian casualties and night raids”) and over a third are upset at war and instability (likely also blamed on NATO). Only 9 percent say they are angry with the Taliban!
Almost everyone said that the Marjah campaign produced more refugees (ICOS estimates at least 30,000), who are now living in tent cities or makeshift refugee camps.
Nearly 60% of respondents said they believed the Taliban would just return to Marjah, so the US has not in fact succeeded in convincing locals that they are even capable of the “clear” operation in the take, clear, hold and build strategy. Skepticism about holding and building is therefore likely to be even higher. And 95 percent, almost all, believe more young men have joined the Taliban in the aftermath of the Marjah campaign.
Another troubling finding is that slightly over half now believe the angry young men are motivated to join the Taliban by a belief in “jihad,” i.e. a desire to fight to end the foreign military occupation of their country. Other studies have suggested that many Taliban footsoldiers are just in it for the money. If these respondents are correct in their perception, it would be a troubling development– that young Pashtun males are becoming ideologically radicalized against NATO. A majority still feels, however, that if jobs could be provided to the angry young men, it would draw them away from the Taliban.
The report says, “The principal demand expressed by 70% of Afghans interviewed is the immediate provision of help from NATO, the international community and the Afghan government: they expect shelter and food for the refugees, the rebuilding of destroyed property and the clearing of landmines.” They don’t think they are getting a ‘government in a box’ as Gen. McChrystal promised. They don’t think they are getting basic post-campaign aid. No NGOs are operating in Marjah itself and only two in nearby Lashkargah.
Although the respondents do want security and two-thirds do hope NATO will clear insurgents from the road to the capital of Kabul from their region, and even say they would a similar clearing in Qandahar (!), given their other responses I conclude that they want security imposed in a way that does not displace people or kill innocents. I.e. they want better and less intrusive policing, not a military attack on a civilian area.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Saturday, May 1, 2010
Headlines on recent developments in Afghanistan
The following four headlines from various media sources were gathered by Just Foreign Policy. Together they point to little progress for the US-led coalition in Afghanistan, and growing support for the Taliban/insurgents in southern parts of the country.
Bear in mind, these developments are unfolding after the Obama sanctioned increase to Afghnistan of 30,000 troops this year (bringing US troop levels to about 100,000), along with additional contractors, the ongoing training of Afhan army and police, and including some troops from NATO. The generals in the field now expect that the "need" for the occupation will go on for many years. There are other reports as well indicating that the Pentagon will soon be asking for another 20,000 US soldiers.
As time passes, the US-led occupation seems more and more like a rough re-run of what happened in Vietnam, with its death, destruction of villages and habitat, and lack of support from the indigenous population. In both cases, we were told that the continued escalation of war was necessary to our national security. It all sounds like a broken record. The opportunity costs, or how we might otherwise spend the tens of billions of dollars on the broken economic system of the US itself, are great and increasing.
There are perhaps larger concerns behind the day-to-day reports. While Afghanistan is not rich in fossil fuels, it is geographically situated so that a pipeline could be built through it to transmit the oil from other countries in central Asia. Additionally, Afghanistan figures in the tensions between Pakistan and India. Both countries would like to have a dominating influence in Afghanistan to advance their own perceptions of security and influence in the region. And the US administration and Pentagon apparently want to demonstrate that US hegemonic power is intact. Whatever the larger reasons, Afghanistan appears like a pawn in larger imperialistic plots. The dominos may be falling, but not to advance the interests of the societies that are being directly and indirectly affected.
Bob
---------------------------
Some headlines from Just Foreign Policy, April 30, 2010.
1) Nato's most senior civilian official said US and NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan can expect to be engaged in a combat role for three or four more years, the Guardian reports. Thereafter, they could be expected to remain in Afghanistan, training and mentoring local forces, for a further 10 to 15 years. President Karzai is due to visit Washington on May 10.
3) A U.S. night raid that killed a relative of Afghan parliamentarian Safia Siddiqi was conducted without informing the local police, the Los Angeles Times reports.
4) The most significant revelation in the Pentagon's Afghanistan report this week is that Gen. McChrystal and ISAF acknowledge officially that Taliban insurgents dominate a vast contiguous zone of heavily populated territory across southern Afghanistan that McChrystal regards as the most critical area in the country, writes Gareth Porter for Inter Press Service. The report admits that the population in key districts across most southern provinces is sympathetic to or supportive of the insurgents.
5) The Pentagon's report on the last six months in Afghanistan suggests the situation is little better over all than it was six months ago despite enormous expenditures of effort, money and lives by US and international forces, the New York Times reports. The report is mandated by Congress every six months.
Bear in mind, these developments are unfolding after the Obama sanctioned increase to Afghnistan of 30,000 troops this year (bringing US troop levels to about 100,000), along with additional contractors, the ongoing training of Afhan army and police, and including some troops from NATO. The generals in the field now expect that the "need" for the occupation will go on for many years. There are other reports as well indicating that the Pentagon will soon be asking for another 20,000 US soldiers.
As time passes, the US-led occupation seems more and more like a rough re-run of what happened in Vietnam, with its death, destruction of villages and habitat, and lack of support from the indigenous population. In both cases, we were told that the continued escalation of war was necessary to our national security. It all sounds like a broken record. The opportunity costs, or how we might otherwise spend the tens of billions of dollars on the broken economic system of the US itself, are great and increasing.
There are perhaps larger concerns behind the day-to-day reports. While Afghanistan is not rich in fossil fuels, it is geographically situated so that a pipeline could be built through it to transmit the oil from other countries in central Asia. Additionally, Afghanistan figures in the tensions between Pakistan and India. Both countries would like to have a dominating influence in Afghanistan to advance their own perceptions of security and influence in the region. And the US administration and Pentagon apparently want to demonstrate that US hegemonic power is intact. Whatever the larger reasons, Afghanistan appears like a pawn in larger imperialistic plots. The dominos may be falling, but not to advance the interests of the societies that are being directly and indirectly affected.
Bob
---------------------------
Some headlines from Just Foreign Policy, April 30, 2010.
1) Nato's most senior civilian official said US and NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan can expect to be engaged in a combat role for three or four more years, the Guardian reports. Thereafter, they could be expected to remain in Afghanistan, training and mentoring local forces, for a further 10 to 15 years. President Karzai is due to visit Washington on May 10.
3) A U.S. night raid that killed a relative of Afghan parliamentarian Safia Siddiqi was conducted without informing the local police, the Los Angeles Times reports.
4) The most significant revelation in the Pentagon's Afghanistan report this week is that Gen. McChrystal and ISAF acknowledge officially that Taliban insurgents dominate a vast contiguous zone of heavily populated territory across southern Afghanistan that McChrystal regards as the most critical area in the country, writes Gareth Porter for Inter Press Service. The report admits that the population in key districts across most southern provinces is sympathetic to or supportive of the insurgents.
5) The Pentagon's report on the last six months in Afghanistan suggests the situation is little better over all than it was six months ago despite enormous expenditures of effort, money and lives by US and international forces, the New York Times reports. The report is mandated by Congress every six months.
Friday, April 30, 2010
Findings of Pentagon study not promising for US occupation in Afghanistan
Juan Cole summarizes the highlight of a new Pentagon study of Afghanistan districts, which was first reported by The New York Times. The study covers the last six months. Cole refers to five of the study's findings. His assessment is that the findings do not augur well for the US-led occupation of Afghanistan. There is little support for President Karzai's government. And there is an increase in the number of districts where there is sympathy toward the insurgencies and an increase in the number of districts where violence has increased.
I expect that the Pentagon will be asking for another increase in US troops to Afghanistan. Instead, they should be contemplating a change in their course, including an increase in support for reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
------------------------
Juan Cole, Informed Comment, April 30, 2010
http://www.juancole.com
Meanwhile, some statistics on Afghanistan from a new Pentagon study of the past 6 months, as reported by the NYT:
NATO is operating in about 100 districts of the country (the vague equivalent of counties).
Number of Afghans in 92 districts (assessed for their relationship to the Federal government) that actively support the government of Hamid Karzai: 0
Number of districts out of 92 that are neutral toward the government: 44
Number of districts sympathetic to the insurgency in March 2010: 48
Number of districts that had been sympathetic to the insurgency in June, 2009: 33
Increase in violent incidents from Feb. 2009 to March 2010: 87 percent.
None of these statistics look particularly good to me.
I expect that the Pentagon will be asking for another increase in US troops to Afghanistan. Instead, they should be contemplating a change in their course, including an increase in support for reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
------------------------
Juan Cole, Informed Comment, April 30, 2010
http://www.juancole.com
Meanwhile, some statistics on Afghanistan from a new Pentagon study of the past 6 months, as reported by the NYT:
NATO is operating in about 100 districts of the country (the vague equivalent of counties).
Number of Afghans in 92 districts (assessed for their relationship to the Federal government) that actively support the government of Hamid Karzai: 0
Number of districts out of 92 that are neutral toward the government: 44
Number of districts sympathetic to the insurgency in March 2010: 48
Number of districts that had been sympathetic to the insurgency in June, 2009: 33
Increase in violent incidents from Feb. 2009 to March 2010: 87 percent.
None of these statistics look particularly good to me.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
US plan to arm tribal militia runs into problems
Reporting from Achin, Afghanistan, Anand Gopal offers examples of how conflicted, or potentially conflicted, Afghan tribes can be. (See Gopal's article below.) Tribes are divided into clans and sub-clans. And tribal elders, representing various clans, may not always cooperate with one another. The US military had the idea of rewarding tribes with money and promised development projects that created militia to fight off "Taliban" in their areas. Their notion was that these militia would eventually work with regular Afghan police or troops and expedite the removal of "Taliban" from their areas.
Gopal gives examples of how this has not worked out as planned. He identifies two problems. First, not all clan leaders are consulted about or willing to agree to creating anti-Taliban militia. When one clan goes along with the US authorities and some do not this can heighten inter-tribal conflict and vitiate the viability of a militia. Second, Gopal found that when tribal militias were put in place, they were sometimes viewed by local Afghans as worse than the Taliban.
One implication of Gopal's report is that the US military authorities don't really understand tribal dynamics. It may be that, as an occupying force, they never will obtain such understanding or acceptance.
----------------------------
U.S. plan to arm Afghan militia founders on tribal rivalries
Anand Gopal McClatchy Newspapers
last updated: April 27, 2010 07:56:04 PM
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/27/92976/us-plan-to-arm-afghan-militia.html
ACHIN, Afghanistan — The detritus of tribal war litters the road that leads into this quiet mountain hamlet in eastern Afghanistan. The charred bodies of vehicles and the skeletal remains of destroyed houses fill the desert that flanks the road. Most of the shops in the main bazaar are shuttered, and some residents have packed up and left.
Achin district, a home of the Shinwari tribe, is part of an ambitious countrywide U.S. push to fund tribal militias to stand against the Taliban and stabilize the violence-plagued region. A months-long feud between Shinwari clans has brought Achin to a standstill, however, threatening to undermine the effort and illustrating the difficulties in enlisting tribes to combat the insurgency.
The initiative encourages tribes and other community groups in a number of areas around the country to defend their territory from the Taliban. A similar effort in Iraq is widely credited with diminishing the violence there.
The groups don't receive weapons — which already are plentiful in Afghanistan — but U.S. Special Operations Forces provide money and in some cases training. The militias are meant to complement uniformed Afghan forces and Western troops.
Locals say that tribal dynamics complicate such initiatives, however. "We want to solve the Taliban problem, but not cause a whole series of other problems in the process," said Moyen Shah, the deputy head of the provincial council, which helps govern the eastern province of Nangarhar.
The drive began last summer in the rugged, mountainous district of Achin. Insurgents and smugglers regularly crossed the nearby Pakistani border into the area, which consists of a small bazaar and clusters of homes behind mud-brick walls.
In July, two Shinwari leaders raised a militia to attack these insurgents. The tribal force killed a key Taliban commander and expelled a small band of insurgent fighters from its territory.
The rare uprising sparked a series of meetings between some tribal leaders and U.S. troops, according to Shinwari elders, after which the leaders pledged early this year to bar the Taliban from Achin.
It was one of the clearest anti-Taliban stances that any Afghan tribe had taken in recent years. "If we catch anyone harboring Taliban, we will fine him and burn down his house," said Malek Osman, one of the elders who made the pledge. "The Shinwaris are a huge tribe. We can make a major difference."
U.S. military officials rewarded the tribe with $200,000 and promised more development funds to come.
With the funds and newfound prestige, however, came infighting. Like most other Afghan tribes, the Shinwari are subdivided into a tangle of clans and sub-clans, each with its own leaders. Only one of the clans, the Shobli, had made the pledge against the Taliban.
"We haven't participated in that decision," said Muhammad Nabi, an Achin resident and member of another Shinwari clan, the Ali Sher Khel. "Those tribal elders don't represent us, and they don't speak for all Shinwaris." A number of others who were interviewed agreed with this sentiment.
Shortly after the decision to expel the Taliban was announced, the Ali Sher Khel claimed that the Shobli had occupied part of their land on the outskirts of the Achin bazaar, and launched an attack. Thirteen people were killed and 35 injured, and most of the houses there were reduced to rubble.
Many Shobli fled, leaving behind smoldering ruins and heightened tensions. Locals said life still hadn't returned to normal. "Look around," Achin resident Abdul Habib said, pointing to a gaunt, nearly deserted central bazaar. "There is fear everywhere. The (clans) don't trust each other and they think fighting will start again at any minute."
The Shobli that remain in the area don't patrol or otherwise attempt to enforce the Taliban ban, for fear that it would further stoke tensions. Moreover, the police rarely venture far from the main bazaar into the patchwork of farms and orchards in the countryside or the nearby barren flatland, where many Ali Sher Khel live.
As a result, the Taliban still roam openly in parts of Achin, according to locals and government officials.
Tensions also are brewing between Shobli elders and the Afghan government. "The government is made up of thieves and mafia men," Osman said. "We prefer to work for the Americans."
The Afghan government, in turn, is wary of tribal groups that are beyond its control, something that it said could undermine the development of the national army and police. Ahmad Zia Abdulzai, the Nangarhar provincial spokesman, said the government aimed to incorporate the tribal militias into the Afghan police force.
North of here, in the northern province of Kunduz, a multiethnic area that has a large Taliban presence in the Pashtun regions, dozens of militias have sprouted recently. Many of their commanders are former warlords who participated in Afghanistan's civil war in the 1990s and were disarmed in the years after the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2001, only to rearm in recent months. In some areas — particularly those without large Pashtun populations — locals report that the militias have been reducing the Taliban threat.
In other parts of Kunduz, however, locals say that the new militias are even worse than the Taliban are. In the district of Imam Sahib, a militia leader known as Commander Nizam is widely accused of crimes that include looting and rape.
"His people stopped our bus one night," recalled Fardin Rasouli, a businessman from the area, "and took all of our money, even the jewelry from the women. During the day these people are supposedly providing security, but during the night they become thieves."
Kunduz government officials acknowledged that Nizam and other militias occasionally crossed the line. "There have been some complaints about the militias," said Mohebullah Saidi, a spokesman for Kunduz province. "Members of the suspected militias have been arrested, and there is an investigation ongoing."
Still, he said that the militias were needed until the government could field its own effective security force. U.S. Special Operations Forces are widely thought to have provided money to Nizam and other commanders, but neither side would comment on the issue.
Military officials say that the use of militias is subordinated to the development of Afghan security forces. The "over-reliance on tribal- or community-based security can promote instability or abuses of power that are associated with warlordism," said U.S. Navy Lt. Cmdr. Thomas Porter, a spokesman with the international forces. "At the same time, we've learned that it's not productive to work against the grain of Afghan culture, which means respecting the existing system of tribal and communal ties."
Nonetheless, it's no surprise that governments are wary of any plan to arm the militias.
"We have a dangerous history in this country with militias," Abdulzai said, referring to the country's civil war, in which thousands died as a result of warring militias. "We need to learn from that experience and make sure we don't repeat the same mistakes."
(Gopal is a McClatchy special correspondent
Gopal gives examples of how this has not worked out as planned. He identifies two problems. First, not all clan leaders are consulted about or willing to agree to creating anti-Taliban militia. When one clan goes along with the US authorities and some do not this can heighten inter-tribal conflict and vitiate the viability of a militia. Second, Gopal found that when tribal militias were put in place, they were sometimes viewed by local Afghans as worse than the Taliban.
One implication of Gopal's report is that the US military authorities don't really understand tribal dynamics. It may be that, as an occupying force, they never will obtain such understanding or acceptance.
----------------------------
U.S. plan to arm Afghan militia founders on tribal rivalries
Anand Gopal McClatchy Newspapers
last updated: April 27, 2010 07:56:04 PM
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/27/92976/us-plan-to-arm-afghan-militia.html
ACHIN, Afghanistan — The detritus of tribal war litters the road that leads into this quiet mountain hamlet in eastern Afghanistan. The charred bodies of vehicles and the skeletal remains of destroyed houses fill the desert that flanks the road. Most of the shops in the main bazaar are shuttered, and some residents have packed up and left.
Achin district, a home of the Shinwari tribe, is part of an ambitious countrywide U.S. push to fund tribal militias to stand against the Taliban and stabilize the violence-plagued region. A months-long feud between Shinwari clans has brought Achin to a standstill, however, threatening to undermine the effort and illustrating the difficulties in enlisting tribes to combat the insurgency.
The initiative encourages tribes and other community groups in a number of areas around the country to defend their territory from the Taliban. A similar effort in Iraq is widely credited with diminishing the violence there.
The groups don't receive weapons — which already are plentiful in Afghanistan — but U.S. Special Operations Forces provide money and in some cases training. The militias are meant to complement uniformed Afghan forces and Western troops.
Locals say that tribal dynamics complicate such initiatives, however. "We want to solve the Taliban problem, but not cause a whole series of other problems in the process," said Moyen Shah, the deputy head of the provincial council, which helps govern the eastern province of Nangarhar.
The drive began last summer in the rugged, mountainous district of Achin. Insurgents and smugglers regularly crossed the nearby Pakistani border into the area, which consists of a small bazaar and clusters of homes behind mud-brick walls.
In July, two Shinwari leaders raised a militia to attack these insurgents. The tribal force killed a key Taliban commander and expelled a small band of insurgent fighters from its territory.
The rare uprising sparked a series of meetings between some tribal leaders and U.S. troops, according to Shinwari elders, after which the leaders pledged early this year to bar the Taliban from Achin.
It was one of the clearest anti-Taliban stances that any Afghan tribe had taken in recent years. "If we catch anyone harboring Taliban, we will fine him and burn down his house," said Malek Osman, one of the elders who made the pledge. "The Shinwaris are a huge tribe. We can make a major difference."
U.S. military officials rewarded the tribe with $200,000 and promised more development funds to come.
With the funds and newfound prestige, however, came infighting. Like most other Afghan tribes, the Shinwari are subdivided into a tangle of clans and sub-clans, each with its own leaders. Only one of the clans, the Shobli, had made the pledge against the Taliban.
"We haven't participated in that decision," said Muhammad Nabi, an Achin resident and member of another Shinwari clan, the Ali Sher Khel. "Those tribal elders don't represent us, and they don't speak for all Shinwaris." A number of others who were interviewed agreed with this sentiment.
Shortly after the decision to expel the Taliban was announced, the Ali Sher Khel claimed that the Shobli had occupied part of their land on the outskirts of the Achin bazaar, and launched an attack. Thirteen people were killed and 35 injured, and most of the houses there were reduced to rubble.
Many Shobli fled, leaving behind smoldering ruins and heightened tensions. Locals said life still hadn't returned to normal. "Look around," Achin resident Abdul Habib said, pointing to a gaunt, nearly deserted central bazaar. "There is fear everywhere. The (clans) don't trust each other and they think fighting will start again at any minute."
The Shobli that remain in the area don't patrol or otherwise attempt to enforce the Taliban ban, for fear that it would further stoke tensions. Moreover, the police rarely venture far from the main bazaar into the patchwork of farms and orchards in the countryside or the nearby barren flatland, where many Ali Sher Khel live.
As a result, the Taliban still roam openly in parts of Achin, according to locals and government officials.
Tensions also are brewing between Shobli elders and the Afghan government. "The government is made up of thieves and mafia men," Osman said. "We prefer to work for the Americans."
The Afghan government, in turn, is wary of tribal groups that are beyond its control, something that it said could undermine the development of the national army and police. Ahmad Zia Abdulzai, the Nangarhar provincial spokesman, said the government aimed to incorporate the tribal militias into the Afghan police force.
North of here, in the northern province of Kunduz, a multiethnic area that has a large Taliban presence in the Pashtun regions, dozens of militias have sprouted recently. Many of their commanders are former warlords who participated in Afghanistan's civil war in the 1990s and were disarmed in the years after the U.S.-led invasion of the country in 2001, only to rearm in recent months. In some areas — particularly those without large Pashtun populations — locals report that the militias have been reducing the Taliban threat.
In other parts of Kunduz, however, locals say that the new militias are even worse than the Taliban are. In the district of Imam Sahib, a militia leader known as Commander Nizam is widely accused of crimes that include looting and rape.
"His people stopped our bus one night," recalled Fardin Rasouli, a businessman from the area, "and took all of our money, even the jewelry from the women. During the day these people are supposedly providing security, but during the night they become thieves."
Kunduz government officials acknowledged that Nizam and other militias occasionally crossed the line. "There have been some complaints about the militias," said Mohebullah Saidi, a spokesman for Kunduz province. "Members of the suspected militias have been arrested, and there is an investigation ongoing."
Still, he said that the militias were needed until the government could field its own effective security force. U.S. Special Operations Forces are widely thought to have provided money to Nizam and other commanders, but neither side would comment on the issue.
Military officials say that the use of militias is subordinated to the development of Afghan security forces. The "over-reliance on tribal- or community-based security can promote instability or abuses of power that are associated with warlordism," said U.S. Navy Lt. Cmdr. Thomas Porter, a spokesman with the international forces. "At the same time, we've learned that it's not productive to work against the grain of Afghan culture, which means respecting the existing system of tribal and communal ties."
Nonetheless, it's no surprise that governments are wary of any plan to arm the militias.
"We have a dangerous history in this country with militias," Abdulzai said, referring to the country's civil war, in which thousands died as a result of warring militias. "We need to learn from that experience and make sure we don't repeat the same mistakes."
(Gopal is a McClatchy special correspondent
Millions of Afghans face disaster in upcoming winter
As the following article indicates, food insecurity affects at least 8.4 million Afghans, caused by poverty, high food prices, drought, armed conflict, and the remoteness of many areas. With winter coming soon, they will suffer even more from inadequate diets. The situation is made worse by the general inaccessibility to medical care. As a consequence a large number of Afghans are vulnerable to high rates of pneumonia and respiratory diseases during the winter months. Women and children are especially at risk.
The focus of the US-led military occupation consumes most of the money being spent by the US and NATO in Afghanistan. This unfortunately does too little to confront the potential food and medical crises faced by millions of Afghans. The Afghan government is also burdened by the expense of training police and soldiers, with too little money to deal with the expected crises. A change in priorities from military objectives to humanitarian and reconstruction goals would surely make a positive difference.
----------------------------------
Nightmarish Potential Humanitarian Disaster
http://outlookafghanistan.net/news_Pages/Opinion.html
As the winter gets closer and closer, the parliamentarians have said that government is not ready to combat a potential humanitarian disaster. MPs say the lessons from last year’s bitter winter have not been learnt. With 30% of Afghans suffering from hunger, and 70% living below the poverty line, they have urged the government to send food aid to rural areas immediately. According to Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, last year heavy snowfall, extremely cold weather, diseases and lack of access to adequate food killed over 2,000 mostly elderly people and children. On the other hand, Health officials have expressed concerns about the spread of pneumonia and respiratory diseases in winter months if people do not have access to medical care. In fact, the people are facing three inextricably formidable challenges that include insecurity, food shortage and diseases. The minister of public health said “Food insecurity has made already vulnerable people even more vulnerable.” According aid workers, millions of Afghans have been affected by high food prices, drought, crop failure, armed conflict and other disasters. The ministry of public health has also said that lack of food and/or poor nutrition has caused deteriorating health in women and children, making access to healthcare all the more important. Earlier, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) analyst Paul Smyth said “While the eyes of the world have focused on violence which is increasingly terrorist in character, an estimated 8.4 million Afghans, perhaps a third of the nation, are now suffering from ‘chronic and food insecurity.” Observers and experts say that millions of Afghans have been pushed into high-risk food-insecurity by high food prices, drought and conflict-related problems. So with the snowfall imminent and with no adequate aid supplies into remote and rural areas, a severe humanitarian disaster remains nightmarish if the no immediate measures are taken.
The focus of the US-led military occupation consumes most of the money being spent by the US and NATO in Afghanistan. This unfortunately does too little to confront the potential food and medical crises faced by millions of Afghans. The Afghan government is also burdened by the expense of training police and soldiers, with too little money to deal with the expected crises. A change in priorities from military objectives to humanitarian and reconstruction goals would surely make a positive difference.
----------------------------------
Nightmarish Potential Humanitarian Disaster
http://outlookafghanistan.net/news_Pages/Opinion.html
As the winter gets closer and closer, the parliamentarians have said that government is not ready to combat a potential humanitarian disaster. MPs say the lessons from last year’s bitter winter have not been learnt. With 30% of Afghans suffering from hunger, and 70% living below the poverty line, they have urged the government to send food aid to rural areas immediately. According to Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, last year heavy snowfall, extremely cold weather, diseases and lack of access to adequate food killed over 2,000 mostly elderly people and children. On the other hand, Health officials have expressed concerns about the spread of pneumonia and respiratory diseases in winter months if people do not have access to medical care. In fact, the people are facing three inextricably formidable challenges that include insecurity, food shortage and diseases. The minister of public health said “Food insecurity has made already vulnerable people even more vulnerable.” According aid workers, millions of Afghans have been affected by high food prices, drought, crop failure, armed conflict and other disasters. The ministry of public health has also said that lack of food and/or poor nutrition has caused deteriorating health in women and children, making access to healthcare all the more important. Earlier, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) analyst Paul Smyth said “While the eyes of the world have focused on violence which is increasingly terrorist in character, an estimated 8.4 million Afghans, perhaps a third of the nation, are now suffering from ‘chronic and food insecurity.” Observers and experts say that millions of Afghans have been pushed into high-risk food-insecurity by high food prices, drought and conflict-related problems. So with the snowfall imminent and with no adequate aid supplies into remote and rural areas, a severe humanitarian disaster remains nightmarish if the no immediate measures are taken.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Momentum in US Congress for the beginning of the end of Afghan war
Mark Weisbrot suggests that the US-led war in Afghanistan will end when a majority of the members in the US House and Senate go on record as favoring a clear timetable for the withdrawal of US troops. Weisbrot's article was included today, April 27, 2010, at: http://www.zcommunications.org/how-wars-are-ended-rebellion-in-u-s-congress-could-mark-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-afghan-war-by-mark-weisbrot
Weisbrot writes that a "rebellion" in congress is happening. He writes:
"...a rebellion is growing in Congress against the war. Wisconsin Democratic Senator Russ Feingold, House Democrat Jim McGovern from Massachusetts, and House Republican Walter Jones from North Carolina have introduced legislation that would require President Obama to establish a timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The bill has quickly picked up 29 co-sponsors, and could reach 100 within the next few weeks."
The movement in favor of withdrawal in Congress is being influenced by changes in the larger climate of opinion in both Afghanistan and the US, and probably by sheer economics. Weisbrot points out that in Afghanistan, which will be spending and unsustainable 61% of its projected 2011 GDP for the army and police, a poll sponsored by the US Army found that "94% of Kandahar residents support negotiations with the Taliban, rather than military confrontation."
In the US, Weisbrot writes, "The majority of Americans are against the war, and every week thousands of Americans continue to put pressure on their representatives in Congress...."
If the shift in the US Congress against the war maintiain's its momentum, then, along with pressures from the voters - and with mounting costs and casualties and high unemployment- the "end" of the US-led war in Afganistan may end sooner than we have thought. How great that would be!
Weisbrot writes that a "rebellion" in congress is happening. He writes:
"...a rebellion is growing in Congress against the war. Wisconsin Democratic Senator Russ Feingold, House Democrat Jim McGovern from Massachusetts, and House Republican Walter Jones from North Carolina have introduced legislation that would require President Obama to establish a timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The bill has quickly picked up 29 co-sponsors, and could reach 100 within the next few weeks."
The movement in favor of withdrawal in Congress is being influenced by changes in the larger climate of opinion in both Afghanistan and the US, and probably by sheer economics. Weisbrot points out that in Afghanistan, which will be spending and unsustainable 61% of its projected 2011 GDP for the army and police, a poll sponsored by the US Army found that "94% of Kandahar residents support negotiations with the Taliban, rather than military confrontation."
In the US, Weisbrot writes, "The majority of Americans are against the war, and every week thousands of Americans continue to put pressure on their representatives in Congress...."
If the shift in the US Congress against the war maintiain's its momentum, then, along with pressures from the voters - and with mounting costs and casualties and high unemployment- the "end" of the US-led war in Afganistan may end sooner than we have thought. How great that would be!
Child Labor widespread amidst poverty in Afghanistan
The following article is written by Anna Badkhen and appears on the Foreign Policy.com website at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/kids_at_work_in_afghanistan. The following paragraph provides a framework for the specific examples she describes in other parts of the article.
"Despite the billions of international aid dollars funneled into Afghanistan since 2001, the country is weighed down by crushing poverty -- a burden that falls heavily on children. The United Nations estimates that one-third of Afghanistan's children under 14 work. Drive out of any city in any direction, and you will see children as young as seven herding livestock, tilling fields, leveling dirt roads. Peek inside the shops of Dasht-e-Shor Street: Half of the workforce on this grimy boulevard appears to be children. There are child welders, child carpenters, child auto mechanics, child haulers of bags of cement, child shredders of carrots for someone else's pilau."
Badken finds from her interviews that some children start working as young as 7 years old, they work long hours, and get little or no money (e.g., working for an uncle out of family loyalty or gratitude). Most have little formal education. Even before they reach their adolescence, they have the faces of old men, she observes. The faces of poverty and exploitation, exacerbated or generated by war and foreign occupation.
Anna Badkhen's reporting trip to Afghanistan is supported by a grant from the Center for Investigative Reporting. Her book about war and food, Peace Meals, is coming out in October.
"Despite the billions of international aid dollars funneled into Afghanistan since 2001, the country is weighed down by crushing poverty -- a burden that falls heavily on children. The United Nations estimates that one-third of Afghanistan's children under 14 work. Drive out of any city in any direction, and you will see children as young as seven herding livestock, tilling fields, leveling dirt roads. Peek inside the shops of Dasht-e-Shor Street: Half of the workforce on this grimy boulevard appears to be children. There are child welders, child carpenters, child auto mechanics, child haulers of bags of cement, child shredders of carrots for someone else's pilau."
Badken finds from her interviews that some children start working as young as 7 years old, they work long hours, and get little or no money (e.g., working for an uncle out of family loyalty or gratitude). Most have little formal education. Even before they reach their adolescence, they have the faces of old men, she observes. The faces of poverty and exploitation, exacerbated or generated by war and foreign occupation.
Anna Badkhen's reporting trip to Afghanistan is supported by a grant from the Center for Investigative Reporting. Her book about war and food, Peace Meals, is coming out in October.
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